WHO technical manual on tobacco tax policy and administration. by unknown
WHO TECHNICAL MANUAL ON 
TOBACCO TAX POLICY  
AND ADMINISTRATION

WHO TECHNICAL MANUAL ON 
TOBACCO TAX POLICY  
AND ADMINISTRATION
WHO technical manual on tobacco tax policy and administration
ISBN 978-92-4-001918-8 (electronic version) 
ISBN 978-92-4-001919-5 (print version) 
© World Health Organization 2021
Some rights reserved. This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike 3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo). 
Under the terms of this licence, you may copy, redistribute and adapt the work for non-commercial 
purposes, provided the work is appropriately cited, as indicated below. In any use of this work, there 
should be no suggestion that WHO endorses any specific organization, products or services. The use of 
the WHO logo is not permitted. If you adapt the work, then you must license your work under the same 
or equivalent Creative Commons licence. If you create a translation of this work, you should add the 
following disclaimer along with the suggested citation: “This translation was not created by the World 
Health Organization (WHO). WHO is not responsible for the content or accuracy of this translation. The 
original English edition shall be the binding and authentic edition”. 
Any mediation relating to disputes arising under the licence shall be conducted in accordance with the 
mediation rules of the World Intellectual Property Organization (http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/mediation/
rules/).
Suggested citation. WHO technical manual on tobacco tax policy and administration. Geneva: World 
Health Organization; 2021. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.
Cataloguing-in-Publication (CIP) data. CIP data are available at http://apps.who.int/iris.
Sales, rights and licensing. To purchase WHO publications, see http://apps.who.int/bookorders. To submit 
requests for commercial use and queries on rights and licensing, see http://www.who.int/about/licensing. 
Third-party materials. If you wish to reuse material from this work that is attributed to a third party, such 
as tables, figures or images, it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that 
reuse and to obtain permission from the copyright holder. The risk of claims resulting from infringement 
of any third-party-owned component in the work rests solely with the user.
General disclaimers. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication 
do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WHO concerning the legal status 
of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers 
or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there 
may not yet be full agreement.
The mention of specific companies or of certain manufacturers’ products does not imply that they are 
endorsed or recommended by WHO in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.
All reasonable precautions have been taken by WHO to verify the information contained in this publication. 
However, the published material is being distributed without warranty of any kind, either expressed or 
implied. The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with the reader. In no event 
shall WHO be liable for damages arising from its use. 







CHAPTER 1.   
Why this manual? 1
CHAPTER 2.   
Tobacco excise tax policy 11
2.1 Global overview of tobacco tax practices 11
2.2 Designing excise tax policy 18
2.3 Domestic and regional policy integration 55
2.4 New and emerging nicotine and tobacco products 59
2.5 Conclusions 75 
ANNEX 2.1 Countries that apply different types of excise tax structures 89 
ANNEX 2.2 Analytics of the tax base elasticity 90 
ANNEX 2.3 Elements of the devices that make up ENDS/ENNDS products 91
CHAPTER 3.   
Tobacco tax administration 93
3.1 Introduction 93
3.2 Institutional arrangements 94
3.3 The tax compliance cycle 102
3.4 Control and enforcement  115
3.5 Tax administration of other tobacco products  152
3.6 The broader elements of a good tax system  155
3.7 Conclusions 156 
ANNEX 3.1 Composition of tobacco products 166 
ANNEX 3.2 Example of forestalling and countermeasures 172
CHAPTER 4.   
Political economy 175
4.1 SCARE tactic S: Smuggling and illicit trade 176
4.2 SCARE tactic C: Court and legal challenges  198
4.3 SCARE tactic A: Anti-poor rhetoric or regressivity 212
4.4 SCARE tactic R: Revenue reduction 217
4.5 SCARE tactic E: Employment impact 228
4.6 Earmarking tobacco tax revenues to fund health 233 
ANNEX 4.1 Methods to assess the nature and size of the illicit tobacco trade 253 
ANNEX 4.2 How are the tobacco tax revenues earmarked? 269
CHAPTER 5.   
Best practices 271




In 1999, the World Bank’s Curbing the Epidemic was the first report by an interna-
tional organization to recognize that increasing tobacco excise taxes was the most 
effective and cost-effective measure to reduce tobacco use and save lives. Over the 
two decades since, the evidence base supporting this claim, especially in low- and 
middle-income countries, has been steadily growing. Meanwhile, the credibility of 
the tobacco industry’s arguments against tobacco taxation has been slowly waning. 
In short, health-promoting tobacco taxation has come of age, and the evidence has 
consistently shown that it is a win for public health, a win for revenue and a win 
for the economy overall.
But we must be cautioned against complacency. Although the evidence on 
tobacco taxation is irrefutable and there are now signs that the tide is turning on 
the global tobacco epidemic, tobacco taxation was, in 2018, the WHO MPOWER1 
measure that was least implemented at the highest level of achievement. Even more 
concerningly, cigarettes have become more, rather than less, affordable in many 
low- and middle-income countries over the past decade. Many countries set rates at 
insufficient levels and increase them too infrequently, while others still use complex 
and inefficient taxation structures. This failure to advance tobacco taxation able to 
effect significant price increases constitutes a loss for governments in revenues, a 
loss for public health and a win for the tobacco industry.
To overcome this inertia, this manual charts the way forward for policy-makers, 
finance officials and others involved in tobacco tax policy development. It equips 
them with the information and evidence needed for the realization of their coun-
tries’ tobacco tax policy objectives. It also analyses the tobacco industry’s tactics 
for influencing the political economy of tobacco taxation and shows the limitations 
and exaggerations of the arguments used against tax increases. The manual serves 
as an update of the 2010 WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration 
by adding new evidence on the successes of tobacco taxation in all parts of the 
world and broadening its scope to capture more material relevant to developing 
and implementing more effective tobacco tax policy.
1  The WHO MPOWER package of technical measures and resources that comprises (M) monitor tobacco 
use and prevention policies; (P) protect people from tobacco smoke; (O) offer help to quit tobacco 
use; (W) warn about the dangers of tobacco; (E) enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship; and (R) raise taxes on tobacco.
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Its contributions are particularly timely in a COVID-19-stricken world. As the 
pandemic has been worsened by the global burden of noncommunicable disease, 
and revenue is now desperately needed, taxing tobacco should be more palatable 
than ever. This manual shows policy-makers how to seize this unique opportunity 
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Executive summary
This WHO technical manual on tobacco tax policy and administration builds upon 
the 2010 WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration by further detailing 
the strategies for effective tobacco tax policy development, design, implementation 
and administration. This 2021 edition also serves as an update to the 2010 manual, 
incorporating the latest developments in science, technology and policy, as well as 
providing illustrative recent examples from a variety of countries. The best practices 
laid out in this manual are designed to inform governments on the development 
of their tobacco taxation policy, facilitating the achievement of their health and 
revenue objectives while also supporting their overall development strategy.
Tobacco taxes have long been seen as a source of revenue for governments, but 
as evidence of the harms caused by tobacco has accumulated over the years, public 
perception has evolved. Increasingly, governments, as well as the general public, are 
recognizing that taxation of tobacco is not only a revenue source but also an effective 
public health intervention to reduce tobacco consumption and its associated harms. 
The profile of tobacco taxation as a health policy tool has increased greatly since 
the publication of the 2010 WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration. 
Multiple global commitments have been adopted over the past decade to address 
tobacco use specifically – as well as noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) more broadly – through tax and price 
measures to reduce demand for tobacco products, save lives and fund develop-
ment. Global development institutions, including the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and major philanthropic foundations, also agree with WHO 
on the importance of emphasizing and strengthening tobacco taxation as a key 
health policy tool. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has further fuelled this shift in the narrative on tobacco 
taxation by revealing how the global economy is inextricably linked with population 
and planetary health. Investing in health is fundamental to any economic recovery, 
and fiscal policy will be a key driver in addressing the socioeconomic consequences of 
COVID-19. Interventions such as tobacco taxation – which leads to reduced tobacco 
consumption, improved population health and increased revenues for governments – 
should be part of a comprehensive strategy for a build back better recovery.
The evidence is clear: significant increases in excise taxes that lead to price 
increases have consistently proven to be the most effective, as well as the most 
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cost-effective, mechanism for reducing tobacco consumption. This manual will 
guide readers through the necessary steps to create and implement the strongest 
tobacco taxation policies for their specific countries.
There are many factors to consider when developing tobacco taxation policy. 
Understanding the market is a fundamental step before deciding which form of 
taxation to use. Specifically, the choice between ad valorem and specific taxation 
is influenced by the market structure in a given country. At the same time, tax 
structure also shapes the market structure. Over the past decade, there has been a 
trend towards countries adopting specific excise taxes or mixed excise systems that 
rely more heavily on the specific component, which the latest global data associate 
with the highest average prices. 
Tobacco tax structures can be simple, with one flat rate across the board, or com-
plex, with multiple tiers for products with different characteristics. In 2018, 31 coun-
tries used complex, multitiered structures. But evidence demonstrates that simpler 
excise tax structures – utilized in all high-income countries – leave the least room for 
industry manipulation or tax avoidance and brand/product switching by consumers. 
Not only is it important to set taxes at a high level to discourage consumption, 
specific excise tax policies must include regular adjustments to increase the tax rate 
so that it keeps up with inflation and income growth in a country over time. Excise 
tax increases should aim to reduce the affordability of tobacco products. The base on 
which the tax is applied is also important. For specific taxation, the tax base should 
be the quantity in clearly defined units. For ad valorem (or mixed) taxation, the best 
practice is to use the retail price as the tax base and introduce a minimum excise tax. 
With regard to non-tax regulations that affect the price of tobacco products, pric-
ing regulation may be considered to prevent the tobacco industry from exercising 
differential tax shifting, which it uses to ensure that large price gaps exist between 
premium and cheap cigarettes. However, pricing policies cannot be used alone. If con-
sidered, they should be used only as complements to significant excise tax increases. 
Other non-tax regulations include banning promotional discounts for tobacco 
products and banning the sale of single cigarettes. To assuage concerns that tax 
increases will increase inflation – as well as to reflect the declining trend in consump-
tion of tobacco products – it is good practice to exclude tobacco products from the 
basket of items that are used to develop consumer price indexes. Finally, in order 
to make excise tax on tobacco products more effective in reducing overall tobacco 
use, all tobacco products must be taxed in a comparable way.
Regular assessment, evaluation and monitoring of the impact of tobacco tax 
policies over time are essential components of effective tax policy development and 
analysis. Governments need to have accurate estimates of price, income and tax base 
elasticities in order to anticipate the impact of a tax increase on consumption and 
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tax revenue. Ideally, other factors such as non-price policies should also be taken 
into account when estimating price and income elasticities for a specific country. 
A variety of tools and indicators exist to measure impact and monitor progress, and 
these are described in Chapter 2 of this manual. 
When developing tobacco tax policy, it is also important to take the broader policy 
context into consideration at both the domestic and the regional level. Domestically, 
cooperation is needed across sectors to ensure that policies and interventions in the 
areas of agriculture, trade, finance and labour do not work against the public health 
objectives of tobacco control and taxation. For countries that are part of a regional 
bloc, regional harmonization of tobacco taxation is a useful tool to prevent tax revenue 
erosion, tax avoidance and tax evasion, as well as to protect population health. Tax 
harmonization must be designed carefully, however, to be effective. The experience 
of the European Union (EU) demonstrates that both a declining consumption trend 
and stable revenues can be achieved with harmonized minimum excise tax rates. 
Discussions of policy development and implementation for new and emerging 
nicotine and tobacco products such as heated tobacco products (HTPs) and electronic 
nicotine and non-nicotine delivery systems (ENDS/ENNDS), are complicated, by 
their constantly changing technology and market dynamics. Policies and regulations 
need to be developed carefully and adjusted accordingly. 
Where HTPs are not banned, the current recommendation is to tax them at the 
same level as cigarettes on a per-unit basis, regardless of tobacco content. 
Early evidence from the United States shows that demand for e-cigarettes, a 
subcategory of ENDS/ENNDS products, is possibly even more price-responsive 
than the demand for conventional cigarettes, meaning that taxes can be used as 
an effective deterrent to ENDS/ENNDS products use. While there is preliminary 
evidence of substitutability between conventional cigarette use and e-cigarette use, 
further research is needed to understand substitutability effects among users of 
both conventional cigarettes and ENDS/ENNDS products. It is essential to imple-
ment regulation of ENDS/ENNDS products along with any tax policy to safeguard 
public health. 
In countries where they are not banned, ENDS/ENNDS products must be regu-
lated and taxed in a manner that discourages uptake by youth and non-users. Taxing 
e-liquids is a key component of ENDS/ENNDS taxation. Nicotine-containing and 
non-nicotine-containing e-liquids should be taxed equally. Ultimately, while the 
policy implications of these newer products require careful consideration, the fact 
remains that conventional tobacco products constitute the overwhelming share of 
consumption (more than 97% in 2018).
Tobacco tax administration must be both efficient and effective to ensure that 
health objectives are met and the desired level of tax revenue is raised. Since the 
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implementation of tobacco taxation often involves numerous agencies within a 
country, clearly defined roles and responsibilities are essential to maximize efficiency. 
Coordination among the different agencies involved, as well as with neighbouring 
countries, is required for tobacco tax administration to be effective. Performance 
evaluation and accountability for competent authorities is also necessary, and many 
tools and indicators exist to facilitate these processes (described in Chapter 3). There 
are a number of steps authorities should take to ensure efficiency and effectiveness 
at each stage throughout the tax compliance cycle (see Chapter 3, section 3.3).
Control and enforcement are the main functions of tax administration, and 
these can best be achieved through the use of a strategic plan and a risk-based 
approach. Controls can be exercised through licensing and due diligence, fiscal 
markings (e.g. tax stamps), tracking and tracing, implementation of anti-forestalling 
measures, national audits and specific controls for imports and exports, as well as 
for free zones and transhipment points. Once smuggling or illicit trade is detected, 
actions such as seizing and destroying smuggled and/or illicit tobacco and col-
lecting due taxes must be taken immediately. To deter further illegal activities, a 
comprehensive audit must also be carried out, including all those involved in the 
illicit acts. Penalties and sanctions must be sufficient to deter illegal activities. The 
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products provides invaluable guidance 
for tobacco tax administration, control and enforcement that is applicable even for 
countries that are not Parties to it.
The broader elements of a good tax system include proper resourcing of competent 
authorities, strict rules and regulations to detect and punish corruption and a strong 
judiciary system capable of resolving disputes as soon as possible.
In its efforts to oppose tobacco tax increases, the tobacco industry utilizes many 
SCARE tactics – (S) smuggling and illicit trade, (C) court and legal challenges, 
(A) anti-poor rhetoric, (R) revenue reduction and (E) employment impact – to 
influence the political economy of tobacco. Chapter 4 provides detailed analyses 
of these issues with supporting evidence that belies the SCARE tactics, as well as 
guidance for tax and other relevant authorities on how to anticipate and respond 
to industry arguments. 
This manual also provides tools and methodologies to help tax authorities define 
and evaluate the problem of illicit trade of tobacco products in their countries, inde-
pendent of the tobacco industry’s generally inflated estimates. Price (and tax) levels 
are not a key determinant of illicit trade; rather, the problem is exacerbated by the 
lack of governance and tax administration capacity. Refraining from increasing taxes 
is not the solution. Countries should instead respond with a comprehensive strategy 
to fight illicit trade, including undertaking independent estimates of illicit trade 
levels and implementing good tax administration practices such as those discussed 
in Chapter 3 and contained in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol (WHO FCTC) Protocol to Eliminate the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. 
When it comes to court challenges, the tobacco industry is less likely to challenge 
excise taxes than other tobacco control measures, because taxation is a comparatively 
well-established regulatory measure. The industry will, however, exploit the slightest 
vulnerability in the design, adoption or implementation of tax measures. For this 
reason, measures to strengthen regulators’ legal position are described that will 
enable authorities to protect themselves from potential legal challenges. 
The industry argument of regressivity, or the notion that tobacco tax increases 
hurt the poor because they have to pay a larger share of their income in taxes than 
the rich, has two fundamental limitations. First, the notion of regressivity does not 
take into consideration the broader health and economic harms caused by tobacco 
use that exacerbate the impoverishment of lower-income smokers. These harms 
are actually reduced when tobacco consumption decreases following a tax increase. 
Second, the tobacco industry argument ignores the fact that higher tobacco taxes and 
prices can induce behaviour change as is reflected in the price elasticity of demand. 
Evidence consistently shows that lower-income smokers are more sensitive to price 
and therefore more likely to reduce smoking in response to a tax and price increase. 
Including these factors shows tobacco taxation to be, in fact, a progressive public 
health intervention that disproportionately benefits the poor.
While essentially admitting that a tobacco tax increase may have the desired effect 
of reducing consumption, the industry also tries to argue that a tax increase will 
also reduce revenues. In fact, the price inelastic demand for tobacco makes tobacco 
tax increases a win-win for both public health and finance. This manual presents 
several country examples that demonstrate how well-designed and well-implemented 
tobacco tax increases lead to increases rather than decreases in revenue in the short 
to medium term. In addition, the reduced consumption resulting from a tax increase 
results in reductions of other tobacco-related government expenditures as well.
The final tactic used by the tobacco industry to challenge proposed tax increases 
is to frame tobacco taxes as an economic rather than a public health issue. This 
false choice between health and jobs is based on faulty assumptions that 1) tobacco 
is a significant source of domestic employment; 2) job creation relies on tobacco 
consumption and 3) tobacco-related livelihoods are prosperous, sustainable and 
irreplaceable. 
Earmarking can be a useful tool for improving the political economy of tobacco 
tax increases. While the primary goal of tobacco tax increases is to reduce demand 
for tobacco, setting aside portions of tax revenue to fund other tobacco control 
efforts or relevant health programmes can help convince the public, politicians and 
officials of the value of significant tobacco tax increases. Earmarking can also be 
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used to counter tobacco industry arguments about potential negative effects of tax 
increases – for example, by supporting tobacco farmers in transitioning to other crops.
Tobacco taxes work. This is why the industry invests so much money and effort 
in blocking large tax increases and other effective tax policy reforms. Policy-makers 
must not be swayed by industry pressure but need only to follow the facts. This 
manual provides all the information policy-makers need to make the right deci-
sions at each step of the process – from designing, evaluating, implementing and 
administering tax policy to refuting specious industry attacks and communicating 
the value of tobacco taxation to legislators and the broader population. An effectively 
designed and efficiently administered tobacco tax policy will not only produce 
the direct results of reducing tobacco consumption among smokers and raising 
revenue for governments, its effects will be felt much more broadly. Indeed, raising 
tobacco taxes is a SMART policy: it Saves lives; Mobilizes resources; Addresses 
health inequities; Reduces burdens on health systems; and Targets tobacco use, a 
major risk factor for NCDs.
• Saves lives: Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable deaths globally 
– it claims 8 million lives each year. Tobacco taxation is the most effective 
mechanism for reducing tobacco consumption and its associated health 
burden worldwide.
• Mobilizes resources: Despite being the single most effective tobacco control 
measure, tobacco taxation is largely underutilized as a policy mechanism. 
Based on available data on the price and taxation of cigarettes, it is estimated 
that excise taxes on cigarettes generated a worldwide total of US$ 361 billion in 
revenues in 2018, including US$ 162 billion in revenues for low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs). If all countries were to raise cigarette excise tax 
rates by the equivalent of US$ 1 per pack, the amount of excise revenue from 
cigarettes would increase by US$ 178–219 billion, or by 49–61% at 2018 levels. 
LMICs would gain the most from such tax increases, with excise revenues 
increasing by 82–103%, providing governments in these countries with an 
extra US$ 133–167 billion. This shows the substantial revenue potential of 
tobacco taxes.
• Addresses health inequities: Tobacco taxation and tax increases are effectively 
progressive or pro-poor policies because of their positive distributional impact. 
Lower-income smokers benefit disproportionately from reduced tobacco 
consumption and use in terms of health gains and income retention.
• Reduces burdens on health systems: The worldwide economic cost of tobacco 
use was US$ 1.4 trillion in 2012. Tobacco taxes reduce tobacco-related burdens 
on governments and health systems through population-based preventive 
measures.
• Targets tobacco use: Tobacco taxation directly targets and reduces tobacco 
use, which is a major risk factor for several deadly NCDs.
In summary, significant tobacco tax increases, designed and implemented according 
to the latest guidance and best practices presented in this technical manual – and as 
a strong component of a comprehensive tobacco control strategy – will bring about 
substantial reductions in tobacco use and the health and economic harms it causes.
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Tobacco taxes are not new. Governments around the world have been applying taxes 
on tobacco and tobacco products practically since the idea of excise was conceived. 
And rightly so: tobacco is not a necessity, it is easy to tax and the demand for it 
is relatively inelastic. These characteristics, along with the substantial revenues 
tobacco taxes generate, have made tobacco a highly appropriate object of taxation. 
As evidence of the harms of tobacco has accumulated over the years, the public 
perception of tobacco taxes has evolved. Now tobacco taxes are not only seen as a 
revenue source, but, more importantly, they are recognized as an effective public 
health intervention to reduce tobacco consumption. This trend reflects the reasons 
excise taxes exist in the first place – to discourage harmful behaviour and to mitigate 
the associated negative externalities (1–2).
Many governments view tobacco taxes as a significant and stable source of rev-
enue, which may explain why there is often a degree of hesitation whenever tobacco 
tax reform is proposed. Historically, many governments have relied on revenues 
from tobacco taxes and have even adjusted the level of taxation according to their 
revenue needs (3). However, some countries are beginning to recognize the value 
of applying high tobacco taxes primarily as a public health tool, viewing revenues 
as a secondary consideration (4).
Arguments against tobacco tax hikes or improvements to the tax structure are 
often economic in nature: such tax changes will allegedly decrease revenues, wipe 
out jobs, increase illicit trade and harm local industries, among other claims. But 
the evidence has consistently shown that such claims are simply not true in an 
overwhelming majority of situations. The tobacco industry, in particular, frequently 
portrays this conflict as a false dichotomy between public health and the economy 
– as if prioritizing health comes at the expense of the economy. In fact, studies and 
real-world experiences have shown that increasing tobacco taxes not only improves 
public health but also has a net positive impact on the economy and development 
of a country – a true win-win scenario (5–6).
As an update to the first WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration 
published in 2010, this manual aims to help readers better navigate the various 
2  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
issues surrounding tobacco taxes and their implementation. The primary intended 
audience includes policy-makers, finance officials, tax authorities, customs officials 
and other relevant persons/bodies involved in the formulation and implementation 
of tobacco tax policy. The manual provides a detailed guide to the design of tobacco 
tax policy and describes how to effectively administer these taxes to maximize impact. 
Detailed discussions of the political economy considerations and the hurdles that 
need to be overcome before and during implementation are included as well. The 
overarching goal is to equip those working in the tax policy and implementation 
spheres with sufficient information to help realize the health and revenue objectives 
of a government’s tobacco tax policy in line with its overall development strategy. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF TOBACCO USE  
AND THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION
Most people are aware that smoking and tobacco use are harmful to health, but 
few truly comprehend the scale of this harm. The tobacco epidemic claimed more 
than 100 million lives in the last century (7), with updated estimates now reaching 
8 million deaths annually from tobacco use and exposure to second-hand smoke 
(8). As much as 80% of these deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) (6), revealing how the developing world carries much of the global burden. 
Tobacco use is a major risk factor for many chronic conditions, including heart 
disease, cancer, diabetes and chronic lung disease – collectively known as noncom-
municable diseases (NCDs). NCDs account for about 15 million premature deaths 
(between ages 30 and 69) worldwide, killing people in their most productive years. 
As the leading cause of preventable deaths, tobacco use remains one of the foremost 
public health challenges of our time. 
The consequences of tobacco use also present enormous economic, development 
and social costs that wreak havoc on families, communities and societies. The annual 
economic cost of smoking was estimated at US$ 1.4 trillion in 2012, equivalent to 
1.8% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) (9). With these figures likely to 
have increased since then, the massive health and economic burdens of tobacco use 
provide justification for governments to intervene and strictly regulate the market 
for tobacco products. The purview of tobacco control extends beyond the strong 
imperative to protect people’s health and well-being; it should also strive to contain 
the market failures and negative externalities of tobacco use, particularly since these 
effects can significantly impact a country’s development trajectory. 
The mounting evidence of the enduring destruction caused by tobacco in the 
20th century provided compelling reasons for a strong global response, which led 
countries to negotiate the World Health Organization Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC). The WHO FCTC came into force in 2005 as the 
CHAP T ER 1. WHY T HIS M ANUAL? 3 
first public health treaty under the auspices of WHO. To facilitate its implementation 
at the country level, WHO packaged a set of demand-reduction measures directly 
taken from the treaty (7). These interventions, collectively known as MPOWER, 
are as follows: (M) monitoring tobacco use and prevention policies; (P) protecting 
people from tobacco smoke (smoke-free laws); (O) offering help to quit tobacco use 
(cessation services); (W) warning about the dangers of tobacco (including graphic 
pack warnings and plain packaging); (E) enforcing bans on tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship; and (R) raising taxes on tobacco products. Specifically, 
under Article 6 of the WHO FCTC, Parties recognized that price and tax measures 
are an effective and important means of reducing tobacco consumption for various 
segments of the population – in particular, among young persons (10).
The severity of the tobacco epidemic and its ongoing damage to health and 
economies are clear justifications for governments to actively intervene and correct 
market failures. The scale of the burden and the rate at which lives are being destroyed 
necessitates urgent and aggressive action on tobacco control, using measures that 
most countries have committed to implementing and that are proven to be effective 
in reducing tobacco use. 
WHY TOBACCO (EXCISE) TAXES ARE CRUCIAL
Among the different tobacco control interventions, raising excise taxes has been 
identified as the most effective as well as the most cost-effective measure to reduce 
consumption (6). While other interventions are certainly important components of a 
comprehensive tobacco control strategy, the direct impact of significant tax increases 
on consumption is by far the strongest. On average, a tax increase that causes prices 
to go up by 10% reduces consumption by 4% in high-income countries and 5% in 
LMICs (6). When implemented at scale, this demonstrates the enormous power 
of tobacco taxation and its potential to save lives. Tobacco taxes differ from other 
interventions in that their impact can increase and build over time – even if taxes 
are already relatively high, their rates need to be continuously increased to retain 
and amplify their effectiveness. However, this should not be taken as a suggestion 
that governments considering tobacco control interventions should focus solely on 
taxes. Taxes are even more effective when implemented as part of a comprehensive 
package of measures such as MPOWER, which covers distinct but complementary 
intervention points.
Among the different taxes applied on tobacco products, excise taxes are the most 
significant because they raise both absolute and relative prices (6). This is important 
when considering health objectives, since it is the magnitude of the price increase 
of tobacco products that determines the reduction in consumption. An excise tax 
is typically applied on a limited set of products, designed to discourage their use by 
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raising the price significantly over that of other products available in the market. This 
is in contrast to value added taxes (VAT) or sales taxes, which apply to most goods 
and services. Seeking to raise the prices of tobacco products through VAT or sales 
taxes would fail to increase relative prices, making this an ineffective and inefficient 
method. Customs or import duties on tobacco products are also utilized, but their 
impact is waning with the global trend towards bilateral and regional agreements 
aimed at trade facilitation. The application of these duties varies across countries, 
but overall, they are not applicable to locally produced tobacco products. As a tool 
to increase prices, import duties cannot substitute for excise taxes, since they are 
not specifically designed to reduce consumption. 
When viewed as a public health policy tool, tobacco taxation is highly cost-effective, 
since it delivers significant impact yet is relatively inexpensive to implement (11). 
The costs of implementing tobacco taxation are much lower than those of clinical 
NCD interventions such as cancer treatments or maintenance medications, since 
the commodity and human capital requirements are less substantial (12). Moreover, 
increasing tobacco taxes actually generates additional revenue for a government. 
Tobacco taxes are also very effective in pre-empting or reducing consumption among 
groups of people who are especially price-sensitive – youth in particular, who are 
prevented from initiating a lifelong addiction if taxes and prices are sufficiently 
high (13). This is also true for the poor, who are more prone to catastrophic health 
expenditures than the wealthy are. Preventing initiation or encouraging cessation 
by imposing high taxes provides an escape route from the vicious cycle of tobacco 
use and poverty (6).
A DECADE OF PROGRESS AND COMMITMENT TO ACTION
Since 2010, when the first WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration 
was published, numerous developments have raised the profile of tobacco taxes as 
an essential public health intervention. The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
WHO FCTC adopted guidelines for implementation of Article 6 of the treaty, which 
focuses on price and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco. Also within 
this period, three high-level meetings on the prevention and control of NCDs by 
the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the endorsement of the Global 
NCD Action Plan in 2013 by the World Health Assembly, have resulted in strong 
global commitments to implement measures, such as increased tobacco taxes to 
protect people’s health. 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which contains 17 goals known as 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), describes the global development strategy 
for the next decade. Within the SDGs, two specified targets are highly relevant for 
tobacco control: strengthening the implementation of the WHO FCTC (target 3.a) 
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and reducing premature mortality from NCDs by 30% (target 3.4). Furthermore, the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda1, which aims to provide a global framework for financing 
the SDGs, also highlights tax and price measures on tobacco as key mechanisms 
to reduce demand and save lives while increasing domestic resources for develop-
ment. Another important milestone was the 2018 entry into force of the Protocol 
to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. These key events, along with several 
outcome documents and policy declarations in the area of tobacco control and the 
wider development sphere, have introduced tobacco taxation into the consciousness 
of a much larger share of policy-makers.
As detailed in subsequent chapters, numerous countries have imposed sufficiently 
high tobacco tax rates while applying best practices in tax policy design and imple-
mentation over the past decade (8, 10). For example, sustained and substantial tax 
increases have reduced tobacco use in LMICs such as Brazil (14), Turkey (15) and 
the Philippines (16). High-income countries also continued their leadership in this 
area, comprising 23 of the 38 countries judged to have sufficiently high tobacco taxes 
in 2018 (8). However, much remains to be done. The 2019 WHO report on the global 
tobacco epidemic (RGTE) shows that tobacco taxes are still the most underutilized 
tobacco control policy among the MPOWER measures (8), with only 14% of the 
world’s population being covered by sufficiently high tobacco taxes.
Substantial progress has also been made in building the tools and evidence base 
for tobacco taxation. Volume 14 of the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(IARC) handbooks of cancer prevention, Effectiveness of tax and price policies for 
tobacco control, published in 2011, is a key review of the literature published as of 
May 2010 on the effectiveness of tax and price policies in reducing tobacco use. 
The National Cancer Institute (NCI)-WHO Monograph on the economics of tobacco 
and tobacco control, published in 2016, details the evidence accumulated over the 
years from various countries, focusing not only on tax and price policies, but on all 
aspects of the economics of tobacco and tobacco control. In addition, numerous 
published studies from LMICs provide a comprehensive picture of the impact of 
tobacco taxation in different contexts. The updated Appendix 3 of the Global NCD 
Action Plan explains the cost-effectiveness of tobacco taxation (11), while the Global 
NCD Business Plan, Saving lives, spending less, built on this work by estimating a 
dollar figure for the return on investment expected from implementing the best-buy 
interventions for tobacco control, including taxation (12).
The past decade has seen major steps forward for tobacco taxation in terms of 
global commitments, the number of countries implementing best practices and the 
1  The Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third Conference on Financing for Development. Third Inter-
national Conference, 13-16 July 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
content/documents/2051AAAA_Outcome.pdf, accessed 17 February 2021). 
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expansion of the evidence base on tobacco taxes, particularly in LMICs. Within 
the development sphere, institutions such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and many other multilateral agencies are aligned with WHO 
on the importance of tobacco taxation and the need to improve its implementation 
(17–18). Considerable challenges remain; although it appears that the world is 
headed in the right direction, progress needs to accelerate at a much quicker pace 
in order to achieve the SDG targets by 2030. 
SHAPING A “NEW NORMAL” FOR TOBACCO TAXATION
 The global upheaval caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has cast an unprecedented 
spotlight on how well governments around the world prepared for and responded 
to the crisis. It has exposed glaring health systems vulnerabilities and highlighted 
the struggles of many countries to control the spread of the virus. But perhaps more 
than anything, the pandemic has demonstrated how the economy, trade, science, 
politics and many other aspects of our societies are very much interdependent and 
interconnected with the health of the population. 
It is clear that an individual’s state of health can significantly determine their 
susceptibility to disease and their ability to overcome it. People with NCDs are 
more vulnerable to becoming severely ill with a number of conditions, which also 
appears to be the case with COVID-19 (19). Tobacco use is a major risk factor for 
NCDs, and available research suggests that smokers are at higher risk of developing 
severe illness and dying from COVID-19 (20). Just as the different aspects of society 
are interconnected, so too are people’s health, the existence of health-promoting 
environments and the government policies and agencies that shape these environ-
ments. This critical moment presents a unique opportunity and renewed motivation 
to discourage the use of harmful products such as tobacco and to further improve 
tobacco control measures, especially tobacco tax policy. 
Moving forward, a business-as-usual approach to tobacco taxation will not be 
sufficient. Responding to this new reality and preparing for the next pandemic entails 
implementing measures that promote healthier populations. Like the COVID-19 
pandemic, any future pandemic will likely exacerbate health inequities, bring about 
more economic uncertainty and put pressure on governments’ fiscal capacities. 
Interventions such as higher tobacco taxes, which protect people’s health while 
generating more revenues and economic benefits, become even more important 
in such crisis situations. Given this context and the stakes involved, ministries of 
finance and tax authorities are in a unique and powerful position – one of saving 
not only livelihoods, but also lives. 
The importance of increasing tobacco taxes – one of the most effective public 
health tools available – cannot be overstated. The traditional approach of treating 
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tobacco tax exclusively as a revenue source has no place in the new normal. One 
cannot deny the scale of the tobacco epidemic, the necessity to correct market failures 
and the overwhelming evidence of tobacco taxation’s benefits to health and to the 
economy. The positive trend in the changing narrative around tobacco taxation 
needs to continue. Tobacco taxation should not be viewed in isolation from the rest 
of government policies, but rather as an important part of the whole, an essential 
piece in working towards our common goal of better health for all. 
OVERVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE CHAPTERS
This manual is primarily designed for policy-makers, finance officials, tax authorities 
and customs officials. It may also be useful for officials within health ministries or 
other government agencies, as well as nongovernmental organizations working in 
this area, including tobacco control advocates. Significant effort is made to present 
real-world examples and recent experiences from a wide range of countries to 
demonstrate success stories and lessons learned in raising tobacco taxes. A sub-
stantial amount of evidence has been generated in LMICs over the past few years 
that supports and augments the existing evidence base, providing a much broader 
body of knowledge than was available when the first WHO technical manual on 
tobacco tax administration was released.
Chapter 2 delves into the theory, practice and empirical evidence on tobacco excise 
tax policy, including current global trends. The chapter offers a detailed analysis of 
the various elements that constitute tax structure, aiming to provide policy-makers 
with a comprehensive understanding of the factors affecting prices, consumption 
and the market. It describes the key components to keep in mind when designing 
tobacco tax policy to maximize the impact of tax increases and improve the tax 
structure. The chapter also includes updated global price and tax data, specific 
examples from various countries and a discussion of tax base elasticity, automatic 
excise tax adjustments and pricing regulations, as well as descriptions of new and 
emerging nicotine and tobacco products, including electronic nicotine- and non-
nicotine delivery systems (ENDS/ENNDS) and heated tobacco products (HTPs).
Chapter 3 focuses on tobacco tax administration. It provides an in-depth discus-
sion of the fundamental components that make tobacco tax collection effective and 
efficient, ensuring achievement of the health and revenue objectives of tax policy. It 
highlights the importance of cooperation among the various agencies involved in 
the implementation of tobacco taxes within countries and across borders. Building 
on country and regional experiences from previous decades, the chapter outlines 
specific measures and recommendations to maintain oversight of the whole tax 
compliance cycle. Also included are actions to facilitate control and enforcement, 
such as licensing, fiscal markings (e.g. tax stamps), tracking and tracing systems 
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and import and export controls. Finally, the discussion pivots towards the broader 
elements of a good tax system, such as proper resourcing of competent authorities, 
a strong judiciary and strict rules regarding corruption.
Chapter 4 deals with the important challenges in the area of political economy 
when countries attempt to increase tobacco taxes or simplify the tax structure. The 
tobacco industry often relies on identified patterns of argumentation and tactics 
to obstruct such reforms, i.e. SCARE tactics – (S) smuggling and illicit trade, (C) 
court and legal challenges, (A) anti-poor rhetoric (regressivity), (R) revenue reduc-
tion and (E) employment impact – each of which is discussed thoroughly in this 
chapter. Also included is a detailed discussion of the measurement of illicit trade 
and a discussion of earmarking tobacco tax revenue for health purposes. 
Finally, Chapter 5 presents a comprehensive list of the best practices in tobacco 
tax policy and administration discussed throughout this manual. The list is intended 
to serve as a practical guide and quick reference to the salient points presented.
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Tobacco excise tax policy
2.1. GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF TOBACCO TAX PRACTICES
A well-designed tax policy is key to having an effective tax policy. Any government 
that is planning to reform its tax policy must first understand the fundamental 
components of a good tax policy, as well as consider the strengths and weaknesses 
of different approaches to taxation, how they impact price and the requirements for 
tax administration. Understanding how the tobacco market operates in a country is 
equally important for policy-makers because of the inevitable interaction between 
the market and tax structures.
Beyond the political considerations that strongly influence tobacco tax policy 
development, this chapter focuses on the technical aspects of tobacco taxation – excise 
tax in particular. Section 2.1 provides an overview of tobacco tax practices at the 
global level, focusing on the different ways countries structure excise tax. Section 
2.2 emphasizes the importance of carefully designing excise tax policy, highlighting 
not only the significance of tax increases but also excise tax structure and its impact 
on prices, taking into account how market structure influences trends. This section 
also discusses the importance of measuring impact as another aspect of tax policy 
development, and it presents the crucial elements for performing measurement, as 
well as the relevant indicators available to monitor progress. 
Section 2.3 describes external policy considerations in the design phase to ensure 
that the goals of tobacco control and taxation are achieved. Intersectoral policy 
integration and coherence at the domestic level is discussed as a strategy to ensure 
that policies of other sectors do not inhibit or obstruct public health policy objectives. 
This section also reviews the current state of regional tax harmonization based on 
the experience of existing regional blocs and draws conclusions on the best policy 
approaches to preserve the public health interests of individual countries. 
Section 2.4 discusses new and emerging nicotine and tobacco products, in par-
ticular HTPs and ENDS/ENNDS. It reviews the latest evidence on the health impacts 
of these products and current approaches to regulation. Key policy considerations 
are identified, and recommendations are provided for adopting an appropriate 
excise tax policy for these products. 
Section 2.5 summarizes the issues covered in the chapter and the key takeaways.
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2.1.1 TAXES APPLIED ON TOBACCO PRODUCTS
Taxes are classified as either direct or indirect. Direct taxes are imposed on the 
profit, income, property or wealth of persons or companies, whereas indirect taxes 
are imposed on the price of goods and services. Indirect taxes are most relevant to 
tobacco products taxation, because they directly influence price. A variety of types 
of indirect taxes can be applied to tobacco products. These include:
• excise taxes – taxes that apply to a few selected commodities (they can also 
be applied to alcohol, fuel, sugar-sweetened beverages, etc.).
• VAT or sales taxes – VAT is a multistage tax on all consumer goods and 
services that is applied proportionally to the price the consumer pays for a 
product. It is a tax on the amount by which the value of an article has been 
increased at each stage of its production or distribution. Some countries 
impose sales taxes instead of VAT. Unlike VAT, which is collected at every 
stage of the supply chain, sales taxes are generally levied at the point of retail 
on the total value of goods and services purchased. Ultimately, the consumer 
ends up paying the tax, whether it is a VAT or a sales tax.
• import duties – taxes on selected goods imported into a country to be consumed 
in that country (i.e. goods that are not in transit to another country). In general, 
import duties are collected from the importer at the point of entry into the country.
• other taxes – other indirect taxes, such as environmental taxes, that do not 
fall into any of the categories listed above.
One of the most well-established and widely understood points in tax policy is that 
tobacco products should be subject to excise taxation. The focus of this chapter – 
and of this manual overall – is on excise taxes. They are the most important type 
of indirect taxes for tobacco control because they are applied directly to tobacco 
products and contribute the most to increasing the price of tobacco products relative 
to other goods and, subsequently, to reducing consumption. 
There are two basic types of excise taxes:
• specific – levied as a monetary value per quantity of the product being taxed 
(e.g. 1 000 cigarettes, pack of 20 sticks, kilogram of tobacco); and
• ad valorem – levied as a percentage of the value (e.g. retail price, or the 
producer/ex-factory price or the cost, insurance and freight [CIF] value1) 
of the product being taxed.
These types of excise tax can be applied at a uniform or a differential (tiered) rate 
and on their own or in combination (i.e. a mixed system). 
1  CIF is the value of an imported product as declared to customs upon entry into a territory.
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Given the widespread use of cigarettes – almost the only tobacco product used 
in some parts of the world – and the scarce availability of data for other tobacco 
products, this chapter focuses mainly on cigarettes. But there are a few examples 
and recommendations for other tobacco products, including those that are more 
prevalent in specific parts of the world (e.g. bidis or smokeless tobacco in South-East 
Asia and waterpipe tobacco in the Eastern Mediterranean region). 
2.1.2 CIGARETTE TAXES AND RECENT TRENDS WORLDWIDE 
Tax and national income levels: the higher the income level,  
the higher the taxes and prices
At the global level, cigarette price and tax levels correlate positively with a country’s 
income level: prices and taxes are higher in higher-income countries and lower as 
income level decreases. This trend has not changed over the years since 2008. Figure 
2.1 presents the levels of price and tax by income groups for 2018, using the World 
Bank classification of income groups.
Fig. 2.1 Weighted average retail prices and taxation (excise and total taxes) of most-sold brand 
of cigarettes, by income group, 2018
Notes: Averages are weighted by WHO estimates of the number of current cigarette smokers ages 15 
and older in each country in 2017.
Prices are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted dollars or international dollars to account 
for differences in the purchasing power across countries – based on 53 high-income, 97 middle-income 
and 28 low-income countries with data on prices of the most-sold brand, excise and other taxes and 
PPP conversion factors.
Source: (1).
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Tax and price levels: the higher the tax share, the higher the price
Globally, cigarette prices correlate positively with tax percentage levels: as the total 
tax share (of which excise represents the largest part) as a percentage of retail price 
increases, the price of cigarettes generally also increases (see Fig. 2.2 below).2 This 
indicates that taxes do influence prices.
Fig. 2.2 Weighted average retail prices and taxation (excise and total taxes) of most-sold brand 
of cigarettes, by total tax levels, 2018
Notes: Averages are weighted by WHO estimates of the number of current cigarette smokers ages 15 
and older in each country in 2017.
Prices are expressed in PPP adjusted dollars or international dollars to account for differences in the 
purchasing power across countries – based on 53 high-income, 97 middle-income and 28 low-income 
countries with data on prices of the most-sold brand, excise and other taxes and PPP conversion factors.
Source: (1).
Tax level and WHO regional classification: taxes and prices are highest  
in the European region, followed by South-East Asia, the Americas  
and the Western Pacific, with the lowest levels in the Eastern Mediterranean  
and African regions
At the regional level (WHO regional classification), average levels of prices and taxes 
vary greatly. The highest level can be seen in the European region, which includes 
the European Union (EU) countries. The EU’s unified tax structure includes high 
levels of minimum taxes – which lead to high prices – and encourage member 
2  This is a general trend and does not apply for every country; there are countries that have a large tax 
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countries to regularly increase their taxes to meet their obligations. However, with 
the current minimum level now being reached by all EU member countries, the 
motivation to increase excise taxes may wane. Indeed, the minimum cigarette excise 
amount in the EU has not been adjusted since it went into effect on 1 January 2014, 
and it is suffering from inflation erosion. Member States of the EU acknowledged 
this in June 2020 by stating that action at the EU level is required to ensure that 
minimum excise duty rates regain traction to effectively reduce the consumption 
of tobacco products and that the minimum rates of excise duties on a number of 
tobacco products would be increased (2). 
Excise taxes are lowest in the African and Eastern Mediterranean regions. And 
China – reported separately due to its size – has lower tax rates than the Western 
Pacific region (see Fig. 2.3). 
Fig. 2.3 Weighted average retail prices and taxation (excise and total) of most-sold brand of 
cigarettes, by region, 2018 
Notes: China is represented separately from the Western Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) average because 
of its exceptionally large number of smokers compared with the number in other countries in the region. 
AFRO is the African Region, AMRO is the Region of the Americas, EMRO is the Eastern Mediterranean 
Region, EURO is the European Region, SEARO is the South-East Asia Region. 
Averages are weighted by WHO estimates of the number of current cigarette smokers ages 15 and older 
in each country in 2017.
Prices are expressed in PPP adjusted dollars or international dollars to account for differences in the 
purchasing power across countries – based on 53 high-income, 97 middle-income and 28 low-income 
countries with data on prices of the most-sold brand, excise and other taxes and PPP conversion factors.
Source: (1).
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Global tax structures trend: more countries are adopting specific excise taxes 
or mixed excise systems that rely more on the specific component
Since 2008, the number of countries that rely solely on ad valorem taxes or apply 
no excise taxes at all has decreased as more countries have adopted specific or 
mixed systems. More of the countries that have implemented a mixed system have 
increased the specific component of the tax structure relative to the ad valorem 
component (see Figs. 2.4 and 2.5).3
Fig. 2.4 Changes in excise tax structure, 2008–2018
Fig. 2.5 Changes in reliance on specific versus ad valorem component in mixed systems, 2008–2018
Source: (1).
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The imposition of a minimum specific excise tax: half of the countries that have 
a mixed or ad valorem structure impose an excise tax floor
A minimum specific excise tax ensures that at least a certain minimum amount of 
tax is paid, irrespective of price level. Almost half of the 101 countries that impose 
either ad valorem or a mixed excise for which data on minimum excise are available 
(47 countries) set a minimum specific excise tax.4 Nearly two thirds of those that set a 
minimum specific excise tax (29 countries) are high-income countries; most of them 
are in the EU, which requires its members to impose a minimum specific excise tax. 
The choice of tax base worldwide: almost half of the countries that apply  
a mixed or ad valorem excise system use retail price as the base
Setting the base for applying a specific excise is relatively easy: most countries use 
a defined quantity of sticks for cigarettes, the weight in kilograms for tobacco and 
the weight in grams for other tobacco products (1).
Different bases for ad valorem excises are applied in different countries. Nearly 
half of the 105 countries that implement either ad valorem or a mixed excise for 
which data are available (47 countries) use the retail price5 as the tax base for the ad 
valorem part, and most of those (28 countries) are high-income countries. Using 
the retail price as the base for the excise ad valorem tax is more effective than using 
the producer price or the CIF value. Unlike retail prices, which are easy for tax 
administrators to ascertain by monitoring the market, the producer price or CIF 
value is prone to undervaluation by producers or importers, who may pass on their 
margins to related parties further down the supply chain and successfully reduce 
their tax burden. This tactic is also known as transfer pricing. 
Additionally, global-level data show that the excise ad valorem on the retail price 
seems to lead to higher retail prices on average compared with an excise ad valorem 
applied on other bases, such as the producer price or CIF value (see Fig. 2.8 below).
On complex tiered structures: 31 countries still apply complex, multitiered 
excise taxes on tobacco products
As of 2018, 31 countries imposed excise taxes that varied according to defined char-
acteristics of cigarettes, including price level, type of production, type of package and 
length of cigarette (Table 2.1). Some countries use more than one criterion to differen-
tiate the tax rates. Indonesia, for example, imposes differential rates based on volume 
4  This means that countries with a mixed system impose an overall minimum specific excise tax (where 
the yield of the specific plus the ad valorem excise cannot be below the set minimum specific excise tax), 
in addition to the excise on a specific component.
5  Countries that impose ad valorem on retail price exclusive of VAT are also included, since retail prices 
are easy to determine and VAT rates are known variables.
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produced, type of cigarette and price level. In other countries, such as Member States of 
the EU, differential rates for cigarettes are prohibited by law, and the rate of the ad va-
lorem tax and the amount of specific excise duty must be the same for all cigarettes (3).
Table 2.1 Criteria used by countries for tiered excise taxes, 2018
BASE OF TIERS COUNTRY
Retail price Bangladesh, Belarus, Indonesia, Jordan, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand
Cigarette grade (e.g. premium, mid-grade, 
economy)
Egypt, Japana, Mali
Producer price China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Production volume Indonesia
Type filter/non-filter Belarus, Georgiaa, India, Kenya, Republic of Moldova, 
Nepal, Papua New Guinea




Algeria, Bolivia (Plurinational State of )
Packaging soft/hard Mozambique, Uganda
Cigarette length India, Nepal, Sri Lanka
Trade (domestic/imported) Iran (Islamic Republic of ), Lebanon, Myanmar, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Uzbekistan
Leaf content (domestic/imported) Fiji, United Republic of Tanzania
a Japan and Georgia were using a tiered excise tax structure when these data were collected in 2018, 
but as of 2020, that is no longer the case.
Source: (1). 
2.2 DESIGNING EXCISE TAX POLICY
Significantly increasing the taxes on and prices of tobacco products is the most effective 
and most cost-effective policy to control tobacco use (4). Increased taxes that are passed 
on to tobacco users as higher prices reduce consumption. When designing tobacco 
tax policy or reforming tobacco tax systems, policy-makers face challenges ranging 
from technical issues – such as determining what tax structure and rates to apply – to 
political economy issues such as addressing the SCARE6 tactics of the tobacco industry. 
This section provides guidance for policy-makers regarding the best tax structure to 
use from a health perspective, taking into consideration all the appropriate tax designs. 
It also proposes recommended indicators to consider when formulating policy change.
6 SCARE tactics are the tactics most commonly used by the tobacco industry when countries plan to 
increase tobacco taxes. They are described, and refuted, in detail in Chapter 4.
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2.2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TYPE OF EXCISE TAX STRUCTURE
The existing theoretical and empirical evidence on approaches to the choice of 
(uniform) specific and ad valorem excises is reviewed below, along with their effects 
on price, consumption, perceived quality and variety of tobacco products, govern-
ment revenue and tax administration. 
The use of the word “quality” in this chapter does not refer in any way to the health 
impact of a tobacco product. It refers rather to the consumers’ perceptions of quality 
and their decision to buy a product, which they may evaluate based on the packaging, 
the blend used for the cigarette or anything that makes the product more appealing 
to them. Just to be clear, from a public health perspective, all cigarettes are equally 
harmful even if perceived by consumers as having higher or lower quality.
The choice between ad valorem and specific taxation is influenced by the market 
structure, i.e. the nature and degree of competition in the market for goods and 
services. Although each country has its own specific characteristics, the tobacco 
market structure is typically a monopoly or an oligopoly where firms have the power 
to control prices – and hence exploit the tax structure – to their benefit. For example, 
China, the largest producer and consumer of tobacco products in the world (5), has 
a state monopoly. In Viet Nam, foreign brands are produced under licence by the 
state monopoly. In Thailand and Egypt, despite the presence of foreign companies, 
the market is dominated by the state-owned company. In Uruguay, the oligopoly 
is led by a domestically owned company. In Bangladesh, the oligopoly consists of 
domestically owned companies competing with foreign companies (6). In most of 
Africa, the market consists of transnational tobacco companies (7). 
The impact of tax structure on final price:  
uniform specific versus uniform ad valorem 
The choice between specific and ad valorem taxes is a long-standing issue in tax 
policy, as the level and structure of excises have different implications for the interests 
and goals of various groups. Given the market structure of the tobacco industry – 
typically a monopoly or oligopoly for most products in most countries – different 
excises may have different effects on government revenue, manufacturer profit, 
consumer price, perceived product quality and variety and tax administration (8–16). 
Consequently, the two types of excise taxes – specific and ad valorem – may have 
different implications for public health to the extent that they affect individual 
consumption via their impact on perceived product quality, variety and prices. 
Moreover, governments have the potential to influence tobacco excises to manage 
demand, raise revenue and promote public health.
20  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
The impact of tax on prices and in turn on consumption is also influenced by 
price and income elasticities, as well as consumer perceptions of quality (“perceived 
quality”) and the variety of available products, which, in turn, are closely linked to 
the type of tax structure adopted.
Tax structure is affected by both the price elasticity of demand and the price 
elasticity of supply. The price elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of 
consumer demand to changes in prices. The price elasticity of supply measures how 
sensitive producers are to changes in prices. 
Tobacco tax structure is also influenced by market structure. In a monopoly, the 
profit-maximizing firm sets the price, considering the price elasticity of demand: the 
lower the price elasticity (in absolute value) – i.e. the less sensitive the consumer is 
to price changes – the higher the price the monopolist can set. Profits are typically 
abnormal in a monopolist market structure, meaning total sales revenue is higher 
than total cost (where total cost includes a normal profit). A monopolist producer 
therefore receives more than the minimum reward required to invest its (physical 
and human) capital and undertake business risks. 
Economic theory predicts that in a private monopoly, prices are higher than in 
an oligopolistic market. This is not, however, necessarily true when the monopoly 
is owned by the state and the government’s objective is not straightforward profit 
maximization: the government might have other considerations, such as preserving 
jobs (e.g. in China) or keeping prices low for low-income consumers (e.g. in Egypt). 
Under a monopoly, an ad valorem taxation structure enables the monopolist 
producer to set prices lower than would be possible under a specific tax structure. 
This is feasible because under ad valorem taxation, when supply increases and price 
falls, the price reduction is not fully borne by the producer. Rather, the price reduc-
tion is partly shared by the government since, as supply increases, the tax per unit 
of product sold falls. In other words, ad valorem taxation leads to lower prices and 
higher consumption relative to revenue-equivalent specific taxation. Technically, this 
means that the supply function is less elastic under ad valorem taxation. In contrast, 
under a specific taxation structure, any increase in the monopolist producer price 
will go to the producers as revenue, which incentivizes them to increase prices. 
The same logic also applies to an oligopolistic market structure, where profits 
again are, in general, abnormal.
KEY TAKEAWAY 1 
In a monopoly or an oligopoly, specific taxation incentivizes industry  
to set prices higher than it would with ad valorem taxation.
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Understanding oligopolies, however, is more complicated, since they are characterized 
by strategic interdependence among a few firms. This strategic interdependence 
extends to the relationship between industry and regulators. Industry anticipates 
the government’s regulatory policy – whether through tax or other interventions – 
and acts accordingly. For example, competitors may coordinate and lobby against 
a certain tax structure reform or tax rate increase. 
Under an oligopoly market structure, ad valorem taxation is a relatively more 
efficient tool for transferring part of the profits to the government as tax revenue, 
since it acts like both an excise and a profit tax. In contrast, a specific tax has a 
smaller (negative) effect on profits. This explains why we observe multinationals 
that are leaders in high-priced brands (e.g. Philip Morris International [PMI]) 
lobbying in favour of specific taxation (17). As an example, in the countries of the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), the tobacco industry 
has been trying for a long time to lobby governments to introduce a specific excise 
(18–21). After years of consideration and discussions on the possible introduction 
of excise taxes, the GCC adopted the Common Excise Tax Agreement of the States 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council in November 2016 (21), which introduced an ad 
valorem excise on tobacco products. 
Tobacco companies’ support for excise tax structures ultimately depends on the 
market segments they control in a particular country. A company selling mainly 
premium brands will favour specific excises, whereas a company that sells mid-priced 
or economy brands would favour ad valorem excise (17). 
When oligopolistic firms produce identical products, a specific tax has a stronger 
positive effect on price and is more likely to be overshifted to consumer prices than 
an ad valorem tax (13). Overshifting means that the price increases by more than 
the tax increase itself. Empirical evidence supports this (22–26). 
KEY TAKEAWAY 2 
In an oligopoly, prices are likely to increase by more than the amount  
of the specific tax increase when demand is relatively inelastic.
In general, demand for a product depends not only on prices but also on consumer 
perceptions of quality and preferences for variety. For example, the most popular 
brand in GCC countries is Marlboro, a premium brand (1). 
Consumers differ in their willingness to pay, depending on their respective 
perceptions of quality, which influence whether they ultimately purchase high- or 
low-priced brands. A tax-induced price increase can cause the following plausible 
responses from consumers or users of tobacco products: (1) a group of consum-
ers will quit; (2) a group of consumers will reduce their overall consumption; 
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(3) another group, most likely high-income users, will switch to an upgraded version 
of the tobacco product if its relative price (compared to the cheaper brand) has been 
reduced, which is the case under a specific tax increase; there might also be a group 
of consumers in the lower income range who switch to lower-priced variants of the 
tobacco product if the price gap increases, as is the case under an ad valorem tax 
increase; and (4) another group might switch to the illegal market or buy products 
in a neighbouring country with a lower tax where possible. 
Consumers’ decisions to purchase are also affected by their preferences for variety 
– meaning preferences among products that consumers perceive as equal in quality 
but are given different characteristics by the producers to account for consumer 
taste preferences. Thus, it is possible that a tax increase that leads to an increase in 
average prices will lead to an increase in the total quantity demanded in the market 
because of an increase in the variety of product choices available to consumers. Variety 
enables new consumers to be captured, especially in an environment lacking certain 
regulations (e.g. without plain packaging and flavour bans). The tobacco industry was 
able to capture a new group of consumers when it introduced menthol cigarettes into 
the tobacco market. There is more than sufficient evidence that menthol cigarettes 
increased youth smoking initiation, increased nicotine dependence and reduced 
adult smoking cessation (27). To prevent this from happening in their countries, 
Member States of the EU have prohibited characterizing flavours other than tobacco 
in tobacco products (28). It is therefore important to consider the broader effects 
that the structure and level of an excise tax can have on average price, perceived 
quality and the variety of cigarette brands and other emerging substitutes.
When consumers make choices based on dimensions other than quantity, the 
two types of tax structures are not equivalent, even in a perfectly competitive market 
where firms have no market power (29–30). To illustrate this point, consider a 
US$ 1 cost to improve consumer perceptions of quality for a tobacco product. This 
will lead to an equivalent price increase under specific taxation but not under ad 
valorem taxation. At an ad valorem rate of 20%, the price must increase by more 
than US$ 1, or by 1/(1 – 0.2) to cover the US$ 1 cost of improvement, due to the 
multiplier effect. A specific tax induces consumers to reduce the quantity demanded, 
but they might still choose to pay a higher price in exchange for a product that they 
perceive to be of better quality. An ad valorem tax, on the other hand, leads to a 
reduction in both quantity and perceived quality, not a substitution between them. 
An ad valorem tax has only an income effect and – unlike specific taxation – does 
not lead to substitution between perceived quality and quantity.
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KEY TAKEAWAY 3 
Under specific taxation, the industry has incentives to create upgraded 
variants of tobacco products that attract new consumers and 
encourage consumption. 
When firms produce differentiated products, as the tobacco industry does, economic 
theory provides ambiguous results regarding specific versus ad valorem taxation. 
The relative effects of the two types of tax are not as straightforward as in the case of 
oligopolistic firms producing a homogeneous product. With differentiated products, 
the relative effects of the tax types depend on various assumptions: whether or not 
firms face symmetric costs, whether the number of firms is fixed or new firms can 
enter the market and the level of the tax revenue requirement. When firms face 
different costs, ad valorem taxes exacerbate the absolute differences in marginal 
costs between them. The high-cost brand is not considered a perfect substitute for 
the low-cost brand. A sufficiently high ad valorem tax rate may lead to a relative 
underproduction of the high-cost products (31). The effect of specific and ad va-
lorem taxes on consumer perceptions of quality depends on market structure and 
the price and income elasticities of demand across various qualities. The relative 
price of the cheapest product does not necessarily remain unchanged or increase; 
it might fall (32). 
Empirical evidence showing that increases in the specific tax lead to a lower market 
share for the cheaper generic brands and an upward shift to premium brands (33–34) 
usually considers gradual tax increases and ignores income effects. Chaloupka et al. 
(35) found that in 21 EU countries that impose a mixed tax system, the price gap 
between premium and low-priced brands – while not reflecting the full distribution 
of cigarette prices – is smaller when the specific component of the mixed structure 
dominates.7 Although the price gaps are narrower under specific taxation, there is 
evidence that firms sometimes respond by introducing new, very cheap (subvalue) 
brands, or they exercise differential tax shifting. 
This practice has been evident in India for quite some time, with the Indian 
Tobacco Company launching a number of cheaper variants of its flagship cigarette 
brand, Gold Flake, to take advantage of a lower excise tax rate in the so-called 
microcigarette (< 60 mm length) market (36). Consequently, the cheapest end of 
India’s cigarette market has expanded significantly in recent years due in part to 
the marketing of new brand variants like Gold Flake Century.
7  The EU countries impose a mixed tax structure with a minimum tax floor. Some countries rely on the 
specific component more than others, but they remain within a given range (the specific component 
must be between 5% and 76.5% of total tax share of the weighted average price).
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As another example, transnational tobacco companies, which have sold ultra-
low-priced brands in the United Kingdom since 2006, have managed to double their 
market share in a few years: their real price did not increase, since they absorbed part 
of the tax increases (37). The share of ultra-low-priced brands increased between 
2001 and 2009 from 5% to 10%, while the market share of economy brands increased 
from 40% to 50% and the market share of premium brands and mid-priced brands 
decreased during the same period (from 35% to less than 25% for the former and 
from 15% to 5% for the latter). In order to keep the price of discount brands low 
and certain consumers in the market, firms may overshift the tax for premium 
products and undershift it for the lower-priced products (37–40). 
KEY TAKEAWAY 4 
Evidence suggests that the price gap between brands is narrower 
under a specific tax structure. As the tobacco industry simultaneously 
consolidates producers and widens its portfolio of products, evidence 
is emerging that it is introducing cheaper brands while increasing the 
price of its expensive brands, therefore paradoxically widening the 
price gap within its products. The extent of the impact is still unclear, 
however, and this evidence does not negate the overall conclusion  
that a specific tax structure reduces price gaps.
The impact of tax structure on final price:  
uniform specific, ad valorem and mixed systems 
Evidence from the 2019 RGTE (1) data suggests that the average price of the most-
sold brand of cigarettes – weighted by the number of smokers – is the highest in 
countries implementing a mixed system that relies more on specific excise, followed 
by countries applying specific excise taxes only, followed by countries applying a 
mixed system that relies more on ad valorem and then by countries that apply ad 
valorem excise only (Fig. 2.6). The price is lowest in countries that have no excise 
at all. In past WHO reports on the global tobacco epidemic, countries that applied 
specific excise only had the highest price, on average. The trend may have changed 
partly because more countries are adopting mixed excise systems.
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Fig. 2.6 Weighted average price and excise for a pack of the most-sold brand of cigarettes,  
by excise tax structure, 2018
Notes: Averages are weighted by WHO estimates of the number of current cigarette smokers ages 15 
and older in each country in 2017.
Prices are expressed in PPP adjusted dollars or international dollars to account for differences in purchasing 
power across countries – based on 53 high-income, 97 middle-income and 28 low-income countries, with 
data on prices of the most-sold brand, excise and other taxes and PPP conversion factors.
Source: (1).
Shang et al. (41) describe and compare price distributions, using data from 16 
countries of the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Project that impose different 
cigarette tax structures. Specific uniform taxation tends to result in less variability 
in prices than all other structures (ad valorem tax, mixed tax, tiered tax). In general, 
structures other than uniform specific tax give rise to more opportunities for brand 
switching and tax avoidance. Reliance on complicated systems is likely to be as-
sociated with wider price distribution, leading to greater tax avoidance, as there are 
more opportunities for substitution with cheaper brands when taxes rise. 
KEY TAKEAWAY 5 
Evidence suggests that the tax structures most likely to lead to higher 
prices are uniform specific excise tax structures or mixed systems  
that rely more on specific excises.
Mixed system 
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The impact of tax structure on final price:  
uniform excise versus tiered tax systems
Another aspect of tax structure that impacts final price is the use of tiered taxation, 
i.e. tax rates that vary according to product characteristics. The characteristics can 
vary, from price level to the type of tobacco leaf contained in the cigarette, the size 
of production volume, the packaging, etc. Table 2.1 (earlier) lists the criteria used by 
31 countries as the basis for different tax rates. Evidence suggests that the average 
cigarette price and the average excise level for a pack of cigarettes tend to be much 
lower in countries that use a tiered excise structure than in countries that use a 
uniform excise tax (see Fig. 2.7). 
Fig. 2.7 Weighted average price and excise for a pack of the most-sold brand of cigarettes for 
countries with and without tiered taxation, 2018
Notes: Averages are weighted by WHO estimates of the number of current cigarette smokers ages 15 
and older in each country in 2017.
Prices are expressed in PPP adjusted dollars or international dollars to account for differences in the 
purchasing power across countries – based on 53 high-income, 97 middle-income and 28 low-income 
countries, with data on prices of the most-sold brand, excise and other taxes and PPP conversion factors.
Source: (1).
Uniform specific tax structures are likely to lead to relatively higher prices with 
less variability in price distribution. Compared with tiered tax structures that have 
differential rates based on brand characteristics, uniform taxation may reduce 
consumers’ incentive to switch to cheaper brands (leading to higher quit rates 
and lower prevalence), as well as decreasing manufacturers’ incentive to reduce 
their tax liabilities by changing their pricing strategies, production process or size 
(42–45). In Indonesia, for example, where small producers were taxed more fa-
vourably, manufacturers had an incentive to reduce their scale of production but 
increase the number of affiliated small companies. The issue was resolved when tax 
authorities considered the aggregate production of all affiliated companies in the 
application of differential tax rates. By 2017, there were 786 active factories, while 
Excise uniform









CHAP T ER 2. TO BACCO E XCISE TA X PO LI C Y 27 
there had been 4 198 factories in 2006.8 Abolishing the differential tax rates would 
have been even more effective in removing the incentive for tax avoidance, as well 
as helping improve both public health and government finances.
KEY TAKEAWAY 6 
Evidence suggests that applying a uniform excise tax on cigarettes  
is not only easier to administer than tiered systems but also  
more likely to lead to higher cigarette prices.
The impact of tax structure on final price:  
the significance of the choice of the tax base
 It is important for the excise tax to be applied to the base that leads to the greatest 
possible effect on price and revenue. For specific taxation, the tax base is the quantity 
of tobacco products. The quantity of cigarettes, cigars and bidis is measured in number 
of sticks; for other tobacco products, such as smokeless tobacco or roll-your-own 
(RYO), it is measured in the weight of the tobacco. When the tax is ad valorem, the 
choice of the tax base is important not only for health considerations – due to its 
effect on consumption – but also for tax revenue generation and industry profits. 
An ad valorem tax that is based on the ex-factory price (or CIF value) provides 
tobacco manufacturers with opportunities to reduce their tax liability, especially 
when they control the distribution system. Tobacco producers may sell cigarettes 
to distributors who are related parties at a reduced price, which then serves as the 
basis for calculating their ad valorem tax liability. Distributors, however, can then 
set high prices and share the extra profit with the producers (46). Because of the 
potential for such trade mispricing, the best practice is to use the retail price as the 
tax base and introduce a minimum excise tax per pack. 
Data in the 2019 WHO RGTE (1) show that, on average, the price level of a pack 
of cigarettes and the excise level are both much higher in countries that use retail 
price as the base for their ad valorem excise (Fig. 2.8). The maximum retail sales 
price, which includes all taxes, is used as the ad valorem tax base in the EU. That 
price also forms the tax base for ad valorem taxes in a growing number of LMICs, 
including Brazil, Egypt, Thailand, Turkey and Rwanda. 
8  Indonesian Ministry of Finance, personal communication, 2017.
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Fig. 2.8 Weighted average price of the most-sold brand of cigarettes in countries that use retail 
price as the base for their ad valorem excise, 2018
 
Notes: Averages are weighted by WHO estimates of the number of current cigarette smokers ages 15 
and older in each country in 2017.
Prices are expressed in PPP adjusted dollars or international dollars to account for differences in the 
purchasing power across countries – based on 53 high-income, 97 middle-income and 28 low-income 
countries with data on prices of the most-sold brand, excise and other taxes and PPP conversion factors.
Source: (1).
KEY TAKEAWAY 7 
The base on which the excise is applied is important. For specific excise, 
the base needs to be clearly defined (for cigarettes, cigars and bidis, it 
is the number of sticks; for other tobacco products, such as smokeless 
tobacco or RYO, it is the weight of tobacco). For ad valorem excise – 
where the base is typically either retail price, CIF value or producer 
price – evidence suggests that countries that apply the excise tax on 
the retail price of cigarettes tend to have higher prices than those that 
apply the tax on other bases. CIF and producer prices are difficult for 
government authorities to ascertain and are prone to undervaluation.
The tax impact on final price: the significance of the minimum excise tax
The use of a minimum excise tax in countries with ad valorem or mixed systems 
is another important factor in determining final price. On average, the price of a 
pack of cigarettes – as well as the excise level – is much higher in countries that 
impose a minimum specific excise than in those that do not (see Fig. 2.9). While 
more than half of the 47 countries that apply a minimum excise are members of 
the EU, removing EU countries from the average calculations produces the same 
conclusions.
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Fig. 2.9 Weighted average price of the most-sold brand of cigarettes in countries with and 
without a minimum specific excise tax, 2018
 
Notes: Averages are weighted by WHO estimates of the number of current cigarette smokers ages 15 
and older in each country in 2017.
Prices are expressed in PPP adjusted dollars or international dollars to account for differences in the 
purchasing power across countries – based on 53 high-income, 97 middle-income and 28 low-income 
countries with data on prices of the most-sold brand, excise and other taxes and PPP conversion factors.
Source: (1).
KEY TAKEAWAY 8 
Among countries that apply an ad valorem or mixed excise tax  
on cigarettes, evidence suggests that those that impose a minimum 
specific excise tax tend to have higher prices than those that  
do not. The minimum excise tax also helps guarantee  
minimum excise revenues.
Summarizing the advantages, disadvantages and impacts of the choice  
of excise tax structure for tobacco products
Table 2.2 summarizes the characteristics of different types of tobacco excise taxes and 
the advantages and disadvantages of each type in relation to its impact on quantity 
demanded, perceived quality of brands offered, price, certainty and stability of 
revenue, administration and enforcement and opportunities for tax avoidance and 
tax evasion as they are predicted by the economic theory of imperfect competition 
and observed in real life.
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Table 2.2 Characteristics of different types of tobacco excise taxes
Specific excise Ad valorem 
excise
Ad valorem 
with a minimum 
specific excise 
(or excise tax 
floor)
Mixed specific
and ad valorem 
excise
Mixed specific  
and ad
valorem excise 
with a minimum 
specific excise 
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Specific excise Ad valorem 
excise
Ad valorem 
with a minimum 
specific excise 
(or excise tax 
floor)
Mixed specific
and ad valorem 
excise
Mixed specific  
and ad
valorem excise 
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2.2.2 OTHER TAX DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The significance of automatic adjustments and indexation  
of specific tax to inflation
Specific taxation does not depend on price and therefore, unlike the ad valorem 
tax, is not automatically adjusted for inflation. The real value of a specific tax is 
eroded over time as the price of the taxed product increases. Therefore, especially 
in countries with rapid growth in inflation, the nominal value of the specific tax 
must be increased regularly in order for the tax to maintain its real value. This is of 
great importance for both public health and public revenues, especially in countries 
where manufacturers do not increase prices regularly and/or low-priced tobacco 
products are the dominant products in the market.
Table 2.3 lists countries that include automatic adjustments to their excise in 
order to avoid the erosion of the specific excise over time, using different units of 
adjustment and based on different frequencies.
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Table 2.3 Countries that include automatic adjustments to the specific excise
COUNTRY UNIT OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPECIFIC EXCISE 
Argentina Inflation (consumer price index [ CPI]), on a quarterly basis
Armenia Minimum specific excise set to increase in the Tax Code by 15% on 
average between 2019 and 2021
Australia Wages – excise rates on tobacco and tobacco products increase in 
March and September each year, based on average weekly ordinary 
time earnings
Bosnia and Herzegovina Specific excise rate is increased annually by at least 7.50 convertible 
marks per 1 000 cigarettes; minimum excise tax is increased annually  
to be at least 60% of the weighted average price
Canada Inflation – federal tobacco tax rates are to be increased every five years, 
indexed to Canada’s CPI starting in 2019
Chile Inflation
Colombia Specific tax set to 1 400 pesos, increased to 2100 pesos in 2018; starting 
in 2019, it will increase yearly by the CPI plus 4 points
Costa Rica Inflation
Dominican Republic Inflation, on a quarterly basis
France Increase from 2017 to reach an average price for cigarettes of €10 per 
pack by 2020
Honduras Inflation, annually to December of the previous year
Italy Minimum tax burden calculated every year in March on the basis of the 
weighted average price of cigarettes sold in the previous year 
New Zealand Inflation annually plus 10% annually from 2017 to 2020
Nicaragua Updated annually as of 1 January 2017, taking the highest among 
the annual devaluation of the official exchange rate of Cordoba with 
respect to the US dollar, published by the Central Bank of Nicaragua, 
and the annual inflation rate of the CPI published by the National 
Development Information Institute, observed in the last 12 months 
available
North Macedonia Specific and minimum specific rate increase by 0.2 denars per cigarette 
on 1 July each year until 2023
Philippines Agreed tax increases and rates for specific excise tax between 2020 and 
2023, with a 5% indexation thereafter
Romania Inflation, annual (1 January) adjustment of the total excise according to 
inflation calculated on 1 October of the previous year
Serbia Inflation, every six months
Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) – Botswana, 
Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia 
and South Africa
Inflation, on an annual basis9
Sweden Inflation
9  While the adjustment is not strictly automatic in the SACU, it is greatly informed by the inflation rate. 
The Treasury has some discretion. In recent years, the increases have typically been slightly above inflation.
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COUNTRY UNIT OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPECIFIC EXCISE 
Turkey Producer Price Index 
Ukraine Agreement to increase the specific component 20% annually between 
2019 and 2025
United Kingdom Increase by 2% above the retail price index (measure of inflation) for 
the 2015–2020 Parliament
 Source: (1).
KEY TAKEAWAY 9 
To avoid erosion of their specific excise tax, countries need to regularly  
– and, ideally, automatically – adjust the excise to inflation.
The significance of automatic adjustments and indexation of specific  
tax to income growth
In addition to the risk of erosion due to inflation, the effect of a (specific) tax can 
be significantly reduced if the tax is not adjusted for increases in consumer income. 
Income growth makes products more affordable – thereby encouraging consump-
tion – especially in countries with rapid income growth. Australia is one of the rare 
countries that explicitly adjusts its specific excise rates according to wage growth 
(see Table 2.3). However, a number of countries have adopted automatic adjustments 
that are higher than inflation and sometimes largely cover income growth as well 
(see also Table 2.3). Adjusting tax for income growth contributes to increases in 
prices that make tobacco products less affordable (see section 2.2.3).
KEY TAKEAWAY 10 
The specific excise tax needs to be adjusted to reflect income growth 
so that tobacco products do not become more affordable over time. 
Measures for specific contexts: the role of pricing and other non-tax regulation 
Emerging evidence indicates that the tobacco industry finds ways to mitigate the 
impact of higher taxes on prices. For example, despite the heavy reliance on specific 
taxation in the United Kingdom, a price differential between premium and cheap 
cigarettes still exists. There is evidence that the tobacco industry does not always 
pass tax increases on to cheaper products (37, 48). Differential shifting among price 
categories is also observed in the EU (49–50), New Zealand (38) and the United 
States (51). Therefore, the public health community has suggested that pricing 
regulation could be considered as a method of eliminating inexpensive tobacco 
products that are often used by the young and the poor (52). Three types of pricing 
regulation are described below: minimum mark-up, price floor and price ceiling.
CHAP T ER 2. TO BACCO E XCISE TA X PO LI C Y 35 
Pricing regulation
• Minimum mark-up – It has been argued that a minimum mark-up of wholesale 
tobacco prices could be a better strategy to raise prices of tobacco products 
than excise tax increases. Minimum mark-up laws aim to discourage the 
sale of products below an assessed cost by imposing a mark-up to the cost 
declared at different levels of the supply chain. Some studies in the United 
States have shown that minimum mark-ups do not increase average cigarette 
prices (53–54). However, a recent study of the impact of minimum mark-up/
price laws has shown that these laws are linked with higher prices, especially 
for the cheapest brands, and could be used as an effective tool to mitigate the 
impact of the industry’s price-reducing promotions (55). Another concern 
related to minimum mark-ups is that they can be manipulated by manufac-
turers and are likely to lead to higher profits for the industry, as well as extra 
administrative costs for the government (56).
• Price floor – A few studies suggest that setting a price floor, or a minimum 
price, is an alternative strategy for increasing tobacco taxes, particularly with 
respect to reducing health inequities (57–60). A price floor, imposed by the 
government or as a vertical restraint imposed by the supplier upon retailers, 
is a price that firms cannot legally undercut. Governments impose price floors 
to restrain unfair competition or, in the case of services, to increase quality. It 
is difficult, however, to find the right floor or to anticipate unintended conse-
quences or an industry’s adjustments. A study in Malaysia, where a minimum 
price for cigarettes was imposed in 2010, found that the policy did not seem 
to have a meaningful impact on prices: licit brand prices remained well above 
the minimum price, while illicit brands remained well below it. This outcome 
may be a result of the floor being set too low or the proportion of illicit trade 
being high, either of which would reduce the effectiveness of the policy (52).
  In the EU, imposing minimum retail sale prices for cigarettes could be a 
breach of harmonized legislation concerning the internal market, as minimum 
prices would distort competition. Therefore, increasing minimum excise 
duties is recommended instead, to discourage consumption (61). Increasing 
the minimum excise duties would also result in the additional revenue going 
to the governments instead of contributing to industry profits. 
  A price floor would probably lead to increased industry profits – giving the 
industry greater funds for its marketing strategies – and lower tax revenue 
for governments, reducing their ability to cover costs associated with tobacco 
use. By reducing price competition, the price floor allows firms to compete 
aggressively for market share in other dimensions (e.g. product specifica-
tions). Competition among firms may prevent them from raising their prices, 
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but a government that imposes a price floor does this for them. Minimum 
pricing is likely to create windfall profits for manufacturers and retailers. It 
can even help manufacturers sustain a cartel. If the industry uses the money 
to increase promotions, advertising or grant proposals for related research, 
this could undo some of the potential benefits of the policy.10 
  Some recent evidence shows that, at least in the case of the United Kingdom, 
increased concentration of power among a handful of multinational corpora-
tions is enabling them to undermine tax increases through increased price 
segmentation, and that requiring minimum prices might be a good way to 
address the problem. A longitudinal analysis of price data from the United 
Kingdom (48) has shown that despite regular excise tax increases over time, 
average real prices for cheaper segments of the tobacco market (in this case, 
cigarettes and RYO) did not increase – indicating an undershifting of the tax 
increases in those segments that resulted in increased sales volume. At the 
same time, average prices for more-expensive market segments increased, 
indicating overshifting of the tax increases that resulted in decreased sales 
volume. This industry strategy ensures that the most price-sensitive consumers 
remain addicted, while encouraging initiation and discouraging cessation. 
Furthermore, segmenting the market further by overshifting the tax increase 
on premium brands while undershifting it for cheaper brands mitigates the 
impact of declining consumption resulting from higher taxes while increasing 
overall industry margins and profitability. 
  Another situation where setting minimum prices can be a useful policy 
is specific to the United States. Banning marketing and promotions11 is not 
possible under the freedom of expression protections of the Constitution of 
the United States (Amendment I), and it was estimated in 2008 that more 
than 82% of all advertising and promotional spending by the tobacco industry 
was focused on reducing the price of their products at the point of sale (62). 
This limitation on how government can set policy has paved the way for the 
implementation of minimum price policies in many states and cities to counter 
the detrimental impact of price promotions on consumption and on the tax 
policy itself. Huang et al. (55) found that the presence of minimum price laws 
was associated with higher cigarette prices. They also noted that cigarette prices 
were even higher than prices resulting from minimum price laws in states 
that also prohibit industry from engaging in other price-reduction strategies, 
10  See, for example, the PMI strategy of setting up the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World and grant 
proposals for related research. 
11  See section below on banning promotional discounts for tobacco products for further discussion 
about marketing and promotions.
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such as below-cost combination sales, using trade discounts to reduce the 
base cost of cigarettes and distributing below-cost coupons to consumers.
  In the contexts of both price segmentation and price promotions, the imposi-
tion of minimum prices as a complementary policy to excise tax increases 
– not as a policy alternative – may help guarantee that taxes do indeed lead 
to the intended reduction in consumption. Nonetheless, more evidence is 
needed to support the effectiveness of this policy. 
• Price ceiling – Concerns about differential tax shifting have led to suggestions 
that a price cap may benefit public health by limiting the tobacco industry’s 
ability to reduce average prices by differentially shifting tax increases among 
various price segments (63–64). Because tobacco manufacturers operate across 
international markets, however, they could maintain low prices in one coun-
try but maintain overall profitability by selling more premium products in 
another country. Additionally, limiting price increases does not fit the public 
health purpose of reducing consumption. It is worth noting that maximum 
retail prices are sometimes used as a base for calculating the ad valorem tax 
payments in countries with ad valorem or mixed tax systems. 
In a systematic review of the literature on non-tax policy approaches to raising prices, 
Golden et al. (63) hypothesized how such policies would influence price dispersion 
and average prices. Their study found that minimum price policies combined with 
promotion bans have the potential to increase average prices. This is, of course, 
relevant in a context where price promotions are present. From either a theoretical 
or a practical standpoint, however, it is clear that price policies cannot be used alone 
and should always be considered as complements to excise tax increases. Significantly 
increasing taxes is the most effective way to dissuade consumption, correcting 
whatever bias may exist. Significant tax increases also provide the added benefit 
of raising money for the government rather than profits for the tobacco industry. 
Nonetheless, a minimum price might help narrow the gap between cheap and pre-
mium cigarettes when applied to all tobacco products to avoid product substitution.
Other non-tax regulation
• Banning promotional discounts for tobacco products – The sale of tobacco 
products at a discount rate – such as through reduced-price coupons or 
buy-one-get-one-free offers – encourages consumption and undermines 
tax increases. Such practices should be completely banned. They often exist 
outside the realm of the finance sector because they are considered a type of 
marketing – promotional discounts are usually addressed in tobacco control 
laws under the Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship provision. 
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According to the 2019 RGTE (1), 118 countries out of 195 with all levels of 
income had such a provision implemented as of 31 December 2018. 
• Banning the sale of single sticks of cigarettes – Article 16 of the WHO FCTC, 
“Sales to and by minors,” paragraph 3, requires Parties to “prohibit the sale 
of cigarettes individually or in small packets which increase the affordability 
of such products to minors”.
  Some smokers opt for buying single sticks partly because of the lower im-
mediate costs of buying cigarettes individually (65). Internal (unpublished) 
analysis of single-stick prices collected by WHO for the 2012, 2014 and 2016 
editions of the WHO RGTE shows that, in fact, the aggregate price of 20 
single sticks of cigarettes sold separately is generally higher than the price of 
a 20-cigarette pack sold in the market of a specific country. Despite this fact, 
single-stick sales – and sales of small-sized packs – make cigarettes accessible 
to consumers with limited disposable income. De Ojeda (66) found in a 
study conducted in Guatemala that single-cigarette sales are associated with 
increased cigarette accessibility for less-educated, lower-income populations 
and minors. Single-stick sales are also a feature of many markets in South-East 
Asia, including most notably Bangladesh and India, but also in other parts 
of the world, e.g. South Africa.
  Single-stick sales also reduce the impact of a tax increase, since the in-
crease per stick is much smaller than the increase per pack (67). In a study 
investigating how smokers in New York City responded to a tax increase 
of US$ 1.25 per pack in 2008, Coady et al. (68) found that 15% of smokers 
bought more single cigarettes than they had previously.12 By allowing single 
stick sales, governments risk losing part of the ad valorem taxes if the tax 
base is the retail selling price; the retail price of single sticks is much more 
difficult to monitor than the retail price of packs of cigarettes, on which, for 
example, tax stamps with prices can be applied.
  An internal WHO analysis of the most recent tobacco control laws in 2018 
in 195 countries found that 86 countries impose by law a ban on the sale of 
single sticks of cigarettes (36% of the countries are high-income, and 64% 
are LMICs). In addition to banning the sale of single sticks of cigarettes, 67 
of the 86 countries specify a minimum size for packs of cigarettes. Most 
(52 countries) use the 20 cigarettes per pack standard, but minimum sizes 
12  Before 2018, the use of single sticks was possible, but it has since been banned. See New York City 
Administrative Code. chapter 7: regulation of tobacco products, subchapter 1: Tobacco Product Regula-
tion Act, §17-704.a-1. New York: New York Legal Publishing Corporation; 2020 (http://library.amlegal.
com/nxt/gateway.dll/New%20York/admin/title17health/chapter7regulationoftobaccoproducts?f=tem
plates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:newyork_ny$anc=JD_T17C007, accessed 29 September 2020).
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range from five sticks in Ghana up to 25 sticks in Papua New Guinea. Another 
15 countries do not specifically ban the sale of single sticks but do specify 
the minimum size for packs of cigarettes. 
  According to the WHO FCTC, in order to reduce affordability, single stick 
sales should be banned and a minimum number of cigarettes contained per 
pack should also be defined.
KEY TAKEAWAY 11 
A number of non-tax measures are closely connected to tax policies, 
including price regulations, bans on promotional discounts for tobacco 
products and bans on the sale of single sticks of cigarettes. 
 
The price policies discussed are (1) minimum mark-up, (2) price floors 
and (3) price ceilings. Current evidence does not yet demonstrate 
that minimum mark-ups and price floors lead to increases in average 
price. Nonetheless, they may be relevant in some specific contexts as 
complementary policies to excise tax increases. Price ceilings limit price 
increases, which can mitigate their impact on consumption. 
 
Price marketing strategies such as promotional discounts and the sale 
of single sticks undermine the effect of tax policies and should be 
banned. A minimum pack size should also be required by regulators.
Tax increases and their possible impact on inflation
At times, the inflationary impact of tax increases on cigarettes and other tobacco 
products is raised as an argument for not increasing these taxes. This may be a 
concern in countries where wages and/or a significant share of government spend-
ing is indexed to inflation (e.g. for public pension payments) or where government 
policy is to keep inflation low. The extent to which tobacco product tax increases 
lead to increases in inflation depends on several factors, most notably the share of 
these taxes in prices and the weight tobacco prices are given in computing a price 
index. For example, if taxes account for 25% of tobacco product prices, a doubling 
of the tax (100% increase) will increase prices by 25%. If the weight given to tobacco 
products in the price index is 3%, the index will rise by 0.75% in response to the tax 
increase. As tobacco taxes account for a larger share of tobacco product prices, the 
inflationary impact of a tax increase will be greater. Similarly, as tobacco products 
are given more weight in computing a price index, a given tax increase will have a 
greater inflationary effect. In general, for most countries, the inflationary impact 
of tobacco product tax increases would be relatively small (47).
40  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
Consumer price indexes have multiple purposes. They are an important economic 
indicator for most countries and are often a key determinant of monetary policy. 
Inflation rates have a direct impact on interest rates and exchange rates. In many 
countries, changes in wages, social security benefits and other payments are tied 
to inflation as measured by a price index. Price indexes are used to provide more 
accurate comparisons of changes in expenditures, incomes and prices for specific 
goods over time, as well as to allow comparisons across countries.
Given the many uses of consumer price indexes and the potential inflationary 
impact of tobacco tax increases, some governments have developed alternatives that 
exclude tobacco (and sometimes other goods) for some uses. For example, since 
1992, France has excluded tobacco products from the price index used for adjust-
ing minimum wages (47). However, many countries continue to include tobacco 
product prices in their consumer price indexes. Excluding tobacco products from 
the basket of goods used in developing key price indexes would greatly reduce 
concerns about their impact on inflation. In addition, with declining consumption 
of tobacco products, the inclusion of their prices in key price indexes results in a 
distorted measure of price for many consumers.
KEY TAKEAWAY 12 
If governments are concerned about the potential inflationary 
impact of a tobacco tax increase because wages or some government 
spending may be tied to a price index, they can use a price index  
that excludes tobacco products. 
The importance of taxing cigarettes and other tobacco products  
in a comparable way
While cigarettes are the most commonly used tobacco product globally, other tobacco 
products are as prevalent and sometimes more prevalent than cigarettes in some 
parts of the world. Bidis and smokeless tobacco are the main products consumed 
in some countries in South-East Asia – Bangladesh and India in particular – and 
waterpipes are widely used for smoking tobacco in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region (4). These products, as well as RYO, have historically been taxed much less 
than cigarettes (see, for example, Fig. 2.10 for Bangladesh and India, where the 
excise tax and prices of bidis and smokeless tobacco are much lower than those for 
cigarettes). This differential taxation undermines the health impact of excise taxes 
on tobacco products because (1) it encourages users to switch from cigarettes to 
the lower-taxed product (see the case of Thailand below); (2) it is not effective in 
reducing tobacco use in general, especially if the most widely used product in the 
country is not cigarettes; (3) it can encourage tax avoidance by companies that may 
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redefine products that are similar to cigarettes so that they fall within the lower-
taxed product category (see the EU example below) and (4) it reduces the size of 
government revenues since those products could have been taxed at higher levels. 
Fig. 2.10 Price and tax of the most-sold brand of cigarettes, bidis and smokeless tobacco  
in Bangladesh and India, 2018
Source: (1).
In Thailand, for example, the price of cigarettes has been raised quite successfully 
through taxation over a number of years, while taxes and prices of loose or RYO 
tobacco have until very recently remained unchanged. Indigenous tobacco used 
for RYO cigarettes has historically been exempt from excise, while foreign tobacco 
was taxed at a low level relative to that of manufactured cigarettes. Consequently, 
Thailand experienced growth in the RYO market even though cigarette consumption 
had been falling.13 The Thai government eventually took strong action to address 
this issue. First, the exemption for indigenous tobacco was removed in 2018. The 
Cabinet then approved an increase in the excise rate on small producers (of indigenous 
tobacco) from 0.005 baht per gram to 0.025 baht per gram in 2020, with another 
increase to 0.1 baht per gram scheduled for 2021 (69). 
In the EU, the minimum excise duty levels for cigars and cigarillos is significantly 
lower than that for cigarettes. The Member States of the EU are required to levy an 
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excise duty of at least €90 per 1 000 cigarettes, which should be 60% of the weighted 
average retail selling price of cigarettes released for consumption. For cigars and 
cigarillos, only €12 per 1 000 items, or an excise duty of 5% of the retail selling price, 
is required. As a result, the excise tax share on cigarettes is much higher in many 
EU countries than the share for cigars and cigarillos. In response, some companies 
started to market so-called borderline cigarillos. These products have characteristics 
similar to cigarettes but can be sold at a lower price because for excise purposes, 
they are considered as cigarillos. Although this issue seems to be largely solved by 
amendments to the definitions of these products at the EU level and a change in tax 
structures in some countries, it is important to be aware of the unintended incentives 
that can be created by large gaps in excise tax levels between product categories 
(70–71). For more details on industry tactics to undermine tax increases, see Box 2.1.
KEY TAKEAWAY 13 
To make excise tax on tobacco products more effective in reducing 
overall tobacco use and to avoid substitution between products,  
all tobacco products need to be taxed in a comparable way.  
The Guidelines for implementation of Article 6 of the WHO FCTC (Price  
and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco) (73) recommend  
that all tobacco products should be taxed in a comparable way.
Box 2.1 Industry tactics used to undermine tax increases
Tax increases reduce the demand for tobacco products and present a threat to the 
tobacco industry’s high profits. The industry responds by using various strategies 
(17, 46, 48), including the following (46):
Stockpiling (forestalling/front-loading) – Before the implementation of an an-
nounced tax increase, manufacturers overproduce tobacco products, paying the 
pre-tax-increase rate. As a consequence, sales and tax revenue decline immediately 
but temporarily after the tax increase (while sales and revenues had increased sub-
stantially just before the tax increase) and the industry attributes this drop in revenue 
to the emergence or increase of illicit trade. This practice results in tax avoidance if 
there is no law prohibiting it (see also the discussion on anti-forestalling in Chapter 3).
Changing certain product characteristics (for example, weight or length) and/
or adjusting the production process – When tobacco products are taxed at different 
rates or are subject to different tax increases, the industry can, for example, re-label 
one type of tobacco product as another product that has a lower tax burden (as in 
the example of the EU above).
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Choosing the time of a price increase announcement strategically – The industry 
may raise prices in anticipation of a tax rate increase, generating extra profits in the 
period until the tax is actually implemented. When the tax increase is implemented, 
consumption and tax revenue will fall, but prices will not change, so the industry 
can claim that the tax policy was ineffective in reducing demand. 
Adopting price-discriminating strategies or price-related promotions – The 
industry may offer discounts, retailer rebates or added value (gifts) to tobacco 
purchases to minimize the loss of price-sensitive consumers. This, however, is not 
possible in countries where strict bans on tobacco advertising, promotions and 
sponsorship are implemented.
Using brand proliferation (for example, launching a low-priced brand) and 
price segmentation – Manufacturers can choose to reduce prices of certain brands or 
introduce new, even cheaper ones to keep price-sensitive consumers in the market. 
There is evidence that firms introduce new cheaper products and use price-marking 
– printing the price directly on packs of tobacco products – to lock in their price (48). 
Such practices compromise both public health and revenue objectives.
Differential shifting of tax increases across different price segments, depending 
on the market circumstances – The industry may increase the price of a product by 
more than the amount of the tax increase (tax overshifting) and blame the govern-
ment for the total increase. Tax overshifting is profitable when demand is inelastic, 
that is, when the price increase more than offsets the reduction in sales. The industry 
may overshift the tax increase for higher-priced brands, which are expected to be 
more price inelastic than lower-priced brands. Additionally, to keep price-sensitive 
consumers in the market, the industry may temporarily absorb part (or all) of the 
tax increase on lower-priced brands. The differential tax shifting will lead to different 
responses in the demand for the different brands (37, 48). 
Lobbying government to distort interventions – Government policy might be 
influenced by tobacco industry lobbying, directly or indirectly. Policy-makers are not 
simply welfare or revenue maximizers; they also value political support. Industry 
lobbying might lead to adopting a favourable type of taxation, postponing tobacco 
tax increases or distorting the tax rate downwards (17). Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC, 
“On the protection of public health policies with respect to tobacco control from 
commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry”, and its guidelines 
provide useful guidance on how to address tobacco industry interference. In fact, all 
181 countries that are Parties to the WHO FCTC have a legal obligation to implement 
the requirements of Article 5.3. 
Having correct expectations about industry responses is important for estimating 
the impact of a tax increase on consumption and tax revenue. 
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2.2.3 MEASURING IMPACT AND RECOMMENDED INDICATORS
Governments need to consider a number of indicators when formulating policy 
changes. Inappropriate assumptions about consumer behaviour, market structure 
and industry behaviour can lead to faulty policy analysis. 
Measuring impact on price and demand
Consumption habits, local traditions and industry characteristics – such as the 
number of different brands offered, the possibilities of cross-border shopping and 
the presence and level of illicit trade – all affect the shape of the demand and supply 
of tobacco products, thereby determining the value of the price elasticities. Price 
elasticity, together with the industry’s pricing strategies – for example, the degree 
of tax shifting – and the tax share in the retail price, determine the elasticity of 
the tax base, regardless of whether the base is determined by quantity (for specific 
taxation) or transaction value (for ad valorem taxation). 
The importance of elasticity estimates
Different types of elasticity should be considered:
• price elasticity
 – own-price elasticity – measures the response of consumers’ demand for 
a product following a change in the price of the product.
 – cross-price elasticity – measures the response of consumers’ demand for a 
product when the price of another product changes. Cross-price elasticity can 
also occur between different brands or price segments for the same product.
• income elasticity – the response of consumers’ demand for a product when 
their income level changes.
Correct estimates of price and income elasticities are important for policy-makers 
who need to anticipate the impact of a tax increase on consumption and tax rev-
enue. Estimates will vary depending on a number of factors, including whether 
responses are considered in the short run versus the long run, the functional form 
of the demand function used, whether factors such as addiction or tax evasion are 
accounted for and the way data are constructed. For example, details such as the 
degree of aggregation of data, whether gender- or age-specific data are used, the 
time span covered and which estimation procedures are used (e.g. ordinary least 
squares, two-stage least squares or generalized method of moments) will all affect 
the results of the estimate (72).
Price elasticities may change over time, as well because of changes in any of the 
other factors affecting demand, such as income or tobacco control measures, and also 
because of changes in estimation techniques and the types or sources of data used. 
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Moreover, what is of most interest is the price elasticity of total demand. A tax 
increase may reduce tax-paid retail sales but not necessarily total consumption. 
For example, smuggling can significantly bias price elasticities when the elasticities 
are estimated using legal sales data; not accounting for possible illicit trade might 
lead to overestimation. Similarly, when cross-border shopping is included, the price 
elasticity of demand is lower (in absolute value) (74). Estimating the total price 
elasticity of demand for legal and illegal consumption can be done by using cross-
sectional data from nationally representative household surveys. However, this 
approach also has its weaknesses. For example, respondents tend to underreport 
their consumption of tobacco, which leads to bias in the size of demand. Price 
endogeneity14 is another technical problem that can be challenging to address.
To comprehensively estimate the total effect of a tax increase on demand for all 
tobacco products as well as on tax revenue, the degree of substitutability between 
them needs to be estimated (55). Cross-price elasticity measures how the quantity 
demanded of a particular tobacco product changes when the price of another tobacco 
product increases. When this elasticity is positive, the products are substitutes; 
the higher the value of the elasticity, the closer substitutes the products are to one 
another. For example, positive cross-price elasticity between RYO and manufactured 
cigarettes implies that the demand for RYO increases as the price for cigarettes 
increases. Substitutability may also arise between different cigarette brands – when 
the relative price of economy brands increases, demand for premium brands may 
increase. This effect can be exacerbated when differential (tiered) taxation is ap-
plied on different types of cigarettes, further widening the gap in prices between 
brands and segments and encouraging substitution. The substitutability between 
traditional and new and emerging tobacco and nicotine products is currently of 
great interest (see section 2.4 below). In some countries, different tobacco products 
can also be complementary rather than substitute goods. This means that when the 
price of a tobacco product increases, the demand for its complement drops because 
users are unlikely to use the complementary tobacco product alone. For example, 
a number of studies have found manufactured and indigenous bidi cigarettes to be 
complementary goods in India (75–76).
The sign and magnitude of income elasticity vary across time, countries and 
demographic groups. For example, in the United States, a high-income country, 
income elasticity over time has changed from positive to negative, and cigarettes 
have switched from being a normal good to an inferior good (77–78). On the other 
hand, among LMICs, where prevalence of smoking tends to be relatively higher, 
14  Price is endogenous because it is not an independent variable: it is estimated by dividing expenditure 
on tobacco by consumption of tobacco, with consumption being a dependent variable in the estimation 
of price elasticity.
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cigarettes might still be a normal good, with consumption increasing as income 
levels increase (positive income elasticity) (79–80). 
There are unobservable characteristics that differentiate higher-income smok-
ers from lower-income smokers, such as differences in time and risk preferences, 
differences in associating a social stigma with smoking and differences in taste for 
smoking as a pleasurable activity. When these characteristics are ignored, estimates 
of the correlation between income and smoking-related outcomes are biased. Kenkel 
et al. (81), using techniques that estimate the causal effect of income on smoking 
among low-income adults, found that tobacco is a normal (even a luxury) good: 
higher income is associated with a higher probability of smoking participation and 
a lower probability of smoking cessation. 
These results are consistent with those regarding the impact of the business 
cycle – periods of expansion or recession in economic activity – on health be-
haviour and outcomes. Ruhm (82–83), for example, found that smoking declines 
during temporary economic downturns and increases during economic expansions. 
Tarantilis et al. (84) found that estimates of income elasticities of demand in Greece 
were higher after the economic crisis of 2010 than before it. The financial crisis and 
the austerity measures shifted the demand for cigarettes downwards and turned 
cigarettes into a more income-elastic good. Interestingly, evidence from Germany 
suggests that the propensity to become a smoker significantly increases during an 
economic downturn. However, among those who are already smokers, cigarette 
consumption actually decreases (85).
Ideally, when estimating price and income elasticities, the effect of non-price 
policies should also be accounted for. A recent study from South Africa shows that 
failing to take non-price policies into account will overstate the price effect (86).
The NCI/WHO Monograph (4) suggests that price elasticity of demand for 
tobacco is on average -0.4 in high-income countries (ranging from -0.2 to -0.6). 
Estimates for LMICs are more variable, clustering around -0.5 (ranging from -0.2 
to -0.8). A price elasticity of -0.5 means that a 10% increase in price would lead to 
a 5% reduction in consumption.
KEY TAKEAWAY 14 
Policy-makers need to know the elasticity of demand – including 
price elasticity (own-price and cross-price) and income elasticity – for 
tobacco products in their country in order to correctly assess the 
impacts of potential policy changes on consumption and subsequent 
revenues. These estimates need to be made on a regular basis to 
capture changes in demand over time. 
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The importance of the tax base elasticity
The tax base elasticity measures the sensitivity to a change in the tax rate of the base 
on which the tax is imposed – the base being tobacco consumption in the case of 
specific taxation and tobacco expenditure in the case of ad valorem taxation. The 
magnitude of the elasticity of the tax base depends on price elasticity of demand, the 
tax structure, the level of the tax rate and its share in price, along with the industry 
response through its decision to absorb, pass through or overshift the tax on to 
the retail price. Consumers’ preferences and income, the availability of substitutes 
and other non-price tobacco control measures also influence the tax base elasticity, 
essentially through the price elasticity of demand. 
The magnitude of the elasticity of the tax base also depends on social motivations, 
including price and tax expectations, which are ultimately impacted by successful 
tobacco control measures that affect consumers’ willingness to pay taxes or prices. 
In addition, the tax-base elasticity depends on smokers’ perceptions of the prob-
ability of detection and tax enforcement when using illegal products, as well as the 
availability and accessibility of opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance. Finally, 
consumers’ willingness to pay taxes depends on their perceptions regarding the 
use of the tax revenue (87). Therefore, the tax base elasticity is largely influenced 
by government policy choices. 
Increasing the tax share in prices is recommended by WHO as a tool to achieve 
the public health objective of reduced tobacco use: a higher tax share in prices 
increases the tax base elasticity, all else remaining constant, and therefore increases 
the reduction in the tax base through the resulting reduction in smoking. However, 
manufacturers can be expected to attempt to manipulate the tax base elasticity 
through their pricing policies, such as tax shifting. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
industry behaviour is itself affected by government tax policy and regulations. 
A number of factors need to be taken into account when considering tax pass-
through. As discussed earlier, tax is more likely to be overshifted within a specific 
tax structure than within an ad valorem structure. There is also evidence of industry 
overshifting the tax for premium or expensive cigarette brands while undershifting 
the tax for cheaper brands. This indicates that within a given market, the industry’s 
decision on the extent of tax pass-through will vary based not only on the tax 
structure but also on the structure of the market. It will also vary by brand. But this 
does not give an indication about the impact of the tax increase on the average price 
of a tobacco product. In the context of the tax base elasticity and the impact of tax 
increases on revenues, it is important to assess how tax increases affect average prices. 
The example of South Africa is very useful here. Over the past two decades, South 
Africa has been consistently increasing its specific excise tax on cigarettes, which 
has led to large price increases. An analysis of the effect of excise tax increases on 
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cigarette prices between 2001 and 2015 (26) shows that while there is evidence of 
tax overshifting, at least within a specified period of time, overall, the tax has been 
undershifted in real terms. This undershifting is due partly to increased competitive-
ness in the market and partly to the introduction of low-priced brands. Of course, this 
encouraged some consumers to downshift their consumption to cheaper products, 
but it also pushed manufacturers of more expensive brands to absorb part of the 
tax increase to reduce the impact on price.
A change in the level of the tax rate – with all other factors that influence con-
sumption held constant – will result in a change in the tax revenue.15 Estimates 
of tax base elasticity help governments predict changes in tobacco tax revenues 
following a tax increase (see details in Annex 2.2). 
 
Under specific taxation:
• tobacco consumption – the tax base – is expected to be price inelastic (17, 47);
• prices increase by less than the tax increase, on average (there is no tax 
overshifting overall); and
• consumption – the tax base – is also expected to be tax inelastic: the quantity 
of consumption falls less than proportionately to the tax increase, and the 
tax revenue increases.
Under ad valorem taxation: 
• the tax base is the total consumer expenditure (or, equivalently, the industry 
sales revenue) on (legal) tobacco consumption – that is, the tax base under 
ad valorem taxation is determined by both price and quantity, which is itself 
a function of price;
• the sign of the tax base elasticity – which can be either negative or positive 
– depends on the magnitude of the price elasticity of demand;
• since evidence suggests that tobacco demand is price inelastic, the tax base 
elasticity is positive; 
• when the ad valorem tax rate increases, both price and quantity adjust, but 
quantity falls less than proportionately to the price increase, and tax revenue 
increases; and
• a tax rate increase leads to both a higher level of revenue and a lower level of 
consumption; the value of the elasticity – and hence the tax revenue – increases 
with the degree of tax shifting.
15  This concept has been used by Laffer to argue that tax increases that are too high will reduce excise 
tax revenues (the so-called Laffer curve). For a detailed discussion on the Laffer curve, see section 4.4 
in Chapter 4.
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Taxation serves as an instrument for achieving both fiscal and public health objectives. 
If, after successful tobacco control interventions, prices reach levels where demand 
becomes elastic, the tax base is still most likely to be inelastic due to tax undershift-
ing, since overshifting is not a good pricing policy when demand is elastic. In other 
words, a tax rate increase – in combination with non-price tobacco control measures 
that make consumers more sensitive to price (tax) increases – leads to decelerating 
but still positive marginal revenues. For an example of a tobacco taxation success 
story, see Box 2.2. For further details of countries’ experiences with tax increases 
and their impact on revenues, see section 4.4 in Chapter 4.
KEY TAKEAWAY 15 
Policy-makers’ key policy tool to control demand is tax. Therefore, it 
is essential they assess not only the impact of price on demand but, 
more appropriately, the impact of tax on demand: this is the tax base 
elasticity. The tax base elasticity is essentially determined by (1) the 
price elasticity of demand, (2) the degree to which the industry will 
pass the tax on to the retail price and (3) the tax as a share of the 
retail price. The degree to which these elements are affected by a 
tax increase will impact demand and revenues. Currently, the three 
components combined are not high enough in any country for a tax 
increase to lead to a reduction in excise tax revenues.
Box 2.2 A tobacco taxation success story: Turkey
Turkey is an example of a country that has been increasing taxes regularly and sig-
nificantly over a relatively short period of time and has reaped the benefits of this 
policy. As shown in Fig. 2.11, the excise tax per pack of cigarettes more than doubled 
in real terms over 10 years, with the real price almost doubling as well. In parallel, 
tobacco excise revenues increased by 67% and cigarette sales decreased by 20%. 
Since the beginning of the country’s Health Transformation Program in 2003, Turkey 
has successfully increased public health spending and collected more tobacco tax 
revenue. According to the latest available figures, in 2015, tobacco tax revenue was 
equivalent to 42% of the country’s public health expenditure and 1.5% of GDP (88).
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Fig. 2.11 Tobacco excise revenue and consumption in Turkey (base year 2008), 2008–2018
Sources: Reference 1 for the price of the most-sold brand, Ministry of Finance for the sales and revenue 
data and IMF world economic outlook, April 2020. See https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-
database/2020/April for the adjustment for inflation.
Impact on affordability
While price increases clearly have an impact on consumption, when the effects of 
increasing per capita income of a population are not considered, the price impact 
may not be as strong as expected. Increases in a population’s income also increase 
its purchasing power. And, as indicated earlier, tobacco products generally behave 
like a normal good. Consequently, as income increases, it is expected that tobacco 
consumption will increase as well. To mitigate this effect, price increases (following 
tax increases) need to be greater than increases in income. This is where the concept 
of affordability comes in. Affordability examines the effects of both increasing prices 
and increasing incomes on consumer behaviour. 
A common and easy way to calculate affordability, made popular by Blecher 
and van Walbeek (89), is to use the percentage of GDP per capita required to 
buy 2000 cigarettes (or 100 packs of 20 cigarettes) in a given year. An increase in 
this proportion over time will indicate that cigarettes are becoming less affordable 
and should lead to reductions in consumption. Changes in trends in affordability 
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relative to a population’s ability to purchase cigarettes and enable them to revise 
their policies accordingly. Recent studies in India, for example, highlight the wide 
price differential between manufactured cigarettes and indigenous tobacco products 
such as bidis and chewing tobacco, as well as the propensity for these indigenous 
products to become more affordable over time due to favourable or more lenient 
tax policies towards them (90–91). 
Figure 2.12 shows the change in affordability of a pack of the most-sold brand 
of cigarettes by country income group between 2008 and 2018. During this time 
period, affordability declined in almost 70% of high-income countries, while it 
declined in slightly more than 35% of middle-income countries and only 26% of 
low-income countries. 
Fig. 2.12 Number of countries that have experienced a change in affordability of cigarettes 
between 2008–2018, by income level
Note: Change in affordability was computed as the least squares rate of change in the per capita GDP 
required to purchase 2000 cigarettes of the most-sold brand in local currency in a given year. The trend 
rate of growth was computed for countries with four or more years of data, including 2018. Affordability 
was assessed as not having changed if the least squares trend in the per capita GDP required to purchase 
2000 cigarettes over the period 2008–2018 was not statistically significant at the 5% level.
Source: (1).
KEY TAKEAWAY 16 
From a health perspective, in addition to examining the impact of a tax 
increase on the levels of price, demand and revenues, policy-makers 
should consider a tax hike that will lead to prices rising more than 
increases in their population’s income; a tax increase should make 
tobacco products less affordable to consumers so that  
demand will be effectively reduced. 
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Projecting impact on consumption, smoking prevalence and lives saved
The WHO interactive smoking projection and target-setting tool (WHO ISPT) 
The WHO ISPT enables national policy-makers and tobacco control experts to 
explore the potential impact of proposed tobacco control policies. It uses impact 
factors of selected WHO FCTC demand-reduction measures derived from published 
literature, trends in tobacco smoking rates, national demographic information and 
tobacco-related mortality risk. The WHO ISPT provides projections of (1) tobacco 
smoking rates and (2) tobacco-smoking-related deaths in a country under different 
policy settings and for different time periods. It was designed to promote multisec-
toral collaboration within countries by enabling experts from various ministries 
(for example, health, education, finance, national statistics), civil society, academia 
and media to explore options for medium- and long-term tobacco control planning 
together with WHO experts. Use of the WHO ISPT enables strong partnerships for 
policy change advocacy, program development and evaluation.16 In particular, it 
can help policy-makers in the Ministry of Finance assess the specific contribution 
of tax policies – within overall tobacco control policies – towards achieving specific 
targets in tobacco prevalence reduction.
Projecting impact on excise revenue 
The WHO tobacco tax simulation model (WHO TaXSiM)
The WHO TaXSiM is a simple but data-intensive Excel-based tool that helps policy-
makers analyse their tobacco tax policy and assess the impact of any excise tax 
increase or change in excise tax structure on price levels, legal sales and revenues 
from excise and other taxes on tobacco products. Using detailed data about the 
market – including the majority of brands found in the market, their market share 
and price levels and the applicable tax – and assumptions about price elasticity of 
demand, the WHO TaXSiM predicts the impact of tax changes on consumer prices, 
consumption volume and tax revenues generated by each brand and market segment 
for the following year. The exercise can be done for multiple years.17 
By exploring market data in detail, in addition to assessing the potential rev-
enue impact of changes in excise tax, the WHO TaXSiM is a useful instrument for 
highlighting weaknesses and opportunities in an existing tax system and market. 
It can also encourage policy-makers to create administrative databases that can be 
periodically updated to monitor the dynamics of the cigarette market. 
16  The WHO ISPT is not available publicly, but WHO will work directly with interested countries upon 
request to use it to produce data-to-action-type plans.
17  For more information about the methodology, see https://www.who.int/tobacco/economics/tax-
sim_background.pdf, accessed 29 September 2020.
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KEY TAKEAWAY 17 
Policy-makers can use available tools to simulate the impact of tax 
increases on prices, consumption and revenues, as well as  
smoking prevalence and lives saved.
Recommended indicators to monitor tobacco taxation progress 
MPOWER
WHO publishes a biannual RGTE, which monitors global progress in tobacco con-
trol. In particular, the report focuses on the implementation of the policy package 
MPOWER, a set of proven demand-reduction measures in line with the key provi-
sions of the WHO FCTC (1). 
While raising taxes on tobacco (component R) is proven to be the most effective 
and cost-effective policy to reduce tobacco use (4), implementing the entire MPOWER 
package at the best practice level will reinforce the impact of R. For example, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, banning promotional discounts as part of the E 
measure (enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship) will 
favour price increases following a tax increase. If all the MPOWER tobacco control 
measures except R were implemented at the best practice level, all else remaining 
constant, revenues would be expected to decline. Thus, in order to maintain revenue 
levels, it is important to raise excise taxes on tobacco products regularly to compen-
sate for the decline in tobacco use from the other four tobacco control measures. 
Tax share 
The main indicator in the R policy in the RGTE (1) is the total share of indirect taxes 
in the retail price of the most-sold brand of cigarettes.18 Countries whose most-sold 
brand of cigarettes has a total tax that is equal to or greater than 75% of the retail 
price are considered to be at the highest level of achievement.
While total taxes include excise taxes, VAT (or sales taxes), import duties (when 
applicable) and other indirect taxes (where applicable), it is preferable to focus on 
excise taxes, since they are the component that most influences the relative price 
of tobacco. The share of excise tax in the retail price can be extracted from the 
RGTE database.19 The 2010 WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration 
recommended making excise taxes account for at least a 70% share of excise taxes 
in the retail price of tobacco products (47). 
18  For more details about how this indicator was compiled, see Technical Note III of the RGTE 2019 
(https://www.who.int/tobacco/global_report/Technical-Note-III.pdf?ua=1). 
19  See taxes and retail price for a pack of 20 cigarettes, globally, in WHO report on the global tobacco 
epidemic 2019 (https://www.who.int/tobacco/global_report/Table-9.1-Taxes-and-retail-price-for-a-pack-
of-20-cigarette-most-sold-brand.xls?ua=1, accessed 29 September 2020).
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Affordability
As discussed previously, the share of tax in the retail price is not enough to ensure 
that a policy will be successful in reducing demand. Any tax increase should lead 
to an increase in price that will effectively discourage consumption. While global 
trends indicate that a high tax share is positively correlated with a high price level 
(see Fig. 2.2 in section 2.1.2), this may not necessarily apply to a particular country; 
a tax share can be high, while at the same time tobacco products remain afford-
able. For this reason, it is important to monitor not only tax increases but also 
whether those increases led to a price increase that is greater than income increases. 
As described in section 2.2.3 of this chapter, a common indicator is the percentage 
of GDP per capita required to buy 100 packs of 20 cigarettes in a given year.20
Other indicators
As discussed in detail in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, a good tax structure can make a 
tax policy more effective in increasing prices and decreasing affordability of tobacco 
products. Indicators can include whether a uniform excise is applied, whether it is a 
specific excise and whether it is adjusted regularly for inflation. A number of such 
indicators are also monitored through the RGTE and can be downloaded online.21
A tobacco tax indicator compiled in 2020 combines the various elements that 
form a good tobacco tax policy. The Tobacconomics Cigarette Tax Scorecard (92) 
rates a country’s tobacco tax policy performance based on best practices. The four 
components that determine the level of performance are (1) cigarette price (in 
PPP), (2) changes in the affordability of cigarettes over time, (3) the share of taxes 
(total and excise) in retail cigarette prices and (4) the structure of cigarette taxes 
(i.e. whether excise is applied; whether it is uniform or tiered; whether excise is 
specific, ad valorem or mixed; and, for the ad valorem component, if the tax is 
applied on the retail price and if there is a minimum specific excise and, for the 
specific component, if tax is automatically adjusted upwards). Each of the four 
components is given a score, using a five-point index, with the total score reflecting 
an average of the four component scores. The closer the total score is to 5, the bet-
ter the tobacco tax policy performance is in a given country. While this published 
scorecard is currently applied only on cigarettes, it can be easily applied on other 
tobacco products, provided the needed data are available.
20  This indicator has also been compiled in the RGTE; see (https://www.who.int/tobacco/global_report/
Table-9.6-Affordability.xls?ua=1, accessed 29 September 2020).
21  See supplementary information on taxation, globally, in WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 
2019 (https://www.who.int/tobacco/global_report/Table-9.5-Supplementary-information-on-taxation.
xls?ua=1, accessed 29 September 2020).
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KEY TAKEAWAY 18 
Tobacco taxation works best if implemented as part of a 
comprehensive MPOWER package. MPOWER is an overall indicator  
that incorporates all the key demand-side tobacco control measures.
KEY TAKEAWAY 19 
In addition to assessing the potential impact of a tax increase,  
policy-makers need to monitor progress over time. The share of the tax 
in the retail price is an indicator of progress. However, it is important 
to remember that an effective tax increase must translate into higher 
prices in order to make tobacco products less affordable. Combining all 
the components of a good tax policy into one scorecard can also  
be useful for assessing tobacco tax policy as a whole.
2.3 DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL POLICY INTEGRATION
While it is essential to design tobacco tax policies with the utmost consideration of all the 
aforementioned factors, it is also important to consider how external factors can impact 
or even impede public health policy objectives. As Chapter 3 explains, cooperation 
among the various agencies that are directly involved in tax administration, collection 
and enforcement is important for effective and efficient tax policy implementation. But 
in the design phase, it is also essential to engage with agencies and other policy-makers 
that are not directly involved with taxation. Domestically, coordination is required to 
ensure that policies in non-health sectors do not negatively impact or even counteract 
tobacco control initiatives. For countries that are part of a regional bloc, harmonization 
of tobacco taxation is essential to protect the single market – as well as the health of 
the population – and to prevent tax revenue erosion, tax avoidance and tax evasion.
2.3.1 INTERSECTORAL COOPERATION ON DOMESTIC POLICY
Domestic policies in agriculture, industry, trade, finance and labour have the po-
tential to create or support incentives at different stages of tobacco production, 
manufacturing and distribution that can be counterproductive to the objectives 
of tobacco control and taxation. For example, subsidies provided to farmers or 
manufacturers involved in growing or processing tobacco can reduce prices and 
incentivize continued participation or even increase development in these areas, 
which is counterproductive to the goals of making tobacco products less affordable 
and reducing tobacco consumption. Multisectoral integration and policy coherence 
are needed at the country level to ensure that public policies and interventions in 
non-health sectors do not act against the intended public health impact of tobacco 
control and taxation.
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KEY TAKEAWAY 20 
Greater policy coherence in agriculture, industry, trade, finance 
and labour should be promoted to ensure that public policies and 
interventions in these sectors do not counteract the intended public 
health impact of tobacco control and taxation. 
2.3.2 REGIONAL TOBACCO TAX HARMONIZATION
Policy integration is driven by the recognition that cooperation on domestic policies 
can substantially increase the gains from forming a regional bloc. Harmonization 
is desirable and may be necessary in certain areas with spillover effects, such as tax 
policy, the possibility of a so-called “race to the bottom” or threats to public health. 
Harmonization could be as simple as setting minimum standards and requirements 
based on global norms and best practices.
Harmonization of tobacco taxation is required to ensure the establishment and 
proper functioning of a single market, prevent tax revenue erosion, prevent tax 
avoidance and tax evasion and protect people. When barriers to trade between 
countries are removed, harmonized tax rates support the single market because they 
improve the ability of consumers, producers and investors to make decisions that are 
not distorted by taxation but reflect real opportunity costs. Tax competition – where 
countries simply undercut each other’s tax rate – could prevent governments from 
raising sufficient funds to pursue social policy. To avoid such a race to the bottom, 
countries can establish minimum tax rates within the customs union (93). Even if 
tax competition is not present, when substantial tax differences exist in neighbouring 
countries, there is a clear incentive to trade across borders in order to reduce tax 
payments legally or illegally. 
The experiences of established regional economic communities offer important 
policy lessons, not only in terms of the general integration process but also for the 
process and extent of tax policy coordination. 
The EU implemented a successful regional tax harmonization scheme. Over 
the years, the focus in harmonization of tobacco taxes has broadened from the 
elimination of tax obstacles to the fight against harmful tax competition, tax avoid-
ance and tax evasion and, more recently, to public health protection. Naturally, 
addressing these issues requires increasing convergence in fiscal policy and tax 
administration. 
Although price differentials still exist, setting a minimum on the share of taxes 
in the final price of tobacco products as well as a minimum excise tax has helped 
countries reach some level of harmonization. The EU experience confirms that both 
a declining tobacco consumption trend and stable revenues can be achieved with 
harmonized minimum excise rates (94). Moreover, the harmonization process has 
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offered opportunities for the enforcement authorities (tax or customs) to obtain 
information that can be used in the fight against fraud and tax evasion. 
On the other hand, the experience of harmonization efforts in the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) shows how the absence of a supranational 
body (like the EU) or a hegemonic member state (see the SACU example below) 
can slow down policy integration that would benefit all member countries (95). The 
eight countries of the WAEMU are bound by a Tax Directive22 that requires them to 
impose an ad valorem excise on the CIF value or producer price of tobacco products, 
which is subject to under-declaration and is difficult to ascertain. Additionally, a 
maximum excise rate is imposed, and some members apply additional taxes to deal 
with this constraint. The Directive was revised in 2017 (96), but unfortunately the 
tax structure remains the same, and the maximum rate was not removed but rather 
has been increased.
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which has five member countries, 
is the oldest existing customs union, established in 1910. Thanks to the hegemonic 
lead of South Africa, a country with a sophisticated administration system and an 
aggressive tobacco tax policy, SACU adopted a well-integrated tax policy that has 
benefited all its members (95). 
The GCC, established in 1981, is a regional intergovernmental political and 
economic union consisting of six states of the Persian Gulf. Home to one fifth of the 
global oil supply (97), the GCC has never relied on taxation as a source of revenue; 
no direct or indirect taxes were applicable in the region. Although there was no 
excise on tobacco products, as a customs union, the GCC countries have a common 
external tariff. This common tariff includes harmonized rates but also a harmonized 
structure. The import duty is 100% of the CIF value of tobacco products imported 
in the region, with a minimum tax per quantity imported. 
However, in recent years, to reduce their dependence on income from oil, GCC 
countries have considered diversifying their sources of income, including by de-
veloping reliance on indirect taxes such as excise and VAT. In 2015, a decision 
was adopted at the 36th GCC summit meeting to implement selective taxes on all 
imported tobacco products and cultivated raw tobacco grown domestically (GCC 
Decision number 963/1). A follow-up decision in December 2016 formally agreed to 
the introduction of an excise tax on tobacco and other products such as sugary and 
energy drinks, as well as special goods (alcohol and pork meat), in all GCC countries. 
The decisions at the national level to implement this subregional decision came 
into force gradually in all GCC countries, starting with Saudi Arabia, which began 
22  Directive No. 03/98/CM/WAEMU on the harmonization of Member States’ legislation of excise duties 
was adopted 22 December 1998. It was amended by Directive No. 03/2009/CM/WAEMU of 27 March 
2009 with the objective of harmonizing excise duties within WAEMU.
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implementation in June 2017, followed by Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) later that year, Qatar in 2018 and Oman in 2019 (1). Only Kuwait has yet to 
adapt its national laws accordingly. The excise introduced by the GCC countries 
has a structure somewhat similar to the import duty on tobacco products: the rate 
is 100%, but the base was changed from the CIF value to the retail price excluding 
taxes. The introduction of the excise led to large increases in the price of the most-
sold brand of cigarettes in member countries between 2016 and 2018 – by 33% 
in Bahrain, more than 80% in the UAE and more than 100% in Saudi Arabia (1).
In federations such as Canada and the United States – where the central govern-
ment has real taxing power and some financial and regulatory control over the states 
or provinces – tobacco taxes are not harmonized (98–99). Even though there are 
significant interjurisdictional differences in taxes and prices, and tax harmonization 
holds great potential to reduce the scope of illicit transactions in the tobacco market, 
there is little evidence that Canadian provinces or individual states in the United 
States are interested in tobacco tax harmonization. 
Tax harmonization is most relevant in the context of further economic integration 
within a group of countries that are already part of a customs union, but it needs 
to be planned well to be effective. Discrepancies in law interpretation and a lack 
of standardization of tobacco product definitions and tax base lead to suboptimal 
situations. Tax rate alignment, or setting minimum rates, should come after tax 
structure alignment. It is important that governments support the move towards 
harmonization and are committed to dedicating enough financial resources and 
skilled personnel to oversee the entire process. 
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In the context of regional economic integration and ongoing 
discussions regarding the possibility of harmonizing tobacco excise 
taxation among member countries, the experiences of existing groups 
can be instructive. So far, only the EU, SACU, WAEMU and, more recently, 
the GCC have effectively implemented a harmonized approach to 
excise taxation of tobacco products. Lessons learned indicate that 
harmonization should be planned well and should not come at the 
expense of tobacco control.  
 
Setting a common minimum specific excise tax, adjusted over time,  
is the best approach. This ensures that taxes and prices are above  
a minimum level, encouraging equalization of price levels and  
at the same time reducing affordability across countries.  
On the other hand, agreeing on maximum tax rates is a bad policy. 
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Countries that wish to raise their taxes further for revenue purposes, 
health concerns or both should be given the space to do so.  
 
Concerns about illicit trade provoked by higher tax rates are best 
dealt with by strong cooperation in administration and enforcement, 
information sharing and adoption of new technology with  
common or interoperable information systems.
2.4 NEW AND EMERGING NICOTINE AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS 
In recent years, awareness of tobacco risks and harms, implementation of tobacco 
control provisions – especially under the WHO FCTC – and tightening of regulations 
have resulted in declining sales of cigarettes, primarily in high-income economies. 
This has changed the dynamics of the tobacco market. In response to these effective 
tobacco control measures, the tobacco industry has diversified its business by promot-
ing a new portfolio of products, which they claim to be technological innovations 
that supposedly reduce the harms and risks associated with conventional tobacco 
products, particularly cigarettes. 
So-called novel tobacco products have been promoted by the tobacco industry 
as “cleaner alternatives,” “safer alternatives” and “reduced harm/risk products” with 
no smoke and no ash. On the basis of these claims, they negotiate for less-restrictive 
regulatory environments within countries. Some of the new products are also mar-
keted or promoted for smoking cessation, despite the evidence of this outcome 
being inconclusive. Where these products are not banned, one of the debates in 
the global health community concerns the issue of their regulation and taxation. 
2.4.1 HEATED TOBACCO PRODUCTS (HTPs)
HTPs are tobacco products that produce aerosols containing nicotine and toxic 
chemicals upon heating of the tobacco or activation of a device containing the 
tobacco. These aerosols are inhaled by users sucking on or smoking the device. 
They contain the highly addictive substance nicotine (found in tobacco) as well as 
non-tobacco additives and are often flavoured. 
The tobacco in HTPs may be in the form of specially designed cigarettes (e.g. 
so-called heat sticks or Neo sticks) or pods or plugs. These products include IQOS 
from PMI, Ploom TECH from Japan Tobacco International (JTI), glo from British 
American Tobacco (BAT) and PAX from PAX Labs. HTPs differ not only from con-
ventional cigarettes but also from ENDS – some of which are called e-cigarettes – as 
ENDS do not contain tobacco but rather a nicotine solution (see next subsection). 
However, the boundaries between the different products are becoming increasingly 
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difficult to define, given the emergence of so-called hybrid tobacco products that 
contain both nicotine solution and tobacco. 
HTPs are currently available in more than 40 countries and are banned in fewer 
than 10 countries. Even in countries where they are regulated, there is significant 
variation in the approaches taken to regulation. A variety of factors affect a country’s 
ability to control and regulate the use of HTPs, including national regulatory pow-
ers, enforcement capacity regulatory frameworks, country capacity and tobacco 
industry interference (1).
Most countries tax HTPs at a lower rate than cigarettes and on the kilogram of 
tobacco as a base when applying a specific or mixed excise (see Table 2.4). The use 
of such a base may be quite challenging for tax collection, especially because of the 
difficulty of checking the tobacco content in each stick. In the past, some countries 
taxed cigarettes per kilogram of tobacco, but today it is common practice to tax 
them per stick regardless of tobacco content. 
Table 2.4 Excise taxation of HTPs, first collected for July 2018 – updated for July 2020
OVERALL COMPARISON WITH CIGARETTES
Type of excise Base unit is kg, 
overall rate lower 
than cigarettes
Base unit is sticks, 
rate is the same 
as cigarettes
Base unit is sticks, 
rate is lower than 
cigarettes
Other


















Azerbaijan a, Japan, 
Ukraine b
Armenia, Hungary, 






Moldova f , 
Serbia g
Ad valorem 
excise (base is 




Spain, Switzerland Saudi Arabia 
and United Arab 
Emirates (base 
is retail price 
exclusive of excise 
and VAT)
Indonesia h
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Mixed system (ad 
valorem compo-
nent based on 








and West Bank 
and Gaza Strip (ad 
valorem excise 
base is wholesale 
price)
a The specific excise rate applied is the same as for imported cigarettes, higher than the rate applied to 
domestically produced cigarettes.
b The rate is the same as the minimum excise on cigarettes per 1 000 pieces. Rate and structure were 
effective as of 1 January 2021.
c The specific excise rate is defined as 25% of the excise tax on cigarettes based on an equivalency used 
between cigarettes and HTPs. There are planned increases of this proportion to 40% by 2023. 
d In 2020 the specific excise rate was only 11% lower than cigarettes.
e The specific excise tax is based on the weight (kg) of tobacco mixture and is calculated at 40% of the 
minimum excise tax per 1000 cigarettes.
f Specific excise rate is higher than for cigarettes but, unlike HTPs, cigarettes also face an ad valorem 
excise. Overall effect of excise is a slightly lower for HTPs.
g The specific excise tax is based on the weight (kg) of tobacco mixture and is calculated at 40% of the 
minimum excise tax per 1000 cigarettes. There is a planned phased increase of this proportion aiming 
equalization with cigarettes by 2025.
h While cigarettes face a specific excise tax rate, HTPs face an ad valorem rate, the highest rate as defined 
by law, on the basis of a pre-defined minimum price.
Sources: (1, 100, 101, WHO data collection of price and tax of cigarettes and HTPs in 2020, unpublished as 
of April 2021 and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids website on Taxation and Price for Heated Tobacco 
Products https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/global/taxation-price/staging-tax-gap).
A study by Liber (102) compared prices of HTPs and cigarettes in 34 countries and 
showed that while taxes have been systematically lower for HTPs than for cigarettes, 
prices were higher in half of the countries surveyed. 
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HTPs, when taxed, are usually taxed lower than cigarettes, although 
they generally seem to be priced higher than cigarettes. 
It is important to remember that HTPs are tobacco products, and the same provisions 
that apply to tobacco products should apply to them as well. This is articulated in 
WHO’s information sheet on HTPs (103), which provides guidance on how these 
products should be regulated, as well as Decision FCTC/COP8(22) for novel and 
emerging tobacco products. Moreover, MPOWER measures, which help WHO 
Member States to implement the demand-reduction articles of the WHO FCTC, 
are applicable to HTPs, in particular, Article 6 for taxation. Currently, there is no 
evidence demonstrating that HTPs are less harmful than conventional tobacco 
products. Furthermore, HTPs contain chemicals not found in cigarette smoke, the 
health effects of which are not yet known. Independent assessment of industry 
data demonstrates that more than 20 harmful and potentially harmful chemicals 
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are significantly higher in HTP emissions than in cigarette smoke (104). Therefore, 
there is a need to learn more about these products and the health impacts of their 
emissions, as well as the impacts of exposure to these emissions. 
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Currently, there is no evidence demonstrating that HTPs are less 
harmful than conventional tobacco products.
From both public health and tax administration perspectives, HTPs should be taxed 
at the same level and in the same way as tobacco cigarettes. Some countries have 
already adopted this approach and are taxing HTPs at the same rate per stick as 
cigarettes (Azerbaijan, Colombia, Georgia, Israel, Japan, Ukraine and West Bank 
and Gaza Strip). Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have recently introduced an 
excise tax on tobacco products as part of the GCC, are now applying the same 
import duty rate and excise tax structure for cigarettes and HTPs.
Continuing developments in technology and changes in products have led to a 
recommendation to tax HTPs per unit. The definition of unit may vary by product 
within the HTP category. For example, one unit of IQOS is one heat stick, for 
Glo it is one Neo Stick and for Ploom TECH it is one tobacco pod. Governments 
will need to determine the exact definition of a unit for each product allowed on 
the market. The potential complexity of the market strongly supports limiting the 
types of HTPs allowed in a country and setting strict regulations to standardize the 
products as much as possible. 
Countries can also consider taxing the devices used to consume HTPs, i.e. the 
holder and the charger (see product description in Annex 3.1).
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HTPs are tobacco products, and they need to be treated as such.  
Where they are not banned, HTPs need to be strictly regulated and 
taxed. The recommendation is to tax them at the same level  
as cigarettes on a per-unit basis. Countries can also consider  
taxing the devices used for HTP consumption. 
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2.4.2 ELECTRONIC NICOTINE AND NON-NICOTINE DELIVERY SYSTEMS 
(ENDS/ENNDS)23
Products like ENDS and ENNDS have evolved rapidly over the past decade. ENDS 
heat a solution (e-liquid) containing nicotine, but not tobacco, and other chemicals 
that may be toxic to people’s health to create an aerosol, which is inhaled by the 
user. Examples of ENDS include Juul from Juul Labs, Vype from BAT and blu from 
Imperial Brands (1).
Electronic non-nicotine delivery systems (ENNDS) are essentially the same 
as ENDS, but the e-liquid used generally does not contain nicotine. Upon testing, 
however, many so-called zero-nicotine solutions are found to contain nicotine 
(105–107). 
While generally considered as a single product class, ENDS products constitute a 
diverse group with potentially significant differences in the production of toxicants 
and delivery of nicotine. There are several coexisting types of devices for ENDS/
ENNDS on the market, including first-generation or so-called cigalikes, second-
generation tank systems and even-larger third-generation or personal vaporizers. 
Collectively, they are also often referred to as e-cigarettes, vapes or vape pens. Other 
categories of ENDS include e-hookahs, e-pipes and e-cigars – hence, ENDS is 
an all-encompassing term for multiple product categories. Some of the products 
resemble their conventional tobacco counterparts – cigarettes, cigars, cigarillos, 
pipes or hookahs – while others are shaped more generically like pens, USB memory 
sticks or basic cylinders. Different forms of nicotine are also used in these ENDS, 
the most recent one being nicotine salts, which deliver high levels of nicotine (1). 
There are two types of ENDS/ENNDs products: open systems and closed systems. 
Open systems are devices that allow the user to buy e-liquids and fill their device 
with the mixtures they want (with no nicotine, different nicotine concentrations 
and/or flavours). Closed systems are products that come with a prefilled container 
(called a cartridge, pod or tank).
For the past decade, divisive debates have been waged over the effectiveness of 
ENDS as smoking cessation aids – especially for tobacco users who are unable to 
give up the habit – as well as the possibility of ENDS playing a role in public health. 
However, the evidence remains inconclusive. Despite the tobacco industry and other 
related industries promoting these products as tools for quitting smoking, current 
evidence does not support their use as part of a population-based cessation strategy 
(108). Accordingly, the United States Surgeon General, in January 2020, concluded that
23  It is worth noting that ENDS are not tobacco products and not exactly new products – the technology 
has been around since the late 1980s (e.g. Premier, Eclipse and Accord). However, the recent generation 
of these products is new and has more or less piggybacked on the success of e-cigarettes.
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E-cigarettes, a continually changing and heterogeneous group of products, are 
used in a variety of ways. Consequently, it is difficult to make generalizations 
about efficacy for cessation based on clinical trials involving a particular e-
cigarette, and there is presently inadequate evidence to conclude that e-cigarettes, 
in general, increase smoking cessation (109).
The evidence on the adverse health effects associated with use of ENDS is mounting, 
and when ENDS are used in combination with smoking – which is the practice 
of the majority of ENDS users (110) – the adverse health effects of two or more 
products are combined. However, there are insufficient data to understand the full 
breadth of these effects, as ENDS have not been on the market long enough for 
their long-term effects to be established.
Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that the aerosols of the majority of ENDS and 
ENNDS, some of which are cancer causing chemicals. ENDS also contain nicotine, 
which is highly addictive. In addition, ENDS are associated with increased risk of 
cardiovascular diseases and lung disorders, as well as adverse effects on the developing 
fetus during pregnancy (108, 110). For adolescents, the use of nicotine can lead to 
dependence and may harm brain development. Use of ENDS could also lead to a 
new generation of nicotine and tobacco users, as seen in some countries, especially 
since these products are designed to appeal to young people. Although the specific 
level of risk associated with ENDS has not yet been determined conclusively, these 
products are undoubtedly harmful. Therefore they should be strictly regulated if 
allowed to be sold in domestic markets, and must be kept away from children. 
Taxation will be a key component of regulation, since it is an effective tool for 
influencing consumer behaviour.
Some countries have taken the bold decision to completely ban these products. 
Approaches that have been taken range from partial to comprehensive bans, and 
ENDS/ENNDS products were banned in more than 30 countries in 2018.24 In other 
countries, they are regulated as, for example, consumer products, pharmaceutical 
products or tobacco products, or they are completely unregulated. WHO recom-
mends that where ENDS/ENNDS are not banned, they should be regulated to 
achieve the following objectives:
1. prevent the initiation of ENDS/ENNDS by non-smokers and youth, with 
special attention to vulnerable groups;
2. minimize as much as possible potential health risks for ENDS/ENNDS users 
and protect non-users from exposure to their emissions;
3. prevent unproven health claims being made about ENDS/ENNDS; and
24  Data collected for the WHO RGTE 2019.
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4. protect tobacco control activities from all commercial and other vested interests 
related to ENDS/ENNDS, including the interests of the tobacco industry.
ENDS/ENNDS present a risk to youth, who have taken up their use in high numbers 
in some countries, including Canada and the United States (1, 111). The Juul brand, 
for example, has quickly gained a significant e-cigarette market share in the United 
States (112–113). Its marketing and popularity have led the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) to raise serious concerns and to seek solutions to 
effectively prevent youth from taking up the use of ENDS/ENNDS (114). The city 
of San Francisco banned the sale of e-cigarettes in June 2019 (115). 
In addition to posing a risk for initiation by youth, ENDS can attract non-
tobacco users or prevent current smokers from quitting. Taxation could play a 
role in preventing the uptake of these products, specifically among non-smokers, 
vulnerable groups, children and adolescents. 
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The long-term health effects of ENDS/ENNDS products are still 
unknown, but they are clearly harmful to health. Furthermore, 
evidence on the effectiveness of ENDS products as a smoking-
cessation aid remains inconclusive. Taxing these products could play 
a role in preventing their uptake, specifically among non-smokers, 
vulnerable groups, children and adolescents. 
Price elasticity of demand for ENDS products
In the context of taxation, it is important to ask whether demand for ENDS is 
price-responsive. Preliminary evidence, although almost exclusively focused on 
e-cigarette data from the United States, indicates that this is the case: demand for 
e-cigarettes may be even more price-responsive than the demand for conventional 
cigarettes, so taxes can be used to deter initiation by never-users (116–123). Most of 
the studies of price elasticity of demand for ENDS products also demonstrate that 
e-cigarettes and conventional cigarettes are partial substitutes – that is, they show 
positive cross-price elasticity. The magnitude of the elasticity indicates the degree 
of substitutability between products: the higher its value, the closer the products 
are to being substitutes, with higher cigarette prices being associated with increased 
e-cigarette sales. Some of the studies also show a substitutability effect in the other 
direction, with increased prices for e-cigarettes leading to an increase in conven-
tional cigarette use (117, 120). All of the studies show evidence of substitutability 
except for one (124), which differentiates between exclusive and dual users and 
shows no evidence of substitution between e-cigarettes and conventional cigarettes. 
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The presence of concurrent (or dual) use – consumers using both conventional 
cigarettes and ENDS products – complicates results and highlights the need for 
more research in this area to better disentangle the different effects. 
Liber et al. (125) analysed sales prices in a sample of 45 countries and concluded 
that comparable units of conventional cigarettes cost less than disposable e-cigarettes. 
The units considered for pricing e-cigarettes included both the e-liquid and the 
rechargeable device. Taken alone, the price of e-liquids is on average much lower 
than that of cigarettes in high-income countries and the same in LMICs. The time 
needed to buy back a rechargeable device is estimated to be less than two weeks 
in most countries. 
One can argue that increasing price differentials by further increasing taxes on 
regular cigarettes could be effective in driving current smokers of regular cigarettes 
to e-cigarettes (126) as a potentially lower-risk alternative (127). However, the ef-
fectiveness of ENDS as smoking cessation devices is still being debated; a study by 
Sweet et al. (128) shows that dual use of e-cigarettes as a potential tool for cessation 
was effective only in the short term. Moreover, significantly more smokers said they 
would quit if cigarette prices doubled and e-cigarettes were not available (122) or 
that they would never have become addicted to nicotine if e-cigarettes had not been 
so readily available (129). Once an e-cigarette user is addicted to nicotine, there 
is a risk of initiating traditional tobacco products use (130). In general, cessation 
can be better facilitated by governments via stronger implementation of the other 
tobacco control policies that have been proven effective at reducing use. 
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Few studies are available on the price elasticity of ENDS products,  
and the available data come almost exclusively from the United States. 
These early studies indicate that demand for e-cigarettes  
will go down as the price of e-cigarettes increases. Generally,  
the results also show that cigarettes and e-cigarettes are partial 
substitutes, where an increase in cigarette price would increase  
the demand for e-cigarettes while reducing demand for cigarettes.  
But these results do not differentiate between people who  
are exclusive cigarettes or e-cigarette users and those  
who are users of both products.
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Tax structure
Different countries impose different tax structures on ENDS/ENNDS products25 
(see details in Table 2.5). The Republic of Korea, for example, imposes a specific 
tax per millilitre of ENDS/ENNDS e-liquid (131), while Indonesia imposes an ad 
valorem tax on the retail price of the e-liquid; the maximum rate allowed by law 
for tobacco products (132). In the United States, there is no common way to tax 
e-cigarettes among the states that do tax them (133–134). The situation is similar in 
the EU, where new and emerging nicotine and tobacco products are not currently 
covered by the tobacco tax directive, and Member States may apply a national tax 
as they see fit under their own rules. All the EU countries that tax ENDS products 
apply a specific excise per millilitre of e-liquid.
These different tax treatments have the potential to distort the functioning of 
the internal market. In February 2020, the European Commission concluded that 
the current provisions of the harmonized directive are no longer relevant for the 
taxation of ENDS and HTPs, and this is a source of concern from the internal market 
perspective (135). In June 2020, the Member States of the EU reiterated that it is 
urgent and necessary to upgrade the EU regulatory framework by harmonizing defini-
tions and the tax treatment of novel products such as ENDS/ENNDS and HTPs (2).
Table 2.5 Types of excises applied on ENDS/ENNDS products e-liquids globally and in individual 





containing e-liquids  
(ENDS products)
Taxing all e-liquids  
(ENDS and ENNDS products)
Specific (based on volume per mL) Albania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Pakistan, Portugal, Republic 
of Korea, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovenia, Sweden
Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, Georgia, Greece, 
Hungary, Italyb, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Montenegro, Morocco, North 
Macedonia, Philippines, Serbia
Ad valorem (% of retail price or 
import value)
Bahraina Indonesia, Jordan, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen
TYPE OF EXCISE
INDIVIDUAL STATES IN THE UNITED STATES
Taxing only nicotine-
containing e-liquids  
(ENDS products)
Taxing all e-liquids  
(ENDS and ENNDS products)
Specific (based on volume per mL) Delaware, Illinois (Chicago), 
Cook County, Louisiana, Ohio, 
Puerto Ricoc, Connecticutc 
Kansas, North Carolina, 
Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin
25  The focus is on the e-liquid used for ENDS/ENNDS products.
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Ad valorem (% of wholesale/
distributor price)
Alaska (Juneau, Matanuska-
Susitna Borough), California, 




Washington DC, Virgin Islandsc
New York
Mixed New Jersey, New Mexico
a Tax applied to e-shisha (or e-hookah) because e-cigarettes are banned in Bahrain.
b Italy imposes differential rates for nicotine and non-nicotine containing liquids.
c States in which it is unclear if only ENDS or both ENDS and ENNDS products are taxed with an excise. 
Sources: (1, 135, complementary data from Frank Chaloupka and WHO data collection of price and tax of 
cigarettes and HTPs in 2020, unpublished as of April 2021).
Table 2.6 provides reference material on the pros and cons of different considerations 
for determining the tax structure and base of ENDS/ENNDS products e-liquids.










1. Reduces the price gap between 
similar products 
 
2. Simple from a tax 
administration perspective, as 
only the volume needs to be 
determined
1. Difficult to compare if tax 
equivalencya with cigarettes is 
sought 
 
2. Requires laboratory capacity to 
detect the presence of nicotine in 
e-liquids, as there is currently no 
simple way to determine whether 
the e-liquid contains nicotine 
(self-declarations by industry are 
not sufficient) 
 
3. Does not cover non-nicotine-
containing e-liquids, which 
are also harmful when inhaled 
via e-cigarettes and during 
independent tests have often 
been found to contain nicotine, 
contrary to product labelling or 
representations by the industry
 
4. Potentially favours products with 
a higher nicotine concentration 
per mL, which also tend to be the 
products most responsible for the 
rapid uptake in youth initiation in 
countries where these products 
are available and aggressively 
marketed
 
5. May encourage more do-it-
yourself (DIY) products where 
e-liquids are mixed by the users 
themselves, which increases the 
risk of accidents, illness and death









1. Reduces the price gap between 
similar products 
 
2. Simple from a tax 
administration perspective, 
as only volume needs to be 
determined 
 
3. Covers non-nicotine-containing 
e-liquids, which are also harmful 
when inhaled and during 
independent tests have often 
been found to contain nicotine, 
contrary to product labelling or 
representations by the industry
 
4. Does not require laboratory 
capacity to detect the presence of 
nicotine in liquids
1. Difficult to compare if tax 
equivalency with cigarettes is 
sought 
 
2. Challenge in detecting and 
differentiating whether the 
liquids (e.g. propylene glycol 
and vegetable glycerine) to be 
used in ENDS/ENNDS are falsely 
declared as being for other 
purposes (e.g. food, cosmetics or 
pharmaceuticals) at import and 
manufacturing levels
 
3. Potentially favours products 
with a higher nicotine 
concentration per mL, which also 
tend to be the products most 
responsible for the rapid uptake in 
youth initiation in countries where 
these products are available and 
aggressively marketed




tax per unit 
of nicotine 
concentration
1. More likely to serve as barrier 
to youth initiation by affecting 
the lowest price category, and 
products with a higher nicotine 
concentration per mL are affected 
the most; also reduces the price 
gap between different products 
 
2. Covers non-nicotine-containing 
e-liquids, which are also harmful 
when inhaled and during 
independent tests have often 
been found to contain nicotine, 
contrary to product labelling or 
representations by industry 
 
3. Current market observations 
(2019) within the same product 
categories indicate that nicotine 
concentration is not a major 
determinant of price; increasing 
taxes as nicotine concentration 
becomes higher may change 
this and would reinforce the 
health justification that nicotine is 
addictive and not harmless
 
4. Reduces manufacturers’ 
incentive to increase nicotine 
concentration in order to reduce 
the tax burden
 
5. Reduces DIY incentives, as 
increasing nicotine concentration 
for personal consumption will 
increase cost to user
1. Difficult to compare with 
cigarettes if tax equivalency with 
cigarettes is sought 
 
2. Challenge in detecting and 
differentiating whether the 
e-liquids (e.g. propylene glycol 
and vegetable glycerine) to be 
used in ENDS/ENNDS are falsely 
declared as being for other 
purposes (e.g. food, cosmetics or 
pharmaceuticals) at import and 
manufacturing levels  
 
3. Requires laboratory capacity to 
measure the amount of nicotine 
concentration in e-liquid solutions 
 
4. More complicated from a tax 
administration perspective, as 
both volume and nicotine content 
need to be assessed










tax per unit 
of nicotine 
concentration
1. More likely to serve as barrier 
to youth initiation by affecting 
the lowest price category, and 
products with a higher nicotine 
concentration per mL affected the 
most; also reduces the price gap 
between different products 
 
2. Current market observations 
(2019) within the same product 
categories indicate that 
nicotine concentration is not 
a major determinant of price; 
increasing taxes as the nicotine 
concentration becomes higher 
may change this and would 
reinforce the health justification 
that nicotine is addictive and not 
harmless
 
3. Reduces manufacturers’ 
incentive to increase nicotine 
concentration in order to reduce 
the tax burden
 
4. Reduces DIY incentives, as 
increasing nicotine concentration 
for personal consumption will 
increase cost to the user
1. Difficult to compare if tax 
equivalency with cigarettes is 
being sought 
 
2. Requires laboratory capacity to 
detect the presence of nicotine in 
e-liquids as there is no simple way 
currently available to determine 
whether the e-liquid contains 
nicotine; self-declarations by 
industry are not sufficient  
 
3. Requires laboratory capacity to 
measure the amount of nicotine 
concentration in e-liquid solutions 
 
4. More complicated from a tax 
administration perspective, as 
both volume and nicotine content 











1. Easier to compute and 
regulate for tax equivalency 
between ENDS products and 
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ad valorem – although this does 
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recommendation that specific 
taxes are better for conventional 
cigarettes) 
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2. Requires strong tax 
administration capacity to 
implement effectively – in 
particular, capacity to assess the 
validity of declared tax base value
 
3. Requires laboratory capacity to 
detect the presence of nicotine in 
e-liquids, as there is currently no 
simple way to determine whether 
the e-liquid contains nicotine 
(self-declarations by industry are 
not sufficient)
 
4. May encourage more DIY 
products where e-liquids are 
mixed by users themselves, which 
increases the risks of accidents, 
illness and death










1. Easier to compute and regulate 
for tax equivalency between 
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large heterogeneity of products 
(especially if tax on cigarettes is 
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not change the long-standing 
recommendation that specific 
taxes are better for conventional 
cigarettes) 
 
2. Does not require laboratory 
capacity to detect the presence 
of nicotine in all e-liquid solutions 
sold
 
3. Covers non-nicotine-containing 
e-liquids, which are also harmful 
when inhaled and during 
independent tests have often 
been found to contain nicotine, 
contrary to product labelling or 
representations by industry
1. Prone to undervaluation 
because the true value of the tax 
base is difficult to ascertain 
 
2. Requires strong tax 
administration capacity to 
implement effectively – in 
particular, capacity to assess the 
validity of declared tax base value
  
3. Challenge in detecting and 
differentiating whether the 
e-liquids (e.g. propylene glycol 
and vegetable glycerine) to be 
used in ENDS/ENNDS are falsely 
declared as being for other 
purposes (e.g. food, cosmetics or 









1. Easier to compute and 
regulate for tax equivalency 
between ENDS products and 
cigarettes in the context of a 
large heterogeneity of products 
(especially if tax on cigarettes is 
ad valorem – although this does 
not change the long-standing 
recommendation that specific 
taxes are better for conventional 
cigarettes) 
 
2. Less prone to undervaluation 
as tax base is easier to assess 
(compared with a CIF/producer 
price base)
1. Requires laboratory capacity to 
detect the presence of nicotine in 
e-liquids, as there is currently no 
simple way to determine whether 
the e-liquid contains nicotine 
(self-declarations by industry are 
not sufficient) 
 
2. Requires capacity to monitor 
the market to assess market 
prices 
 
3. Does not cover non-nicotine-
containing e-liquids, which 
are also harmful when inhaled 
in an e-cigarette and during 
independent tests have often 
been found to contain nicotine, 
contrary to product labelling or 
representations by the industry
 
4. May encourage more DIY 
products where e-liquids are 
mixed by users themselves, which 
increases the risk of accidents, 
illness and death
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1. Easier to compute and regulate 
for tax equivalency between 
ENDS/ENNDS products and 
cigarettes in the context of a 
large heterogeneity of products 
(especially if tax on cigarettes is 
ad valorem – although this does 
not change the long-standing 
recommendation that specific 
taxes are better for conventional 
cigarettes) 
 
2. Does not require laboratory 
capacity to detect the presence 
of nicotine in all e-liquid solutions 
sold 
 
3. Less prone to undervaluation 
as tax base is easier to assess 
(compared with a CIF/producer 
price base)
1. Requires capacity to monitor 
the market to assess retail prices
 
2. Challenge in detecting and 
differentiating whether the 
e-liquids (e.g. propylene glycol 
and vegetable glycerine) to be 
used in ENDS/ENNDS are falsely 
declared as being for other 
purposes (e.g. food, cosmetics or 
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e-liquids will be 
the base for the 
specific excise.
2. Retail price 
will be the 
base for the ad 
valorem excise.b
1. This system aims to exploit the 
best characteristics of both the 
specific and the ad valorem tax 
systems:
a. Specific component guarantees 
a minimum tax and pushes all 
prices up. 
b. Ad valorem component is 
easier to compute and regulate 
for tax equivalency between 
ENDS products and cigarettes 
in the context of a large 
heterogeneity of products 
1. Requires capacity to monitor 
the market to assess retail prices
 
2. Requires laboratory capacity to 
detect the presence of nicotine in 
e-liquids, as there is currently no 
simple way to determine whether 
the e-liquid contains nicotin; 
(self-declarations by industry are 
not sufficient) 
 
3. Does not cover non-nicotine-
containing e-liquids, which 
are also harmful when inhaled 
via e-cigarette and during 
independent tests have often 
been found to contain nicotine, 
contrary to product labelling or 
representations by the industry
 
4. Difficult to set a minimum 
specific excise amount/specific 
excise amount, especially if tax 
equivalency with cigarettes is 
sought
 
5. May encourage more DIY 
products where e-liquids are 
mixed by users themselves, which 
increases the risks of accidents, 
illness and death
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presence will be 
the base for the 
specific excise.
2. Retail price 
will be the 
base for the ad 
valorem excise.b
1. This system aims to exploit the 
best characteristics of both the 
specific and the ad valorem tax 
systems:
a. Specific component guarantees 
a minimum tax and pushes all 
prices up 
b. Ad valorem component is 
easier to compute and regulate 
for tax equivalency between 
ENDS/ENNDS products and 
cigarettes in the context of a large 
heterogeneity of products
 
2. Does not require laboratory 
capacity to detect the presence 
of nicotine in all e-liquid solutions 
sold
1. Requires capacity to monitor 
the market to assess retail prices
 
2. Difficult to set a minimum 
specific excise amount/specific 
excise amount, especially if 
equivalency with cigarettes is 
sought
 
3. Challenge in detecting and 
differentiating whether the 
e-liquids (e.g. propylene glycol 
and vegetable glycerine) to be 
used in ENDS/ENNDS are falsely 
declared as being for other 
purposes (e.g. food, cosmetics or 
pharmaceuticals) at import and 
manufacturing levels
a Tax equivalency can be measured in different ways: (1) in terms of tax burden (as % of the retail price) 
or (2) as the exact amount of tax for equivalent quantities (assuming an equivalency between a certain 
volume of e-liquid and a pack of cigarettes).
b There is also the option to use the producer price/CIF value as a base for the ad valorem component, 
but it is a weaker option because the base is difficult to ascertain and therefore prone to undervaluation. 
Note: Table compiled following a WHO Expert Meeting on Taxation of Electronic Nicotine and Non-Nicotine 
Delivery Systems (ENDS/ENNDS), Geneva, Switzerland, 2–4 September 2019.
There is currently a lack of evidence on the practical challenges being faced by 
countries favouring one approach over the other. Furthermore, such data are difficult 
to obtain because the nature of the market is constantly changing. 
However, a clear recommendation can be made with regard to which e-liquids 
to tax. As indicated in Table 2.5, some countries tax all e-liquids – whether or not 
they contain nicotine (ENDS and ENNDS products) – while some tax only nicotine-
containing e-liquids (ENDS products). As shown in Table 2.6, there is evidence that 
in a number of instances, ENNDS products do contain some nicotine. Additionally, 
ENNDS products are not harmless (136–137). It is therefore recommended that all 
e-liquids be taxed for both ENDS and ENNDs products.
The question of whether to employ differential taxation based on nicotine content 
seems reasonable from a health perspective, since nicotine is a toxic substance. 
However, this would likely create an additional burden for tax administrators as 
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they would need to determine the nicotine concentration of e-liquids on the market. 
Additionally, this may no longer be relevant, as advancements in technology indicate 
that other features of the product can influence nicotine delivery beyond the actual 
concentration of the e-liquid. It is now possible to increase nicotine delivery at low 
nicotine concentrations by increasing battery power (by reducing resistance or 
increasing voltage) (138).
In terms of implementation, while most countries seem to have adopted a specific 
excise tax on ENDS/ENNDS e-liquids per millilitre, one benefit of implementing 
ad valorem taxation is that it seems relatively easier to regulate in the context of 
a large heterogeneity of products. However, it is essential that the tax be applied 
on the retail price value of the products, as this base is easier to ascertain than any 
other value that could be declared by the manufacturer. 
It is also important to add that regulation of the characteristics of ENDS/ENNDS 
products is essential, and it should be implemented along with any tax policy adopted. 
Regulations should include:
1. setting a maximum nicotine concentration per millilitre to safeguard public 
health, including reducing the risk of dependence, especially among youth;
2. setting a maximum volume for cartridges to reduce toxicants exposure and 
possibly limit use;
3. setting a maximum capacity for refill containers to reduce toxicants exposure 
and possibly limit use;
4. setting a maximum battery power to reduce the possibility of influencing 
nicotine and toxicant delivery; and
5. taxing nicotine regardless of its source (e.g. tobacco, eggplant, synthetic).
Countries may choose to impose an excise tax on ENDS and ENNDS devices26 
as well. The easiest type of tax would be an ad valorem tax based on the declared 
retail price. If countries choose not to impose an excise tax on these products, they 
should at least impose the regular VAT or sales tax rate. Imposing an excise tax on 
devices can be challenging from an administrative perspective, as all components 
need to be clearly defined and classified as devices for ENDS/ENNDS consumption. 
For example, if the device is assembled after importation and some parts may be 
used for other purposes than ENDS/ENNDS consumption, authorities may face a 
challenge in detecting and differentiating which component parts would be subject 
to excise tax and which would not.
26  See Annex 2.3 for an overview of elements of devices used in ENDS/ENNDS products.
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KEY TAKEAWAY 27 
There is currently not enough evidence to recommend one tax 
structure over another for ENDS/ENNDS products. However, it is clear 
that taxing the e-liquids used for consumption is key. The excise tax 
should be applied on all e-liquids, whether or not they contain nicotine. 
If the preferred type of excise tax is ad valorem, it should be applied to 
the retail price. Countries can consider taxing devices as well, but they 
need to adequately assess their administrative capacity to do so.
Policy-makers need to be mindful of the diversity and rapid evolution of ENDS/
ENNDS products and adjust accordingly. Regulation must reflect this reality so 
that loopholes will not be exploited by the industry. For example, ENDS/ENNDs 
products include not only e-cigarettes, vapes and vape pens but also other categories 
such as e-hookahs, e-pipes and e-cigars. Lawmakers need to be clear about how 
ENDS/ENNDS products are defined so that subcategories do not fall under the 
radar when regulation comes into effect. Definitions will also be relevant when 
it comes to taxation. An unclear definition can lead to a seemingly contradictory 
situation, such as in Bahrain, where e-cigarettes are banned but e-hookahs are not.27
Finally, while policy-makers need to be mindful of the emergence of new products 
and must take appropriate actions to protect the health of their citizens, it is important 
to remember that the overwhelming share of nicotine consumption remains that 
of tobacco products, especially cigarettes. The total market value of ENDS/ENNDS 
and HTPs sales in 2018 was less than 2.2% of the total market value, while cigarette 
sales alone accounted for 91% of the same total market value (139–140). 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
An overview of excise tax application globally reveals a broad variety of price and tax 
levels, as well as structures used for taxing tobacco products, in particular, cigarettes. 
Some trends, however, indicate that tax and price levels are higher among higher-
income countries. The rate of taxes also matters: higher tax rates are correlated with 
higher prices, and higher prices change behaviour, which leads to a reduction in 
consumption. More countries are moving away from ad valorem taxes and towards 
either mixed or specific excise systems, and there are few countries that do not 
impose any excise tax on cigarettes. 
27  In Bahrain, the Ministry of Production and Trade Decision 38 of 2013 banned e-cigarettes, while the 
official list of excisable products from the Ministry of Finance includes e-shishas (or e-hookahs), making 
them apt to be taxed and therefore considered legal. 
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Significantly increasing the taxes and prices of tobacco products is the most effective 
and cost-effective policy to control tobacco use. Increased taxes – which are passed 
on to smokers as higher prices – reduce consumption. 
When designing tobacco tax policy or reforming tobacco tax systems, policy-makers 
face several challenges, ranging from technical issues – such as determining what tax 
structure and rates to apply – to political economy issues, as well as the perceived 
contribution of the tobacco sector to economic development. 
In designing tax policy, the tax structure adopted not only affects consumption 
overall, it also shapes the market structure. 
Ad valorem taxation incentivizes industry to set prices lower than specific taxation does. 
Evidence suggests that under a specific tax, the price gap between premium and 
lower-priced products is narrower, therefore reducing incentives for substitution to 
lower-priced products following a tax increase. However, as industry consolidates 
producers and widens its portfolio of products, new evidence indicates that the 
industry is introducing cheaper brands while increasing the price of its expensive 
brands, therefore, paradoxically, widening the price gap between its products.
Evidence also suggests that prices are higher under a specific excise tax structure. 
Additionally, from a tax administration perspective, a specific tax is easier to imple-
ment, since only the quantity produced needs to be ascertained rather than the 
value of the product.
Another aspect of tax structure is the use of tiered taxation – that is, tax rates that 
vary on the basis of different product characteristics. Evidence suggests that the 
average cigarette price and the average excise level for a pack of cigarettes tend to 
be much lower in countries that use a tiered excise structure than in countries that 
use a uniform excise tax. Tiered taxation encourages substitution from premium 
to cheaper brands, maintaining smoking prevalence and reducing the health im-
pact of tax rate increases. In addition to leading to lower prices, tiered taxation is 
difficult to administer and creates opportunities for the tobacco industry to avoid 
and evade taxes. 
The design of a tax structure must also consider the base on which tax is applied. 
The choice of base should lead to the highest possible effect on price and revenue. 
For specific taxation, the tax base is the quantity. When the tax is ad valorem, the 
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choice of the tax base is important not only for health considerations, through 
its effect on consumption, but also for tax revenue generation, as well as industry 
profits. An ad valorem tax based on the producer price, or CIF value, gives tobacco 
manufacturers opportunities to reduce their tax liability, especially when they control 
the distribution system through related parties. The best practice in an ad valorem 
(or mixed) excise structure is to use the retail price as the tax base and introduce a 
minimum excise tax per pack.
Other tax design considerations include the importance of using automatic adjust-
ments and indexation to inflation and income growth for the specific excise tax in 
order to avoid erosion of the tax over time. 
Emerging evidence indicates that tobacco taxation does not always achieve the 
intended results, because the tobacco industry finds ways to circumvent it. Non-
tax policies such as pricing regulation (in particular, minimum mark-ups or price 
floors/minimum prices) may be seen as a complementary approach to ensuring a 
high price level and discouraging consumption of tobacco products. So far, these 
policies have not proven to increase average prices. A price floor is likely to lead 
to increased industry profits, giving the industry greater funds for its marketing 
strategies (such as the introduction of new products), and lower tax revenues for 
governments. By reducing price competition, a price floor allows firms to compete 
aggressively for market share in other dimensions (e.g. product specifications).
However, where powerful multinationals are operating in certain markets with 
presence in all market segments and with the capability to overshift a tax on some 
brands while undershifting the tax on others, or where price promotions cannot be 
banned, minimum price policies may help increase the effectiveness of tax increases. 
Other non-tax policies affecting price levels are those relating to promotional dis-
counts for tobacco products and the sale of single sticks of cigarettes. Both should be 
completely banned. The ban of promotional discounts is usually dealt with in tobacco 
control laws under the Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship provision.
Higher taxes are the most effective way to dissuade consumption, with the added 
benefit of raising money for the government – money that can be earmarked for 
health and education programs, rather than going as profits to the tobacco industry. 
Additionally, in order to make excise tax on tobacco products more effective in reduc-
ing overall tobacco use and in line with the recommendation of the Guidelines for 
implementation of Article 6 of the WHO FCTC (Price and tax measures to reduce 
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the demand for tobacco), all tobacco products need to be taxed in a comparable 
way; the focus should not be on cigarettes only. 
Tax choices and reforms have various and sometimes conflicting consequences for 
the market. For example, there might be a trade-off between quantity and variety 
or perceived quality implications. It is important for the government to recognize 
that firms respond strategically to changes in tax policy. Close monitoring of the 
market is necessary to form correct expectations about industry responses and 
enable estimates of the impact of a tax increase on consumption and tax revenue. 
To estimate the total effect of a tax increase on demand for tobacco products and 
tax revenue, it is important to use correct estimates of the own-price elasticity of 
demand, the cross-price elasticity and the income elasticity of demand. It is also 
important to use updated estimates of demand elasticities, as the environment 
within which consumers make decisions continues to change. For example, financial 
crises or successful tobacco control interventions can be expected to shift demand 
and change elasticity. 
Another key measure of the impact of tax policy is the tax base elasticity. Policy-
makers need to be mindful of the three key components of tax base elasticity: (1) 
the price elasticity of demand of tobacco, (2) the share of the tax in the consumer 
price and (3) the degree of pass-through of the excise tax rate increase to consumer 
price. The degree to which these elements are affected by a tax increase will impact 
demand and revenues. Currently, the three components combined are not high 
enough in any country for a tax increase to lead to a reduction in excise tax revenues.
It is important to acknowledge that if tax increases lead to increases in prices be-
low concurrent increases in income levels, they will not be effective in reducing 
consumption, as tobacco remains a normal good in most countries. Policy-makers 
need to account for affordability when considering tax increases. They should ensure 
that tax increases are high enough to increase prices above income growth so that 
consumption goes down effectively.
When designing tax policy and deciding on the right level to impose, policy-makers 
need to assess and project the impact of their policy decisions. Monitoring and 
evaluation are important. Tools for measuring impact can be very helpful, and 
several such tools exist. The WHO ISPT, for example, looks not only at the impact 
of tax policy but also at a set of tobacco control policies, and this enables national 
policy-makers and other tobacco control experts to explore the potential impact of 
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future tobacco control policies. The tool uses impact factors of selected WHO FCTC 
demand-reduction measures derived from published literature, trends in tobacco 
smoking rates, national demographic information and tobacco-related mortality 
risk. More specific to tobacco tax policy, the WHO TaXSiM assesses the impact of 
any excise tax increase and change in excise tax structure on price levels, legal sales 
and revenues from excise and other taxes on tobacco products.
Building and monitoring indicators of tax and tobacco control policies helps policy-
makers assess the effectiveness of their policies and whether those policies have an 
impact on tobacco use over time. The implementation of the MPOWER package is 
one useful indicator for assessing tobacco control overall. Tobacco taxation works 
best if it is implemented as part of a comprehensive MPOWER package.
The tax share in the retail price of a selected tobacco product is one indicator of the 
effectiveness of tax policy, but a more important one is affordability, that is, whether 
tax increases do lead to price increases that are above income and general price 
increases. A useful indicator to assess the performance of the tax policy overall 
is the Tobacconomics Cigarette Tax Scorecard, which synthesizes best practices in 
tobacco taxation by combining the four key components of tax policy (price level, 
change in affordability over time, total and excise tax share in the retail price and 
tobacco tax structure).
Domestic policies in agriculture, industry, trade, finance and labour all have the 
potential to create or support incentives at different stages in tobacco production, 
manufacturing and distribution that can be counterproductive to the objectives of 
tobacco control and taxation. Greater domestic policy coherence should be pro-
moted across different sectors of the government to ensure that public policies and 
interventions in these sectors do not counteract the intended public health impact 
of tobacco control and taxation.
Differential tax structures and rates have the potential to distort the functioning of the 
internal market. Harmonization of tobacco taxation ensures the establishment and 
proper functioning of a single market; prevents tax revenue erosion, tax avoidance 
and tax evasion; and protects people’s health. In this context, tax competition, where 
countries simply undercut each other’s tax rate, might prevent governments from 
achieving their tobacco control objectives and raising sufficient funds to pursue 
public health policies. To avoid such a race to the bottom, countries can establish 
minimum tax rates on all tobacco products. A common high minimum specific excise 
tax is the best approach to ensure that taxes and prices are above a minimal level.
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In recent years, the world has experienced the rise of new and emerging tobacco 
and nicotine products, including ENDS/ENNDS and HTPs, which the industry 
claims are safer than traditional tobacco products. The evidence so far suggests that 
these products could pose a threat to public health, especially if they attract new or 
young users or prevent current smokers from quitting. 
The market and demand dynamics of these products as well as initiation, cessation 
and switching of tobacco use behaviours among different socioeconomic groups, 
are not yet clear. Until more evidence for the claimed benefits of these tobacco 
products is available, caution should be taken in developing tax policy. Therefore, 
the current recommendation is for HTPs to be taxed at the same level as cigarettes 
on a per-unit basis regardless of tobacco content. In countries where they are not 
banned, ENDS/ENNDS products must be regulated and taxed in a manner that 
discourages uptake by youth and non-users. Taxing e-liquids is a key component of 
ENDS/ENNDS products taxation. Nicotine- and non-nicotine-containing e-liquids 
should be taxed equally. If ad valorem excise is chosen as the structure, the base 
should be applied on the retail price. Countries can also consider taxing the devices 
used for ENDS/ENNDs and HTP consumption, but they need to adequately assess 
their administrative capacity to do so.
While the evolution of new and emerging tobacco and nicotine delivery systems 
merits the attention of administrators and regulators, it is worth remembering 
that the bulk of the world’s tobacco consumption is still in conventional cigarettes. 
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ANNEX 2.1
Table A2.1 Countries that apply different types of cigarette excise tax structures, 2018
SPECIFIC EXCISE  
(65 COUNTRIES)
AD VALOREM EXCISE 
(42 COUNTRIES)
MIXED EXCISE  
(63 COUNTRIES)







State of ), Burundi, 
Canada, Cook Islands, 
Dominica, Ecuador, 
Eswatini, Fiji, Gambia, 
Honduras, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, 







Nepal, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, 
Pakistan, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Republic 
of Korea, Saint Lucia, 




South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Tajikistan, 
Timor-Leste, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, United 






Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cabo Verde, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Chad, 
Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Cuba, Democratic 









Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Syrian Arab Republic, 
Togo, Turkmenistan, 
Tuvalu, United Arab 
Emirates,
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of ), Viet Nam, 
Zambia
Algeria, Austria, 
Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Central 
African Republic, Chile, 
China, Colombia, 




Egypt, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iran 
(Islamic Republic of ), 


















Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, West Bank 
and Gaza Strip
Afghanistan, Angola, 
Antigua and Barbuda, 
Democratic People’s 




States of ), Nauru, 
Niue, Oman,a Qatar,a 
Somalia
a This table shows the status of cigarette excise tax structures as of July 2018 and does not account for 
changes occurring after that date, in particular for the cases of Qatar and Oman, which introduced excise 
on tobacco in January 2019 and June 2019, respectively.
Source: WHO RGTE. 
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ANNEX 2.2 THE ANALYTICS OF THE TAX BASE ELASTICITY
Assume tax revenue R = tsQ or R = tvPQ , where Q is the quantity consumed, ts is 
the specific tax, tv is the ad valorem tax and P is the consumer price. 
The following equations can help to illustrate the different components of the 
tax base elasticity.
Under a specific excise regime, change in revenue depends essentially on the change 
in consumption:
where R is the tobacco tax revenue, is the specific excise tax and is the tobacco tax 
base elasticity.
The tax base elasticity is made of:
where ε, the price elasticity = ,
 is the degree of pass-through of the specific excise tax rate increase on consumer price
and is the tax-price ratio.
Under an ad valorem excise regime, change in revenue depends essentially on the 
change in tobacco expenditure:
where R is the tobacco tax revenue, tav is ad valorem excise tax and ηav is the tobacco 
tax base elasticity.
The tax base elasticity here is made of:
where is the degree of pass-through of the ad valorem excise tax rate increase 
on consumer price,
 is the tax-price ratio 
and ε the price elasticity = .
∂R = Q (1+ηs)∂ ts

























∂R = P Q (1+ηav)∂tav
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ANNEX 2.3 ELEMENTS OF THE DEVICES THAT MAKE UP  
ENDS/ENNDS PRODUCTS
The main components of any ENDS/ENNDS kit include essentially:




• Tanks (refillable containers) with removable atomizer (often sold bundled 
with atomizers) 
• Clearomizers/refillable pods (no removable atomizer) 
• E-liquid
For closed systems
• Disposable e-cigarettes: not rechargeable, thrown away after e-liquid is finished 
• Nondisposable e-cigarettes:
 – Pre-filled cartomizers (cartridges designed to go with the cigalike kit) 
 – Pre-filled tank refills/pods (pods or cartridges designed to go with the 
prefilled tank/pod kits)
Some definitions:
• Atomizer: uses a heating element to vaporize the e-liquid
• Cartomizer: combines the cartridge/tank and the atomizer
• Clearomizer: same as cartomizer, uses different technology
• Cartridge/tank/pod: container that includes the e-liquid
In summary, ENDS/ENNDS product devices include the following:
• USB charger (not a car charger)




• Cartridge/tank/pod with or without atomizer
• Pre-filled cartridge/tank/pod (for closed systems, includes e-liquid)
• E-liquid (added in the cartridge/tank/pod in open systems)




clearomizer-vs-cartomizer, accessed 15 July 2020.





Imposing excise taxes on tobacco products usually serves more than one purpose. 
Governments often find themselves balancing interests between financial and public 
health objectives. Both objectives can best be achieved by an efficient and effective 
competent authority with strong technical capacity to enforce and collect taxes. 
A competent authority is the agency, organization or department that is legally as-
signed to complete a particular activity; in the case of administering tobacco taxes, 
the competent authority is often a tax administration, revenue authority, customs 
department or ministry of finance. 
Article 6 of the WHO FCTC (1), along with its guidelines (2), provides a solid 
foundation for sound tax administration. As stated under section 1.5 in the guidelines, 
tobacco tax systems should be efficient and effective. They 
should be structured to minimize the costs of compliance and administration, 
while ensuring that the desired level of tax revenue is raised and health objec-
tives are achieved. Efficient and effective administration of tobacco tax systems 
enhances tax compliance and collection of tax revenue while reducing tax evasion 
and the risk of illicit trade.
Efficiency in tax administration refers to minimizing the costs per unit of tax revenue 
collected. It is measured by comparing the resources used with the revenues gener-
ated. Effectiveness in tax administration refers to a high level of compliance – also 
described as taxpayers meeting their obligations. Thus, an efficient and effective 
competent authority collects the tax at a minimum cost while ensuring conformity 
to the rules. 
Tobacco taxation is the single most effective tobacco control measure for re-
ducing tobacco use and is best implemented as part of a comprehensive tobacco 
control plan (3). Illicit trade – including smuggling and illicit manufacturing – and 
tax avoidance undermine the effectiveness of tax policies and their objectives (4). 
The impact on illicit trade is often cited by opponents of tax increases, who argue 
that increasing taxes increases illicit trade. They contend that illicit trade can lead 
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to lower revenues for governments and lower prices. The challenge faced by the 
competent authorities is to ensure that due taxes are declared and collected on all 
tobacco products that are manufactured in and/or imported into its jurisdiction, 
while at the same time detecting tobacco products that are illegally manufactured 
in and/or imported into its jurisdiction, stopping such activity and prosecuting the 
responsible parties.  
This chapter describes the shared characteristics of good tax administrations, 
including best practices based on country experiences. It regularly refers to the 
WHO FCTC, and – given the close linkages between tax administration and efforts to 
fight tax evasion resulting from illicit trade – draws extensively from the Protocol to 
Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (5). Any practice or conduct prohibited 
by law and related to production, shipment, receipt, possession, distribution, sale 
or purchase of tobacco products – including any practice or conduct intended to 
facilitate such activity – is considered as illicit trade (Article 1). The objective of the 
Protocol is to eliminate and prevent all forms of illicit trade in tobacco products. 
At the same time, the Protocol includes measures for tobacco tax administration 
based on international best practices, which makes it relevant for all countries, even 
those that are not Parties to it. 
The Protocol was adopted at the fifth session of the COP to the WHO FCTC in 
2012 and entered into force on 25 September 2018. As indicated in the Preamble, 
it was developed in response to the increasing international illicit trade in tobacco 
products (5). The Protocol covers three main areas: (1) measures to control the 
supply chain (Part III); (2) measures dealing with offences, including sanctions 
(Part IV) and (3) international cooperation (Part V). Different provisions of the 
Protocol are discussed in detail throughout this chapter, and section 3.4 is devoted 
specifically to control and enforcement.
3.2 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Competent authorities that collect taxes effectively in an efficient way share a number 
of attributes. The organizational structures of these authorities contain clearly defined 
roles, responsibilities and rules for coordination among relevant bodies. Moreover, 
competent authorities collect data regularly and manage information needed for 
assessing risks. The key to successful risk management is to share this information 
among relevant authorities both within a country and between countries. Effective 
and efficient competent authorities also regularly evaluate their performance and 
accountability according to key performance indicators to identify areas for improve-
ment. These characteristics are discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
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3.2.1. CLEARLY DEFINED ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
The designation of competent authorities for the implementation and enforcement of 
tax laws – including clear definitions of the boundaries of authority among numerous 
agencies within a country – is essential for efficient collection of taxes. Areas where 
different agencies need to cooperate and share data must also be defined. Overlap of 
activities by different authorities leads to inefficient use of resources, whereas gaps 
create opportunities for fraud, leading to ineffective tax laws. The importance of clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities applies not only to tax authorities and customs 
but also to law enforcement agencies, including police and border control forces. 
The implementation and enforcement of taxation is organized differently in various 
countries. The most common structure separates customs and tax administration. 
The trend since the 1990s, however, has been to combine these functions into one 
agency, such as Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in the United King-
dom, SUNAT in Peru1 and AFIP in Argentina.2 Several countries have increased 
coordination between tax and customs by creating a revenue secretariat and also 
implementing systems to share tax records as a single taxpayer account. Coordina-
tion between tax policy and tax administration authorities has also increased. One 
can think of combining both into one department within the ministry of finance 
or ensure that tax administration authorities are consulted during the tax policy 
process. Some tasks, such as licensing, may be handled by other ministries such as 
the ministries of health, agriculture or trade. For example, the Ministry of Health 
of Brunei and the Health Science Authority of Singapore are responsible for the 
licensing of importers of tobacco products (6). In some federal countries, including 
Colombia and the United States, excise taxes – including tobacco taxes – are collected 
and enforced by local or state tax administrations. Other countries have organized 
the administration of national taxes by establishing a single unified revenue body. 
Particularly in larger economies, that body is often responsible for both direct and 
indirect taxes, including excise taxes, and reports to the ministry of finance. All the 
functions needed for effective and efficient tax administration are established within 
these bodies (7). No matter what the institutional arrangements may be, it is vital 
that the agencies cooperate and exchange information and that their competencies 
find their basis in law. More information on this topic is provided in section 3.2.2.
1  Law Decreto Supremo 061-2002-PCM - Disponen fusión por absorción de la Superintendencia Na-
cional de Administración Tributaria – SUNAT con la Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas - Aduanas 
[Supreme decree year 2002 about the merger between Tax and Customs Administration]. Lima: El 
Peruano, 12, July 2002 (in Spanish) (http://www.sunat.gob.pe/legislacion/sunat/ds061-2002-PCM.pdf, 
accessed 13 November 2020).
2  Administracion Federal de Ingresos Publicos, Decreto 618/1997 [Federal Administration of 
Public Revenue, Decree 618] (in Spanish) (http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/an-
exos/40000-44999/44432/norma.htm, accessed 13 November 2020).
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Many countries, however, have separate bodies for the collection of taxes and 
customs duties. A 2015 survey of 135 tax administrations worldwide found that 
only 36% of them were responsible for both tax administration and customs ad-
ministration (8). In most countries, customs authorities are more likely to collect 
excise duties on imports, and in many countries, VAT or sales tax is collected jointly 
with tobacco tax, particularly for imported products. This simplifies controls and 
creates synergy by unifying common processes and procedures, resulting in cost 
savings for tax administrations and taxpayers. The involvement of multiple bodies 
in tax collection requires especially good collaboration and information-sharing 
to ensure efficient and effective collection of taxes and duties.
KEY TAKEAWAY 1 
Institutional arrangements with clearly defined roles  
and responsibilities – designed to prevent overlaps and voids – 
contribute to effective and efficient tax administration.
3.2.2. EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AMONG RELEVANT BODIES 
Coordination at the national level
Coordination among relevant bodies is key to effective tobacco tax administration. 
This means not only clearly defined roles and responsibilities, as described in the 
previous section, but also coordination among the competent authority, customs and 
those responsible for formulating, analysing and implementing tax policy. Regardless 
of the institutional arrangements – whether the responsible parties are all within 
the ministry of finance or in separate government agencies – all parties need to 
cooperate and exchange information to optimize tax collection and enforcement 
of tax policy. In practice, this means that information should be shared among, for 
example, customs, local government units that issue licences and health authori-
ties – particularly those that regulate the sale of tobacco products. 
For tax authorities, the most relevant information concerning excise taxes in-
cludes the identity of taxpayers and those involved in the trade of tobacco (import 
and export data, licences, criminal records, tax returns, bank statements, etc.); the 
category, quantity, value and location of manufactured goods; and the movement of 
those goods until all taxes are paid. Legal impediments to obtaining this informa-
tion – such as bank secrecy or privacy regulations – should be kept in mind, and 
where needed, exceptions for fiscal procedures should be incorporated into law. 
Seizure data are also a valuable source of information; more details on this are 
provided in section 3.4.  
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Tax authorities should regularly coordinate with law enforcement agencies – such 
as the police and border control forces, depending on a country’s laws – to properly 
monitor tobacco-related activities and enforce the tax laws. Often, the competent 
tax authority and customs authorities work in close cooperation with anti-fraud 
teams.3 Coordination and sharing of information can be required in legislation or 
regulations to ensure a streamlined process and avoid confusion. This can be done 
on an ad hoc basis as needed or with formal planned exchanges of information 
and regular meetings. It is recommended that at least a legal basis for exchange or 
access to information among government bodies be established to prevent claims 
during legal procedures that evidence was obtained unlawfully. 
Some countries go beyond exchanging information and cooperation. In the Neth-
erlands, for example, customs authorities not only carry out work for the Ministry of 
Finance, they also carry out non-fiscal tasks for seven other departments, including 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality; the Ministry of Justice and 
Security; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (9). These activities are often based on 
bilateral agreements between the Ministry of Finance and the other departments. 
In other countries, such as the United States and Canada, Customs and Border 
Protection are not part of the Ministry of Finance; they are part of the Department of 
Homeland Security in the United States and the Ministry of Public Safety and Emer-
gency Preparedness in Canada. These agencies also carry out many non-fiscal tasks.
Along with the implementation of new tobacco control and tax laws, several 
countries have also created high-level committees to ensure good coordination and 
implementation of the laws. Led by health and finance ministries, committees ensure 
coordination and fine-tuning to achieve desired results. Botswana, Chile, Colombia, 
Indonesia and Senegal, among other countries, have successfully started with coordina-
tion, planning and monitoring of tobacco laws’ implementation through periodic com-
mittee meetings. The committees usually include representatives from the ministries 
of health, finance, tax and customs, police, transport and, in some cases, education. 
Coordination across borders
Effective approaches to control smuggling in tobacco products require interventions at 
the borders of jurisdictions and therefore must involve the border agencies. However, 
with the globalization of trade, there is a need for close coordination not only between 
tax and border control authorities but also between different jurisdictions. Recent cases 
have demonstrated that an absence of formal cooperation frameworks may expose a 
market to financial crime, including money-laundering and financing of terrorism (10).
3  See, for example, Focus on tax fraud. Customs administration of the Netherlands, tax and customs 
administration. 2017;2 (https://customsnl-insight.nl/article/309563676, accessed 3 October 2020).
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Accession to international cooperation agreements such as the Protocol, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and other regional 
arrangements will contribute greatly to the effective exchange of information and 
cooperation among enforcement agencies. An effective exchange of market data 
and information from participating jurisdictions can prevent potential cross-border 
crimes and loss of domestic revenue. International cooperation reinforces domestic 
measures to stop illicit trade and raise much-needed revenues. Parties to the Protocol 
have a commitment to cooperate with one another and to share information to meet 
their obligations under the Protocol (Article 20). The Protocol itself is the legal 
instrument that allows Parties to cooperate and share information across borders. 
Authorities of governments that are not Parties to the Protocol or another coopera-
tion agreement that represents a legal instrument to exchange information could 
conclude a mutual assistance agreement or exchange of information agreement to 
guide the procedures under which information exchange can take place effectively.
The Revised Kyoto Convention of 2010 promulgated by the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) recommends that jurisdictions that enter into bilateral agree-
ments require the other jurisdiction to provide pre-arrival information on goods 
bound for their customs territory. A survey of 87 WCO members in 2013 found 
that the vast majority of customs administrations had the legal authority to share 
information related to the supply chain of tobacco products with other administrations 
(11). Some economic blocs have also established harmonized legislation applying 
to all of their Member States to provide administrative cooperation to efficiently 
cooperate on tax matters (12).
Coordination can include the establishment of a special agency to ensure the 
safety and proper functioning of external borders, such as the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency, also known as Frontex (from the French frontières extérieures, 
“external borders”). In some of the Frontex-led operations, EU and non-EU countries 
cooperate together with international organizations to target cross-border crime, 
including the smuggling of cigarettes and raw tobacco (13).
Criminals who engage in illicit trade of tobacco products are usually also en-
gaged in related criminal activities such as bribery, money laundering, corruption, 
obstruction of justice and even financing of terrorist organizations (14). A number 
of international treaties provide the legal framework for addressing such conduct 
through mechanisms that tackle illicit trade from a criminal justice perspective, 
such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption and the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Table 3.1 summarizes the types 
of structures available for such coordination.
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Table 3.1 Structures for coordinating mechanisms
TYPE OF COORDINATION BASIS INVOLVED ACTORS
National coordination Agreements with a basis in law 
between national agencies 
Customs authorities, ministries 
of finance and those 
responsible for formulating, 
analysing and implementing 
tax policy; law enforcement 
agencies, such as police and 
border control forces; and 
anti-fraud teams
Agreements between ministries 
or a basis in law or regulation 
on the establishment of high-
level committees
Ministry of health, finance, 
revenue, justice, transport and 
sometimes education and 
enforcement entities such as 
customs and police
Bilateral coordination Bilateral cooperation 
agreements
National governments
Regional coordination Regional arrangements such as
• Harmonized legislation 
applying to all Member 
States of an economic bloc 
to provide administrative 
cooperation in taxation to 
efficiently cooperate on tax 
matters
• Regulation to jointly 
establish a special agency 
to ensure the safety and 
functioning of external 
borders
EU Member States, the 
European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (Frontex), 
customs, law and border 
enforcement agencies
International coordination International treaties or 
conventions such as
• The Protocol
• OECD multilateral 
Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters 
• United Nations Convention 
against Transnational 
Organized Crime
• United Nations Convention 
against Corruption
• International Convention 
for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism
Parties to international treaties 
and conventions, law and 
border enforcement agencies
KEY TAKEAWAY 2 
Regardless of differing institutional arrangements, coordination  
and cooperation within a country and across jurisdictions are essential 
to optimize tax collection and enforcement of tax policy.
100  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
3.2.3. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Key strategic indicators are useful for assessing the performance of a competent 
authority. Performance indicators can include measures such as net revenue col-
lected, total expenditures compared with budgeted amounts, the ratio of costs to 
collection, measures of filing and payment compliance and taxpayer satisfaction 
(15). Several international organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank and OECD have developed tools to evaluate tax 
and customs with key performance indicators. This section provides information 
on some of the indicators that are particularly useful for measuring performance 
related to tobacco taxes, including the cost of collection ratio, tax gap analysis and 
tax revenue targets. 
Cost of collection ratio
Collection costs vary among countries. The cost of collection ratio is the total ex-
penditure as a percentage of the total net taxes collected. This ratio is often used 
as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness of competent authorities. In Table 3.2, 
the cost of collection ratio is calculated for country groups by income level, based 
on an annual IMF survey. The numbers in the table give an indication of resources 
used and revenues collected for taxes in general. The same definition of cost of 
collection was used for all countries. The tax revenue excludes VAT and excise taxes 
on imported products, so it reflects internal taxes only: personal and corporate 
income taxes, VAT and excise on domestic production. Customs duties are also 
not included. The results show the differences among countries at various income 
levels. Other contributing factors include differences between tax systems, economic 
situations and compliance levels. 
Table 3.2 Cost of collection ratio in 2015 per 100 units (ratio of average recurrent budget  
to revenue collecteda)
GROUP (SAMPLE SIZE) 2015
Low-income countries (6) 1.3
Lower-middle-income countries (15) 1.6
Upper-middle income countries (18) 0.9
High-income countries (36) 0.9
All (76) 1.1
a Does not include VAT or excise on imports
Source: (Reference 8, Appendix Table 12).
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As one would expect, given lower levels of automation and resources, the ratio is 
higher for low- and lower-middle-income countries, greater than 1.0 (more than 
1.0 currency unit needed to collect 100 currency units). The ratios for upper-middle 
income and high-income countries are below 1.0, indicating more efficient and/or 
effective collection systems.  
The cost of collection might be less relevant for taxes that are introduced with 
other than solely financial objectives, such as influencing a change in behaviour. In 
particular, in the case of excise taxes applied on tobacco products, the cost of tax 
collection does not reveal the full picture. If excise tax rates are increased substan-
tially – or at least increased above inflation and income growth – consumption will 
be reduced. As a result, health care costs will be reduced due to reduced tobacco-
related mortality and morbidity and increased productivity. These savings are not 
factored into the ratio of cost of collection to revenue, but governments do benefit 
from these lower expenses overall. Nevertheless, the cost of collection can be used 
as an indicator of the efficiency of a competent authority. 
Tax gap analysis
Tax gap analysis is another method of determining how effectively taxes on tobacco 
products are collected. The tax gap is the difference between the tax due and the 
tax that is collected. For example, the theoretical tax due under an ad valorem tax 
on the retail price of cigarettes would be the average price of a pack of cigarettes 
multiplied by the number of packs sold (estimated from household expenditure 
surveys, for example) multiplied by the tax rate. This outcome can then be compared 
to the actual revenues collected (16).
The effectiveness of tax collection can also be determined by using the macro-
economic input-output matrix, measuring the added value of the economic sector 
– tobacco in this case – and the theoretical VAT due and then comparing the result 
with the real VAT collection. This methodology is valid for measuring domestic 
tax evasion (more information on the use of this method to estimate illicit trade is 
provided in Chapter 4, section 4.1). 
Tax revenue target
The performance of a competent authority can also be evaluated by determining 
whether the tax revenue target has been met, if mandated, for a given tax period. 
Although revenue forecasts are often used as targets, caution is advised. Forecast 
revenues could include assumptions such as economic growth, inflation and amount 
collected. Forecasting is a good practice, however, and competent authorities should 
provide input to the government for the forecasting of revenues to improve the 
quality of the estimates. Competent authorities should monitor the actual collections 
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in comparison with the forecasted revenues, but the theoretical base may not be 
attainable for a variety of reasons. In addition, a revenue target could provide an 
incentive for some customs and competent authorities to simply aim to reach the 
target amount, rather than making efforts to collect the maximum amount possible 
with the available resources.
3.3 THE TAX COMPLIANCE CYCLE
For any tax, there are associated compliance, control and enforcement processes. 
The compliance cycle usually includes registration and licensing, tax declarations, 
recordkeeping, storage in warehouses, duty suspension, collection of tax and tax 
refunds. Figure 3.1 illustrates the typical stages of the tax compliance cycle.
Fig. 3.1 Tax compliance cycle
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equipment (Article 6). To ensure an effective licensing system, Parties shall monitor 
and collect, where applicable, any licence fees that may be levied and consider 
using them in effective administration and enforcement of the licensing system, 
for public health or for any other related activity in accordance with national law. 
If feasible, each Party shall require that retailers and tobacco growers – except for 
traditional growers working on a noncommercial basis – maintain complete and 
accurate records of all relevant transactions in which they engage, in accordance 
with its national law (Article 9.4). 
Article 6.3(b) of the Protocol provides a list of information to be requested from 
the applicant of the licence, including:
• relevant identity information on the applicant
• business location of the manufacturing unit or warehouse and production 
capacity
• detailed list of tobacco products and equipment used
• description of where the manufacturing equipment will be installed and used
• documentation or declaration of any criminal records
• information on bank accounts to be used for transactions and payments
• description of intended use and intended market of sale of the tobacco 
products.
To make it easier for authorities to collect all the information they need, rules of 
confidentiality could be exempted in the licensing process.
Licences can be general – covering all activities requiring a licence – or issued 
for each activity separately, such as different licences for manufacturing, importing 
and retail. A general licence is less burdensome for the licensing authority, whereas 
licences for each type of activity offer greater control but at the cost of more adminis-
tration (17). The cost of implementing the licensing system should be proportionate 
to the potential impact of the system. Not only should the type of licences be taken 
into consideration, the process and information needed to obtain a licence should 
be carefully considered to ensure proportionality. The more stringent the process 
is – in terms of the information required and the obligations the system imposes 
on licensees – the more burdensome the regime will be on both businesses and the 
authorities who must administer and enforce it. The more information is collected, 
the higher the compliance and administrative burden will be. It is recommended 
that the added value of the information be balanced with the additional compliance, 
administrative and/or enforcement burden. 
The level of stringency should be decided with consideration of factors such as 
the level of risk of the activity and the availability of enforcement capacity. A more 
stringent regime might be justifiable for activities that pose a higher risk for the 
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government in terms of potential loss of tax revenues – such as the import, production 
and handling of excisable products on which the excise taxes have not yet been paid. 
Authorities could consider setting licence fees at a high enough level to cover the 
costs of administering and enforcing the system. For an example of a system that 
relies mainly on licensing and permissions, see the case study of Australia in Box 3.1.
Wholesalers, distributors and retailers of tobacco products could also be required 
to obtain a licence before they can engage in the trade of those products. This would 
enable the competent authority to require reports on, for example, transactions 
relating to the purchase and sale of tobacco products. Moreover, it would allow 
the authorities to complete the audit trail of the entire supply chain and to obtain 
data that will help tax and health policy-makers properly and effectively monitor 
tobacco products.
Governments could also require a licence for entities dealing with raw materials 
or growing tobacco, including farmers. If licensing of tobacco farmers is deemed 
appropriate and subsequently required in a country, the farmers have to identify and 
register their farm areas and location to obtain a licence. The benefit of requiring 
licences for farmers is that the control of the legitimate supply chain is extended 
to the identification of the source of the raw material for tobacco products. It also 
makes it more difficult to divert raw tobacco from the licit to the illicit supply chain. 
Licences are issued by different agencies across the world. In Brazil, for example, 
the Health Surveillance Agency is responsible for providing licences. Operators 
need to obtain approval of the layout of manufacturing and warehousing facilities 
before they can operate. In addition, they must demonstrate how they will comply 
with other laws and regulations – for example, by showing the design of product 
packaging, including the pack, carton and master case. The factory location must 
be identified before manufacturers can obtain a licence. Finally, a licence is required 
for the importation of machinery to produce tobacco products (18). 
Licences can be a source of useful information if authorities establish the informa-
tion that applicants must supply in order to obtain the licence. Such information 
could include the quantity, price and how the tobacco harvests are disposed, as well 
as the identity of the buyers. It is recommended that an effective licensing regime 
collect information to establish both the identity and characteristics of applicants 
by requiring criminal records on relevant offences, such as previous noncompliance 
with tobacco licences or fraud. 
To avoid loopholes for monitoring raw tobacco, importers of tobacco leaf could 
also be licensed or at least required to register and report information on quanti-
ties, sources and sales. In some countries, this information is already collected by 
a government agency other than tax authorities, for example, by the ministry of 
agriculture. Duplication of requirements and reporting should be avoided through 
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legislation and coordination among agencies. If licensing of (small-scale) farmers 
is difficult to implement, subsequent purchasers (first processors) in the supply 
chain could be licensed and regulated instead. Licensing first processors is often less 
burdensome to enforce for competent authorities because, in general, there are far 
fewer first processors than there are growers. For example, in the EU, between 50 
and 100 first processors have been identified, compared with 55 000 farmers (19).
Countries could also consider requiring registration of persons or entities engaged 
in the manufacture and import or sale of materials used for the manufacturing of 
tobacco products, such as cigarette papers, tobacco leaves, additives, adhesives, 
acetate or any other type of filters used for cigarettes, tipping paper and cellophane 
or plastic wraps, as well as materials for packing the cigarettes into packs, reams 
and master cases. In addition, tobacco manufacturers could be required to obtain a 
licence before they can purchase these materials. The Parties to the Protocol should 
decide on appropriate measures, depending on research as to whether key inputs 
that are essential for manufacturing of tobacco products exist and can be identified 
and subject to effective controls. 
KEY TAKEAWAY 3 
The objective of licensing is to regulate and secure the supply chain. 
It is a powerful tool for obtaining information for verification, further 
investigation and audits. Ideally, all persons involved in the growing 
of tobacco and retailing, transporting, wholesaling, brokering, 
warehousing and distribution of tobacco products or  
manufacturing equipment should be licensed.
Licensing requisites
Based on case studies and best practices – including experiences from managing 
bonded warehouses where the value of merchandise or suspended duties or taxes 
is high – the following kinds of information could be required to obtain a licence, 
in particular, for producers, warehouses and distributors of tobacco products:
• certification of safety of installations, perimeter security for production 
and storage (may include CCTV [closed-circuit television]4 access for tax 
administration) 
• certification of financial solvency
• detailed online, real-time inventory of tobacco products and main raw materi-
als, accessible by tax administration
• electronic accounting systems
4 The term “closed-circuit television” is used generically to describe surveillance camera systems.
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• detailed lists of owners and managers
• banking and other financial records
• periodic electronic reports of transactions for tobacco products
• anytime tax administration right of entry for inventories 
• mandatory electronic tax returns and payments
• mandatory prior-to-arrival customs declarations for tobacco products
• declarations of compliance with the tax stamp system (if applicable)
• for those involved in import or export, authorized economic operator (AEO) 
certification
• proof of compliance with the bond or guarantee regime 
• agreement to finance reasonable cost of inspections and tracking and tracing.
Box 3.1 Case study of licensing in Australia 
Australia has taken an approach to controlling tobacco taxes that differs from that in 
many other countries. It has not used fiscal marks or tracking and tracing.5 Instead, it 
administers tobacco taxes through licensing and permission-based systems aimed 
at facilitating operations by lower-risk entities while preventing or tightly controlling 
commerce involving higher-risk entities. The domestic tax agency, the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO), is responsible for most of the controls. These controls cover 
tobacco that is grown or manufactured and imported as finished goods or as leaf 
for manufacturing in Australia. In fact, the legal tobacco market in Australia consists 
only of imported finished tobacco products. In 2006, all tobacco-growing licences 
were cancelled by the ATO because manufacturers switched to cheaper leaf from 
external suppliers. The last domestic cigarette manufacturers closed in 2015 and 2016, 
and there has been no legal domestic tobacco growing or manufacture since then. 
The ATO administers all other functions relating to the import of tobacco and 
tobacco products, including licensing of bonded warehouses used to store imported 
products and issuance of permissions to undertake movement of bonded tobacco 
products between licensed bonded warehouses or to places of export. 
Importers must apply for a licence for a bonded warehouse to store imported tobac-
co. The applicant must meet general criteria such as fitness, recordkeeping and security.6 
 These criteria are designed to ensure that only low-risk entities are able to enter the ex-
cise tax system. Risk levels are also kept at an acceptable level through provisions allow-
ing the suspension or cancellation of licences, subject to appeal. Licences are valid for a 
5 See sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 for detailed discussions on fiscal marks and tracking and tracing.
6 The entity must not have been charged with an offence under the Excise Act or any Commonwealth, 
State or Territory Act that carries a penalty in excess of US$ 105 000 in the previous 12 months (or convicted 
in the previous 10 years), has shown a history of compliance with tax law in the previous four years, has 
had no previous cancellation of a licence, has adequate financial resources and is not in receivership.
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three-year period, with automatic renewal for licensees with demonstrated compliance.
The permission system relies on post-transaction audits of commercial records. 
Criteria used to assess risk include the size of the duty liability, the compliance record 
of both parties and the possibility of diversion into the market. When there is a 
perceived risk of revenue loss, the application can be denied or a financial security 
deposit can be required. 
Exports of tobacco products are also subject to an export declaration process 
with the Australian Border Force. An approved export declaration is required for the 
products to be able to leave the country.
Following recommendations from a government task force in 2017, the status 
of tax-suspended, bonded tobacco was eliminated as of 1 July 2019. In addition, an 
import licensing regime was introduced, and commercial tobacco imports without a 
licence are banned. Importers are required to identify their duty liabilities at import 
and make immediate payment; there are no credit terms available. Full payment 
of duties and taxes to the Australian Border Force are required prior to a release of 
tobacco products into the country. 
Sources: (20–21).
As mentioned above, certification as an AEO could be requested as part of the 
licensing process. Most customs authorities are familiar with the concept of AEOs. 
Created by the WCO, AEO principles were initially focused on security concerns (22). 
Having a special licensing regime for operators of the tobacco supply chain is recom-
mended due to the special nature of the product. For countries that have no system 
in place, AEO certification could be a starting point for setting up such a regime.
An AEO is defined by the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards (22) as a party 
involved in the international movement of goods – in whatever function – that has 
been approved by, or on behalf of, a national customs administration as complying 
with WCO or equivalent supply chain security standards. AEOs include, inter alia, 
manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers, carriers, consolidators, intermediaries, 
ports, airports, terminal operators, integrated operators, warehousers and distributors.
For many years – in some cases, even since the 1970s – customs administrations 
have been increasingly involved in the security of the international trade supply 
chain. More recently, customs administrations have developed security programmes 
in a global context. The AEO is part of these programmes, and in 2005, the WCO 
adopted the SAFE Framework of Standards. Since then, a number of traders have 
been required to make substantial investments in order to obtain AEO status and 
must continue to invest to maintain that status. 
The AEO program is also recognized by the Trade Facilitation Agreement, a 
multilateral agreement signed by 174 countries (23).
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Some regional blocs have further specified the standards for AEOs and provide 
clear and well-structured information on their websites to guide and encourage 
operators to apply for AEO status. A good example of this practice is the website 
of the Revenue Commissioners of the Republic of Ireland, which contains the in-
formation shown in Box 3.2.
Box 3.2 AEO: Republic of Ireland Tax and Customs 
What are AEOs?
AEO status is a certified standard authorization issued by customs administrations 
in the European Union (EU). It certifies that an economic operator has met certain 
standards in relation to:
• safety and security
• systems to manage commercial records
• compliance with customs rules
• financial solvency
• practical standards of competence or professional qualifications.
This is primarily a trade facilitation measure that recognizes reliable operators and 
encourages best practices in the international supply chain. As an AEO, an operator 
could benefit from:
• recognition worldwide as a safe, secure and compliant business partner in 
international trade;
• lower risk scores in risk analysis systems when profiling;
• priority treatment if physical controls are conducted;
• mutual recognition of AEO programmes under Joint Customs Cooperation 
Agreements, which could result in faster movement of goods through third-
country borders;
• reduced data sets for entry and exit summary declarations (this applies only 
to AEO safety and security);
• easier access to simplified procedures; 
• reduction or waiver of comprehensive guarantees.
The conditions for AEO status apply to all businesses regardless of size. Manufacturers, 
exporters, freight forwarders, warehouse keepers, clearance agents, carriers and 
importers may all apply for AEO status.
Source: (24).
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3.3.2 DATA COLLECTION, DECLARATIONS AND ACCOUNTING
The effectiveness of risk analysis depends on the quality and reliability of the available 
data. This is also the case for risk analysis in relation to tobacco taxes. Obtaining 
reliable data can be a challenge in many countries, but the use of electronic sys-
tems to collect and manage data is increasing in most competent authorities. The 
introduction of VAT in many countries around the world has greatly improved 
the availability of data that can be used for tobacco tax analysis, since reporting 
is done along the supply chain on, for example, the value, quantity of goods and 
transaction date. Most countries applying excise duties also have a VAT system in 
place. In addition, more countries are becoming Parties to the Protocol. With the 
implementation of the Protocol, more data will become available because countries 
will be obliged to implement, among other measures, licensing systems with report-
ing requirements and tracking and tracing systems. More information on tracking 
and tracing systems is provided in section 3.4. The obligations of the Protocol will 
also assist in monitoring the stock of tobacco products. 
Ideally, all entities involved in the tobacco product supply and distribution chains 
should be licensed and required to record every transaction that occurs. As this 
might be burdensome for both tax authorities and taxpayers, the use of automated 
and electronic systems is recommended in order to decrease the costs of compliance. 
An accurate inventory system for all raw materials, machinery, goods in process 
and finished products can be required. It is even more important to have good 
recordkeeping of the required data. As the volume of reported data increases, a 
good information technology (IT) system will be needed. The use of IT for periodic 
tax declarations, accounting, inventory and financial data is critical for obtaining 
accurate information and decreasing costs for the entire reporting system.
Most countries now have some level of automation that can facilitate data analysis. 
An emerging trend is the use electronic invoices, issued by traders, as part of online 
real-time information for tax administration. Countries generally start by using 
electronic invoices at public utility companies and then later expand the use to large 
companies. Electronic invoices minimize the use of paper, contribute to automated 
recordkeeping and give accurate and timely information about transactions for tax 
administration. Several countries began using electronic invoices for companies on 
a voluntary basis and later made their use mandatory, especially for large companies 
with a high number of transactions – including the tobacco industry. Electronic 
invoices have been implemented successfully in EU countries and almost all Latin 
American countries, as well as several Asian countries.7
7 Electronic Invoicing in Latin America: English Summary of the Spanish Document; Inter-American 
Development Bank, Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations, 2018 (https://publications.iadb.org/
publications/english/document/Electronic-Invoicing-in-Latin-America.pdf ).
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To verify that information is accurate, competent authorities could systematically 
cross-check declared information against third-party information (e.g. from banks, 
financial institutions, employers) or match the data with the information in registers 
of other government agencies. Processes of cross-checking and data matching could 
also be automated to minimize the administrative burden (25).
KEY TAKEAWAY 4 
Reliable data are essential for effective risk analysis. While obtaining 
these data can be challenging, electronic systems can help reduce  
the burden by automating procedures of data collection and  
cross-checking of information with different sources.
3.3.3 RECORDKEEPING
Parties to the Protocol are committed to requiring, as appropriate, that all persons 
or entities engaged in the supply chain of tobacco, tobacco products and manu-
facturing equipment keep complete, detailed and accurate records of all relevant 
transactions and details of materials used in the production of tobacco products 
(Article 9). Relevant information includes market volumes, trends, forecasts of 
tobacco products and quantities of tobacco products and manufacturing equipment 
kept in stock in tax and customs warehouses in transit, transhipment and under 
duty suspension. This information should be required from the persons and entities 
engaged in the supply chain and submitted to the competent authority on a regular 
basis, as provided for in the law. The competent authority can use the submitted 
information to monitor compliance with tobacco regulations and payment of taxes. 
A registry with this level of detail can realistically be kept only in electronic form. 
Records must provide full accountability for materials used in the production 
of tobacco products. The intention is that tax authorities and manufacturers should 
be able to reconcile the production quantities with the inputs used in production – 
thereby providing confidence that no unrecorded or illicit production has occurred. 
Obligations should also be imposed on suppliers of key inputs to show that supply 
is commensurate with demand (17). 
KEY TAKEAWAY 5 
To monitor compliance and payment of taxes, all persons or entities 
engaged in the supply chain of tobacco, tobacco products  
and manufacturing equipment should keep complete, detailed  
and accurate records of all relevant transactions, as well as details  
of materials used in the production of tobacco products.
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3.3.4 WAREHOUSING, STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION
According to Article 6.2 of the Protocol, all Parties shall endeavour to license persons 
involved in any wholesaling, brokering, warehousing or distribution of tobacco and 
tobacco products or manufacturing equipment. Maintaining a system of authorization 
allows the authorities to carry out controls in production and storage facilities to 
ensure that taxes are paid (2). The approval process to obtain an authorization could 
include an evaluation of the layout of the plant or warehouse, the machinery that 
will be used and the flow of production, warehousing and shipping, including the 
points of entry and exit of raw materials and finished products. The basic method 
of monitoring production and ensuring that only tax-paid products are released to 
the market from the premises is to identify the production facilities and to control 
the entry and exit points. 
From time to time, the competent authority should conduct a physical inventory 
of the goods contained therein to check whether all documentation was duly prepared 
and approved and to determine the accuracy and completeness of the records kept. 
If the jurisdiction requires tax stamps to be placed on the tobacco products, only 
products with the proper stamps affixed can be withdrawn. 
Generally, tobacco products for which the required taxes have not been paid and, 
if required, fiscal marks have not been affixed should not be allowed into warehouses. 
For practical reasons, many countries allow suspension of excise duties, meaning 
that prior authorized persons can produce, send, receive and store tobacco products 
on which the excise duty has not yet been paid. The relevant authorities could also 
require that products on which the taxes have been paid should not be stored in 
the same areas as the products under duty suspension. Obviously, products under 
suspension of payment of excise duties are at high risk, which could justify stricter 
requirements for production, trade, storage and handling. 
Australia, which has a strict system of licensing and requirements for permission 
to move tobacco products, has migrated to a new system that eliminates bonded 
warehouses from the supply chain as of 1 July 2019. Importers are required to have 
an import licence and to pay excise taxes on cigarettes immediately upon import 
(see Box 3.1 in section 3.3.1).
3.3.5 DUTY SUSPENSION
Many countries require authorization of natural or legal persons (as authorized 
warehouse keepers) to produce, process, hold, receive and dispatch products sub-
ject to excise duty during their business. Producing, processing, holding, receiving 
and dispatching excise goods often take place under suspension of the excise duty. 
Guarantees can be requested from authorized persons to secure the payment of 
taxes. Features of such a system may include strict criteria for granting authorization, 
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warehouse pre-authorization visits, adequate stock control measures, checking the 
origin of excise products and the entire production process and coding and marking 
products. The use of a computerized system for monitoring movements of excise 
goods under suspension of excise duty can be a control as well.
Different licences for products under duty suspension could also be considered. 
This would make enforcement easier and less burdensome for both authorities and 
operators. In general, it is recommended to allow the handling of excise goods 
under suspension of duties only if strict criteria are met. Such criteria could include 
pre-authorization visits, adequate stock control measures, checking the origin of 
excise products and the entire production process and coding and marking products. 
In principle, the movements of tobacco products should also be covered by the 
tracking and tracing system. Considering the high risk related to these products, 
additional monitoring could be considered appropriate, such as a computerized 
system monitoring the movements of excise goods under suspension of excise 
duty. In the design of such a system, it is recommended that close attention be 
paid to customs procedures for import and export to ensure alignment and avoid 
a vacuum in monitoring. 
An example of a computerized system is the EU’s Excise Movement and Control 
System, which follows the movement of all excise products – including manufactured 
tobacco products – for which excise taxes have not been paid. The system records 
the movement in real time and is thereby an important tool for combatting fraud. 
In addition, this system is indispensable for the exchange of information and co-
operation between the relevant authorities of Member States of the EU (26). Finally, 
authorization is required before tobacco products can be produced, imported or 
stored under suspension of excise duties (27). 
KEY TAKEAWAY 6 
Products under duty suspension of excise taxes are at a higher risk  
of tax evasion, which can justify stringent measures such as requesting 
guarantees to ensure the payment of taxes, additional licensing 
requirements, compliance with computerized systems to monitor  
the movement of excise goods under suspension and  
on-site authorization and audits.
3.3.6 COLLECTION OF TAXES
To reduce the complexity of tax collection systems, it is recommended that excise 
taxes be imposed at the point of manufacture, import or release from storage or 
production warehouses for consumption. This is common practice in the majority of 
countries that impose excise taxes. Collecting taxes at this level of the supply chain 
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greatly limits the number of taxpayers and thus the resources needed to control 
them. Encouraging taxpayers to use electronic payment methods can also increase 
the chances of collecting all taxes. 
The same applies to requiring guarantees for certain high-risk activities, such 
as the handling of goods under duty suspension. Many countries decide on a case-
by-case basis the level of the guarantee, depending on the situation of the requestor 
and the level of risk (quantity or value and potentially due excise taxes) that the 
regular business activities represent in a given time frame. Some countries allow 
a reduction of guarantees for operators with a track record of good compliance. It 
should be noted that a guarantee is not a limitation of the liability; taxpayers can 
still be requested and liable to pay an amount far above the level of the guarantee.
Tax payments should be required by law to be remitted at fixed intervals after 
sales or on a fixed date each month (2). Many countries have a specialized collection 
enforcement unit that works full-time on the collection of taxes. It is important to 
have a stop-filer or payment control that can act immediately when noncompliance 
occurs, by sending a message and phone call of late declaration or late payment 
to the taxpayer. This increases the likelihood of keeping taxpayers compliant. If 
nondeclaration or nonpayment persists, the bond or guarantee could be executed. 
Another reason for collecting excise taxes around the time of production or 
import is that quantities can be monitored more effectively at these points. There 
are different options for monitoring the supply chain of tobacco products. The 
decision about what kind of monitoring system to use depends on the country’s 
financial, technical and human resources. The weakest form of monitoring is in-
dustry self-declaration. Activities to verify compliance and ensure the collection 
of the full amount of taxes due can include, for example, physical checks, audits, 
cross-checking of declared information with third-party data and inspection of 
administration and recordkeeping. 
In general, in countries with poor administration systems, enforced compliance 
is carried out by imposing physical control over the production or manufacturing 
process. The cost of physical control increases when there is a potential for fraud by 
excise officers. However, fraud can be diminished significantly when excise officers 
are rotated frequently among different locations and supervisors make surprise 
visits. Historically, some countries (e.g. India) have posted tax administration staff at 
production facilities to monitor production and removals. In India, a staff member 
of the competent authority is placed in cigarette and large bidi manufacturing facili-
ties around the clock. Each officer records the daily production and the quantity of 
cigarettes/bidis that leaves the factory and reports to the next officer.8
8 Ministry of Finance India, personal communication, 2009.
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A better option is to monitor production remotely. The competent authority 
can require the installation of CCTV cameras in strategic places throughout the 
manufacturing and warehousing facilities. With these, the authority can establish 
a central command post from which the facilities and activities can be continu-
ously monitored and documented. In addition, the competent authority can carry 
out physical inventory controls from time to time and – if electronic invoices are 
implemented – cross-checking between invoices and declared inventory. This is 
also an effective way to prevent collusion between staff of a competent authority 
and manufacturers or importers. For example, in 2015, the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue of the Philippines required all tobacco companies to install CCTV cameras 
in their production lines and warehouses. This decision was taken in response to 
large seizures of untaxed cigarettes, with the objective of monitoring production 
to ensure the payment of all taxes.  
The collection process must also be supported by IT systems. These systems 
must provide for transparency and accuracy to ensure a safe process for the flow 
of payments from taxpayers to the tax treasury. Most countries have implemented 
automated electronic systems for tax payments linked to each declaration, for both 
domestic and import. It is key for tax administrations to have a comprehensive 
agreement with the banking system in order to obtain lower transaction costs, if 
applicable. Some countries have implemented a state payment web portal that allows 
citizens to pay their taxes and other fees such as county fees, fees for car permits 
and licences and agricultural, health and environmental fees online.
KEY TAKEAWAY 7 
Excise taxes should be imposed at the point of manufacture, import  
or release from storage or production warehouses for consumption,  
to ensure that quantities can be monitored effectively. This also reduces 
the complexity of tax collection systems by limiting the number  
of taxpayers and thus the resources needed to control them.
3.3.7 TAX REFUNDS
Refunds for VAT, excise taxes and customs duties are a common process in most 
countries, under the principle that consumption taxes are not exported. Frequency 
and methods of refund vary by country. It is common to have monthly refunds (if 
there are exports during the period), and the reimbursements may be sent directly to 
the exporter or reserved as a credit to pay other taxes. An alternative used by some 
countries that have a high volume of exports is a so-called zero rate, or suspension, 
meaning that indirect taxes (VAT, excise taxes and customs duties) are suspended 
for the whole chain – from import of raw materials to production and packing until 
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export. This regime requires a special licensing process. Since the tobacco industry 
has an export component, the refund process for this sector requires special atten-
tion for tax administration. 
3.4 CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT 
Control and enforcement are the main functions of tax administration. In fact, 
most tax laws include the objective “to control and enforce tax compliance” and, for 
customs, “to control and enforce tax and duty payments at the border” or similar 
phrases. The Protocol provides guidance for control and enforcement of tobacco 
taxes. Efficient and effective competent authorities often have a strategic plan to 
ensure compliance, a risk-based approach to identify the problematic points in the 
chain and the ability to direct resources accordingly to high-risk or high-value areas.
Tasks that can play a role in control and enforcement include controlling the 
registration and licensing process, due diligence, verifying declarations and collec-
tion of taxes. Production and distribution controls including tracking and tracing, 
fiscal markings, audits and import and export controls all play a role in control and 
enforcement. This section describes the main activities for improving control and 
enforcement, focusing on the tobacco supply chain. The procedures and penalties 
that can be enacted once illicit trade in tobacco has been detected are also discussed. 
3.4.1 CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT PLANNING
Strategic plan
In modern tax administrations, it is common to have a strategic plan, with control 
and enforcement as pillars. Appropriate control of the compliance cycle is key to 
keeping taxpayers in compliance and preventing illicit trade and tax avoidance. 
For this reason, most tax administrations focus a majority of their resources on 
preventive policy. Some examples of this can be found in the strategic plans of the 
United Kingdom and the United States’ Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  
In the United Kingdom, HMRC has had a well-developed strategic plan for 
years. A key pillar of the plan focuses on keeping taxpayers compliant. This is the 
concept of prevention: controlling initial minor noncompliant behaviour for the 
majority of taxpayers, while using strong enforcement for the minority on the 
noncompliant side (28).
The strategic plan of the IRS has a similar approach, with a focus on control. If 
noncompliance is detected, data analysis and behavioural insights are used to identify 
the best way to address noncompliance. Early intervention or self-correction are 
examples of ways to address detected noncompliance. The IRS also highlights the 
importance of resolving noncompliance to ensure taxpayer confidence in the tax 
system and protecting the integrity of the system (29).
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Risk-based approach 
Following the establishment of a strategic plan, an enforcement and control plan 
must be drafted. This plan should include definitions of the activities that will be 
enforced, the taxpayers upon whom they will be enforced and the circumstances 
under which they will be enforced, as well as allocating resources for staffing, audit-
ing, infrastructure and IT. Targets must also be defined, including the number of 
interventions and the amount of additional collected revenue or reduction of tax 
evasion. Several tax administrations elaborate annual plans with periodic perfor-
mance reviews aimed at improving results, and they correct allocations and targets 
as needed. Clear targeting of interventions is needed for better results, more efficient 
use of resources, lower costs for taxpayers and more effective collection. In other 
words, the point is to focus interventions on those who have a higher probability of 
noncompliance. Using a risk-based approach can be particularly beneficial. 
Tax risk management is a key element of control strategy in modern tax admin-
istration. A risk is a possible threat to reaching objectives such as collecting taxes 
in an effective and efficient way for competent authorities. Risk assessment is the 
process of analysing risks and deciding on the best way to manage an identified 
risk. The responses can vary from acceptance to mitigation to avoidance. Proper 
risk assessment allows competent authorities to use their available resources most 
efficiently and to become more effective in dealing with risks. It can be used to improve 
compliance by identifying taxpayers or types of activities with a high risk of noncom-
pliance. Groups of taxpayers with the same characteristics often have similar risks. 
Groups with a high risk of noncompliance could then be subject to greater review. 
Areas of potentially greater risk of noncompliance in the tobacco supply chain 
include import, export and transfers to and from warehouses, particularly when 
they take place under duty suspension.
Gathering risk-related information from internal and external sources is a best 
practice in compliance risk management. Such sources could include third-party 
information (e.g. from banks, credit card companies, transport companies), studies 
on taxpayer behaviour and research on compliance issues, tax gap analysis, tax 
audits and declarations (30). 
Risk management uses these different sources of data along with algorithms to 
find patterns of high noncompliance. Risk analysis can indicate reduced risk as well. 
Lower-risk areas are likely to need less governance to ensure compliance, which 
allows for resources to be directed elsewhere. Risk assessment can therefore help 
with strategic allocation of limited resources to the areas of greatest risk while at 
the same time reducing the burden on lower-risk taxpayers. 
Risk management has always been done by competent authorities, but data 
availability and statistical methods to identify patterns have changed the way risks 
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can be assessed. Although many risk assessment systems are still done manually 
or include manual elements, the use of intensive data techniques allows systematic, 
deeper and more targeted analysis (31).
Modern risk assessment makes use of electronic data on taxpayers, tax payments, 
declarations from other taxes, such as VAT, and third-party information. With these 
data, tax authorities can identify indicators that suggest where further activities 
might be required to ensure compliance. For example, VAT invoices can be used 
to match reported purchases of inputs of tobacco leaf to sales invoices of tobacco 
leaf wholesalers. For taxpayers (i.e. those who are licensed and provide required 
reports), competent authorities can create a business analytics program to determine 
whether the data reported are consistent on each side of the transactions. Moreover, 
in countries with a VAT system, competent authorities can compare the data reported 
by taxpayers under the VAT system with data reported under the tobacco excise tax 
system to detect any inconsistency. VAT invoices can also be used to verify inputs and 
sales data. If VAT is collected at all levels of the supply chain, it is easier for govern-
ments to monitor the supply chain for the enforcement of excise duty obligations. 
Regular surveys on tobacco consumption that use the same methodology can also 
provide indications about the level of compliance with excise tax policy. A sudden 
drop in revenue that is not reflected in consumption data could be an indication 
of illicit manufacturing, illegal imports, cross-border shopping or forestalling. In 
addition, seizure data can provide valuable information on areas and activities at 
high risk of noncompliance.
The structure of tobacco tax policies should also be taken into account when con-
ducting risk analyses. If excise tax rates are increased, there might be a greater risk of 
forestalling or front-loading (see the discussion on anti-forestalling later in this section). 
Differentiated excise tax rates based on product or packaging characteristics – such 
as distinctions between soft and hard packs or filter and nonfilter cigarettes – are also 
prone to manipulation by operators, which could affect tax revenues. One of the options 
to mitigate these risks is to amend the excise tax policy and apply a uniform tax rate. 
For customs transactions, the use of risk management is a key element in target-
ing merchandise and support declarations to be inspected. Before the 1990s, most 
customs agencies used random criteria for selecting targets for inspection. Since 
that time, many countries have implemented risk-based approaches for selecting 
inspections. Historical data on importers and trade communities, complemented 
by artificial intelligence technology, show that risk management tools dramatically 
increased the effectiveness of physical inspections. Most modern customs agencies 
have implemented such techniques, allowing for more effective control processes 
while facilitating smoother processes for those transactions that are in compliance. 
Box 3.3 details some of the recent changes in risk management processes.
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Box 3.3 Changes in risk management
The OECD developed Fig. 3.2 to show the framework and key steps for understanding 
compliance risks in 2004 (32). The same approach is still used to identify, assess and 
prioritize risk. However, many competent authorities now use new technologies and 
advanced data analytics, along with more information sources, including external 
data from banks, employers and sales invoices for VAT, for example. 
Fig. 3.2 Compliance risk management process
Source: (32).
The methods of identifying risks and the analysis of compliance behaviour have 
also changed. Traditionally, competent authorities used audits to identify high-risk 
cases. With more diverse and better data, competent authorities can now use more 
evidence-based approaches to examine risk patterns. Success of compliance activi-
ties is now more often measured in terms of their impact on the overall compliance 
environment, rather than only on increased revenues.9
9 For more information on effective risk management with several indicators and a checklist of questions, 
see the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (68).
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In Indonesia, use of the compliance risk management process reduced the share of 
illicit trade in total consumption of cigarettes from 12% to 3%. More information 
on this can be found in the case study of Indonesia in Box 3.13 later in this chapter.
Understanding the products – as well as the supply and distribution chains – al-
lows competent authorities to identify which areas along a chain pose the greatest 
risk and therefore require more resources. Detailed information on the composition 
of selected tobacco products is given in Annex 3.1.
KEY TAKEAWAY 8 
Risk analysis helps identify the points of intervention that have higher 
probabilities of noncompliance. A risk-based approach with targeted 
interventions allows for better results and more efficient use of 
resources to ensure effectiveness of tax collection. 
3.4.2 CONTROLS OVER THE TOBACCO SUPPLY CHAIN
As defined in Article 1 of the Protocol, the supply chain covers the manufacture 
of tobacco products and manufacturing equipment – as well as their import or 
export – and may be extended, where relevant, to one or more of the following 
activities when so decided by a Party:
1. retailing of tobacco products
2. growing of tobacco, with the exception of traditional small-scale growers, 
farmers and producers
3. transporting of commercial quantities of tobacco products or manufacturing 
equipment
4. wholesaling, brokering, warehousing or distribution of tobacco and tobacco 
products or manufacturing equipment.
Article 4.1 of the Protocol requires parties to “adopt and implement effective mea-
sures to control or regulate the supply chain of tobacco products to prevent, deter, 
detect, investigate and prosecute illicit trade in such goods and to cooperate with 
one another to this end”. Concrete measures to regulate the supply chain, as well 
as best practices in this regard, are discussed further below.
Figure 3.3 shows the main places for reporting and monitoring along the supply 
chain: import, ex-factory and removals from warehouses. Manufacturers could be 
required to report imported inputs at the border, as importers of finished products 
do. If components are subject to licensing, information can be required as part of 
the licensing process. The arrows in Fig. 3.3 represent transporting, which is also 
part of the supply chain.
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Fig. 3.3 Cigarette supply chain from manufacture or import to retail sale
3.4.3 LICENSING10 AND DUE DILIGENCE
A licensing system is effective only if it is properly controlled. Most tax administra-
tions have experience with licensing processes for excise taxes on products such as 
alcoholic beverages and energy products. It is strongly recommended that lessons 
learned with the licensing process of such products be applied when implementing 
and enforcing tobacco-related licensing.
Licensing provides timely and accurate data that can serve as the basis for audits 
because it identifies and controls legitimate operators. For new operators, the process 
to obtain a licence could include visits and verification of production factories, 
storage facilities and distribution premises. Countries that have no licensing system 
in place and would like to start applying licences could allow a transitional period 
for existing operators to comply with the new licensing requirements. The process 
of licensing control must be carried out and updated periodically, in particular 
by controlling the validity of bonds or guarantees, the proper functioning of the 
required systems (CCTV, for example) and recordkeeping.
10 Licensing is discussed here in the context of due diligence and enforcement. Details about how 
licensing can be set up and what information could be requested are presented in section 3.3.1.
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Where licences are required, the law should include a provision specifying that 
purchases from unlicensed suppliers – or sales to unlicensed purchasers – are not 
allowed. This means that both suppliers and purchasers would need to verify those 
with whom they are doing business. This requirement provides enforcement au-
thorities with an entry point to enforce the licensing system at both ends. Also, a 
licensing requirement for manufacturing equipment assists authorities in identifying 
and prosecuting illegal manufacturing of tobacco products, reducing the burden of 
proof substantially. In many countries, the presence of manufacturing equipment 
is not sufficient proof that illegal manufacturing is taking place; the machinery has 
to be in operation and producing illegal tobacco products when authorities inspect 
the location. With a licensing requirement, however, the presence of machinery 
without a licence is sufficient for authorities to act.  
The validity of licences should be time-limited, requiring renewals or reapplica-
tion, to maintain a high level of control. Adherence to the conditions required for a 
licence should be controlled by the authorities, and penalties for noncompliance – for 
example, suspension or withdrawal of a licence – should be severe enough to act 
as a deterrent (33). Regulations for licensing should provide for inspection of the 
licensee’s products and premises, with penalties for noncompliance, which could 
include criminal and civil prosecution for serious or repeated offences. 
As stated in Article 6.3(a) of the Protocol, Parties need to establish or designate a single 
authority or multiple authorities to issue, renew, suspend, revoke and/or cancel licences. 
In accordance with Article 7 of the Protocol, persons engaged in the supply 
chain are required by law to conduct due diligence before and during business 
relationships. They also must report to the competent authorities any evidence that 
a customer is engaged in activities in contravention of its obligations arising from 
the Protocol. This requirement includes customer identification, monitoring of sales 
to ensure that the quantities are commensurate with demand for such products 
within the intended market and taking measures to ensure compliance. Knowledge 
of the demand of a market is indispensable for determining if there is a case of 
oversupplying. If the supply of tobacco products to a lower-taxing foreign market 
exceeds the demand, it creates a higher risk that these products will be smuggled 
back into a higher-taxing country, undermining the objectives and effectiveness of 
the higher-taxing jurisdiction. In the past, some governments decided to impose 
a fine on tobacco companies if the quantities supplied were significantly higher 
than the demand and the risk of being smuggled back into their jurisdiction was 
judged to be high (34,35).11
11 Excise duty rates applied in all the EU countries can be found on the European Commission’s 
webpage: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/excise-duties-alcohol-tobacco-energy/
excise-duties-tobacco_en.
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KEY TAKEAWAY 9 
Licensing helps to identify and control legitimate operators. The data obtained 
from licensing can serve as a basis for audits. Licences should be controlled  
on a regular basis and updated periodically to ensure their validity.
3.4.4 FISCAL MARKINGS (E.G. TAX STAMPS)
Fiscal markings are another important tool for controlling and monitoring pro-
duction and import of tobacco products. Their use is generally considered to be 
appropriate for increasing compliance with tax laws. Fiscal markings can also be 
of help in distinguishing between genuine and illicit tobacco products. Tax stamps 
or other fiscal markings affixed to packs of cigarettes or tobacco products facilitate 
the collection of excise taxes, as well as audits and enforcement actions. The pres-
ence of fiscal markings enables both the competent authority and the public to 
monitor whether the taxes on tobacco products were properly paid. It thus assists 
the competent authority in investigating illicit trade and prosecuting violations.
Fiscal markings include tax stamps, enhanced tax stamps (banderols) and digital 
tax stamps. Examples of fiscal marks are tobacco stamps, tax stamps, excise stamps, 
tax stickers and banderols. Box 3.4 presents details on the different types and features 
of tax stamps. Tobacco products for export are often required to be marked that 
they are for export. Box 3.5 provides useful information regarding the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard for excise tax stamps.
The terminology “fiscal mark” holds no indication of the characteristics of the 
mark. A fiscal marking is affixed to each pack of tobacco product. Requiring a 
standard package size can facilitate the application of the markings (2). Fraudsters 
can be deterred from attempting to re-use fiscal markings (in particular stamps) 
by having the marking affixed to each pack of cigarettes (or other tobacco product) 
before the pack is wrapped with cellophane (36).
In most cases, tax stamps are purchased by the producer or importer and applied 
to each product sold as proof of excise tax payment (33). Fiscal markings should be 
issued to the manufacturer or importer of tobacco products only when excise taxes 
for the products have been fully paid or a guarantee is established.
Box 3.4 Types and features of tax stamps 
Over time, tax stamps and markings have become more sophisticated. In the past, 
tax stamps were often paper-based and easy to counterfeit. New tax stamps use 
additional security features to make them more difficult to counterfeit. Authentica-
tion solutions against counterfeiting can utilize various security features, including: 
• overt features – features that can be verified by the naked eye;
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• covert features – features that can be authenticated only by using dedicated 
and specialized electronic readers;
• semi-covert features – features requiring a simple tool that does not involve 
extensive training; and
• forensic features – features that can be identified through laboratory analysis.
Tax markings can be either physical or digital: 
• physical markings – the information is contained in the document or device 
attached to the package.
• digital markings – information is obtained through a link with a database 
and by decrypting with the tools and keys used for creation of the data. The 
term “digital tax stamp” sometimes leads to confusion, as some paper-based 
stamps with digital components are also described as digital tax stamps. Tax 
markings that are fully digital do not contain information in the document 
or device attached to the package. 
It is probably too simplistic to say that digital tax stamps are more secure than paper-
based tax stamps. Both types have advantages and weaknesses. For instance, both 
physical and digital tax stamps can be weak or strong on security features. Neverthe-
less, the management, production, sales, transport and monitoring of physical tax 
stamps require increased attention. Tax stamps have the same value as banknotes 
and are a possible attraction for theft, loss and fraud. 
In Belgium, for example, the Court of Audit severely criticized the lack of control 
of the production and stock management of tax stamps in 2015. The Court of Au-
dit concluded that tax stamps issuance should operate under recognized security 
practices and procedures relative to the security risk associated with the various 
production, distribution and issuance processes. Moreover, it was noted that new 
printing technology of digital tax stamps on packs may facilitate stock management 
and lead to less fraud. In March 2016, Belgium changed its stamps. The printing 
became an in-house process by the financial federal government department. The 
new stamps are still printed with a watermark, but they also have a digital component. 
The change resulted in a cost reduction by standardizing the sizes and optimizing 
the production process. 
Some of the more advanced fiscal marking technologies include embedded 
threads and watermarks; special inks and coatings, such as so-called invisible inks, 
holograms and foils; and calculated or changeable content. Because of their enhanced 
security features, these stamps can be more expensive than traditional stamps. In 
the state of California in the United States, the traditional stamps cost US$ 0.42 per 
1 000 stamps. The cost of the first generation of high-tech stamps was 10 times higher, 
at US$ 4.77 per 1 000 stamps. This price nearly doubled for the second-generation 
encrypted stamp, to US$ 8.20 per 1 000 stamps. Nevertheless, California collected 
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about US$ 450 million of additional tax revenue in the first decade following the 
implementation of encrypted tax stamps. This additional revenue was far greater 
than the costs of implementation and enforcement. 
Other jurisdictions have also revised their tax stamps to incorporate new technolo-
gies. The state of Michigan, for instance, replaced heat-applied cigarette tax stamps 
with digital pressure-applied stamps in 2015. Michigan deployed a tax stamp with 
several overt and covert security features and a unique quick response (QR) code 
and serial number. QR codes (machine-readable codes consisting of an array of 
black and white squares, typically used for storing URLs or other information) can 
have purposes beyond tracking and tracing. The QR code can be read by consumers 
with a smartphone or tablet application to access information on smoking-cessation 
programs, report violations of the state’s youth access policies, connect to a tip line 
to report noncompliant packs and learn about the harms from illicit tobacco sales 
and purchases. Enforcement authorities can validate stamps using the smartphone-
based eTRACS (Electronic Tax Reporting and Audit Compliance System). As part of 
the system’s implementation, the Michigan State Police department created teams of 
enforcement officers in each of the state’s seven districts and the state Department 
of Treasury created its own enforcement team. 
Sources: (37–42).
Box 3.5 The ISO standard on excise tax stamps 
The ISO published its excise tax stamp standard (ISO/TC 292/SC) in October 2018. 
The purpose of the ISO standard is to assist tax and finance authorities in enhancing 
compliance with excise tax regulations. 
A tax stamp is defined as a visible tax stamp, label or mark placed on certain types 
of consumer goods to show that the applicable excise tax has been paid. The ISO 
standard applies to tax stamps that are physical in nature – not to digital markings, 
which are directly printed on to packs without a physical component. “Authentication” 
in this standard refers to the authentication of the tax stamp, not the product on which 
the tax stamp is affixed. In other words, authentication of a tax stamp on a cigarette 
pack means that the tax stamp is authentic but does not guarantee that the pack is 
authentic. In addition, control measures are needed at the time of the application of 
the stamp to verify the conformity of the tax stamp with the corresponding product.
The standard provides guidance on the content, security, issuance and examination 
of physical tax stamps used to indicate that the required taxes have been paid and 
that the tax stamp is authentic. The use of stamps to facilitate tracking and tracing 
within the supply chain is not described.
CHAP T ER 3. TO BACCO TA X ADM INIS T R AT I O N 125 
Specifically, the ISO standard deals with the following issues:
• defining the functions of a tax stamp
• identifying and consulting with stakeholders
• planning the procurement process and selection of suppliers
• the design and construction of tax stamps
• the overt and covert security features that provide protection of the tax stamp
• the finishing and application processes for the tax stamp
• security of the tax stamp supply chain
• serialization and unique identifier codes for tax stamps
• examination of tax stamps
• monitoring and assessing tax stamp performance.
A stamp may fulfil many functions, but the core business of tax stamps is to ensure 
and facilitate the collection of revenue. The tax stamp must use a combination of 
security features. The tax authority should ensure that the tax stamp can be authen-
ticated and that counterfeit, altered, tampered or otherwise fraudulent tax stamps 
can be detected. 
The standard provides detailed information on the different components of the 
tax stamp such as the substrate, inks, adhesives, laminate, authentication or security 
features and the unique identifier that should enable checks on the payments of 
the required tax.
The process of procurement is discussed in detail in the standard. The tax author-
ity should ensure that the procurement process is open, transparent and meets the 
sustainability objectives. The tax authority should set out the goals and requirements 
to give tendering organizations more leeway in proposing optimum solutions that 
might be different from those the authority would specify. 
The standard is not prescriptive; rather, it provides a catalogue of options. It 
does not, for instance, recommend specific security features, but it does describe 
the different types of features that are necessary for a tax stamp to be secure. Tax 
officials still need to make decisions and choose the option that suits them best, but 
the standard remains recommended reading for those who would like to introduce 
tax stamp programmes in their jurisdiction. 
ISO standards are not freely available but can be purchased at the ISO Store 
(www.ISO.org) or from an ISO national member body.
Source: (43). 
According to Article 8 of the Protocol, each Party shall require that unique, secure 
and nonremovable identification markings – such as codes or stamps – are affixed 
to or form part of all unit packets, packages and any outside packaging of cigarettes 
for the implementation of the tracking and tracing system within a period of five 
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years, and of other tobacco products within a period of 10 years, of entry into force 
of the Protocol for that Party. 
The Protocol specifies that at least the following information shall form part of 
the unique marking: 
• date and location of manufacture
• manufacturing facility
• product description 
• where available, the intended market of retail sale. 
In several countries, QR codes are used as fiscal markings for tobacco and alcohol 
tax control. Each stamp has a unique identifier code and a QR code. The data stored 
in the QR code provide the following product information:
• manufacturer
• production location
• stamp order date
• tax status and class
• brand
• intended market
• unique identifier (serial number).
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The use of fiscal markings is generally considered to be  
an appropriate tool for increasing compliance with tax laws.  
Fiscal markings can also be helpful for distinguishing  
between genuine and illicit tobacco products. 
3.4.5 TRACKING AND TRACING
A tracking and tracing system assists authorities in determining the origin of tobacco 
products – and the point of diversion, if applicable – as well as monitoring and 
controlling the movement of tobacco products and their legal status. The objective 
of a tracking and tracing system is to enable authorities to have information on all 
transactions through the entire tobacco product supply chain until duties are paid 
or other obligations are discharged. 
Traceability is not used only for tobacco products. It is also used to improve the 
supply chain function, as in the case of parcel services, as well as for product safety 
reasons, to manage potential product recalls and for regulatory reasons.
Tracking is the process that monitors where a product is at all times while also 
creating a time and location record for all movements. Tracing is the ability to 
identify the past locations of a product, so that the product’s route can be followed 
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back to its origin (44). In other words, traceability is “the ability to trace the history, 
application or location of an object” (45).
A tracking and tracing system must be able to uniquely identify individual 
products. By marking a product with a unique code or identifier, it is possible to 
unambiguously register that product’s movements. 
Other necessary characteristics include the ability to share the registered move-
ment information and to authenticate products. This enables a product’s status to 
be captured through the supply chain and its history to be identified and verified 
retrospectively. 
According to Article 8.4.1 of the Protocol, Parties should require the following 
information to be available: 
• the date and location of manufacture 
• the manufacturing facility 
• the machine used 
• the production shift or time of manufacture 
• the name, invoice, order number and payment records of the first customer 
not affiliated with the manufacturer
• the product description and intended market of retail sale 
• any warehousing and shipping 
• the identity of any known subsequent purchaser
• the intended shipment route, date, destination, point of departure and consignee.
A good tracking and tracing system enables the government to properly monitor 
the supply chain, improves its ability to ensure collection of the proper duties and 
taxes, provides it with the ability to authenticate whether the identification marking 
is genuine and matches the product and improves its ability to enforce the law and 
provide sufficient evidence to prove noncompliance by a violator.
The following elements are required for an effective tracking and tracing system (46): 
• A serialized unique identification marking for each package of product. These 
identifiers are a distinctive combination of numbers, letters or both. They 
cannot be predictable or used more than once. The representation of the 
identifier on the package can be human-readable (letters or numbers) or 
machine-readable (barcodes). Generation of codes and encryption that are 
part of a tobacco industry patent should be excluded. 
• A data carrier with the serialized unique identifier and other information 
such as date and location of manufacture, manufacturing facility, product 
description and, where available, the intended retail market. This informa-
tion should be readable by authorized agencies of any Party to the Protocol. 
The data carrier should comply with quality standards and be suitable for 
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high-speed production lines. Two-dimensional barcodes, for example, meet 
these standards and are readable with inexpensive equipment.
• A link and parent-child relationship (called aggregation) between different 
packaging units that offers the option to trace a pallet without the need to 
scan all the packs and master cases of that pallet. 
• Recordkeeping of all shipping and receiving events along the supply chain. 
This includes, for example, the departure location and the arrival location, 
as well as the involved operators. International standards from the ISO are 
recommended for the capture and exchange of data and events. 
• The use of international standards for key information that is encoded in 
the data carrier (5). An example of a unique and internationally recognized 
identifier for products is a Global Trade Item Number.
The following details on information storage and sharing are drawn from various 
sections of the Protocol. Data and events along the supply chain must be stored in 
an independent database that is controlled by competent government authorities. 
At the global level, national and/or regional databases can be interconnected to 
facilitate international inquiries by competent authorities. Parties to the Protocol 
agree to establish a global information-sharing focal point located at the Conven-
tion Secretariat of the WHO FCTC, accessible to all Parties, enabling them to 
make enquiries and receive relevant information. Each Party shall ensure that the 
information recorded under paragraph 5 of Article 8 of the Protocol is accessible 
to the global information-sharing focal point on request, subject to paragraph 9, 
through a standard electronic secure interface with its national and/or regional 
central point. The global information-sharing focal point shall compile a list of the 
competent authorities of Parties and make the list available to all Parties. 
The cost of tracking and tracing systems is a concern for many countries, but 
as indicated in paragraph 14 of Article 8 of the Protocol, jurisdictions may require 
the tobacco industry to bear any costs associated with putting in place the tracking 
and tracing system in a country (46). In Brazil, the cost for cigarette manufacturers 
was US$ 0.0185 per pack (42). In Kenya, the cost for manufacturers was US$ 0.024 
per pack (42).
Along with considering the characteristics of a tracking and tracing system 
in selecting a particular one, it is important to avoid conflicts of interest, ensure 
fair and transparent dealing with suppliers, implement a zero-tolerance policy for 
corruption or anti-competitive behaviour and ensure compliance. 
Any tracking and tracing system should be compliant with Article 5.3 of the FCTC, 
which deals with industry interference, and Article 8 of the Protocol. Article 8.13, 
which states that “each Party shall ensure that its competent authorities, in participating 
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in the tracking and tracing regime, interact with the tobacco industry and those 
representing the interests of the tobacco industry only to the extent strictly necessary 
in the implementation of this Article”. Box 3.8 provides a cautionary example of a 
tracking and tracing system that is not compliant with Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC.
While the Protocol contains a great deal of information on the requirements 
that a tracking and tracing system should meet, questions come up in relation to 
the implementation of such systems. To achieve the objectives of the Protocol, the 
Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Protocol, as the governing body of the treaty, 
has the prerogative to establish subsidiary bodies, such as expert groups and working 
groups. In decision FCTC/MOP1(6), the MOP established a working group for the 
development and implementation of tracking and tracing systems in accordance 
with Article 8 of the Protocol, including the global information-sharing focal point 
(Article 8.1) and unique identification markings for cigarette packets and pack-
ages (Article 8.3), to further elaborate on the next steps. The working group will 
produce a comprehensive report compiling good practices and experiences on the 
implementation of tracking and tracing systems, as well as unique identification 
markings for cigarette packets and packages at national or regional levels. The 
working group was also given a mandate to prepare a conceptual analysis of how a 
global information-sharing focal point could be set up.
Implementing a complete tracking and tracing system with fiscal markings takes 
time. In most of the countries that have already implemented tracking and tracing, 
it took several years from starting with the legal framework to final implementation. 
Several hurdles need to be overcome:
• Legal framework approval is usually delayed by the tobacco industry.
• Knowledge of tracking and tracing and associated technologies is scarce at 
tax administrations.
• Tender and bidding processes are complex.
• Coordination between domestic tax authorities and customs is weak.
Even though the process might be lengthy, the investment in a tracking and tracing 
system will be repaid with the amount of tobacco taxes that are not lost due to evasion.
When implementing a new tracking and tracing system, tax administration should 
ask for collaboration and technical assistance from intergovernmental organizations 
and countries that have successfully implemented such systems, in order to speed 
up and ensure success of the process. Examples of tracking and tracing systems 
implementation in Chile, Kenya and the EU are detailed in Boxes 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. For 
countries that already have fiscal markings in place, the potential interaction between 
the markings and the implementation of a tracking and tracing system should be 
taken into account. Further information on this interaction is presented in Box 3.6.
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Box 3.6 Tracking and tracing and fiscal markings 
It is becoming increasingly common for stamps to contain some tracking and trac-
ing features, such as unique identification markings and basic information on the 
product that describes the company, tax status or the product itself. The intention 
is to mark each pack with a unique identification marking so it can be monitored 
from the point of production to the retailer, including each step in between, thereby 
creating a complete time and location history. 
Although a tax stamp could meet the requirements of Article 8 of the Protocol 
and have tracking and tracing features, in general, the focus of tax stamp systems 
differs from that of tracking and tracing systems. Tracking and tracing is more than 
the unique, secure and nonremovable identification markings on the packages 
of tobacco products. It implies reading or scanning the codes; linking the codes 
between packs, cartons, master cases and pallets; uploading the information to a 
database; recording of any shipping and receiving events along the supply chain; 
and interconnecting the different databases. 
While new tax stamp programs contain tracking and tracing features, they are 
primarily intended to facilitate tax collection on the domestic market and not to track 
duty-suspended cross-border trade or the export of products. The focus of tax stamp 
systems is on authenticity and the proof that taxes are paid. The focus of tracking 
and tracing systems is on unique identification and on control of the movements 
in the supply chain by monitoring and investigating the past and future location of 
products. Tax stamp programs focus on stock management, verification (that the 
stamps correspond to the product) and authentication (that the stamps are genuine), 
while the focus of tracking and tracing systems is on the origin, intended route, first 
customer and final destination. The focus of tax stamps is primarily on individual packs 
intended for the duty-paid domestic market, while the focus of tracking and tracing 
systems is on all packaging (packs, cartons, master cases, pallets) and certainly – but 
not exclusively – for the duty-suspended export market. 
Nevertheless, sometimes there can be synergies. For example, the EU countries 
that require a tax stamp or national identification mark for fiscal purposes have the 
option to use it as the security feature for tracking and tracing purposes, provided 
that the requirements are met. In summary, tax stamps can be converted to or be part 
of a tracking and tracing system when the converted system provides aggregation 
between packs, cartons and master cases and records all movement along the sup-
ply chain. For the export market, a unique identification marking should be added. 
Sources: (39–42).
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Box 3.7 What not to do: use the industry solution  
to tracking and tracing 
Codentify is a serialization system used to produce cigarette pack markers for the 
purpose of verifying whether cigarette packs are legal. It was patented by PMI but 
subsequently licensed at no cost to other major cigarette manufacturers. In 2016, 
Codentify was transferred to Inexto, which is an affiliate of the French group Impala. 
What is the problem with Codentify/Inexto?
The main issue is that Codentify/Inexto’s links to the tobacco industry make it incom-
patible with the Protocol, which came into force in September 2018. The Protocol 
specifies that obligations assigned to a Party shall not be performed by or delegated 
to the tobacco industry.  
Additionally, many elements indicate it is an ineffective means of authentica-
tion. For example, the 12-character digital codes generated by Codentify can be 
easily duplicated or cloned and used as originals on either a counterfeit or genuine 
pack, which can then pass the system’s basic verification test. The codes are also 
produced by relatively unsecured, commercially available equipment and do not 
include high-security features capable of protecting the authenticity of identifier 
numbers. Systems that use multilayered, advanced security solutions that enable 
distributors, retailers, customers and authorities to identify noncompliant products 
are more secure.
Another problem is that Codentify/Inexto cannot track products as efficiently as 
other available systems. It requires a much larger enforcement capacity to achieve 
the same detection rates as other systems that are not linked to the tobacco indus-
try. Authorities would have to inspect significantly more packs marked under the 
Codentify system than is necessary under some other systems to achieve the same 
certainty of not missing a fraudulent pack. In addition, not all stakeholders will be 
able to verify that a pack marked under the Codentify system is genuine, while other 
available systems do offer this possibility.
Source: (47).
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Box 3.8 A successful tobacco traceability system:  
SITRAF, Chile
The Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII, Internal Revenue Service of Chile) has success-
fully coordinated and implemented a tracking and tracing system for tobacco products.
Application of a compliance management model 
In the framework of a compliance management model, a traceability system for 
tobacco products utilizes a structural measure to reduce tax evasion. It is estimated 
that evasion of taxes (VAT and excise taxes) in the cigarette market in Chile amounts 
to 16.6% of the country’s total market annually – approximately US$ 300 million.
The traceability system implemented in Chile (SITRAF (TAB2)) allows authorities 
to know in a certain and timely manner the quantities of cigarettes produced or 
imported into the country. Moreover, it helps authorities to distinguish between 
counterfeit products and original products that did not comply with payment of 
the tax. In 2018, the implementation of the traceability system was awarded to a 
company through public bidding. The company is in charge of the implementation 
and operation of the system for five years, according to a contract signed with the 
SII, and must maintain a team of 20 people available for the project.
Direct markings are applied to items produced in Chile for national consump-
tion, and stamps are used for imported products. For both types of product, the 
marking is based on a data matrix code, which is printed using security ink that is 
distinguishable from any other type of ink with specific devices that are provided 
by the awarded company. Although products for export are not subject to marking, 
they are controlled and accounted for by the traceability system.
For national production, devices are installed on each production line that rec-
ognize the type of pack being produced, print a unique code on each pack and then 
read it (activation) to save all the information on servers located in the production 
plant. This information is transmitted to the central servers of the system and then 
to the SII. It is also available for on-site inspection. 
In the case of imported products, the stamps must be acquired in Chile by each 
importer and then sent to its producer abroad, which is responsible for adhering 
them to each pack of cigarettes prior to wrapping the packs with cellophane, us-
ing applicators on the production lines. Once the cigarettes enter Chile, the tax 
determination process has been completed in the service (Provisional Free Transit 
Guide) and the corresponding taxes have been paid to customs (Import Declara-
tion), the importer must enter the data on the stamps used by the importer on the 
platform of the traceability system. After validation, the stamps can be activated in 
the system – that is, they are recognized as valid for commercialization.
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In addition to the devices provided by the company, SII has developed a smart-
phone application for verification by citizens. Although the application cannot verify 
the authenticity of the ink used, it is able to verify whether a code is correctly gener-
ated and display the information contained in the traceability system for the code 
(brand, variety, quantity of cigarettes, products/importer) so that the taxpayer can 
verify its consistency. 
Progress of the compliance management model
Implementation of the traceability system has required a coordinated effort both 
within the service – for the generation of instructions, procedures and computer 
developments – and with other institutions, such as the National Customs Service 
and the Ministry of Health. It is an unprecedented project in terms of coordinating 
the implementation of the system in the production lines of the different tobacco 
companies in the country and the provider company. Some of the main milestones 
of the project are:
September 2014: Law 20,780 on Tax Reform establishes an obligation to implement 
the system within  a term of six months, after the publication of the resolution 
determining the obligated tax payers.
May 2015: Resolution No. 47 determines obligated taxpayers.
June 2015: Circular No. 47 describes obligation to incorporate stamps or distinctive 
marks as a traceability mechanism.
February 2016: Law 20,899 on Tax Reform simplifies the definition of the system, 
allowing the system to be outsourced or provided by the SII, in addition to making 
the type of traceability more flexible.
August 2016: Traceability system regulation D.S. 1,027 is issued (published on 28 
December 2016).
March 2017: Exempt Resolution No. 49 of the Ministry of Finance authorizes the SII 
to outsource all or part of the traceability system.
June 2017: Bidding bases in public market are published.
February 2018: Tender is awarded to selected company.
June 2018: Decision of contract is made by General Comptroller of the Republic.
August 2018: Resolution No. 61 determines taxpayers obliged to apply the trace-
ability system.
August 2018: Holding of first workshops for detailed definitions of the project, with 
the participation of Customs, Ministry of Health, provider and SII.
September – October 2018: Visits of plants to coordinate with producers and define 
adaptations to production lines for system implementation.
January 2019: Resolutions No. 6, 7 and 8 passed, with response to a request for an 
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extension of producers; start of system implementation in all production lines in 
the country.
February 2019: Resolution No. 16 establishes a term to commercialize the remaining 
stock without marking.
2019: Resolution No. 24, with request for extension to importer, includes training 
of customs staff.
March 2019: The traceability system is started up.
June 2019: Stamp process begins for all imported cigarettes.
Currently, the system is installed and operating in all production lines in the coun-
try, placing traceability markings on virtually 100% of the cigarettes produced and 
imported. During 2019, the traceability system enabled controlling approximately 
1 175 million packs: 744 million produced for national consumption, 409 million 
produced for export and 22 million imported yearly.
Source: (48). 
Box 3.9 Case study of Kenya’s implementation of a tracking 
and tracing system 
Kenya’s current tracking and tracing system was preceded by a series of reforms in 
both tax structure and administration of excise taxes. The reforms included electronic 
cargo monitoring of exports, which allowed for automatic monitoring and reporting. 
The system appears to be highly effective because it requires less capacity and is less 
prone to manipulation than earlier systems. The experience of Kenya shows that a 
lower-middle-income country can successfully implement a sophisticated system 
capable of decreasing illicit trade. It also shows the importance of other measures 
such as strengthening enforcement, increasing cooperation and communication 
among different agencies and increasing penalties for noncompliance. Illicit trade, 
as measured by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), was estimated to be around 
15% of total consumption in the market during the initial reform period. After the 
introduction of the new system in 2015, it dropped to 5%. 
Timeline of the major reforms:
2003: In this period, the paper tax stamps used had a unique identifier and were 
colour-coded to indicate the type of product. Regular compliance checks were in-
troduced. In 2007, the cost of a stamp was 2.124 Kenyan shillings or US$ 0.023 per 
pack. However, the stamps were found to be easily counterfeited and could not be 
linked to specific brands.
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2008: The KRA proposed a tracking and tracing system and increasing tax rates. The 
new system was introduced gradually.  
2010: Enhanced security features, including ultraviolet markings, were added to the 
paper stamps. The stamps were to be clearly visible when packs were displayed for 
sale and placed so that opening a pack would destroy the stamp. The stamps were 
verified at four different points along the supply chain. The costs were just slightly 
higher than those of the previous stamps at US$ 0.024 per pack.  
Licensing was introduced for domestic manufacturers, subject to annual renewal. 
Importers were required to register with the KRA. Licences required submission of 
details on the company directors, inventories and equipment, accounting systems, 
input-to-production ratios and brands produced. Penalties for noncompliance were 
increased and included up to three years in prison. 
An electronic cargo tracking system was launched. Electronic seals were affixed 
on containers or trucks, and GPS technology was used for tracking. A bond was 
payable on exports to cover excise and VAT taxes. The bond was released only when 
the goods reached the final destination and taxes were paid. 
Verification involving both countries of the business deal takes place at the bor-
ders. The electronic system provides information about the departure and arrival of 
the goods and the disarming of the seals. Authorities in the importing country are 
notified before the shipment leaves the domestic production facility. The system 
reduces the number of checkpoints and staff needed and generates arrival reports 
that can be verified with VAT refund requests.
As a result of these changes, three factories and seven of the 10 importers were 
shut down due to noncompliance. Exports to Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Mali and Sudan 
stopped because companies could not provide evidence that the goods reached 
the final destination and taxes were paid. More than US$ 11 million in excise tax 
losses was recovered in 2011. The KRA estimated that illicit trade dropped to 8%.  
2013: A contract was signed to introduce a tracking and tracing system for tobacco 
and alcohol, the Excisable Goods Management System, in April. The system added 
production counting, tracking and tracing, stock control, processing and other data 
collection to the existing system. Infrastructure requirements included high-speed 
broadband internet at production facilities, warehouses, the KRA and ports, along 
with reliable power or backup generators at those points. Implementation was 
planned in three stages:
• Stage 1 – A new electronic digital stamp with a unique identifier was introduced. 
It included a data matrix code plus overt markings (holograms, fluorescent 
fibres, a security link for KRA authentication and visible two-dimensional codes 
for verification and activation), semi-covert markings (UV features, fluorescent 
prints detectable by specialized devices, mini text printing for retailers and 
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distributors) and forensic taggants for use in prosecutions. The stamp also 
included human-readable codes for verification by short message service 
using the KRA web portal.
• Stage 2 – Control and monitoring systems were automated in February 2014. 
Manufacturers had to install photosensitive readers on production lines, with 
data automatically sent to the KRA in real time. Each stamp was activated and 
associated with a brand and package size on the line. The KRA database is 
automatically updated every 15 minutes. 
• Stage 3 – Market surveillance began, with 83 officers given powers to seize 
illicit cigarettes and make arrests. The officers were equipped with hand-held 
devices that transmitted data to the KRA for authentication. Distributors and 
retailers became liable for selling products without an excise stamp and were 
subject to fines plus prison sentences of up to three years for noncompliance. 
In 2016, a smartphone application became available with which the public 
could authenticate cigarette packs. Importers must now buy digital stamps 
and send them to export facilities in other countries to be affixed. Tax liability 
is due at removal from a factory or at import. The electronic cargo monitoring 
system is still in effect.
2016: The Excise Duty and Tax Procedures Acts clarified new obligations and penalties. 
2017: A new integrated customs management system was launched.
The KRA estimates that illicit trade levels are now around 5%. The current, more 
comprehensive digital system is cheaper than the previous paper tax stamp system. 
Manufacturers pay for the production monitoring system, but it counts as a busi-
ness expense on corporate tax returns. In 2018, two manufacturers and 10 licensed 
importers were operating in Kenya.
In 2018, aggregation between the markings of packs, cartons and master cases 
had not yet been implemented but was expected to be forthcoming.
Source: (36)
Box 3.10 Case study of the new EU tracking and tracing 
system, May 2019 
Cigarette smuggling and other forms of illicit trade in the EU is estimated to cause a 
loss of €10 billion in revenue annually. In 2018, 4.2 million packs (20 sticks per pack) 
of illegal cigarettes were seized by customs in the EU. Illicit tobacco production 
was also increasing: an illegal factory in Ireland, dismantled in 2018, was capable of 
producing 250 000 cigarettes per hour.
CHAP T ER 3. TO BACCO TA X ADM INIS T R AT I O N 137 
The EU tobacco control policy is described in the Tobacco Products Directive and 
is influenced by the Protocol. Article 15 of the Directive calls for the traceability of 
cigarettes and RYO tobacco products by May 2019 and of other tobacco products 
by May 2024. The EU tracking and tracing system is sufficiently flexible to be imple-
mented at both the regional and the single-country level. Countries can choose 
among providers as long as the basic requirements are met. The policy provides a 
high level of protection against any attempts at manipulating the data. The report-
ing obligations cover all the economic operators involved in the manufacture and 
distribution of tobacco products. 
The EU system requires all unit packets of tobacco products to be marked with a 
unique identifier Information on the movements of those products is to be stored by 
third-party data storage providers. The suppliers of the unique identifiers and data stor-
age are to be financially and legally independent from the tobacco industry. The data 
are to be fully accessible to authorities of EU Member States for enforcement purposes. 
The generation of unique identifiers, as well as all other codes required for pre-
registration of economic operators, facilities and machines, will be done at the Member 
State level by designated identifier issuers. Manufacturers and importers are required 
to supply information relating to the product and production lines when requesting 
unique identifiers from the issuers. The issuers will then generate and deliver batches 
of unique identifiers. On the production line, manufacturers of tobacco products will 
complete each unique identifier with a marking indicating the date and time. The 
unique identifier will be a machine-readable, optical, one- or two-dimensional barcode. 
An anti-tampering device, capable of creating an unalterable independent record of 
the verification process, must have been installed previously. This additional record 
will be accessible to public authorities for potential investigation and inspection. 
Unit packets, as well as aggregated packages such as cartons, master cases or 
pallets, can be tracked and traced throughout the supply chain. Tracking is also 
allowed at an aggregated packaging level as long as unit packets remain traceable. 
During transport, each dispatch and arrival up to the final dispatch to the first retail 
outlet must be recorded and reported. All recorded information must be submitted 
to the independent third-party data storage facility, generally within three hours, 
and 24 hours before dispatch and transloading.  
Costs, including operational costs, are shifted to the tobacco industry, in line with 
Article 8 of the Protocol. The EU system of tobacco traceability and security features 
became operational on 20 May 2019.
Sources: (36, 49–50).
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KEY TAKEAWAY 11 
A tracking and tracing system assists authorities in determining  
the origin of tobacco products and the point of diversion, if applicable, 
as well as monitoring and controlling the movement of tobacco 
products and their legal status. 
3.4.6 ANTI-FORESTALLING
“Forestalling” is a term that describes increases in the production or stock of products 
in anticipation of a tax increase (2). Other terms referring to this practice include 
“stockpiling” and “front-loading”. Forestalling occurs when manufacturers or importers 
increase their tax-paid stock or oversupply the market by increasing production or 
imports in order to pay the previous lower rate. It reduces and delays the effective-
ness of tax measures. The effective starting date of the new tax rate will be delayed, 
revenues will be lower and the possible effect on prices and thus consumer behaviour 
will also be postponed. To illustrate how anti-forestalling measures function, an 
example is presented in Annex 3.2. 
A legal basis must exist for anti-forestalling measures; otherwise, the govern-
ment cannot prevent the industry from forestalling. Legal measures to deal with 
forestalling include (51–52):
1. Limiting the amount of tobacco products that can be released subject to the 
old tax rate and levying the new tax on the products exceeding that limit.
2. Levying the new tax rate on all goods that are still in stock and not yet sup-
plied to the final consumer.
3. Limiting the number of tax stamps issued at the rate that was in effect before 
the increase or limiting the time that products with a tax stamp with the old 
rate can be sold.
4. Requiring producers and importers to buy new tax stamps annually or after 
a tax increase.
Under the first three measures, the competent authority determines the limit for 
taxation at the previous (lower) rate. The quantity allowed may be based on the shelf 
life of tobacco products – around six months for cigarettes – or normal inventory 
levels, such as an average over the previous three years.
The first measure, limiting the amount of tobacco products that can be released, 
requires resources from the competent authority for enforcement. Authorities may 
decide to post inspectors in each production facility, but even without posting 
inspectors, procedures are necessary for determining when the allowed quantity 
has been exceeded and what subsequent actions to take.
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The second measure, levying the new tax on goods in stock and not yet supplied 
to the final consumer, might be difficult to implement. The competent authority is 
required to monitor the manufacturing process and, at the very least, to conduct a 
stock-taking of all players in the supply chain – including the various manufacturers, 
importers, wholesalers and retailers – in a very short window of time. If monitoring 
covers only the stock of manufacturers and importers, this measure could easily 
be circumvented by ensuring the stock is sold to others in the supply chain or by 
setting up separate distribution companies to purchase the stock. Controlling stock 
at the retail level is burdensome and might not be administratively feasible given 
the large number of cigarette retailers. It becomes even more burdensome if there 
is no licensing requirement for retailers because they will first have to be identified. 
The third measure accomplishes the same thing as the first if a country uses tax 
stamps. The fourth also requires tax stamps and is simpler for the competent authority 
but somewhat more burdensome for the tobacco companies, since stamps must 
be purchased every year. Box 3.11 provides examples of anti-forestalling measures 
in EU countries.
Box 3.11 Examples of anti-forestalling measures  
in EU countries 
Several EU Member States have taken measures to limit forestalling. A cautious ap-
proach seems to be required for designing such measures to ensure that they comply 
with EU legislation and the general principles of EU law – in particular, the principle 
of proportionality. No disputes have occurred concerning the right of initiative of EU 
Member States to implement anti-forestalling measures. Nevertheless, several EU 
Member States had to defend their measures in front of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the institution that ensures all national legislation is in line with 
EU law and a consistent application of that law (53). The Court acknowledged that 
anti-forestalling measures are appropriate to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
Moreover, the Court emphasized that fiscal legislation is an important and effective 
instrument for discouraging consumption of tobacco products and therefore for 
protecting public health (54–55). However, the measures taken should be proportion-
ate to the objectives. The principle of proportionality means that only the action 
needed to achieve the objective should be taken, and it should not exceed what is 
necessary. This principle regulates the measures taken within the EU and is included 
in the Treaty on the European Union.
The Court demanded that Portugal amend its legislation to ensure compliance 
with the principle of proportionality. Belgium, Estonia and Hungary were also urged to 
change their anti-forestalling measures to bring them in line with EU legislation (56–57).
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The majority of the EU Member States have anti-forestalling measures in place, 
but there is no harmonization of these measures. The following are some examples:12
• Portugal limits the quantity of cigarettes that can be released in the last four 
months of a year to the average of the previous 12 months plus 10%. In 
addition, manufacturers and importers must sell cigarette packages with a 
tax marking of the preceding calendar year within three months. For other 
tobacco products, longer limits apply.  
• Denmark limits the number of tax stamps issued before a tax increase at the 
old rate to 20% more than are usually purchased in the two months before 
the end of the year.  
• In Poland, tax stamps are valid only for the current calendar year, and cigarettes 
with the old stamp can be sold only through February of the following year. 
• In Romania, companies must apply for approval to release for consumption 
from the customs office.  
Source: (58).
KEY TAKEAWAY 12 
Forestalling reduces and delays the effectiveness of tax measures. 
Implementing anti-forestalling measures can limit the delay of a tax 
increase and its intended effect on revenues and consumer behaviour. 
3.4.7 ADDITIONAL NATIONAL AUDITS AND CONTROLS 
In addition to the previously described measures, several periodic audits and controls 
could be implemented to increase compliance with tax laws. The most common 
audits and controls are the following:
• Cost audit – The cost audit method provides expected VAT and tobacco tax 
collection by simulating the intermediate and final cost of cigarettes. It starts 
with the inventories of raw materials and estimates added values and final 
cost, then matches the results with real collection from the tobacco supply 
chain. Annex 3.1 provides more information about the components that 
make up some selected (tobacco) products. 
• Transfer pricing audit – To ensure companies pay their fair share of tax, prices 
of transactions between related companies should be assessed, and when 
prices are not in line with the market conditions, they should be corrected. 
Companies that operate at the international level (transnational companies), 
including many tobacco companies, can manipulate import or export prices 
12 Considering the frequency of court cases concerning anti-forestalling incidents, these measures might 
have been replaced or amended.
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of merchandise or raw material to related companies or branches in other 
countries, with the objective of lowering profits in countries with higher tax 
rates, and can transfer those profits to countries with lower taxes.
• Price and market monitoring – Retail price surveys can provide information 
about variance from the market price in certain locations, highlighting areas 
of potential tax avoidance or illicit trade. Physical control of such locations 
requires rapid response teams, as implemented in the Philippines. To monitor 
the tax compliance of its taxpayers, the competent authority in the Philippines 
needs to understand the tobacco market; it must have information on brands, 
market segments and prices of products. This information enables authori-
ties to estimate the impact of tax and price changes on consumer behaviour 
and revenues. Market data can be analysed as part of risk management and 
anti-fraud analysis to determine whom to investigate for noncompliance and 
when to do so. Sales data can be triangulated to validate other data sources, 
such as household surveys on prevalence. Market data and trends are also 
useful indicators for determining whether there is a case of oversupplying. 
See also section 3.4.3. 
• Consumer control – Involving the public via awareness campaigns has also 
been shown to be effective. Consumers have the right to be assured that the 
products available in the market are authentic and come from legitimate 
sources. Thus, it is in the consumers’ interest to understand and be able to 
verify that they are buying genuine products. The features of the fiscal marks 
on tobacco products should help consumers distinguish between genuine 
and illicit products. Some countries – Kenya, for example (see the case study 
in Box 3.9) – use a smartphone application to allow anyone to check both 
covert and overt features and to report any cigarettes with incorrect markings. 
Other countries, such as the Netherlands, have developed a smartphone 
application that allows anyone to report a suspected case of excise tax fraud. 
• Cross-check controls – Competent authorities should consider using multiple 
sources to obtain market data and determine if these data are consistent 
with tax declarations. VAT declarations can be used to verify that suppliers 
and purchasers of raw materials and final products are reporting the same 
amounts. Bank information can be used to verify both sides of transactions 
along the supply chain. Any discrepancy can alert the competent authority to 
conduct further investigation for possible illicit trade of tobacco or tax evasion.
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KEY TAKEAWAY 13 
Several different types of periodic audits and controls that  
can be carried out to increase compliance, including cost audits, 
transfer pricing audits, price and market monitoring,  
consumer controls and cross-check controls. 
3.4.8 IMPORT AND EXPORT CONTROLS
Parties to the Protocol should allow import and export of tobacco products and 
manufacturing equipment only by duly licensed natural persons or legal entities 
(Article 6.1). A well-known strategy used by fraudsters is to declare products for 
export so that no duties are due to the country of export. These products are subse-
quently transported through other countries, using the in-transit regime that allows 
temporary suspension of duties until the goods arrive at their final destination. Before 
arriving at their final destination – where the excise duties would be due – the goods 
disappear or are lost while being diverted to the illegal supply chain. The goods 
may never leave the country, or they may be smuggled back into the country from 
which they were exported without declaring or paying duties. This risk of loss of 
revenue can be mitigated by requiring a guarantee or bond, which will be released 
only if payment of duties in another country is proven. 
No tobacco product should be allowed into a jurisdiction unless the required 
fiscal marking (such as a tax stamp or export label) is affixed on the pack, according 
to the national law. Tobacco products for export should bear a marking indicating 
that the product is destined for the export market. 
Illicit tobacco trade could be decreased significantly if the various competent 
authorities that have jurisdiction over manufacturers and exporters of tobacco prod-
ucts and manufacturing equipment would provide the competent authority at the 
destination with prior information when a shipment has been authorized and is about 
to take place. The information could include the name of the consignee, a description 
of the item shipped and the quantity. Also, the competent authority at the destination 
should inform the competent authority having jurisdiction over the shipper that a 
shipment was received along with the pertinent information relating to the shipment.
A good IT system is also required for import and export. Electronic processing of 
prior-to-arrival manifest and import declarations is recommended. Most countries 
have implemented an online customs system to process import and export declara-
tions, including all required data such as country of origin or export, description 
of merchandise, value, weight, cargo insurance, carrier, importer or exporter and 
broker identification, detailed tax duties to pay and final destination. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement provides sev-
eral tools for better controls, including collaboration between customs administrations, 
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exchange of information, use of non-invasive devices and prior-to-arrival import 
declaration (23).
Non-invasive detection equipment at customs posts is highly capable of detect-
ing contraband merchandise. The most common tools are X-ray scanners that are 
used for small parcels, containers, trucks and trains. Most modern ports have also 
implemented the use of X-ray scanners, and such technology is improving the speed 
of controls to as little as two minutes per container. Although the cost of scan-
ners is declining, it remains inaccessibly high for countries with limited resources. 
Fortunately, scanners are often available for lease, making them accessible for tax 
administrations in those countries. 
Less sophisticated and less costly detection equipment includes endoscopes, 
mirrors, night vision equipment, cameras and automatic licence plate readers (33). 
A still less expensive alternative is the use of dogs, which can be trained to detect 
cigarettes and other organic products. Many countries use both scanners and dogs 
to detect contraband tobacco products.
Special physical control measures can also be applied in order to reduce contra-
band. These include the separation of processing operations from the sealed storage 
of taxed and untaxed products. Physical and direct control by officials of the excise 
authority during a part or the whole of an operation can be applied (for example, 
physical escort of the transit consignment from border to border by individual 
trucks or in a convoy, or application of radio or satellite tracking systems such as 
GPS-enabled devices to goods, conveyances, vehicles or containers).
Control at borders is essential and should include integrated technology and 
cooperation with agencies at the border station. Frontline officers should be sup-
ported by appropriate intelligence, guidance and supervision from management, 
as well as technical aids to enforcement.
Within a country, mobile excise control units are helpful for verifying excisable 
goods as they are transported domestically. These units should be dispatched to 
important transport corridors, communication centres and areas of congestion, 
such as bridges, ferries and passes. These operations require close coordination 
between police, border guards and other public services.
Exports also require special attention, in particular if VAT and tax refunds are 
granted to the export of tobacco products. Validating the real exit in the declared 
amount is essential to avoid illegal re-entry to a territory and the improper refund 
of taxes. For any tax refund, an audit including tax credit information must be 
carried out. The audit may include the invoices for the whole chain involved in the 
export, including tobacco farmers, first processors, manufacturers, wholesalers, 
storage and transport. 
14 4  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
KEY TAKEAWAY 14 
To ensure control of import and export, it is recommended that only 
duly licensed persons and entities be allowed to import and export 
tobacco products and manufacturing equipment. 
3.4.9 FREE ZONES AND TRANSHIPMENT POINTS
The term “free zone” is very broad and can refer to a number of different types of 
areas. The Financial Action Task Force listed the following types in its 2010 report 
(59): free trade, export processing, enterprise, free ports, foreign trade, special 
economic zones and bonded warehouses. A number of these areas can include 
tobacco manufacturing and trade. By definition, controls such as regulation and 
oversight within free zones are less strict than in other areas. This can make them 
appealing to persons involved in illegal cigarette manufacturing or trade (17). In 
fact, illicit activities related to free zones (not limited to tobacco) are regularly 
documented by organizations that recognize the linkage. These activities include 
money laundering, tax evasion and trade in counterfeit goods or other illicit 
goods (60). A report from the European Parliament (61) referring to free ports 
in particular, mentioned that the motivation for using them included a “high 
degree of secrecy and deferral of import duty and indirect taxes”. The report 
even proposed the “urgent phasing out of free ports”. In the European Parliament 
report, free ports are free zones that function as (semi-) permanent storage areas 
for high-value goods.
The Protocol includes a time-bound provision of effective controls on all manu-
facturing and transactions of tobacco products in free zones (Article 12). Free zones 
are defined as a part of the territory of a Party where goods are considered to be 
outside the customs territory for import duties and taxes (Article 1.5). This is the 
same definition used in the International Convention on the Simplification and 
Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Revised Kyoto Convention) (62). Parties 
to the Protocol must implement effective controls in free zones within three years 
of entry into force of the Protocol. For countries not yet Parties to the Protocol, 
stringent controls of manufacturing and transactions involving tobacco products in 
free zones are an important component of an effective and efficient tax administration.
One of the measures for dealing with free zones within the Protocol includes 
implementing “effective controls on all manufacturing of, and transactions in, tobacco 
and tobacco products, in free zones, by use of all relevant measures as provided in 
this Protocol”. As indicated in an Interpol report (17), a significant vulnerability of 
free zones is the fact that different economic operations (e.g. manufacturing, assembly, 
re-packaging and warehousing) take place outside the control of authorities. It is 
therefore essential for customs administrations to exercise their authority in free zones 
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to effectively identify and fight illicit trade in tobacco products. Relevant measures 
listed in the Protocol should be applied. These include licensing, due diligence and 
recordkeeping for all operators within free zones, as well as implementing a track-
ing and tracing regime. Removing exemptions on excise taxes is an additional way 
to increase control and remove incentives for using free zones as a means for tax 
evasion. Indonesia, for example, imposes excise taxes on cigarette manufacturing 
in its free trade zone.13
Parties to the Protocol shall also prohibit the intermingling of tobacco products 
with non-tobacco products in a single container or any other such similar transporta-
tion unit when removed from free zones. Finally, each Party is to “adopt and apply 
control and verification measures to the international transit or transhipment of 
tobacco products and manufacturing equipment in conformity with the provisions 
of the Protocol”.
Article 13 of the Protocol, which covers all duty-free sales of tobacco products, 
requires Parties to the WHO FCTC to consider prohibiting or restricting the sale 
to or import by international travellers of tax-free or duty-free tobacco products, 
as mentioned in Article 6 of the WHO FCTC. These sales erode the effects of tax 
and price measures aimed at reducing the demand for tobacco products and also 
adversely affect government revenues by creating a loophole in the tax structure (2).
KEY TAKEAWAY 15 
Customs administrations should exercise their authority in free zones 
to prevent different economic operations from taking place outside  
the control of authorities. Relevant measures include licensing,  
due diligence and recordkeeping for all operators within free zones,  
as well as implementing a tracking and tracing regime.
3.4.10 PROCEDURES AFTER DETECTING ILLICIT TRADE OF TOBACCO 
The procedures described in previous sections are intended to increase compliance 
and to prevent illicit trade. When smuggling or illicit trade is detected – through, 
for example, audits, tracking and tracing systems, verification of declarations or 
border control – actions such as seizing and destroying smuggled and/or illicit 
tobacco and collecting due taxes must be taken immediately. To deter further illegal 
behaviour, a comprehensive audit of everyone and everything involved in the illicit 
acts must also be carried out. Assets and vessels involved in the illicit activity can be 
seized, and financial accounts can be frozen. Some countries, including the United 
Kingdom, Canada and Chile, have also adopted a strategy known as “follow the 
13 Indonesian Ministry of Finance, personal communication, January 2020.
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money” to obtain more information on those who finance illicit trade. This strategy 
is intended to have a further-reaching effect by targeting those who finance the 
transport, production and storage of illicit products. The United Kingdom, Canada 
and Chile all created special teams tasked with identifying and targeting the offenders. 
Furthermore, Article 18 of the Protocol provides for the confiscation and 
destruction of tobacco, tobacco products and manufacturing equipment. One of 
the difficulties faced by competent authorities in exercising the authority to seize 
and forfeit products and/or equipment used in the manufacture or distribution 
of tobacco products is the cost of keeping or storing the goods and/or machinery 
before destruction. Thus, the law should also provide for a mechanism and timetable 
for the disposal and/or destruction of seized and forfeited goods or machinery, 
while prescribing a mechanism by which these properties can still be presented as 
admissible evidence in a judicial proceeding. Boxes 3.12 and 3.13 provide examples 
of successful efforts to combat illicit trade in the United Kingdom and Indonesia.
KEY TAKEAWAY 16 
As soon as smuggling or illicit trade in tobacco products is detected, 
actions such as collecting taxes and seizing and destroying  
smuggled and/or illicit tobacco must be taken. 
Box 3.12 The United Kingdom’s experience in fighting illicit 
trade in tobacco products 
In 2000, illicit cigarettes accounted for 22% of the cigarette market in the Unit-
ed Kingdom. To deal with the problem, Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise14 
 implemented a major anti-smuggling effort. The strategy was refreshed with ad-
ditional resources and measures in 2011 and reviewed in 2015. The result was a 
steady decline in the illicit cigarette market to 10% by 2013/2014.  
The measures taken were comprehensive and included hiring 1 000 new customs 
officers and investigators. In addition, tobacco supply chain legislation was introduced, 
aimed at discouraging tobacco manufacturers from facilitating smuggling. 
Tougher sanctions included increased fines of up to £5 million levied on a manu-
facturer, criminal prosecution with sentences up to seven years, confiscation of assets 
as part of the proceeds of the crime, payment of duty on the confiscated goods plus 
penalties up to 100% of the duty, prohibition of the sale of tobacco products for 
14 By the time of the renewed strategy, the respective bodies were the HMRC and the United Kingdom 
Border Agency.
CHAP T ER 3. TO BACCO TA X ADM INIS T R AT I O N 147 
up to six months, unlimited fines for selling tobacco without the United Kingdom 
duty-paid fiscal mark after 13 March 2015, referral for withdrawal of the transporter’s 
licence, use of immigration sanctions to refuse entry to the United Kingdom for 
tobacco smugglers and civil action, including bankruptcy.
The cost of these measures was £209 million over the first three years of the 
program and around £100 million annually by 2008/2009. This figure covers only 
HMRC and excludes any costing of the United Kingdom Border Agency. In 2013/2014, 
tobacco tax revenues were £9.5 billion.
After a review of the strategy in 2015, the controls on raw tobacco were strength-
ened by the introduction of an approval system in 2017. Anyone who manufactures, 
purchases, acquires, owns or is in the possession of a tobacco products manufacturing 
machine must be licensed with customs as of 1 August 2018 (63). 
The United Kingdom ratified the Protocol on 27 June 2018. It was the 40th country 
to ratify, which was the trigger point for the Protocol to enter into force.
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Box 3.13 A success story: Indonesia reduced illegal 
cigarettes from 12% to 3% of the market
In some countries, most of the illegal cigarettes are imported, but in Indonesia most 
of them are produced within the country by unregistered manufacturers that are 
usually home-based and relatively small. In several territories, specifically on the 
Island of Java, illegal cigarettes have been produced for generations. This practice is 
supported by the availability of raw tobacco materials and cloves, as well as cheap 
labour costs, especially for female workers. Indonesia also produces cigarette products 
that are not available in most other countries. These products – known as handmade 
clove cigarettes (sigaret kretek tangan) – contain cloves, and the production process 
covers blending, rolling and packing. Parts of the process are done by hand, and 
99% of the labourers are women. 
The strategy for combatting the illegal cigarette trade in Indonesia is divided into 
two main parts: preventive actions and responsive actions. Indonesia’s success in 
effectively tackling illicit trade is attributed to the following key factors.
Monitoring and surveillance
Preventive actions consist of administrative measures – such as issuance of permits and 
the excise stamp purchasing mechanism – that use risk management by optimizing 
the Excise Service Information System (ExSis). With this IT system, the Directorate 
General of Customs and Excise (DGCE) can oversee both daily transactions and daily 
production from factories. When information of suspicious activities is obtained, DGCE 
can suspend the purchase of excise stamps. The efforts to fight the illegal cigarette 
trade also invite stakeholders to be involved by supplying information regarding 
high-risk areas and regional governments.
Strategic communications and community involvement
DGCE continuously disseminates information and conducts public education to fight 
illegal cigarettes. These efforts are conducted every year, using a special campaign 
slogan. In 2019, the slogan was “Gempur Rokok Ilegal” (“Fight Illegal Cigarettes”).
Key performance indicators for DGCE units and offices
Parallel with the above-mentioned preventive actions, DGCE also continuously 
conducts responsive actions: enforcement, investigation and audit activities in 
cigarette factories. Enforcement activities are planned and measured by consider-
ing the limited human resources and the large scale of the monitored territories. 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of administrative and enforcement measures in 
curbing the trade of illegal cigarettes, both types of activities are translated into key 
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performance indicators for all DGCE working units and offices, including regional 
offices and personnel. 
Use of technology and intelligence
Coordination between different DGCE offices responsible for monitoring the produc-
tion and marketing of cigarettes is maintained by sophisticated IT applications that 
enable efficient distribution of information and investigation activities. The applica-
tions are the Customs Intelligence and Tactical Centre for data and analysis and the 
Centre for Command and Control (Pusat Komando dan Pengendalian/Puskodal) for 
ensuring that sea patrols work effectively and efficiently. 
Independent evaluation
To evaluate the efforts and activities to reduce the circulation of illegal cigarettes in 
Indonesia (e.g. cigarettes without stamps, with fake stamps or with used stamps), in 
2016, the government commissioned the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta to 
conduct a survey using a stratified random sampling method. To maintain objectiv-
ity and independence, an independent body from this well-known university was 
appointed to conduct the survey. 
The survey results showed that the level of illegal cigarette circulation in Indonesia 
was 12.1% of total consumption.
In 2018, the DGCE commissioned the University of Gadjah Mada to conduct 
another survey. Results showed that circulation of illegal cigarettes had been reduced 
to 7.0%. In 2019, using the same method the university used, DGCE conducted a 
survey that showed a reduction to 3.0%.
Fig. 3.5 shows the results of the surveys.
Fig. 3.5 Share of illicit trade in total cigarette consumption in Indonesia, 2016–2019
Source: Customs and excise department, Ministry of Finance, Indonesia, personal communication, 2020.
2016 2017 2018 2019
12.1% 10. 9% 7% 3%
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The results of the actions taken can be used as feedback for DGCE in developing 
excise policies for both service and enforcement, including policies for excise tariffs. 
DGCE will provide recommendations for an optimum policy format for controlling 
consumption, maintaining labour protections, optimizing revenue and, most impor-
tantly, constantly reducing the consumption of illegal cigarettes on a national level.
3.4.11 PENALTIES  
Penalties and sanctions must be sufficient to deter illegal activities. Otherwise, finan-
cial penalties may simply be paid as a cost of doing business while the illegal activity 
continues. The Protocol specifies commitments for Parties and provides information 
on best practices for non-Parties. Article 14.1 in Part IV of the Protocol requires each 
Party to establish unlawful activities, including manufacturing, wholesaling, broker-
ing, selling, transporting, distributing, storing, shipping and importing or exporting 
tobacco products or manufacturing equipment without the payment of applicable 
duties or taxes or without using fiscal stamps or other required markings or labels. 
Articles 14.2 and 15 of the Protocol mandate Parties to determine which of the 
types of unlawful conduct set out in Article 14.1 shall be criminal offences. Parties 
must adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to such determinations, as 
well as to define whether the liability for committing illicit trade in tobacco is a 
criminal, civil or administrative offence. Article 17 further provides that the Parties 
shall consider adopting measures as needed to authorize competent authorities to 
levy penalties in an amount proportionate to lost taxes and duties resulting from 
the commission of illicit trade. Box 3.14 provides a case study of how Colombia 
used penalties to fight illicit trade.
Box 3.14 The use of penalties to combat illicit trade  
in Colombia
In 2017, the specific tax on cigarettes in Colombia was doubled, increasing from 
COL$ 700 per pack in 2016 to COL$ 1 400 in 2017. The tax rate was tripled from 2016 
levels in 2018, reaching COL$ 2 100 per pack. A provision was added to increase 
taxes annually after 2018 at the rate of inflation plus 4%.  
In 2015, before the tax increase, Law 1762 introduced a number of measures to 
fight illicit trade more effectively. The length of imprisonment for dealing in contraband 
cigarettes was increased from 3–5 years to 4–12 years. Moreover, government officials 
who facilitate illicit trade – or anyone involved in transporting or retail sales of illicit 
tobacco – face similar prison terms. The law allows vehicles used for smuggling to be 
confiscated, and penalties were increased for illicit trade that is conducted through 
areas such as special economic zones. 
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Under the law, illicit trade is considered to be a source of money laundering, 
which means that the Financial Intelligence Unit can use the same methods it uses 
to investigate other illegal financial activities. This practice is not common. 
The law specifically created new sanctions related to alcohol and tobacco excise 
tax evasion, including the seizure of goods, fines, closure of retail outlets and the 
suspension or cancellation of licences, authorizations or registries. 
Arrests and seizures have increased under the new law. Indeed, since its enactment, 
law authorities reported that between 2016 and 2018, five criminal organizations 
were dismantled, 53 individuals were apprehended and 72 assets were confiscated. In 
addition, 2 236 individuals were apprehended and 503 vehicles transporting smuggled 
goods were confiscated, as transport of such goods is now also considered a crime 
under the law.
More importantly, thanks to the large tax increases, consumption decreased while 
revenues increased substantially in 2017 and 2018 (see Fig. 3.6). It is estimated that 
illicit trade in cigarettes in five Colombian cities in 2016 constituted 3.5% of total 
consumption, a much lower estimate than the industry data suggest. In 2017, after 
nine months of the tax increase implementation, a similar study found that illicit 
cigarettes remained low, at 6.4% of total consumption.
Fig. 3.6 Packs sold and tobacco tax revenue before and after the tax increase in Colombia, 
2016–2018 
Sources: (65–67 and Ministry of Finance, Colombia (Direccion de Apoyo Fiscal), personal communication, 
2020).
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For consumers in possession of illicit tobacco, the minimum penalty should be 
confiscation and destruction of the illicit tobacco products found in their possession, 
with payment required for the unpaid tax and duties on those products. 
In the state of California in the United States, it is illegal to possess a tobacco 
product on which taxes are due and not yet paid. The burden of proving that taxes 
have been paid is on those who have the products in their possession. The provi-
sion is enforced by the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration and 
local law enforcement agencies. A violation is a misdemeanour, with a maximum 
fine of US$ 5 000 and/or up to one year in prison. Illegal packages are subject to 
seizure and forfeiture. 
Most countries have adopted legislation to combat organized crime and money 
laundering. Some countries are using this type of legislation to address illicit trade 
of tobacco. Asset confiscation and increased penalties for involvement in illicit trade 
are becoming more common as well. Withholding or even confiscation of trucks 
involved in smuggling is also common in several countries. 
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Penalties and sanctions imposed should be sufficient to deter illegal 
tobacco trade activities. Penalties should be levied in amounts 
proportionate to lost taxes and duties resulting from illicit trade.  
3.5 TAX ADMINISTRATION OF OTHER TOBACCO PRODUCTS  
In principle, administering tobacco taxes on tobacco products other than cigarettes 
is similar to administering them on cigarettes. However, there is a lack of standard-
ization of other products and sometimes large informal markets. For example, it 
is estimated that two thirds of waterpipe tobacco in the EU is non-duty-paid (19). 
Other tobacco products – such as bidis in South-East Asia, waterpipe tobacco in 
the Eastern Mediterranean region and snus in Sweden – are considered part of a 
country’s traditions. This sometimes leads to situations where governments are 
hesitant to strongly regulate and tax these products. 
Some products, such as kreteks (clove cigarettes) in Indonesia and bidis in India 
and Bangladesh, are mainly sold in one market. Other tobacco products are more likely 
to be produced by hand on a small scale, making it difficult to detect and collect taxes 
on them. The same applies to RYO tobacco, which can be produced on a small scale 
by hand or with the use of small machinery. The trade in raw tobacco and small-scale 
home production of tobacco often take place outside of monitoring and control systems 
(19). As mentioned in section 3.3.1, countries have found various solutions to address 
this problem, including prior approval for purchase or sale of raw materials and reg-
istering, authorizing or licensing of all operators and growers that handle raw tobacco.
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3.5.1 NEW AND EMERGING NICOTINE AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS
In principle, adding a product to an existing tax framework is not likely to impose 
significant costs. It is reasonable to expect that challenges similar to those faced in 
dealing with conventional tobacco products will be faced in the collection of taxes 
on new products, as market players will attempt to use loopholes in tax regulation 
to avoid or evade taxes whenever possible. However, new challenges are expected 
to arise when those new products involve rapidly changing technology and where 
their market dynamics are widely unknown.
Furthermore, taxation of new tobacco products may require additional capacity, 
as a country may need to identify new agencies or authorities, given the different 
characteristics of the taxable items and the tax base. 
3.5.2 HEATED TOBACCO PRODUCTS (HTPs)
Many countries apply a specific excise on tobacco products according to tobacco 
weight (see Table 2.4 in Chapter 2). With HTPs, this is likely to impose a challenge, 
since assessing the content of tobacco in a heated tobacco stick will be an additional 
burden. From a tax administration perspective, it will be easier for authorities to 
apply taxes per stick or per unit, as is done for cigarettes. 
3.5.3 ELECTRONIC NICOTINE AND NON-NICOTINE DELIVERY SYSTEMS 
(ENDS/ENNDS) PRODUCTS
Some countries tax only nicotine-containing e-liquids while others tax both nicotine- 
and non-nicotine-containing e-liquids. Taxing only nicotine-containing e-liquids re-
quires laboratory capacity to detect the presence of nicotine (see Table 2.5 of Chapter 2). 
Self-declarations by industry are not sufficient, since some e-liquids labelled as 
nicotine-free have been found to contain nicotine (see section 2.4.2). Therefore, it 
is simpler to tax both nicotine- and non-nicotine-containing e-liquids. One likely 
challenge of taxing all e-liquids will be the capacity to detect and differentiate 
whether the e-liquids used in ENDS/ENNDS are falsely declared as being for other 
purposes at the import and manufacturing levels. More information on advantages 
and disadvantages of different excise tax policies is given in Table 2.6 of Chapter 2.
The challenge in taxing the other components of ENDS/ENNDS products is their 
diversity (see section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2) and the possibility that some parts may 
be used for other purposes (e.g. in batteries). As indicated earlier, rapidly changing 
technology and the lack of control and knowledge of the market make taxation of 
ENDS/ENNDS devices challenging. It may be for this reason that the majority of 
countries that tax those products address only the e-liquids.  
When applying a tax on these newer products, countries should be aware that 
many customers buy their products online. It is therefore recommended that countries 
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deciding to tax these products draw up a proper implementation plan, including 
how taxes will be collected on imported products and online sales. Online cross-
border sales of tobacco products are not permitted in all countries. Several EU 
countries have banned such sales, which include online sales from retail outlets to 
consumers in another country. Of course, such bans makes sense only if there is 
also capacity to enforce them. 
As in the case of taxing tobacco products, the following actions will be important 
to more effectively impose taxes on these products:
1. implementing strong enforcement mechanisms such as licensing, recordkeep-
ing and control of the supply chain, which can include but is not limited to:
a) imposing strict licensing of retailers, importers and manufacturers; ideally, 
licensing of all those involved in the supply chain and developing a tracking 
and tracing regime for ENDS/ENNDS products and HTPs (to share cost, 
this can be done in tandem with the system developed for cigarettes); 
b) exercising the right to set the frequency and type of audits or controls;
c) exercising the right to confiscate goods; and 
d) imposing sanctions such as penalties, fines and/or withdrawal of licences 
(if applicable) if legislation is not respected. 
Specific to ENDS/ENNDS products:
2. implementing highly consequential sanctions for producers who declare 
nicotine-containing e-liquids as “non-nicotine-containing”; and 
3. requiring a fee (contribution to the costs) for laboratory tests when a new 
product is brought on the market or when there are significant modifications 
to an existing one.
More information on the policy options to apply excise taxes on ENDS/ENNDS is 
given in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2, Table 2.6.
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In principle, the administration of taxes on new and emerging nicotine 
products and tobacco products should be similar to that for cigarettes. 
Due to the lack of standardization of these products, however,  
a rapid and constantly evolving understanding of them and  
their supply chain will be required to achieve effective  
and efficient administration of taxes.
 
CHAP T ER 3. TO BACCO TA X ADM INIS T R AT I O N 155 
3.6 THE BROADER ELEMENTS OF A GOOD TAX SYSTEM 
3.6.1 PROPER RESOURCING OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES  
In addition to legal tools and a legal basis on which to act and enforce, the authori-
ties in charge of implementing excise tax laws should be provided with sufficient 
resources to hire the necessary staff to properly implement and enforce them. The 
necessary staffing could encompass multiple agencies and will often require coop-
eration between agencies, since some aspects – such as regulation, licensing and 
border control – may be performed by agencies other than the competent authority. 
Staff of competent authorities need the necessary tools, equipment, training 
and supplies to carry out their functions. This requirement includes the means 
to build or purchase and maintain a software system that will allow taxpayers to 
submit required information electronically. Electronic filing has benefits for both 
taxpayers and authorities. It minimizes the compliance cost for taxpayers and can 
therefore support voluntary compliance (68). To identify risks of noncompliance, 
the software system should offer competent authorities the ability to analyse the 
data submitted by taxpayers and cross-check it with data from other taxes – such 
as VAT – and third-party sources, such as banks and household surveys. 
Another option for authorities is to make more efficient use of existing resources. 
For example, an authority could optimize the risk management system by switching 
to a risk-based approach: resources could be saved by auditing taxpayers who are 
more likely to be noncompliant based on risk analysis rather than auditing all of them. 
Other problems that challenge the effective functioning of a competent authority 
are lack of a coherent strategy and problems with professionalism related to lack of 
training or corruption (69). Having a strategy avoids directing resources towards less-
important areas. The strategy should always be aligned with the objectives, so that com-
petent authorities can identify which steps they should take and in which order they 
should take them to reach these objectives. A strategy is indispensable to prioritizing 
and organizing resources so that identified issues or risks can be addressed efficiently. 
3.6.2 CORRUPTION
Competent authorities should implement tax laws with integrity and have strict 
rules and regulations for detecting corruption. Strict rules and regulations should 
also be in place for the punishment of both agency personnel and taxpayers who 
engage in corrupt practices. Corruption within a competent authority results in the 
improper monitoring of tax compliance and is one of the causes of the proliferation 
of illicit trade in tobacco products. It also erodes confidence in competent authorities 
and ultimately in governments overall. In addition to effective laws and regulation, 
strong internal audits covering prevention, investigation and sanctions should be 
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implemented. To improve prevention, a risk map should be created that highlights 
areas of misconduct and possible leakages. An action plan to update controls should 
be established to improve areas of weakness detected in procedures and systems. 
The audits should also be scheduled regularly. Prepared internal auditors with pow-
ers to conduct investigations are necessary. Sanctions for corruption, including 
administrative sanctions and criminal prosecution, must be strong. 
3.6.3 A STRONG JUDICIARY
The judicial system should be honest and independent in fact and in perception. 
Disputes should be solved rapidly – not in years, as is the case in some countries. 
The appeals process should have limits so that appeals cannot continue for years. 
The use of criminal rather than civil charges should also be considered, especially 
in the context of illicit trade.  
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Broader elements of a good tax system include (1) proper resourcing 
of competent authorities to hire staff and obtain necessary equipment 
and systems, (2) strict rules and regulations to detect and punish 
corruption among both agency personnel and taxpayers and  
(3) ensuring that the judicial system is honest and independent,  
with disputes being solved as quickly as possible.
3.7 CONCLUSIONS
Policies are more effective if they are properly implemented and enforced. Com-
petent authorities have a key role in the achievement of financial and public health 
objectives of excise taxes. Given the close linkages between tax administration and 
efforts to fight tax evasion resulting from illicit trade, this chapter draws extensively 
from the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (i.e. the Protocol). 
The Protocol provides a blueprint of measures to address the problem of illicit trade 
and can be used as a model even by countries that are not Parties to it. 
Qualities of an effective and efficient tax administration include institutional ar-
rangements where roles and responsibilities of competent authorities are clearly 
defined to avoid overlap and voids. Additionally, effective collaboration among 
relevant bodies must be facilitated. At the national level, within any organizational 
arrangement, it is vital that agencies cooperate and exchange information and that 
their competences find their basis in law. A legal basis for exchange or access to 
information between government bodies should be ensured. At the international level, 
especially for border control, the role of customs is key, and access to international 
CHAP T ER 3. TO BACCO TA X ADM INIS T R AT I O N 157 
cooperation agreements such as the Protocol is very useful. An organizational tax 
administration structure must include a system of performance evaluation and 
accountability through pre-defined key indicators. 
To ensure compliance, the accuracy of information for the tax compliance cycle is 
key, including clear and straightforward taxpayer registration and licensing, declara-
tion, recordkeeping, warehousing, distribution, collection and tax refund processes. 
• Licensing is a powerful tool for obtaining information and securing the supply 
chain of tobacco products. Ideally, all persons involved in the growing of 
tobacco and the retailing, transporting, wholesaling, brokering, warehousing 
and distribution of tobacco products or manufacturing equipment should 
be licensed. 
• Collecting as much information as possible on the business of tobacco and 
recording all transactions are key to reducing tax evasion, but this may be 
burdensome for authorities. The use of IT for periodic tax declarations, ac-
counting, inventory and financial information is critical for obtaining accurate 
information and can help decrease the cost of the whole reporting system. 
• Recordkeeping should be ensured. All persons or entities engaged in the supply 
chain of tobacco, tobacco products and manufacturing equipment should 
keep complete, detailed and accurate records of all relevant transactions and 
details of materials used in the production of those products. 
• Maintaining a system of authorization for warehousing allows the authori-
ties to carry out controls in production and storage facilities to ensure that 
taxes are paid. Ideally, bonded warehouses should be eliminated from the 
supply chain. 
• Duty suspension – which is often applied during the producing, processing, 
holding, receiving and dispatching of excise goods – should be granted only if 
strict criteria are met (e.g. for granting authorization, warehouse pre-authoriza-
tion visits, adequate stock control measures, checking the origin of excise prod-
ucts and the entire production process and coding and marking of products). 
• To limit the number of taxpayers a competent authority has to manage, tax 
collection should take place close to the point of production and import. 
• Refunds for VAT, excise taxes and customs duties are common in most coun-
tries, under the principle that taxes are not exported. The refund process must 
be closely monitored to avoid opportunities for tax evasion. 
Control and enforcement – key components of tax administration – include a number 
of measures to secure the supply chain: licensing and due diligence, fiscal markings, 
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track and trace, anti-forestalling measures, audits and controls, import and export 
control and attention to free zones and transhipment points. Control and enforce-
ment need to be included as pillars in the strategic plan of the tax administration. 
Enforcement and control plans must be designed to define the activities and taxpayers 
that are subject to enforcement and to allocate staffing, auditing, infrastructure 
and IT resources. Targets must be defined, including the number of interventions 
and any additional collection or reduction of tax evasion. This includes choosing 
interventions for those who have a higher probability of noncompliance (the risk-
based approach). In the tobacco supply chain, import, export and transfers to and 
from warehouses may be areas at greater risk of noncompliance. 
• Licensing provides timely and accurate data that can serve as the basis for 
audits, since it identifies and controls legitimate operators. The process of 
licensing control must be carried out and updated periodically – in particular, 
by controlling the validity of bonds or guarantees and the proper functioning 
of the required systems and recordkeeping. Where licences are required, the 
law should include a provision that disallows purchases from unlicensed 
suppliers or sales to unlicensed purchasers. This means that both suppliers 
and purchasers will need to verify those with whom they are doing business. 
This will substantially help to reduce the burden of proof for authorities. In 
addition, to maintain a high level of control, the validity of licences should 
be limited in time, making renewals or reapplication required. 
• Another important measure for controlling and monitoring production and 
import of tobacco products is the use of fiscal markings (e.g. tax stamps). In 
addition to increasing compliance with tax laws, fiscal markings can help 
distinguish between genuine and illicit tobacco products. The use of fis-
cal marks enables both the competent authority and the public to monitor 
whether the taxes on tobacco products have been properly paid. In addition 
to locally produced and imported products, tobacco products for export 
should also be required to be marked, but with an indication that they are 
for export. Requiring a standard package size can facilitate the application 
of fiscal markings. To lower the chance that fraudsters attempt to re-use fis-
cal markings (in particular, stamps) the marking should be applied to each 
pack of cigarettes (and other tobacco products) before the pack is wrapped 
with cellophane. Fiscal markings should be issued to the manufacturer or 
importer of tobacco products only when excise taxes for the products have 
been fully paid or a guarantee is established. Fiscal markings should include 
several security features to make them more difficult to counterfeit. These 
can include overt, covert, semi-covert and/or forensic features. 
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• Tracking and tracing systems assist authorities in determining the origin 
of tobacco products and the point of diversion, if applicable, as well as in 
monitoring and controlling the movement of tobacco products and their legal 
status. The objective of a tracking and tracing system is to provide authorities 
with information on all transactions throughout the entire tobacco product 
supply chain until duties are paid or other obligations are discharged. Any 
tracking and tracing system must be able to uniquely identify individual 
products. By marking a product with a unique code or identifier, it becomes 
possible to unambiguously register that product’s movements. 
A good tracking and tracing system enables the government to properly monitor 
the supply chain, improve its ability to ensure collection of the proper duties and 
taxes, authenticate whether the identification marking is genuine and matches the 
product, improve its ability to enforce the law and provide sufficient evidence to 
prove noncompliance by a violator. To reduce the financial burden of implementing 
such a system, jurisdictions could require the tobacco industry to bear the cost. 
Any tracking and tracing system should be compliant with Article 5.3 of the FCTC, 
and governments should ensure that the system is independent from the tobacco 
industry. While the objectives of fiscal markings and tracking and tracing systems 
are different, stamps increasingly contain tracking and tracing features. 
• Implementing legal measures to prevent forestalling can limit the delay of 
a tax increase and its intended effect on revenues and consumer behaviour. 
Forestalling, stockpiling or front-loading occur when manufacturers or im-
porters increase their tax-paid stock or oversupply the market by increasing 
production or imports before a tax increase in order to pay the previous 
lower rate. 
• Periodic audits and controls can be implemented to increase compliance. 
These include cost audits, transfer price audits, price and market monitoring, 
consumer controls and cross-check controls.
• Import and export of tobacco products and manufacturing equipment should 
be allowed only for duly licensed natural persons or legal entities. The risk of 
loss of revenue can be mitigated by requiring a guarantee or bond that will be 
released only if payment of duties in another country is proven. No tobacco 
product should be allowed into a jurisdiction unless required fiscal markings 
(such as tax stamps or export labels) are affixed on the pack, according to the 
law. Tobacco products for export should bear a marking indicating that the 
product is destined for the export market. Exchange of information between 
jurisdictions on the movement of goods can also reduce the risk of evasion. 
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Non-invasive detection equipment (such as X-ray scanners) can be used at customs 
posts to detect contraband merchandise. A cheaper alternative is the use of dogs 
that are trained to detect cigarettes and other organic products. Many countries use 
both scanners and dogs to detect contraband tobacco products. Special physical 
control measures can also be applied to reduce contraband. Such measures include 
the separation of processing operations from the sealed storage of taxed and untaxed 
products. Within a country, mobile excise control units are helpful in verifying excis-
able goods as they are transported domestically. These units should be dispatched to 
important transport corridors, communication centres and areas of congestion, such 
as bridges, ferries and passes. Physical control operations require close coordination 
between police, border guards and other public services.
• Controls such as regulation and oversight are usually less strict in free zones 
and transhipment points. This can make free zones appealing to persons 
involved in illegal cigarette manufacturing or trade. Customs administrations 
should exercise their authority in free zones to effectively identify and fight 
illicit trade in tobacco products. Relevant measures include licensing, due 
diligence and recordkeeping for all operators within free zones, as well as 
implementing tracking and tracing regimes and removing exemptions from 
excise taxes. Other actions include the prohibition of intermingling of tobacco 
products with non-tobacco products in a single container or other similar 
transportation unit when the products are removed from free zones. Sale of 
tax-free or duty-free tobacco products to international travellers should be 
prohibited, as these sales erode the effects of tax and price measures aimed at 
reducing the demand for tobacco products and also adversely affect govern-
ment revenues by creating a loophole in the tax structure.
Procedures after detection of illicit trade of tobacco products should be clearly 
defined. If smuggling or illicit trade is detected through audits, tracking and tracing 
systems, verification of declarations or border control, actions such as seizing and 
destroying smuggled and/or illicit tobacco and collecting due taxes must be taken 
immediately. It is also important that penalties and sanctions be sufficient to deter 
illegal activities. Low financial penalties may simply be paid as a cost of doing 
business while the illegal activity continues. The minimum penalty for consumers 
in possession of illicit tobacco products should be confiscation and destruction of 
the products found in their possession and required payment for the unpaid tax 
and duties on those products. Most countries have adopted legislation to combat 
organized crime and money laundering. Some countries are taking advantage of 
this type of legislation and using it to address illicit trade of tobacco as well.  
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In principle, administering tobacco taxes on tobacco products other than cigarettes 
is similar to administering them on cigarettes. The challenge for taxation of other 
products includes the lack of standardization of those products and sometimes large 
informal markets. Knowledge of the product and the supply chain greatly help to 
facilitate effective tax administration. The trade in raw tobacco and small-scale home 
production of RYO and other products such as bidis often takes place outside of 
monitoring and control systems. The best way to address this challenge is to enforce 
prior approval for purchase or sale of raw materials and a requirement to register, 
obtain an authorization or license all operators and growers handling raw tobacco. 
In principle, adding new and emerging nicotine and tobacco products to an exist-
ing tax framework is not expected to impose significant costs. It is reasonable to 
expect that similar challenges will be faced in the collection of taxes on these newer 
products, as market players will attempt to use the current loopholes in tax regulation 
to avoid or evade taxes on these products whenever possible. However, challenges 
are expected to arise, as newer products involve rapidly changing technology, and 
their market dynamics are widely unknown. Furthermore, additional capacity may 
be required, since a country may need to identify new agencies or authorities, given 
the different characteristics of the taxable items and the tax base. Because the newer 
nicotine and tobacco products are widely purchased online, countries deciding to 
tax these products should draw up a proper implementation plan that includes 
rules on how taxes will be collected on imported products and online sales. Online 
cross-border sales are not permitted in some countries.
The elements of a good tax system include (1) proper resourcing of competent 
authorities sufficient for hiring the necessary staff to properly implement and en-
force excise tax laws; (2) implementation of tax laws with integrity and with strict 
rules and regulations to detect corruption and for the punishment of both agency 
personnel and taxpayers who are engaged in corrupt practices; and (3) ensuring that 
the judicial system is honest and independent in fact and in perception. Disputes 
should be solved rapidly – not in years, as is the case in some countries. 
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ANNEX 3.1 COMPOSITION OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS
To implement and enforce tobacco taxes in the most efficient way, competent authori-
ties should be familiar with all of the components of tobacco products, including 
each of the raw materials used in their manufacture, production inputs and tobacco 
manufacturing machinery. Knowledge of the components of excisable products and 
machinery provides valuable information to identify activities at high risk for non-
compliance, implement measures to ensure all taxes are paid and prevent illicit trade.
Nicotine, non-nicotine and tobacco products and their component parts
In most countries, the ministry of finance determines tax policy, including which 
tobacco products are taxed, while the ministry of health is responsible for product 
and use regulation. This could lead to different definitions of the same product, 
depending on which ministry is responsible for a given law or regulation. Wherever 
possible, a clear and common definition should be developed to simplify procedures 
and avoid confusion. Tobacco products take various forms, and not all may be 
regulated or subject to excise tax in a specific jurisdiction. In addition to cigarettes, 
other traditional tobacco products include smokeless tobacco – such as chewing 
tobacco, snuff and snus – as well as bidis and kreteks (clove cigarettes), which can 
be hand-rolled or manufactured, pipes, hookah or waterpipe and cigars. 
Cigarettes
It is important to understand the materials and component parts of the tobacco 
products most commonly used in a particular country. Cigarettes are the most 
common and significant tobacco products in terms of volume and tax revenues in 
most jurisdictions. 
A cigarette stick is composed of:
• the tobacco blend of various types of tobacco plant (leaves and stem and 
other plant parts) and additives (including flavours);
• the cigarette paper used to wrap the tobacco blend to make up the tobacco rod;
• the acetate filter that forms the white portion at the tip of a filtered cigarette, 
which is in direct contact with the smoker’s mouth;
• the tipping paper or wraps around the filter; and
• the adhesive that secures the cigarette paper around the tobacco blend and 
the tipping (1).
Each manufacturer follows a specific process to produce cigarettes. Aside from 
the tobacco blend, manufacturers also vary the size of cigarette paper and tipping 
paper and the length of acetate filter used per stick (1). In some countries, these 
elements are standardized. In an ideal regulatory framework, a manufacturer would 
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be required to submit information on the specific process for each brand and variant 
of the tobacco product that it manufactures to the competent authorities as part of 
the licensing requirement (see section 3.4.3). Authorities could, for example, require 
manufacturers to submit this information in order to obtain a licence. The minimum 
requirements of the administration and the information that should be included 
could be laid down in law or lower regulation to ensure that authorities have the 
information in their possession for all licensed manufacturers. This information 
contributes to verifying whether a company is reporting the actual quantity of 
cigarettes manufactured for sale and sold cigarettes by comparing the amount of 
materials used for production and the quantities used per cigarette with the total 
number of manufactured cigarettes. Eventually, this information also contributes 
to validating whether the taxes are properly paid. 
Figure A3.1 shows the component parts of a typical machine-made traditional 
cigarette. 
Fig. A3.1 Component parts of a machine-made cigarette
Source: Author’s compilation. Photo by Walter Klerx.
Not all parts of tobacco products are subject to the same level of control. According 
to Article 6.5 of the Protocol, five years following the entry into force of this Protocol, 
the MOP shall ensure at its next session that evidence-based research is conducted 
to ascertain whether any key inputs exist that are essential to the manufacture of 
tobacco products, are identifiable and can be subject to an effective control mechanism. 
On the basis of such research, the MOP shall consider appropriate action. 
In addition to the component parts of tobacco products, materials needed for 
packaging a specific number of sticks into a pack of cigarettes, usually 20 per pack, 
can be monitored. These materials include the foil paper, the package paper (which 
could bear the brand name, design and health warnings), the fiscal marking (if 
required) and the plastic or cellophane wrap. A fixed number of packs of cigarettes, 
Filter
Tipping paper Cigarette paper
Tobacco
Tobacco rodFiltration zone
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normally 10 packs, are packed into cartons, also called reams. These cartons are usu-
ally made of soft paperboard or cardboard, possibly with branding, and are wrapped 
in plastic wrap or cellophane. Fifty cartons are packed in master cases, which are 
made of sturdier and thicker paperboard and stacked on pallets (usually 50 master 
cases to a pallet). An effective regulatory framework would require manufacturers 
and importers to provide information to the competent authorities on packaging 
and design, as well as the number of sticks per pack, carton and master case. 
Prior approval for purchase or sale of materials used in the cigarette production 
process can also be required. In the Philippines, suppliers of such raw materials, 
including those providing tobacco papers and filter components, are required to have 
a licence (2). In some of the Member States of the EU, raw tobacco is also subject to 
fiscal and legal requirements. For example, in Slovakia and Poland, raw tobacco can 
be handled only by authorized operators. While authorized operators do not have 
to pay excise duties on raw tobacco, if raw tobacco is detected by an unauthorized 
operator, excise duties will be due. Hungary, Italy and the United Kingdom require 
registration or authorization for all operators and growers handling raw tobacco (3). 
In addition to knowing the quantities of inputs required to produce a specific 
amount of a regulated product (e.g. cigarettes), the competent authority also needs to 
understand the supply, manufacturing and distribution chains to be able to properly 
monitor, regulate and determine whether taxes have been paid (see also Fig. 3.3). 
Novel and emerging nicotine, non-nicotine and tobacco products
In recent times, new products have been introduced to several markets, namely, 
ENDS, ENNDS and HTPs. 
ENDS usually comprise a nicotine-containing e-liquid but do not contain to-
bacco. ENNDS are essentially the same but do not (ostensibly) contain nicotine. 
The WHO COP requested the Convention Secretariat to invite Parties to monitor 
and report on scientific, regulatory and market developments such as initiation, 
cessation, advertising and promotion of ENDS and ENNDS. Furthermore, the 
COP requested WHO to report on the development of methods by regional and 
international standards-development organizations for the testing and measuring 
of contents and emissions of these products (4).
There are different types of e-cigarettes – the most common type of ENDS and 
ENNDS – and currently there are four generations of products. However, they 
can be divided into two broad categories: open systems and closed systems. Both 
types of e-cigarette use a wick and a heat source to generate an aerosol. The wick is 
saturated with e-liquid, and a microprocessor is used to control operations (not all 
include this). Some e-cigarettes also have an LED light to imitate the burning end of 
a conventional cigarette (5). Fig. A3.2 presents examples of open and closed systems.





(heats solution, aerosolizing nicotine)
Mouthpiece
E-liquid pod
Fig. A3.2 Examples of open and closed systems of ENDS/ENNDs products 
Open ENDS/ENNDS system (e-cigarette)
 
Closed ENDS system (e-cigarette)
Source: (6).
Unlike ENDS/ENNDS, HTPs do contain tobacco. HTPs produce aerosols containing 
nicotine and toxic chemicals when tobacco is heated or when a device containing 
tobacco is activated (7). HTPs are composed of two elements: the sticks or pods that 
contain the tobacco and the device used to heat the tobacco. Both are necessary for 
the product to be used. Fig. A3.3 shows an example of a heated tobacco product. 
HTPs are tobacco products and are therefore subject to the regulatory measures 
contained in the WHO FCTC.
Rechargeable battery
Power button (to start vaping)
Mouthpiece
Atomizer / Heating element
(heats solution, aerolizing nicotine)
E-liquid tank
(refillable e-liquid nicotine tank)
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Fig. A3.3 Components of an HTP
Holder:
Tobacco stick:
Note: PLA: polyactic acid, MPF: mouthpiece filter.
Sources: (8-9). 
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ANNEX 3.2 EXAMPLE OF FORESTALLING  
AND COUNTERMEASURES
This example is hypothetical but inspired from the situation in the Philippines. The 
amounts and prices have been altered, however, and it is assumed that the normal 
inventory kept by a tobacco manufacturer is two months.  
The excise tax imposed on a pack of cigarettes in the current year is US$ 3.00; 
it will be increased to US$ 3.30 at the beginning of the new fiscal year (January in 
this example). The monthly production of Brand Y cigarettes of company X, which 
it declares for tax purposes, is as follows:
















Since the normal inventory is two months, the quantity in the two months prior 
to the implementation of the new excise tax rate is disregarded. The shelf life of 
tobacco products is approximately six months. The average of the six months prior to 
November is computed to obtain the quantity presumed to be produced or imported 
if there was no tax increase. The quantity from May to October (inclusive) divided 
by 6 is 10 100 000 packs. Thus, any quantity produced beyond 10 100 000 packs for 
the months of November and December (the months prior to the implementation 
of the new tax rate) is assessed using the new tax rate. 
In this example, 10 100 000 of the packs produced in November will be taxed at 
the old rate of $3.00, and 9 900 000 packs will be taxed at the new rate of $3.30. For 
December, 10 100 000 packs will be taxed at $3.00, while 14 900 000 packs will be taxed 
at $3.30. Without imposing these measures, the government would have been deprived 
of the excise tax increase on 24 800 000 packs. In addition, the effect of the increase 
on prices and consumers would have been delayed by approximately two months. 
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In countries using tax stamps, the withholding of the issuance of stamps is a 
well-known approach to counter forestalling. Another practical solution is to allow 
the competent authorities to request advances from the industry to cover revenue 
shortfalls, provided there is a legal basis for such requests. 




As with any proposed government action, policy-makers need to navigate the political 
environment of tobacco taxation at every stage of policy development, implementa-
tion and administration. While every country’s distinct history, culture, systems 
and structural forces shape its unique political landscape, there are some universal 
themes when it comes to tobacco control and particularly tobacco taxation. These 
themes boil down to the distribution of money, power and resources. The tobacco 
industry, as both a political and economic player, understands these themes well. 
The industry has been effective in using principles of the political economy of 
tobacco taxation in its efforts to block important advancements in tobacco control. 
Nevertheless, the savvy policy-maker can see through the industry arguments by 
considering who benefits from industry-favoured policy measures and interven-
tions. The industry’s challenges to tobacco tax policies can be organized into the five 
categories of SCARE tactics. This chapter provides a road map to help policy-makers 
navigate the political economy of tobacco taxation through each of these themes. 
The first five sections dissect the tobacco industry framing of each issue, pinpoint-
ing the flaws in each argument, identifying the extent to which each concern has 
merit and suggesting how a responsible government can address each one. These 
discussions are supported by unbiased evidence from independent, peer-reviewed 
research, as well as specific examples from country experiences. Sections 4.1 through 
4.5 on SCARE tactics will equip policy-makers with the tools they need to proceed 
with confidence that their tobacco tax policy – developed and implemented fol-
lowing the guidelines spelled out in this technical manual – will bring about the 
greatest health and economic benefits for their constituents, regardless of industry 
attempts to thwart them. Section 4.6 further buoys policy-makers’ efforts to ensure 
the beneficial impacts of their policies, as it describes how earmarking can improve 
the political economy of tobacco taxation by funding programmes and initiatives 
that promote and support the health and well-being of the population.
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4.1 SCARE TACTIC S: SMUGGLING AND ILLICIT TRADE 
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION
The tobacco industry and its allies argue that tobacco tax increases will inevitably 
result in an increase in the illicit trade in tobacco products (1–2). They claim that 
higher tax rates and higher prices strengthen the financial incentives for criminal 
enterprises to supply cigarettes from lower-tax jurisdictions, boost domestic tax 
evasion and encourage smokers to seek cheaper illegal cigarettes. The industry also 
challenges the argument that tobacco tax hikes increase government revenue by 
claiming that the presence of an illicit tobacco market will actually reduce revenue 
collection following a tax increase. More recent versions of this argument – adapted 
to address public health concerns about tobacco use – claim that illicit market growth 
also offsets reductions in smoking prevalence that would otherwise be brought about 
by tobacco tax increases. In summary, the tobacco industry and its allies claim that 
raising tobacco taxes are ineffective – and even counterproductive – because they 
are circumvented by illicit markets, which prevents the government from achieving 
its public health objective and reduces rather than increases tax revenues.
When a country considers a proposal to increase tobacco excises, the tobacco 
industry and its allies frequently make exaggerated claims about the size and scope 
of illicit tobacco trade in that country. Opponents of tobacco tax increases argue that 
price differentials are the exclusive – or at least the dominant – cause of illicit trade. 
Influenced by this fear-inducing faulty diagnosis, tax authorities frequently find it 
difficult to make decisions about tobacco taxes. However, the industry diagnosis 
always contains the same erroneous elements. First, the illicit trade in a country is 
frequently less than the industry portrays it to be, and the country’s tax enforcement 
policy towards tobacco products is rarely unique or in any way different from the 
norm in the country (3). Second, the scale of illicit trade in tobacco is not exclusively 
or even primarily determined by tax or price differentials. Typically, it results from a 
set of governance problems characterized by government corruption, weak regulatory 
frameworks, poor tobacco tax administration, ineffective criminal justice systems, 
lack of dissuasive sanctions and/or weak norms regarding participation in illegal 
and informal markets (4–7). 
This section provides guidance for tax and other relevant authorities on how to 
respond to the tobacco industry SCARE tactic that increasing tobacco taxes will lead 
to smuggling and illicit trade in their countries. Tax authorities need to  know the 
nature, causes and extent of illicit trade so that they can define the problem properly 
and formulate an appropriate response. This chapter addresses the available tools for 
better defining and understanding specific illicit trade problems, particularly tools 
that facilitate independent assessment of the magnitude of that trade. Improvements 
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to governance within the realm of tax authorities – such as best practices in tobacco 
tax administration and policies to improve the effectiveness of fiscal regulations 
or norms regarding participation in informal and illegal markets – are discussed 
in Chapter 3.
This section first describes the nature of the illicit tobacco trade to highlight some 
of its complexities and identify complementary policies for tackling the problem. 
Next, evidence that calls into question the link between illicit trade and high prices 
or tax rate changes is discussed. Finally, to help tax authorities assess their own 
situation, several different methodologies are presented to estimate the scope of the 
illicit tobacco trade and to evaluate estimates of that trade for a particular country 
or tax jurisdiction. 
4.1.2 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE ILLICIT TOBACCO TRADE
The WHO FCTC defines illicit trade as:
any practice or conduct prohibited by law and which relates to production, ship-
ment, receipt, possession, distribution, sale or purchase, including any practice 
or conduct intended to facilitate such activity (8). 
Non-duty-paid tobacco products found in a jurisdiction (i.e. through littered-pack 
surveys) could be the result of either of two related but distinct activities: tax evasion 
and tax avoidance. Tax evasion is a set of unlawful actions seeking the non-payment 
of tobacco taxes and duties, whereas tax avoidance comprises legal actions with 
the purpose of avoiding payment of some or all taxes, such as bringing an amount 
of cigarettes up to the legal allowance from a lower- into a higher-tax jurisdiction. 
Tax avoidance is not illegal and is therefore not considered part of illicit trade in 
tobacco products.1
The focus of this section is on tax evasion activities, which can occur in the 
movement across borders or in domestic production and distribution. When tax 
evasion happens across borders, it is known as smuggling (9) and can be done on 
a large scale or a small scale. Tax evasion in the domestic market can be partial, 
when licensed and authorized producers or distributors comply with only part of 
their tax obligations, or total, when the whole production and distribution system 
is illegal and out of sight of tax administrators (5, 10–14).2 Large-scale tax evasion 
schemes can be run by different types of producers and their associated distributors, 
such as the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) and their national subsidiaries, 
1  Tax avoidance practices –common among states in the United States and countries in the EU – are 
not analysed in this section. 
2  Tax evasion is normally considered as illicit manufacturing in the literature (14).  
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other local tobacco companies producing their own brands and illegal factories that 
normally counterfeit other brands or produce illicit brands.
Large-scale smuggling involves, for example, taking advantage of tax-free zones 
and mislabelling shipping products prior to or during transit (11) or using so-
phisticated clandestine networks. This form of tax evasion is systemic and can be 
carried out by TTCs (12), by local companies producing in countries with low tax 
enforcement, e.g. Paraguay (15) that feed neighbouring countries and regional illicit 
hubs through a network of clandestine distributors (15) or by companies located in 
tax-free zones like Jebel Ali and Dubai in the UAE (16) or such zones in Russia or 
Cyprus (17). The origins, routes and quantities of large-scale smuggling frequently 
change as affected countries or markets react by strengthening enforcement and 
seeking bilateral cooperation with the jurisdictions of origin. For example, the 2013 
comprehensive strategy of the EU (10) enhanced bilateral cooperation with major 
source and transit countries of illicit cigarettes coming to Europe, including Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine. These agreements improved day-to-day cross-border coopera-
tion, reduced illegal flows and introduced gradual tobacco excise rate adjustments 
in those three countries to bring them to European levels.    
Small-scale smuggling (also known as ant smuggling or bootlegging) is the 
cross-border trafficking of cigarettes in quantities that are larger than the allowable 
limits (e.g. two cartons) but smaller than large shipments (e.g. truckloads, cargo 
containers), normally for the purpose of selling at a profit (11). This type of illicit 
trade may exist in places where there are opportunities within neighbouring tax 
jurisdictions. For example, small-scale smuggling is commonly done by individuals 
living in French and German provinces near lower-taxed countries (e.g. Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain, Poland and Czechia) (18). 
Counterfeiting is a form of illicit manufacturing that involves the production 
of tobacco products (including packaging and tobacco filler) without the approval 
of the trademark holder (13). 
Another product of illicit manufacturing is so-called cheap or illicit whites. 
Cheap whites are branded (e.g. Jin Ling) or unbranded cigarettes that are legally or 
illegally produced3 and knowingly sold in the illicit market (17). Cheap whites are 
not usually produced by TTCs (17, 19).4 They are produced by small tobacco produc-
tion companies in one country and often sold in illegal markets of neighbouring 
3  Ross et al. (17) analysed this issue and found that the sale to the first purchaser is usually legal. Their 
analysis covers the production in free zones (i.e. in the UAE, Russia and Cyprus) and production exported 
from Viet Nam, Indonesia and China. In those cases, there is no need to make the first sale illegally. 
However, cheap white production in Paraguay is sold to domestic distributors, and most of those sales 
are completely illegal.  
4  Ross et al. (17) and Gilmore et al. (19) identify some cheap white brands sold by TTCs, such as President 
(PMI), produced in Ukraine, and Esse (Korea Tobacco & Ginseng Company, KT&G), produced in Indonesia. 
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countries. For example, in Paraguay, cheap whites are produced on a large scale by 
a few companies under the guise that they are marketed domestically, but a large 
share is smuggled into Uruguay and Brazil (4). Iglesias et al. (20) showed how TTCs’ 
cheap brands were illicitly shipped through Paraguay to be sold in the Brazilian 
and Argentine markets in the 1990s. This contributed to increased production of 
cheap whites in Paraguayan firms, which continued the illicit business even after 
Brazilian legislation obstructed the illegal activity of the TTCs.
Domestic tax evasion is a pervasive phenomenon, particularly in LMICs. Partial 
tax evasion in tobacco products can be found at any level of tax rates or prices and 
is generally the result of defective legislation or weak tax enforcement.5 Complete 
or total tax evasion occurs when producers and distributors are clandestine or 
when there are serious institutional challenges to tax enforcement between two tax 
jurisdictions, such as between the United States and Native American Reservations. 
Evidence of illicit manufacturing has increased in recent years in several places in 
the world, including the EU (10) and Brazil (21).
TTCs were predominant in illicit trade activity until the end of the 20th century, 
and even with the entrance of new actors into the illicit business, TTCs have not 
entirely exited. Gilmore et al. (22) analysed industry-funded data and seizure data 
and concluded that TTCs are still involved in illicit trade in Europe, despite the 
Anti-Contraband and Anti-Counterfeit Agreements (the “Agreements”) signed 
between the four TTCs and the EU (23).6 Using industry-funded data, Gilmore et 
al. show that 58% of illicit EU cigarettes can be attributed to the four main TTCs. 
When seizure data are used, 69% to 73% of illicit EU cigarettes can be attributed 
to these firms (22). 
It is always difficult to assess the extent of the global illicit tobacco trade because 
of its illegality, its global and changing nature and problems with data collection (24). 
Before the 21st century, when TTCs were almost unique actors in the large-scale 
smuggling of well-known cigarette brands, the difference between global exports 
and imports of cigarettes could provide a good approximation of the size of this 
problem globally (7). However, with the growth of illicit manufacturing in general, 
the manufacturing of cheap whites and the illegal movements of those products 
5  This occurs when licensed and authorized producers underreport actual quantities and sell the non-
duty-paid produced quantities through illegal channels. It can also include instances when producers 
do not report quantities at all, as in many ad valorem systems of LMICs.
6  From 2000 on, the European Commission and 10 Member States launched court cases regarding 
smuggling and money laundering against several TTCs. To end the court cases, the Anti-Contraband 
and Anti-Counterfeit Agreements were signed, which required the TTCs to exercise stringent control 
over their supply chain (through tracking and tracing, due diligence and anti-money-laundering and 
reporting obligations), share operational intelligence with Member States and the EU and pay penalties 
for seizures, as well as annual payments over a period of 12 years. The agreement with PMI has ended, 
the one with JTI will end in 2022 and the others with Imperial Tobacco and BAT will run until 2030 (23).
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over the past two decades, trade statistics are no longer as useful as they were in 
the past. Joossens et al. (25) tried to estimate the size of the global illicit cigarette 
market by adding different types of national estimations prepared around 2007. 
They found that the estimated size was 657 billion cigarettes per year, or 11.6% of 
the global cigarette market. According to Joossens et al., illicit trade costs govern-
ments US$ 40.5 billion in tax revenue worldwide, and eliminating illicit tobacco 
trade would recover US$ 13 billion in immediate revenue in high-income countries 
and US$ 18.3 billion in LMICs.7
Descriptions of the types of illicit trade are useful for developing the first com-
ponent of a strategy to fight it: assess the nature and size of the problem. Table 4.1 
presents all the main components of a strategy to fight illicit trade. To make progress 
in this first component – knowing the problem – authorities could use and adapt 
existing instruments of health surveillance or seek partnerships with academia and 
independent specialists to investigate the issues involved, using different methodolo-
gies (see subsection 4.1.4 and Annex 4.1 on methodologies to assess the nature and 
size of the problem). Knowing the nature of the problem requires the cooperation 
of different government actors – for example, to investigate both the financial and 
criminal operations of organized crime behind the illicit trade. The gathering of 
qualitative information on the nature of the illicit trade should start simultaneously 
with the statistical work of measuring the magnitude of the problem.  
Table 4.1 Components of a strategy to fight the illicit tobacco trade
1. Assess the nature and size of the problem 
Use and adapt existing health surveillance and other existing national surveys to assess the problem
Seek partnerships with academia and independent specialists to find ways to rigorously study illicit trade
Use financial and police investigations to identify and fight organized crime operating in illicit trade
2. Start identifying and implementing appropriate country-specific policies and strategies  
to address illicit trade
Improve tax and customs administration to close the legal and administrative loopholes facilitating 
illicit trade
Implement other appropriate policies to deal with country-specific problems
3. Become a Party and/or implement the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 
Adapt the Protocol supply-chain control obligations 
Adjust national penalties for illicit trade offences
Seek and build international cooperation
7  The WCO publishes an Illicit Trade Report annually, with the main characteristics and trends of illicit 
flows in key products, including tobacco, using data based on customs seizures. 
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Methodologies available to estimate the nature and size of illicit trade are discussed 
in subsection 4.1.4. This is the first step for dealing with SCARE tactic S. Chapter 
3 discusses at length the relevant tax administration measures and best practices 
to minimize opportunities for illicit trade in tobacco products. Table 4.2 presents 
examples of appropriate policies and strategies targeted to address specific types of 
illicit trade in addition to the best practices described in Chapter 3. 
After completing the first step of this strategy, tax, health and justice authorities 
should discuss how to face country-specific problems, considering not only tax and 
customs administration measures but also social, law enforcement and international 
cooperation policies and strategies.  
Table 4.2 Suggested policies and strategies to address country-specific illicit trade problems
MAIN TYPE OF 
ILLICIT TRADE IN 
THE JURISDICTION
PROBLEMS POLICIES/STRATEGIES TO USE
Bootlegging Neighbouring low-tax jurisdiction Bilateral negotiations to harmonize 
tobacco tax systems
Difficulty of controlling people’s 
movements in countries with 
extensive land borders
Identify and establish suitable social 
protection or employment policies 
for targeted populations in border 
regions
Extensive land border with multiple 
accesses
Bilateral cooperation with law 
enforcement and border control 
forces, monitoring of access routes 





Neighbouring low-tax jurisdiction 
and difficulties in controlling borders
Bilateral negotiations to harmonize 
tobacco tax systems and bilateral 
law enforcement cooperation
Producers and distributors in the 
lower-tax jurisdiction aiming to 
supply the high-tax jurisdiction
Bilateral cooperation to harmonize 
tax systems and control producers 
and distributors in the origin country, 




a third country or 
tax-free zones
Producers and distributors aiming 
to supply non-duty-paid tobacco 
products wherever possible
Customs and other forms of 
international cooperation to control 
and monitor exports from identified 
areas
Domestic tax evasion Existence of many small informal or 
semi-formal producers
Encourage business concentration 
through producer associations and 
cooperatives, create incentives 
for formalization and establish 
licensing rules and basic electronic 
information systems for raw material 
and production
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Underreporting from formal 
producers
Improve tax administration with 
policies such as basic electronic 
information systems for inputs 
and production, establish neutral 
procedures to verify production, 
improve audit systems, increase 
third-party information on inputs 
and production of tobacco products
Clandestine factories Law enforcement investigation of 
commercial associations with raw-
material and machine producers and 
distributors
Governments should try to identify the incentives and governance problems that 
encourage and allow illicit trade movement inside their country. As seen in Table 
4.2, the design and implementation of policies to deal with those problems do not 
depend exclusively on tax and customs authorities; they also depend on the efforts of 
the police and law enforcement, the Justice Department and the judicial apparatus. 
In other words, a great deal of coordination and consultation  among different types 
of government bodies and expertise is needed to produce an adequate response. 
It is also clear from Table 4.2 that domestic tax evasion by formal producers can 
be tackled by tax authorities and is mainly related to the supply-chain-control 
provisions of the Protocol. 
The Protocol (26) builds upon and complements Article 15 of the WHO FCTC, 
which addresses means of countering illicit trade in tobacco products as a key aspect 
of a comprehensive tobacco control strategy. The Protocol is a blueprint of measures 
to deal with this problem, and its provisions should be part of any strategy for 
fighting the illicit market. It is a legally binding treaty in its own right that entered 
into force on 25 September 2018. As described in detail in Chapter 3, the Protocol 
has three main lines of action: supply-chain controls, recommendations on how to 
treat unlawful conduct related to the illicit tobacco trade and suggested mechanisms 
to seek and build international cooperation to fight that trade. Countries can start 
implementing Article 15 of the WHO FCTC and the appropriate polices or strate-
gies recommended by the Protocol even before acceding to it, selecting those most 
suitable to the nature and extent of their particular problem. Such transitional work 
will facilitate the eventual implementation of the Protocol, because any plan to 
correct loopholes in tax and customs practices will bring government authorities 
closer to the best practices recommended in the Protocol.
4.1.3 DETERMINANTS OF TAX EVASION: THE ROLE OF PRICE LEVELS 
The argument that price and tax rates are the main determinants of the illicit tobacco 
trade has persuaded some governments (e.g. Uruguay and Georgia in the past) to avoid 
policies that may lead to cigarette price increases (e.g. excise tax rate increases) (4). 
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Some governments (e.g. Canada in 1994, Brazil in 1999 and Pakistan in 2017) (20, 
27) have even reduced tax rates in attempt to reduce the illicit trade. 
The wider scholarly literature demonstrates that illicit trade is not a monocausal 
phenomenon (7) but is the result of many factors, most of them related to gover-
nance issues. Government corruption, weak regulatory frameworks, poor tobacco 
tax administration, ineffective criminal justice systems, weak norms regarding 
participation in illegal and informal markets and conflicts between neighbouring 
countries (5) all contribute to the existence and growth of the illicit tobacco trade. 
It is difficult to isolate the role of price from each of the other factors because 
(1) obtaining prices and quantity measures of illicit trade is inherently challenging; 
(2) in most countries, there are many cigarette brands, and prices vary between and 
even among brands; and (3) there is a lack of good measures to deal with nonprice 
factors affecting illicit trade, such as government corruption and ineffective criminal 
justice. These constraints make it challenging to develop rigorous empirical evidence 
about how price and other factors affect illicit trade. Despite these fundamental 
challenges, the economic literature has produced credible evidence that price is 
always only one factor – and often not the most important factor – determining 
the extent of illicit trade.  
Many econometric studies about the influence of price and other factors have 
focused on cross-border shopping (or small-scale bootlegging from low- to high-tax 
jurisdictions), given the availability in the United States and Europe8 of sales data 
for low- and high-tax jurisdictions, classified in a convenient way by geographical 
zones – i.e. close to or far from the borders. Those studies attempted to explain the 
illicit trade flows or the relatively higher sales in low-tax jurisdictions as a function 
of price and tax differentials between the lower-tax and surrounding higher-tax 
jurisdictions, after controlling for other important factors affecting cross-border 
sales such as proximity to borders and levels of corruption (6, 7, 11, 28).9 The main 
conclusion of the studies is that illicit trade flows are not linked solely to price (29). 
Some show a significant effect of price differentials together with other factors, 
but others do not find significant price differential effects. The important policy 
implication of these analyses is that decreasing tobacco tax rates and real prices in 
higher-tax jurisdictions could have minimal or no effect on illicit market shares.10
8  This was a traditional strand of the literature in the United States on trade among states, and to a lesser 
extent in European countries, most of which used conventional but inaccurate illicit trade measurements.
9  Recently, PMI-Altria financed some studies of factors affecting cross-border sales. One of those studies, 
Prieger and Kulic (28), criticized Merriman et al. (2000) (9) and arrived at the conclusion that in cross-border 
shopping, price differentials are important for determining the magnitude of illicit trade. 
10  Brazil decreased tax rates and real prices at the beginning of the 21st century to fight illicit trade 
coming from lower-tax jurisdictions. After this action, however, the government lost revenues, and the 
size and scope of illicit trade remained unaltered, according to industry sources (20).   
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Observational and case studies provide information that may improve public 
policy even when they are unable to produce compelling evidence of causal relation-
ships. Some observational studies have correlated price levels with illicit market 
shares, using large samples of countries. Joossens et al. (25) found that countries 
with high taxes and prices normally have lower shares of illicit trade than countries 
with lower tax shares and prices. In their sample, high-income countries generally 
have relatively high cigarette prices and tax shares, but their favourable results (i.e. 
lower levels of illicit trade) are related to effective tax administration and lower 
corruption levels. In contrast, LMICs generally have lower prices and tax shares, 
along with significant illegal market shares. Joossens et al. attribute difficulties in 
fighting illicit trade to weak tax and customs administrations and, in most cases, 
institutional and legal challenges (25).
Figure 4.1.1 illustrates the relationship between price and illicit trade, using the 
price (in US$) per pack of the most-sold brand of cigarettes and the estimated level 
of illicit trade for 94 countries in 2018.11 There is no apparent unique association 
between the two variables. Running a linear regression with retail price as the explana-
tory variable and share of illicit trade as the dependent variable shows an inverse, 
but not statistically significant, relationship between price and illicit market share.12 
Figure 4.1.1 illustrates some particular cases: 
• Many countries with low prices (i.e. lower than US$ 2 per pack) have the 
highest levels of illicit trade in the sample, e.g. Brazil (BRA) ($1.33 and 46.3% 
illicit share), Pakistan (PAK) ($0.39 and 40%), Ethiopia (ETH) ($0.55 and 
32.9%), Ghana (GHA) ($1.06 and 29%) and Cameroon (CMR) ($0.89 and 25%). 
• In contrast, many of the countries with prices between US$ 4 and $8 – which 
could be considered high enough for financial incentives to operate – have 
illicit trade shares of less than 10% of total consumption. These countries 
include the Republic of Korea (KOR) ($4.02 and 0.8%), Czechia (CZE) ($4.31 
and 2.9%) and Sri Lanka (LKA) ($6.89 and 1.6%). 
• All countries that have very high prices – higher than US$ 8 – except for 
Ireland, register illicit trade shares below 20%. These countries include France 
(FRA) ($9.39 and 17.8%), Switzerland (CHE) ($8.71 and 5.5%), Singapore 
(SGP) ($10.35 and 3.7%) and Norway (NOR) ($14.51 and 9.6%).
11  National estimates of the magnitude of illicit trade are controversial. The tobacco industry’s numbers 
overestimate the problem and are based on questionable methodologies. Estimates with a rigorous and 
transparent methodology are not available for a large sample of countries for the same year. In order 
to compare price levels with illicit market shares, Euromonitor’s estimations of illicit market share were 
selected, for two reasons: they are comparable estimates for a large sample of countries in a given year, and 
no one could argue that they are biased towards tobacco control’s points of view. The use of Euromonitor 
data does not imply that WHO fully agrees with all the details and methodologies used to obtain them. 
12  Other factors must be taken into account to transform this observational analysis into a rigorous 
analysis of cause and effect.
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Fig. 4.1.1 Share of illicit trade versus retail price of the most-sold brand of cigarettes in US$,  
by country, 2018
Note: The extent of illicit trade in cigarettes is measured by Euromonitor as the estimated quantity of illegal 
cigarettes consumed in a country divided by the estimated total consumption of cigarettes in that country.
Sources: (27, 30). 
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As indicated in numerous studies and analyses of illicit trade in tobacco products 
(4–5), the most effective way to tackle the problem is not to forgo tax increases 
but rather to strengthen the capacity to fight the trade. Therefore, it is important 
to consider the relationship between good governance and illicit trade. The more 
capacity a country has to counter illicit trade in general, the lower the level of that 
trade will be.
An index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the Global Illicit 
Trade Environment Index, measures countries’ structural capacity to fight illicit trade 
overall. The EIU indicator is a combination of four indicators or categories designed 
to assess countries’ performance in those areas; the closer the overall indicator is to 
100, the better the country’s capacity to fight illicit trade. The four categories are:13
1. government policy, which measures the government’s commitment to pro-
actively monitoring and preventing illicit trade;
2. supply and demand, which measures the extent to which the domestic en-
vironment discourages or encourages supply and demand for illicit goods;
3. transparency and trade, which measures transparency and the degree of 
governance applicable to free-trade zones and transhipments; and
4. customs environment, which measures how effectively customs services 
facilitate legitimate trade while at the same time preventing illicit trade.
Figure 4.1.2 illustrates the relationship between the EIU indicator and the estimated 
level of illicit trade in cigarettes in a set of countries. There is an inverse and statisti-
cally significant relationship between the indicator and the estimated level of illicit 
trade in cigarettes. This suggests that as the capacity to fight illicit trade in general 
increases, the illicit trade in cigarettes falls.14
13  For more details about this indicator, visit http://illicittradeindex.eiu.com/.
14  The association was significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level, using a linear 
regression between the two variables.
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Rigorous independent research has established that despite the challenges of illicit 
trade, taxation of tobacco products is an effective public health intervention that 
substantially reduces tobacco use and generates government revenue (5). Further, 
when cigarette taxes increase, governments generate higher revenue and consumption 
is reduced (32–33). However, ineffective tax administration can allow illicit trade to 
grow and can undermine some of the benefits of tobacco taxation by making cheaper 
cigarettes available. For example, the average street price of smuggled cigarettes in 
Malaysia is 55% lower than its legal tax-paid equivalent (34). Illicit tobacco trade 
also reduces government tax revenue and may increase health costs associated with 
smoking and costs associated with policing. 
4.1.4 MEASURING ILLICIT TRADE IN TOBACCO PRODUCTS
The magnitude of illicit trade is a powerful argument in tax policy discussions, and 
for this reason the tobacco industry funds estimation of illicit trade in countries 
or regions of particular interest to itself (i.e. Project Sun and Project Star in the 
EU and Oxford Economics in East Asia). However, a recent systematic review 
of industry data on illicit trade finds substantial methodological weaknesses in 
industry-commissioned reports (24). Furthermore, Blecher et al. (35) argue that 
industry-funded studies tend to systematically overestimate the size of illicit trade 
to persuade authorities to abandon tobacco tax reforms. Independent researchers 
have also uncovered inconsistencies in tobacco-industry-funded estimates (36). 
Some examples of inflated industry-linked illicit trade estimates are given in 
Table 4.3, which compares peer-reviewed and independent studies with estimates 
funded by the tobacco industry. Because some countries have several industry 
estimates from different sources or years, Table 4.3 presents the estimate included 
in the article that published the independent study, because it was considered as 
representative and adequate to illustrate the overestimation. In all cases, the industry 
estimates exceed those of the independent studies.
Measuring the scale of illicit trade can be a daunting task for governments because 
different methods are employed by independent researchers, governments and the 
tobacco industry. Nonetheless, it is worth investing in these studies because they 
drive policy discussions and can be used to evaluate the impact of policies (e.g. tax 
increases, plain packaging and health warnings). 
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Table 4.3 Illicit market share estimated in independent studies compared with estimates  
in tobacco-industry-funded studies
COUNTRY SIZE OF THE 
ILLICIT MARKET 




SOURCE OF THE 
INDEPENDENT 
STUDY 
SIZE OF THE 
ILLICIT MARKET 








Colombia 3.5% of the total 
market in five cities, 
2016
Maldonado et al., 
2018 (37) 
13% of the total 
market, 2014
FND and INVAMER, 
2015
Chile 16.3% of the 
total market in 
the Metropolitan 
Region of Santiago, 
2017
Paraje et al., 2020 
(38)





Brazil 28.8% of the total 
market, 2014
Iglesias et al, 2017 
(39) 




Mexico 8.8% of the total 
market in eight 
major cities, 2017
Saenz de Miera 
Juarez et al., 2020 
(40) 





As shown in Table 4.4, methodologies to measure illicit trade can be grouped into 
three types: (1) direct measurement; (2) residual methods and (3) expert opinion 
(12). Direct measurements rely on evidence directly linked to actual illicit behaviour 
and pack observation; residual methods infer evasion based on theory and evidence 
about consumption and legal sales; and expert opinion distills information garnered 
from talking to individuals with the most direct knowledge of the tobacco market. 
Each method has advantages and disadvantages. No single method is unambigu-
ously superior to others, but direct measurement and residual methods are more 
conducive to determining the size of the illicit market, whereas expert opinion 
could provide insight into the details of the market’s operations.15
Table 4.4 presents the relative amount of resources and the degree of expertise 
required to implement each main measurement method, as well as the primary 
purpose, data collection characteristics, sampling features and unit of analysis. A 
brief description of each of the methods is presented in Annex 4.1. Merriman (11) 
and Ross (9) provide more expansive details. 
There is no simple selection rule for deciding what measurement method to 
use. The major factors to consider when selecting a method or methods include (1) 
the nature and characteristics of the illicit trade problem (i.e. where and how the 
15  In interviews with experts from the tobacco industry, provisions of Article 5.3 of the FCTC and its 
Guidelines need to be followed.
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problem manifests and whether domestic tax evasion or illegal inflows of foreign 
brands or a combination of both predominates), (2) previously collected data, (3) 
available budget and (4) expertise of available analysts. 
Available budget and staff skills are often the main restrictions that governments 
face. Therefore, Table 4.4 orders the measurement methods according to resources 
needed and available expertise. For example, residual methods and expert opinion 
can provide crude but useful estimates at low cost and require the lowest levels of 
technical sophistication. Another low-cost option for countries that employ popula-
tion health surveillance surveys is to add questions to measure illicit trade, such 
as brand name, value and quantities of the last purchase. In contrast, the direct 
measurement approach often requires sophisticated research designs and expensive 
(and time-consuming) field research.
Table 4.4 Overview of resources and expertise needed and main purpose of measurement 
methods
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$$$ High Size and characteristics 
of illicit trade, probabili-







Notes: Universe includes total population; D = direct measurement, R = residual method, E = expert opinion. 
Scale for resource costs assuming a moderately sized study (e.g. a representative study of a region of 
several million):  $ (cheapest) – weeks of skilled labour hours; $$ (moderately expensive) – 1 to 2 months 
of skilled labour hours; and $$$ (most expensive) – 6 to 12 months of skilled and unskilled labour hours.
A more detailed description of the different measurement methods is given in Annex 
4.1. To further assist responsible authorities in deciding which method to select, 
Table 4.5 presents the key characteristics of each of the measurement methods, 
along with the main advantages and disadvantages of each. Countries may begin 
with methods that require fewer resources and less skills to obtain an overview of 
the problem. Seizures – which are a by-product of law enforcement efforts – pro-
vide a first step, and countries can analyse the information obtained (origin of the 
products, brands, location, etc.) and report the results to increase public awareness 
of the problem.16 Alternatively, countries can add questions related to illicit trade 
to existing and funded health surveillance surveys conducted regularly by health 
surveillance authorities and statistical authorities. In that way, cooperation in using 
existing measurement methods between health authorities – the tobacco control 
office and health surveillance unit – tax and customs authorities and the national 
16  Seizures are useful for obtaining qualitative information about the illegal activity, but they have to 
be treated very cautiously in projecting the size of the problem. Countries may think they have a very 
large problem because they have competent authorities doing an extraordinary job at finding illicit 
goods. On the other hand, countries can have less-efficient authorities making few seizures, and in these 
environments, seizures tell nothing about the size and nature of the problem.
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statistical office could be a starting point for identifying the nature and size of the 
illicit trade problem in the country. 
Direct observation of packs has been increasingly implemented in many LMICs, 
through different types of surveys such as intercepts of smokers or retailers, pack 
return, littered-pack inspections and covert purchases of cigarettes. These activities 
have expanded the skills of independent researchers and academia and increased 
knowledge of these methods. Also, increasingly cheaper digital technologies allow 
interviewers to take pictures and record pack characteristics in direct observation 
surveys or in larger national self-report consumer surveys.   







Seizures (D) Statistics of tobacco 
products confiscated 
by local and national 
authorities
Readily available from 
law enforcement 
agencies
May not provide a 
representative picture 
of the size and/or 
nature of illicit trade
Using existing health 
surveillance surveys to 
obtain self-reported 
consumption (D)
Adding or improving 
questions about brand 
names, quantities, 
prices, locale of 
purchase and other 
factors
Produces good 
estimates at national 
level
Self-reported data 
may be biased due 
to the social stigma 
of consuming illicit 
tobacco products
Gap analysis (R) Compare self-reported 
consumption data 
with observed (usually 
administrative) data 
about tax-paid sales
When quality data are 
available, is simple 




Data on tax-paid sales 
and/or consumption 
are frequently 
inaccurate and in many 
cases do not provide 
information on the size 
of the illicit market, but 




Estimated according to 
the difference between 
tax-paid sales and 
predicted consumption 
given by the model
Because it is consistent 
with a long tradition 
of economic theory, 
empirical estimates can 
be evaluated 
Requires high-quality 
data on a variety of 
important variables 
over a period of 
time and advanced 
econometric modelling 
expertise






Expert interviews (E) Experts include 
researchers (e.g. in 
economics, criminal 
justice and public 
health), journalists, 




Useful for identifying 
the nature of 
and trends in the 
marketplace (e.g. 
venues where illicit 
cigarettes are sold, 
modes of entry), and 
the interviews can be 
useful for defining the 
method to assess the 
size of the illicit trade
Information 
obtained may not be 
generalizable, and 
expert knowledge 
may be outdated or 
limited by the experts’ 
experience; also, 
experts often have 
strong biases
Smoker/retailer 
intercepts and pack 
observation surveys (D)
Examining the packs of 




Is direct and objective, 
and smokers do not 
suffer from any value 
judgements
The difficulty of 
identifying areas 
representative of 




such as elderly and 




Pack return and swap 
surveys (D)
Also a pack observation 
study using survey 
sampling techniques to 
examine smokers’ pack 
characteristics 
May decrease the 
stigma associated with 
traditional smoking 
surveys
In LMICs, survey 
distribution may be 
unreliable because 
of the mail delivery 
system
Littered pack surveys 
(D)
Also known as 
empty-discarded-pack 
surveys; publicly 
discarded packs bear 
characteristics (e.g. tax 
stamps, public health 
warnings) that indicate 
whether they are tax 
compliant
Yields estimates that 
are less likely to be 
biased from issues 
of social desirability, 
recall error and 
confidentiality
Significant budgets 
could be needed 
to employ field 
researchers to collect, 
code and analyse the 
data; surveys do not 
provide information 
about the smoker and 
the price paid
Covert purchases (D) Uses covert purchases 
of packs and single 
cigarettes to gauge 
the availability of illicit 
cigarettes
Directly identifies 
sources of illicit 
cigarettes
It is difficult to create 
a sampling frame 
of retailers for illicit 
sources or to know 
what smokers are 
actually buying and 
how much  
Self-report consumer 
surveys (D)




various modes of 
distribution 
Good estimates at 
national level
Self-reported data 
may be biased due 
to the social stigma 
of consuming illicit 
tobacco products
Notes: D = direct measurement, R = residual method, E = expert opinion.
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Ultimately, when capacity allows, more solid estimates will need to be made using 
more than one methodology at a given point in time. Ideally, estimates will be made 
on a regular basis in order to assess the evolution of illicit trade over time and its 
possible connection to policy changes.
4.1.5 CRITIQUING STUDIES THAT MEASURE THE SIZE OF THE ILLICIT MARKET 
Measuring illicit trade is a challenge for researchers, industry and governments, 
because the trade is, by definition, hidden from plain sight. Buyers and dealers 
sometimes go to great lengths to ensure that their participation in illicit activity is 
concealed. Over the years, researchers and government agencies have been increas-
ingly interested in estimating the size of illicit markets and identifying effective 
interventions. As consumers of research, governments should critically examine 
available studies and evaluate them on their scientific rigor and methodological 
transparency. Measurement issues are particularly acute with respect to the illicit 
tobacco trade because it is a politicized topic. High estimates may raise questions 
about the tobacco industry’s ability to control the supply chain, its involvement in 
illicit diversion, the impact of taxation policies and the effectiveness of enforcement 
strategies. While the industry has portrayed itself as taking an active stance in 
measuring and fighting illicit trade (e.g. Project Star, conducted by KPMG LLC but 
paid for by PMI, later followed by Project Sun), in the past it has used smuggling as a 
strategy to enter closed markets – for example, in China and Russia (19, 41). Govern-
ments should carefully scrutinize evidence about the illicit tobacco trade produced 
by industry or quasi-industry sources and are advised to seek alternative evidence. 
Quasi-industry reports are studies commissioned by the industry but published by 
private research companies (e.g. Ernst and Young, Oxford Economics) (11). 
Characteristics of good analyses
One of the main characteristics of a good analysis is scientific rigor, which involves 
the use of relevant theoretical frameworks, sound statistical methods and examination 
of the robustness of findings (e.g. sensitivity analyses). High-quality research reports 
provide transparent explanations about their methodology and statistical analysis 
steps undertaken, as well as supplementary analyses that established the robustness 
of the findings. For example, Joossens et al. (25) clearly describe the data sources 
used (limitations and advantages and where they can be found) and calculations 
performed on the number of lives that would be saved if the global market share 
of illicit cigarettes was eliminated. Explanations should be detailed enough to allow 
future researchers to scrutinize the analysis and replicate the findings. 
Replicability is another hallmark of good science. For example, littered-pack 
studies should detail where and when data collection took place, how many packs 
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were collected per geographical unit, the protocol of identifying the illicit packs 
(e.g. characteristics of the warning labels, brands, tax stamps, etc.) and details of 
statistical analyses. There should also be explanations of the representativeness of 
the selected geographical areas. Failure to provide this depth of information may 
call into question the generalizability of a study and whether there are faults with 
the chosen method. 
In the context of policy decisions regarding illicit trade, the most useful data 
provide information about a representative sample of individuals and geographies. 
Studies that are limited to, for example, one group of individuals based on specific 
characteristics or a given geography may yield biased information. Research reports 
also should be clear about the study’s limitations. For example, studies that measure 
illicit trade often do not measure product counterfeiting and do not include non-
cigarette tobacco products in their estimates (42). When statistical estimates are 
included, they should provide confidence intervals as well as point estimates to 
account for uncertainty resulting from simple random chance (11).  
Characteristics of flawed analyses
Flawed analyses can convolute and distort scientific knowledge about illicit trade. 
Flaws usually manifest in the data, methodology, statistical analysis and/or interpreta-
tion of the results (11). Studies may be purposefully designed with methodological 
flaws to yield high or low estimates of the trade. For example, research showing 
that illicit trade constitutes a large share of the total market may be used to support 
arguments that taxes cause sharp increases in illicit trade, whereas lower estimates 
may be used to support arguments that certain governmental interventions (e.g. 
increased retail inspections) are effective. Pressures to skew data may also be tied 
to funding. For example, high estimates can sway governments to provide more 
resources for law enforcement activities. Analyses can be purposefully skewed by 
using data sources or data collection methods that will provide biased estimates. 
Flawed studies sometimes provide incomplete or inaccurate descriptions of 
their methodology. They may lack detail regarding the quality of the data used 
or information about how the data were collected and analysed. For example, a 
common weakness in industry-funded research on discarded packs is that the 
methods of collection and forensic analysis are not reported, ostensibly because 
they are “proprietary” information (43). However, these methodological details 
are key to assessing whether a study’s findings are biased by sampling error, model 
misspecification, measurement error, non-response or other flaws.
It may be impossible to assess measurement error if researchers fail to disclose 
questions included in a survey instrument. Survey items used to measure the illicit 
tobacco trade may be imprecise. For example, asking respondents the frequency with 
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which they purchase “cheap” cigarettes may yield biased estimates, particularly if 
consumers can purchase cigarettes at discounted prices by using coupons. To more ac-
curately measure tax evasion, surveys must include questions about the location of last 
purchase, purchase price, presence of public health warning labels and brand names.
There are other ways that flawed studies can inadvertently or purposefully distort 
estimates of illicit trade. For example, data collectors can intentionally oversample 
areas known to be hot spots of illicit sales or sites that residents from lower-tax 
jurisdictions visit. Researchers can collect discarded cigarette packs close to the 
borders of countries with lower taxes to (inadvertently or purposefully) demonstrate 
the undesired side effects of tax policies. Studies published in non-peer-reviewed or 
lightly peer-reviewed outlets such as edited book volumes or policy briefs should 
be viewed with more scepticism than those published in highly regarded peer-
reviewed outlets.
4.1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Globally, the illicit tobacco trade continues to be a major concern for tax admin-
istrators because of the challenges it generates to collecting higher revenues as 
well as the challenges to accurate and independent measurement. Industry figures 
provide distorted conclusions regarding the extent of the problem – frequently with a 
monocausal explanation of the link between illicit trade and tobacco taxation. Illicit 
trade comprises multisystemic issues and requires multiple strategies. Worldwide, 
countries at different levels of economic development have implemented a variety 
of effective measures to combat the illicit trade in tobacco products. The Philippines 
and the United Kingdom, for example, have addressed illicit trade as part of their 
overall tobacco tax reform (4). 
Price (and tax) levels are not a key determinant of illicit trade, the presence of 
which is exacerbated by the lack of tax administration capacity. Refraining from 
increasing taxes is not the solution; countries should instead respond with a com-
prehensive strategy that includes at least these three main components:
1. It should identify – independently from the industry – the nature and dimen-
sions of the problem. It is necessary to assess scientifically and with the best 
statistical practices the size of the illicit trade to understand the characteristics 
and scope of the problem. 
2. It should identify and implement appropriate policies and strategies targeted 
at addressing the specific type of illicit trade the country is experiencing. It 
should address directly the country-specific institutional and/or governance 
challenges – as well as the lack of multilateral coordination that can exacer-
bate illicit trade – and improve tax and customs administration practices as 
described in Chapter 3.
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3. It should implement best practices contained in the WHO FCTC Protocol 
to Eliminate the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and accede to the Protocol 
if the country is not yet a Party.  
There are proper methods and policies with which to address the illicit tobacco trade. 
If countries start implementing the appropriate policies, they can raise tobacco taxes 
and reap health and revenue benefits even in the presence of illicit trade.  
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4.2 SCARE TACTIC C: COURT AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION
The tobacco industry views well-designed and significant tax increases as a threat 
to the profit, growth and long-term sustainability of its business. As noted by PMI 
in 1985: 
Of all the concerns there is one – taxation – that alarms us the most. While 
[other restrictions] … do depress volume, in our experience taxation depresses 
it much more severely (44). 
The industry is, however, less likely to launch direct legal challenges to excise taxes 
than to other tobacco control measures (see Box 4.2.1 for details), because taxation – 
and excise tax in particular – is a comparatively well-established regulatory measure; 
in many jurisdictions, taxes have been levied on tobacco products for more than a 
century. There is also less unanimity in opposition to taxes among tobacco industry 
actors, because differences in the market position of different tobacco companies 
affect their interests in tax policy. This, in turn, decreases the likelihood that they 
will act collectively on the issue (45). BAT’s stated strategy in the early 1990s was
to influence governments with regard to the level and structure of tobacco taxation 
in order to promote market growth and to secure competitive advantage (46).
Nevertheless, tobacco industry actors will still legally challenge, or at least legally 
threaten, significant tax measures when vulnerabilities in their design, adoption or 
implementation are apparent.
Box 4.2.1 Court and legal challenges to tobacco tax 
measures
Evidence suggests that the tobacco industry and its allies instigate fewer legal actions 
against tax measures than against other tobacco control measures:
1. The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids’ tobacco control laws database contains 
only a handful of cases concerning tobacco tax measures, but hundreds on 
other tobacco control topics. This pattern can also be seen in a 2018 review of 
tobacco control legal challenges that examined this and two other databases 
to select 96 cases relevant to the question of the WHO FCTC’s usefulness in 
litigation (47). Only 6 of these 96 cases were challenges related to tax measures. 
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2. A 2013 systematic review of empirical studies on tobacco industry interference 
with tobacco tax policy found that only 9 of 36 relevant articles reported 
the specific use of litigation as a tobacco industry tactic (1). All 9 concerned 
constitutional challenges to earmarking provisions for tobacco tax initiatives 
in the United States (1). 
3. A 2015 study on industry interference in LMICs cited legal challenges to tobacco 
control measures in 15 countries as examples of industry interference, but 
none of the challenges concerned a tobacco tax measure (48).
4. A 2016 analysis of papers published in systematic reviews of industry inter-
ference with tax and marketing measures found that only 5 of 65 papers 
concerning tobacco tax related to the use of litigation or threats of litigation 
to interfere with tobacco tax measures (49).
The tobacco industry makes extensive use of legal experts (1, 50–52) who study all 
relevant laws and regulations closely to determine their likely and arguable boundar-
ies for the purpose of manipulating regulations and regulators (1, 50–52).  Based 
on this expert advice, tobacco companies know when regulations remain within 
the bounds of both international and domestic obligations but can still argue that 
legally permissible tobacco control measures would be defeated in litigation if passed 
(48, 51–52). As the threat of a legal challenge alone can be used to the industry’s 
advantage, recourse to litigation is seldom needed or desirable (1, 45, 48, 51, 53–56). 
Even when litigation is launched, the objective may be to delay or weaken a measure 
rather than to win on the merits of the case (1, 45, 48, 53). To counter actual and 
threatened legal challenges, policy-makers need to be aware of relevant legal obliga-
tions when preparing and implementing tobacco control measures. Fortunately, the 
tobacco industry playbook is relatively predictable. Tax and other tobacco control 
measures can thus be designed to strengthen the regulators’ legal position against 
genuine threats and enable them to dismiss baseless industry threats. 
4.2.2 COUNTRY EXPERIENCES WITH LEGAL CHALLENGES  
TO TOBACCO TAXATION 
Legal obligations that are relevant to tobacco taxation include those under do-
mestic law and international instruments such as international trade agreements 
and international investment agreements (IIAs).17 Some of the legal issues that a 
tax measure may encounter are outlined in Table 4.6. Case studies from various 
countries illustrate how these legal issues have and have not been avoided in the 
17  Relevant international trade agreements include the WTO Agreement and custom unions such as 
the EU, the East African Customs Union and Mercosur. Relevant IIAs include bilateral investment treaties 
and the investment chapters in free trade agreements and within custom unions. 
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passage, design and implementation of tobacco taxes. These issues are not the norm, 
however, and should not give rise to undue apprehension. The case studies are rated 
as positive, mixed or negative based on the extent to which the legal decision upheld 
the taxation measure in question.
Table 4.6 Potential legal issues for tobacco tax measures
VULNERABILITIES LEGAL OBLIGATIONS CASE STUDIES
Inadequate consultation 
and other procedural 
vulnerabilities
Domestic procedural law 1, 2
Due process protections for investors under IIAs None




imports or investors 
Nondiscrimination obligations under WTO Agreements 
and Customs Unions
8, 9, 10
Nondiscrimination obligations under IIAs 11
Investment incentives  
or inducements
Arbitration mechanisms under investor-state contracts 12
Fair and equitable treatment clauses of IIAs None
Other substantive 
breaches
Constitutional rights and restrictions on taxation 4
Statutory restrictions on the imposition of taxation 6
Expropriation clauses of IIAs 5
Ultra vires (the scope of legal authority) 7
Avoiding procedural vulnerabilities in tax laws 
Procedural defects can be avoided by taking great care in progressing and imple-
menting regulatory or legislative provisions. Procedural concerns pose a dilemma 
for tobacco control regulators. Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC and the COP guide-
lines for its implementation state that policy-makers and regulators should interact 
with the tobacco industry only when and to the extent strictly necessary (57). For 
taxation measures, interaction might be necessary because consultative and de-
liberative processes could be prescribed under domestic constitutional provisions 
and procedures for good governance, due process requirements of IIAs and some 
international trade agreements. The tobacco industry may use these requirements 
as leverage to delay, distort or hijack the rule-making process in contravention of 
Article 5.3. Accordingly, interactions with the tobacco industry should be limited 
to strictly necessary consultation conducted in a transparent or public manner but 
with care that this does not come at the expense of a measure’s defensibility. The 
proper balance will depend on the jurisdiction in question, since constitutional, 
statutory and applicable international legal obligations vary.
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CASE STUDY 1 (MIXED):  
Industry manipulation of legislative procedures
In 2012, a bill stipulating, among other things, the creation of a new specific excise 
tax on cigarettes passed its final reading in Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly. Passage 
of the bill had, however, proceeded under “urgency” and notwithstanding a pending 
constitutional enquiry (a constitutional query is meant to prevent passage of a bill).18
ISSUE MAJORITY DECISION MINORITY DECISION LESSON
Whether the court 
could consider the 
enquiry despite 
passage of the bill and 
the effect the bill’s 
passage could have 
despite the enquiry.
The enquiry was taken 
up by the Supreme 
Court’s Constitutional 
Division’s majority 
(58). The signing and 
publication of the 
bill by the executive 
was suspended by 
the Constitutional 
Division pending their 
decision on the merits 
of the case – which, 
in the end, found 
any question of the 
bill’s constitutionality 
baseless (58). 
The enquiry was 
inadmissible by reason 
of having been filed 
too late and notice of 
its filing having not 
been received by the 
legislature prior to 
the reading of the bill 
(58).  In disagreement 
with the majority, the 
minority held that 
the court could not 
consider the enquiry 
or suspend the 
bill’s signing by the 
executive – the final 
step in becoming law.
This challenge 
demonstrates how 
the tobacco industry’s 
defenders may 
attempt to frustrate 
and impede a tax 
measure’s passage. In 
this case, the challenge 
seemed to have been 
a delaying tactic, as 
it was posted on 
the same day as the 
final reading of the 
bill. Its authors may 
have either wanted 
its pending nature to 
cause the legislature 
to delay or, as occurred, 
to create conditions 
for a procedural 
and constitutional 
challenge in the 
absence of delay. All 
the grounds of the 
challenge itself were 
found to be without 
merit. Although such 
frivolous challenges 
cannot be prevented, 
they can and should be 
anticipated to ensure 
that they do not lead 
to a tax measure’s 
defeat.
18  “Urgency” is a procedure under which a bill is progressed through a legislature in an expedited fashion.
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CASE STUDY 2 (POSITIVE):  
Adhering to domestic procedural requirements 
Kenya’s tobacco control regulations required the tobacco industry to pay a levy to 
compensate the state for health care and other negative externalities of smoking. In a 
2016 challenge brought against these regulations, the plaintiff, BAT, was unsuccessful 
on every count (59–60). Even though the levy was not considered a tax measure 
by the court, the case study is instructive on how regulators may safeguard tax 
measures against procedural challenges.






the measure were 
adequate.
Asserting that the 
Constitution and the 
Statutory Instruments 
Act together meant 
that “appropriate 
consultations with 
persons who are likely 
to be affected” were 
required because of 
the measure’s likely 
substantial effect on 
business. BAT claimed 
that this standard 
was not met. Kenya’s 
government claimed 
that it was under 
no obligation to 
undertake special or 
extensive consultation 
with the tobacco 
industry.
The judge found in 
favour of Kenya’s 
government, 
noting that (1) the 
requirement to consult 
does not imply that 
any particular view 
needs to prevail; (2) 
dissatisfaction with the 
level of consultation 
is not decisive; (3) on 
the facts, industry 
was allowed, and 
often invited, to send 
representatives to 




and (4) consultation 
on the regulations was 
adequate (59). 








from the tobacco 




but did permit their 
attendance at public 
meetings and the 
ability to submit 
their views under 
usual procedures. In 
this way, both the 
principles behind WHO 
FCTC Article 5.3 and 
the requirement for 
consultation under 
Kenyan law were 
observed.
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Avoiding procedural issues in tax administration
CASE STUDY 3 (NEGATIVE):  
Contravening procedural requirements in international obligations
In 2010, a WTO panel held that Thailand violated the Customs Valuation Agreement 
(CVA) by the process it used to value cigarettes that Phillip Morris (PM) Thailand 
imported into the country from a related party, PM Philippines. Customs values 
are important as they are the tax base for tariffs and can feed into the base for other 
taxes levied against the value of the good, such as ad valorem excise taxes and VAT. 
Transaction values declared by PM Thailand were rejected by Thai tax authorities as 
influenced by the relationship between the parties and a customs value determined 
by deduction was substituted (61).  
ISSUE LEGAL OBLIGATION DECISION LESSONS
Whether Thailand 
adequately consulted 
with PM Philippines 
before rejecting its 
declared transaction 
value (61). 
The CVA requires 
good faith exchange 




Thailand had failed to 
properly explain its 
reasons for rejecting 
the transaction value, 
as well as its belief that 
price was influenced 
by the relationship 
between the two 
parties (61). This was 
a violation of the CVA. 
Thailand did not appeal 
these findings.
Thailand’s authorities 
needed to take 
greater care in their 
dealings with the 
tobacco industry to 
ensure they met the 
pertinent procedural 
obligations. In this 
instance, a specific 
and high standard 
of consultation – the 
provision of detailed 
reasons and an 
opportunity for 
response – was 
prescribed by the CVA 
and Thailand failed to 
meet it.
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Ensuring compliance with substantive requirements
Rules found in domestic and international law also establish substantive obliga-
tions. This subsection focuses on substantive obligations found in domestic law. 
International obligations concerning discrimination and investment incentives are 
considered in the next subsections.
CASE STUDY 4 (POSITIVE):  
Tax measure found to be consistent with the Constitution 
The Chilean government introduced a substantial increase in tobacco and fuel 
excise, and in 1995, a coalition of taxpayers brought a Constitutional challenge to 
the measure (62).
ISSUE DECISION LESSON
Whether the tax was, per article 
19 of the Chilean Constitution, 
“obviously disproportionate or 
unjust” (62).
The excise tax increase did not 
violate the Constitution, as it 
was neither confiscatory nor 
manifestly irrational.
Generally applicable excise 
taxes are not vulnerable to 
challenges for being excessive, 
unfair or disproportionate.
CASE STUDY 5 (POSITIVE):  
Failure to grant tax rebates not an expropriation under an IIA
This case study is an example of a claim for breach of an expropriation clause in an 
investment treaty. Such clauses protect foreign investors against measures that can be 
construed as directly or indirectly seizing an investment or depriving it of its value 
(63). In the case, an investor was, for more than a decade, denied tax rebates by the 
Mexican government. This affected the profitability of the business of purchasing 
and reselling Mexican cigarettes abroad, and the investor brought the claim to an 
investment agreement arbitral tribunal in 2002 (64).
ISSUE DECISION LESSONS
Whether Mexico’s failure to 
grant rebates to the investor 
exceeded the bounds of valid 
regulation to constitute indirect 
expropriation of the investor’s 
investment (65). 
There was no expropriation. 
The arbitral tribunal noted that 
not all business problems are 
violations: the investor had no 
right to participate in the “grey 
market” export of cigarettes 
and there were sound reasons 
to restrict that market (65). 
Further, the investor was able 
to participate in other business 
ventures and actually continued 
to have business success (65). 
Claims of indirect expropriation 
made under IIAs are unlikely 
to be successful, as generally 
applicable tax measures are a 
legitimate form of regulation. 
A mere loss of profit will not 
suffice. Claims of expropriation 
will not succeed unless a 
substantial or significant 
deprivation of the investment 
results.
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CASE STUDY 6 (NEGATIVE):  
A regulation contrary to superior domestic legislation
In 2011, an Indonesian tobacco industry association group, FORMASI, challenged a 
new excise regulation. Since 2009, the government had been implementing a tiered 
specific excise tax system based on a set of characteristics (size of production, type 
of cigarettes and price levels). In 2011, excise rates were increased in nearly all of 
the 19 tiers, but the reference prices were not accordingly adjusted. This gave rise 
to a legal issue.
ISSUE DECISION LESSONS
Whether new excise regulations 
breached a 57% ceiling for the 
rate of excise on the retail sale 
price of tobacco products under 
the superior Excise Law (66–70). 
The challenge specified that 
excise exceeded this ceiling 
for hand-rolled domestic clove 
cigarettes (kreteks) (68, 71).
The Court found in favour of the 
tobacco industry association, 
and the government was 
required to immediately revoke 
the 2011 regulation. (69–70). 
It is advisable to stay within 
the rules and be aware of legal 
hierarchies – including superior 
domestic legislation. The 
tobacco industry scrutinizes 
all increases in tobacco taxes. 
In this case, a breach of a 
legislative requirement for a 
single category of tobacco 
product resulted in Indonesia 
suffering lost revenue and a 
setback in its efforts to reduce 
tobacco consumption.  
Ensuring a tax measure is within an authority’s legal power 
A tax measure is ultra vires when it goes beyond the legal power of the enacting 
body. As with case study 6, this is a legal issue that involves legal hierarchies. In ultra 
vires cases, however, instead of centring on conflict between inferior and superior 
law, the issue is whether an authority that enacts a tax measure is authorized to do 
so. This issue may arise when a tax measure is enacted by a subnational jurisdiction 
or by an executive acting under a statutory delegation.
CASE STUDY 7 (NEGATIVE):  
Tobacco taxation contrary to the Australian Constitution 
ISSUE DECISION LESSONS
Whether New South Wales’ 
licensing and penalty fees 
regime constituted an excise 
tax by other means contrary to 
the Australian Constitution’s 
exclusive grant of that power to 
the federal government (72).
The court found that state 
licensing fees were excise taxes 
and that this was contrary to 
the Australian Constitution (72). 
Authorities enacting tobacco 
tax measures must act within 
the scope of their legal power.
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Avoiding discrimination against imports and foreign investments
Although inherently discriminatory, customs duties may be used subject to the 
agreed upper limits in a country’s trade agreements. Excise and other taxes designed 
with the aim of raising tobacco prices to reduce demand and advance human health 
should be origin-neutral: they should not seek to tax local products less than foreign 
products or aim to treat foreign products differently from one another. Tobacco 
tax measures are pursuing objectives other than health when they aim to raise the 
price of imports more than that of local products or seek to burden favoured market 
participants less than others. Solely health-protective tobacco taxes will not ordinarily 
violate Articles III:2 and I:1 of the GATT (the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade), which prohibit discriminatory taxation (in light of general exceptions). 
Nor will solely health-protective tobacco taxes directly violate anti-discrimination 
protections for investors found in the national-treatment (NT), most-favoured-nation 
(MFN), expropriation and fair-and-equitable-treatment (FET) clauses of IIAs (63, 
73–74). It is possible to make claims for breach of international obligations on grounds 
other than discrimination, but such claims are generally highly unlikely to succeed.
CASE STUDY 8 (NEGATIVE):   
BAT v Uganda (2017 East African Court of Justice) 
DISCRIMINATION LESSON
Uganda established a higher level of excise taxes 
on imported cigarettes – including those from 
Partner states of the East African Customs Union 
(75) – than on local cigarettes. Its implementation 
was discrimination contrary to Article 15 of the 
Customs Union Protocol (75). 
Differential taxation explicitly based on origin 
can be construed as protectionist discrimination 
in violation of international obligations. The 
tobacco industry can also turn to international 
trade agreements outside of the WTO – in 
particular, customs union mechanisms.
Difficulties arise when ostensibly origin-neutral and health-protective tobacco taxes 
result in dissimilar taxation of tobacco products (73). Discrimination does not exist 
simply because there is dissimilar taxation – the taxation must adversely impact 
imported goods more than local products, the imports of one nation more than 
another or a particular investor’s products more than comparable products. Where 
dissimilar taxation between product categories results in discrimination, the tax 
will ordinarily still be lawful if the dissimilar taxation is based solely on a legitimate 
regulatory distinction between the product categories in question.19 
19  The precise applicable rules vary depending on the nature of the legal obligations in question. Under 
the GATT, dissimilar taxation of like or directly competitive products can be justified based on scientifically 
grounded distinctions between products under Article III:2 and, in the alternative, discrimination that is 
necessary under the explicit carve-out for health-protective measures, Article XX(b) (73). For the MFN and 
NT clauses of IIAs, differential taxation can be argued as nondiscriminatory on the basis that difference in 
harm means the products are not “alike” or, in the alternative, discrimination is justified based on scientific 
evidence of differences in harm and rational reasons for the health-protective role of differential taxation (63). 
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Where discrimination is inadvertent, lack of an intention to discriminate is not 
sufficient as a defence for breach of obligations under IIAs or the GATT (73, 76). 
Policy-makers should carefully scrutinize measures to determine:
1. whether an aspect of a tax measure’s design or implementation may be more 
to the detriment of imports or foreign investors than of local products or 
domestic investors;
2. whether the potentially discriminatory aspect of the tax measure serves any 
useful purpose in supporting the tax measure (i.e. it is needed to achieve the 
health goal);
3. whether there is any reasonable alternative that could achieve the same effect 
without the potential for discrimination; (i.e. it is indispensable) and
4. when it is needed and indispensable there is a good chance that it will be 
defensible.
The case studies below provide examples of discrimination arising in connection 
with a tobacco tax measure. 
CASE STUDY 9 (NEGATIVE):  
Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines 
(2010 WTO panel)
The facts of this case are presented in case study 3. This case study examines claims 
of discrimination rather than the procedural issues. 
DISCRIMINATION EXPLANATION LESSONS
Thailand implemented its policy 
for determining the tax base for 
VAT on cigarettes inconsistently 
(61).
Thailand applied a 
methodology in fixing the tax 
base, in particular a marketing 
cost component, of imported 
cigarettes that differed from 
that for local products (61). This 
resulted in the marketing cost 
component for the imported 
cigarettes being higher than 
it would have been under 
the general methodology. 
This difference in treatment 
was insufficiently justified 
and therefore considered 
discriminatory.
As there is potential for 
inadvertent discrimination 
when the base for an ad 
valorem tax is fixed, tax 
base determinations must 
be consistent and well-
reasoned (61). This case study 
demonstrates how policy-
makers need to take care in 
designing and implementing 
ad valorem taxes to ensure 
they are nondiscriminatory and 
legally defensible.
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Thailand’s VAT rebate policy 
imposed a potentially 
higher tax burden and also 
created more burdensome 
administrative requirements for 
imported cigarettes (61).
Resellers of cigarettes produced 
by a government entity were 
granted an exemption from 
VAT (61). Although resellers 
of imported cigarettes would 
be eligible for a tax credit 
on their VAT, this was not an 
automatic process (61). The 
distinct treatment of resellers of 
imported cigarettes and those 
of local cigarettes resulted 
in the risk that there would 
be a higher VAT burden for 
the former (61). The distinct 
treatment also imposed an 
additional administrative 
burden on resellers of 
imported cigarettes and altered 
conditions of competition (61). 
Rules for the collection and 
enforcement of tax obligations 
should be the same, or as 
similar as practicable, in both 
form and effect for domestic 
and imported tobacco products.
CASE STUDY 10 (NEGATIVE):  
Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale  
of Cigarettes (2004 WTO panel; 2005 WTO Appellate Body)
Under article XX(d) of the GATT, discrimination that is necessary to secure com-
pliance with a legitimate tax measure will be justified provided there is no less-
discriminatory alternative. In this case, this justification was used unsuccessfully.
DISCRIMINATION EXPLANATION LESSONS
The Dominican Republic’s 
tax stamp regulations were 
discriminatory towards 
imported goods (77). Under 
the regulations, all cigarette 
packs had to be affixed with tax 
stamps, but imported cigarettes 
were to be affixed with tax 
stamps under the supervision 
of local tax authorities following 
importation, while locally 
manufactured cigarettes could 
be affixed with a tax stamp in 
the course of production.
This de facto distinction 
between local and imported 
products modified the 
conditions of competition to 
the detriment of imported 
cigarettes by (1) increasing 
costs for importers and (2) 
impairing the aesthetics of 
imported products (77). The 
panel did not consider this 
discrimination justified: it 
was not necessary for the 
enforcement of tax measures, 
because less restrictive 
alternatives were available such 
as permitting importers to affix 
tax stamps during the course 
of production (Dominican 
Republic – measures affecting) 
(77). The panel’s findings were 
upheld on appeal (78).
Policies crafted to ensure 
compliance with tax 
measures need to also 
be nondiscriminatory. 
Discrimination claims can arise 
when compliance costs are 
higher for imports than for 
local products and this de facto 
distinction is avoidable. It is 
important to consider whether 
less burdensome alternatives 
may achieve the same objective.
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 209 
CASE STUDY 11 (NEGATIVE):  
Feldman Karpa v Mexico (2002 ICSID [International Centre for Settlement  
of Investment Disputes] Arbitral Tribunal)
Arbitral tribunals have accepted differences in treatment accorded to investors 
protected by IIAs when there is a legitimate connection between the distinctions 
drawn and public welfare objectives (76). The facts of this case are presented in 
case study 5. This case study examines aspects of the case involving the investor’s 
claim of discrimination, rather than the substantive issue of expropriation. Claims 
of discrimination are made on different grounds than claims for expropriation, 
which is why the case was decided differently on this claim.
DISCRIMINATION LESSONS
Denial of foreign investors’ claims for tax rebates. 
Tax rebate claims were granted to similar local 
investors (65), which was a violation of an IIA’s 
national treatment clause (65).
Foreign and local investors must be treated 
similarly, and consistent and well-documented 
policies must be used to guide administrative 
decisions. The denial of the rebates may have 
been justified, but the government was unable 
to establish this due to a lack of documentation.
Avoiding the investment incentives trap
Investor-state contracts between the tobacco industry and governments should be 
avoided. They are not merely “contractual” in the domestic law sense, as even in 
the absence of an applicable IIA, they can be internationalized to provide inves-
tors the right to (1) remove dispute settlement from the state’s court in favour of 
independent arbitration and (2) remove the dispute from the state’s legal framework 
in favour of general principles of law (63, 76). Commitments under these clauses 
cannot, therefore, be legislatively moderated or extinguished, nor can liability be 
limited within domestic courts that may be more likely to favour the state’s right 
to regulate in favour of public health (76). 
Investor-state contracts and other noncontractual inducements can be further 
internationalized by umbrella clauses within IIAs. Such clauses make reneging on 
undertakings assumed towards investors a breach of the IIA (76). Moreover, even 
in the absence of an umbrella clause, contracts and inducement can underpin a 
claim for legitimate expectation and breach of fair and equitable treatment and 
can also strengthen an investor’s claim for indirect expropriation (63). Arbitral 
awards make clear that although taxes can be expected to vary and tobacco will 
be regulated, investors can have the legitimate expectation that states will abide by 
formal inducements and written contractual undertakings.
A common clause within investor-state contracts, the stabilization clause, is 
ruinous to evidence-based tobacco control’s most effective measure: excise tax in-
creases. Stabilization clauses purport to freeze specific domestic law from the time 
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of investment (63). Seemingly less onerous, economic equilibrium clauses require 
contracting states to compensate for regulatory changes that negatively affect an 
investment’s value (63). There is little difference in effect between these two types 
of clauses: liability for the cost of breaching an equilibrium economic clause can be 
onerous enough to make it fiscally challenging and politically unpalatable.
CASE STUDY 12:  
An investor-state contract
A state entered into an investment agreement with a TTC in 2001 on the privatiza-
tion of its state-owned tobacco enterprise and creation of a joint venture. This 
investment was to provide economic benefits under the agreement: the joint venture 
would increase exports and profit using the TTC’s cash and expertise while also 
ensuring prioritization of local employment, manufacturing and resources. The 
final investor-state contract included a form of economic equilibrium clause under 
which any increase in the excise tax rates applied to the company’s tobacco products 
before a set date would be compensable. While the agreement was not removed 
from the state’s law, it provided for independent arbitration in case of a dispute 
over its compensation. In addition, there is a bilateral investment treaty between 
the host state and another state in which the TTC’s subsidiary has residence that 
includes a FET clause – this could buttress, if needed, the protection provided by 
the stand-alone arrangements of the investor-state contract. There were similar 
less-formal inducements offered to a separate TTC.
The extent to which incentives have been granted to the tobacco industry is 
unknown, but contracts and inducements are likely to be offered in the context of 
the privatization of state-owned tobacco interests and in dealings between investors 
and state-owned tobacco enterprises (63). Although countries have been entrapped 
by their incentives to industry, the investor-state contract provides the clearest 
example of how undertakings and inducements with the tobacco industry under-
mine tobacco control (56, 79–80). States should avoid offering industry incentives 
and, in particular, entering into contractual undertakings with the industry. More 
systematically, government should consider avoiding IIAs that elevate incentives 
and inducements above sensible and reasonable regulation.
4.2.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Health-protective and origin-neutral tobacco excise taxes are legally defensible, and 
industry threats are usually baseless. There are, however, certain rules governing 
procedure, design and consultation that governments may need to consider:
1. Governments should be aware of the standard of consultation required under do-
mestic law and any applicable international obligations (case studies 1, 2 and 3). 
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It is important to distance the tobacco industry from the policy-making 
process to the extent that this is permissible. Do not grant the industry special 
consideration, but do ensure that it is consulted with as required – for example, 
by providing public meetings, timely information and the ability to submit 
industry views – while being aware of potential procedural manipulation 
(case studies 1, 2 and 3).
2. Excise tax is generally safe from challenges that claim it is confiscation or 
expropriation under domestic or international law (case studies 4 and 5). 
But express limits on taxation can be found in other laws or a country’s 
constitution or in the limits of the power to tax granted to an authority (case 
studies 6 and 7). 
3. Explicit and de facto discrimination against foreign tobacco products or 
investors must be avoided in the design, implementation or enforcement of 
tax measures (case studies 8, 9, 10 and 11). Legal issues may arise not from 
the tax measure itself, but rather from ancillary measures that support its 
implementation (case studies 9 and 10).
4. Explicit differentiation between products based on their effect on health may 
be challenged as discrimination if it falls heaviest on imported products and 
has to be justified on the basis of evidence of impact on health and a lack of 
alternatives.
5. Investment incentives in the form of inducements or contractual undertak-
ings should not be offered, as these may be binding (case study 12) or may 
ground a challenge under an IIA; they are also contrary to the WHO FCTC 
Article 5.3 Guidelines.
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4.3 SCARE TACTIC A: ANTI-POOR RHETORIC (REGRESSIVITY)
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
In their efforts to lobby against tax increases, the tobacco industry and its affiliates 
often claim that increases in tobacco taxation will hurt the poor (81–82). This argu-
ment is based on the concept of regressivity in relation to taxation. Conceptually, a 
tax can be regressive if it means that lower-income people pay a greater proportion 
of their household income to meet the tax burden than do wealthy people. In other 
words, the tax burden tends to be relatively higher for lower-income households than 
for middle- and high-income households. However, there are two limitations to the 
industry’s argument. First, the concept of regressivity based solely on tax burden 
does not consider the wider health and economic harms caused by tobacco use. 
Second, higher tobacco taxes and prices can induce behaviour change among the 
population, as reflected in the price elasticity of demand (83–84). In combination, 
these broader considerations effectively make tobacco taxation a progressive – rather 
than regressive – public health intervention.
4.3.2 REGRESSIVITY AND THE BROADER PERSPECTIVE
In a narrow sense, tobacco taxation can be seen as regressive because lower-income 
people must allocate a relatively greater proportion of their household income than 
wealthy people to pay for tobacco products when those products become more 
expensive following a tax increase. In many countries, people from lower-income 
groups use tobacco more than other people (85). A systematic literature review by 
WHO found a robust association between lower income and a higher prevalence 
of current smoking among adults, both men and women (86). This finding was 
consistent across three decades of studies, across most geographic regions and across 
countries of different income classifications. For example, in India, high rates of 
tobacco use – i.e. use by more than 30% of the adult population – are found only in 
lower-income states such as Assam and Odisha, where net state domestic product 
is still below 100 000 rupees per capita (see Fig. 4.3.1) (87).
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Fig. 4.3.1 Relationship between adult tobacco use and net state domestic product per capita in 
states and union territories of India, 2016–2017
 
Source: (87).
However, this finding does not account for broader health and economic factors that 
determine the full impact on households. Tobacco taxation can in fact be viewed as a 
progressive – or pro-poor – policy when these wider considerations are properly ac-
counted for and explained. In terms of health concerns, the relatively high use of tobac-
co among low-income populations translates into a much greater burden of tobacco-
attributable diseases for these populations, including higher morbidity and mortality. 
Low-income groups are also less able to afford medical care to treat tobacco-
attributable diseases, and large out-of-pocket medical expenditures can further 
impoverish many families. Consequently, many poor individuals do not get or 
even seek the medical care they need. One study found that in Bangladesh, 55% of 
patients diagnosed with a tobacco-attributable illness did not seek further medical 
care. This lack of health care utilization was attributed in part to prohibitively high 
out-of-pocket treatment costs (88). The combination of high rates of tobacco use 
and lack of access to affordable medical care means that tobacco use measurably 
contributes to the poverty rate in a number of high-tobacco-burden countries, 
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The poor are also known to be more price-sensitive than the wealthy; lower-income 
smokers exhibit higher price elasticities than their higher-income counterparts. This 
is demonstrated in recent studies by the World Bank, findings of which are shown 
in Fig. 4.3.2 (91). The poor respond more strongly to higher tobacco taxes and 
prices by reducing their use of tobacco products more than others, and thus they 
benefit disproportionately in terms of avoiding tobacco-related deaths, diseases and 
associated medical costs. A similar conclusion was drawn in a systematic review of 
the population impact of tobacco control policies on socioeconomic inequities in 
high-income countries at the late stage of the tobacco epidemic (92). The review 
found 16 relevant studies relating to taxation, only one of which found a regressive 
association between tax and the social economic gradient (seven found a progressive 
impact, while the others produced mixed results).
Fig. 4.3.2 Price elasticity of tobacco consumption, medium estimate, by decile
Source: (91).
This wider economic perspective is explained in the World Bank’s Extended Cost-
Benefit Analysis (ECBA) framework, which assesses the distributional impact of 
tobacco tax increases on health, among other factors (82, 83). That is, the ECBA 
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on household expenditure by income levels) to capture the full distribution of 
benefits, including improved health and income.
The ECBA framework has been applied in studies of various countries, including 
Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Indonesia, Republic of Moldova, South 
Africa, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Viet Nam. The evidence from these 
studies supports the view that effective tobacco tax policies can generate pro-poor 
and welfare-improving outcomes. When reductions in medical expenditures and 
additional years of working life that result from lower smoking-related mortality are 
taken into account, the overall policy of tobacco tax increases becomes progressive 
rather than regressive (see Fig. 4.3.3) (84). A similar conclusion has been reached 
in studies of high-income countries, such as the United States, where a tobacco tax 
increase was enacted in 2009 (93).
Fig. 4.3.3 Impact of a 100% price increase, with medium elasticities, by deciles
 
Source: (91).
Tobacco tax increases will also often lead wealthier smokers to contribute relatively 
more than poorer smokers to the overall amount of tax revenue collected. This is 
because poorer smokers reduce their consumption the most, since they are more price-
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taxed) tobacco products (94). Hence, higher tobacco taxes can be seen as progressive 
in terms of additional revenue collection and health gains resulting from cessation, 
as well as from preventing the young from taking up smoking in the first place. One 
study from China suggests that a 50% tax increase would raise US$ 703 billion over 
50 years, with just 14% of this increase being borne by smokers in the lowest income 
quintile (95). In addition, the tax increase would yield a savings of US$ 24 billion 
in expenditures on tobacco-related diseases, with about 28% of these savings being 
enjoyed by smokers in the lowest income quintile.
The ECBA framework actually presents a rather conservative profile of the net 
benefits of raising tobacco taxes, since it does not include other sources of gain, 
such as reduced harm from exposure to second-hand smoke, increased productivity 
and the potential for poor households to benefit from social programmes funded 
through increased tax revenues (96).
Assessments of the distributive impact of the 2009 tobacco tax increase in the United 
States found that the overall progressivity of the increase was enhanced by the tax rev-
enue being used to expand health insurance coverage for children of low- and middle-
income families (97). Accounting for this expanded coverage added to the progressiv-
ity of the overall legislative package, the bottom line being that the impacts are positive 
for lower-income quintiles and greatest, on average, for low-income households (93).
Similarly, a large proportion of the tobacco tax revenues from the Philippines’ 
so-called Sin Tax Reform was used to subsidize universal health coverage (UHC) 
for poor and near-poor families. Globally, 37 countries are known to earmark some 
tobacco tax revenues for health programs, with many of these programs indirectly 
benefiting the poor and less-advantaged disproportionately more than other groups 
(27) (for details on earmarking, see section 4.6).
4.3.3 CONCLUSIONS
Contrary to the perception of tobacco taxation being regressive, it is a strong pro-
poor policy when the broader economic impacts are taken into consideration. The 
tax burden is not a complete indicator of regressivity, since it does not include the 
negative health and economic impacts of tobacco-attributable diseases or the positive 
impacts of behaviour change in response to tax and price increases.
The health and economic burdens of tobacco-attributable diseases fall dispropor-
tionately on the poor, who tend to have higher tobacco use and are also the least able to 
afford the necessary medical care. Because the poor tend to be more price-sensitive, they 
curtail their use and consumption more significantly than wealthier smokers in response 
to tax increases, which in turn reduces their downstream health and economic costs.
Tobacco taxation can be made even more progressive by earmarking or allocating 
tobacco tax revenues for social goods and services that benefit the poor (see section 4.6).
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 217 
4.4 SCARE TACTIC R: REVENUE REDUCTION 
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION
The tobacco industry and its allies argue that tobacco tax increases result in reduced 
tax revenues for the government. According to them, the reduction in revenues is 
caused either by substitution to cheaper, lower-taxed or smuggled tobacco products 
or by reductions in consumption overall (98–99). 
The tobacco industry often refers to the Laffer curve to make this argument. 
According to this curve, revenues increase along with tax rates up to a certain 
point, after which further increasing tax rates leads to declining revenues. When 
considering tobacco taxes, the tobacco industry assumes that countries are already 
approaching or are even beyond the critical tax rate level (98). 
However, the argument rests on a narrow theoretical and empirically unsubstanti-
ated foundation (98–100). The price inelastic demand for tobacco and the relatively 
low tax share in prices in many countries explain the win-win for public health 
and finance, i.e. that declines in consumption and increases in revenues can occur 
simultaneously (98, 101). Furthermore, many country examples (see case studies 
below) demonstrate that well-designed and well-implemented tobacco tax increases 
lead to increases in revenue, at least in the short to medium term (98, 100). Although 
consumption will diminish with a tobacco tax increase, the percentage increase in 
excise tax per unit is greater than the percentage decrease in tobacco consumption, 
cancelling out at least some of the effect of reduced consumption on revenue (98–99).
A change in the tax rate, with all other factors influencing consumption kept 
constant, corresponds to a change in the tax revenue and is represented by a move-
ment along the Laffer curve. As the tax rate changes, so does the elasticity of the tax 
base; each point on the Laffer curve corresponds to a different tax base elasticity. 
When one or more of the other factors changes, this affects the position of the curve, 
and the tax base elasticity changes at a given tax rate. For example, a successful 
smoke-free policy or advertising ban that reduces the demand for tobacco shifts 
the curve down, reducing the tax revenue potential for each tax rate.
To demonstrate that few, if any, countries are beyond the revenue-maximizing 
point on the Laffer curve, Table 4.7 shows the revenue impact of increasing excise taxes 
under different scenarios, using different price elasticities of demand, different levels 
of tax increases and different starting tax shares, depending on country income levels. 
This is the tax base elasticity approach from which the Laffer curve is derived (for more 
details, see section 2.2.3 and Annex 2.2). The total and excise tax shares shown are 
weighted averages for each country income group, calculated from the RGTE dataset. 
The revenue gains were simulated using progressive levels of excise tax increases 
(25%, 50%, 75% and 100%) and varying price elasticities of demand (-0.4 to -1.2). 
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Table 4.7 Percent increase in excise revenues under different scenarios of tax levels, tax 














Increase in excise revenue when price elasticity  
of demand is:
-0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2
LOW 
INCOME 38% 22%
25% 22% 20% 19% 17% 16%
50% 43% 39% 36% 33% 29%
75% 63% 57% 52% 46% 41%
100% 82% 74% 66% 59% 51%
MIDDLE 
INCOME 58% 41%
25% 19% 17% 14% 11% 9%
50% 37% 31% 26% 20% 15%
75% 54% 45% 36% 27% 19%
100% 71% 57% 45% 34% 23%
HIGH 
INCOME 68% 55%
25% 18% 15% 11% 8% 5%
50% 35% 27% 21% 14% 8%
75% 50% 39% 29% 19% 10%
100% 65% 50% 36% 23% 11%
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the RGTE  (27).21
Substantial revenue increases occurred in all the scenarios that were considered 
in the simulation. These results reaffirm much of what is already known, i.e. that 
higher tax increases generate higher revenue gains, and that these gains increase 
with the increasing inelasticity of demand. Even when demand is relatively price 
elastic (-1.2), the simulation predicts a gain in revenue. The tax share in price also 
affects revenue potential. The lower the tax share in price, the larger the revenue 
potential. This suggests that revenue reductions as a result of an excise tax increase 
will occur only if the scenario is extreme (i.e. a very elastic demand coupled with a 
very high current tax share). It is important to note that the vast empirical literature 
20  These projections use 2018 data from 185 countries. The countries were classified according to World 
Bank income group, with the average total tax share, excise tax share and VAT/sales tax share for each 
country weighted according to the number of current adult cigarette smokers. To calculate the projected 
revenue for each stated elasticity, it was assumed that there would be full pass-through of the excise 
tax increase, along with constant percentages of non-excise taxes (VAT/sales tax) as a share of the retail 
price. The consequent changes in price were multiplied against the respective elasticities to derive the 
expected change in consumption. The projected revenues could be easily computed by multiplying the 
new consumption figures against the increased excise tax rates.
21  These calculations do not take into account brand substitution (cross-price elasticities), income ef-
fects or illicit trade. The excise tax was assumed to be a specific tax, while the non-excise taxes (VAT and 
others) were bundled and treated as an ad valorem tax with retail price as the tax base. The difference 
between retail price minus all taxes was also assumed to be constant, with full pass-through of the tax 
increase to consumers.
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shows tobacco to be universally inelastic; thus the extreme scenario should not be 
given credence by policy-makers. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the data in 
Table 4.7, tax shares in most countries are relatively low and reinforce the revenue 
potential of tobacco tax increases.
The revenue potential of tobacco taxes is indeed quite significant. It is estimated 
that in 2018, excise taxes on cigarettes generated a total of US$ 361 billion in revenues 
worldwide, including US$ 162 billion in LMICs. If all countries were to raise excise 
rates by the equivalent of US$ 1 per pack of cigarettes, the amount of excise revenue 
would increase by between US$ 178 billion and US$ 219 billion, or by 49–61% at 2018 
levels. LMICs would gain the most from these tax increases, with excise revenues 
in these countries increasing by US$ 133 billion to US$ 167 billion, or by 82–103%.22
Revenue reduction in the countries examined was due to other causes, not the 
tax increase per se. For example, Tonga significantly increased its excise tax on 
cigarettes in 2016 and saw a very sharp decrease in its consumption (40% decrease), 
followed by a revenue decrease. This occurred because 20% of smokers switched to 
an untaxed, cheap local loose tobacco product called Tapaka Tonga (102). The lesson 
learned was that Tonga needed to tax all its tobacco products at the same level to 
avoid substitution to lower-price/untaxed tobacco products. Another example of 
revenue decrease that was not related to tax increases but rather to tax administration 
mismanagement is the case of South Africa (see explanation in the case study later 
in this section). Finally, declines in revenue due to long-term declining trends in 
tobacco use should not be confused with being beyond the revenue-maximizing 
point of the Laffer curve. For example, in the United Kingdom, where long-term 
declines in tobacco use are being experienced, a nominal decline in revenues occurred 
between 2017 and 2018 even though excise taxes remained unchanged. Conversely, 
even countries with very high tobacco excise rates experience increases in revenues 
as a result of tobacco tax increases (see the case study of Australia below) (98, 100). 
This suggests that few countries, if any, are beyond the revenue-maximizing point 
on the Laffer curve.
Tobacco consumption is expected to be tax inelastic, even if demand becomes 
effectively price elastic as a result of successful tobacco control interventions. Taxation 
serves as an instrument for both fiscal and public health objectives. If after successful 
tobacco control interventions, prices reach levels where demand is elastic, the tax base 
is still most likely to be inelastic due to tax undershifting, since overshifting is not a 
good pricing policy when demand is elastic (for a more detailed discussion on the 
shifting of tax, see section 2.2.2). In other words, a tax rate increase in combination 
22  Goodchild M, Perucic AM, Paul J. Tobacco taxation as a strategy to achieve global targets for smoking 
prevalence. Unpublished manuscript. October 2020.
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with non-price tobacco control measures, which make consumers more sensitive to 
price (tax) increases, leads to declining but still positive marginal revenues.
In the long run, tobacco control policies, including price and tax measures, may 
be so successful in reducing consumption that revenues will plateau or fall. This 
is ultimately the long-term policy goal. Reducing the impact of the policies and 
ending the global tobacco epidemic is the aim of tobacco control and not something 
to be avoided. However, ending the global tobacco epidemic is unfortunately not 
foreseen in the short to medium term; therefore, governments can currently rely 
upon tobacco taxes as a reliable source of revenue (103). 
4.4.2 THE REVENUE IMPACT OF EXCISE TAX INCREASES: CASE STUDIES
The following case studies illustrate four key points: (1) large and regular tax increases 
result in large and consistent revenue increases; (2) countries with high taxes and 
falling prevalence of tobacco use can still increase revenue with tax increases; (3) 
countries that reduce taxes experience revenue declines; and (4) countries that 
increase taxes in the face of illicit trade still increase revenue.
Large and regular tax increases usually mean large and consistent  
revenue increases 
South Africa’s experience shows how successive tax increases, well above inflation 
and year after year, generate additional revenues even after taxes have been increased 
substantially. After two decades of declining real revenue in the 1970s and 1980s 
as real excise per pack declined, South Africa implemented successive excise tax 
increases from 1994 until 2011 (Fig. 4.4.1) (98, 104). After adjusting for inflation, 
this resulted in a real excise tax revenue increase of 245% (98). Revenues began to 
plateau from 2012 as tax increases stalled. They began to decline after 2015 – not due 
to tax increases, however, but due to a dramatic decline in administrative capacity 
and enforcement measures exacerbated by large-scale corruption in the government, 
including the tax administration authority (105). The rapid and catastrophic decline 
in tax administration and enforcement has been the subject of much attention (106).
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Fig. 4.4.1 Real excise tax per pack of cigarettes and real excise tax revenue in South Africa, 
1961–2020
Source: Data shared by University of Cape Town, 2020.
Similarly, the Philippines provides a compelling example of how large and regular 
tax increases alongside reforms to tax structure can lead to large and consistent 
revenue increases – in this case, also through an accompanying reform to the tax 
structure (Fig. 4.4.2) (98). The 2012 Sin Tax Law consolidated the country’s four 
tax tiers into two by 2013 and established a uniform structure by 2017. The same 
law provided for large, progressive increases across the board, but in particular for 
the lowest tax categories (98). Not only were the revenue gains substantial, they 
exceeded all the projections for 2013–2017 made prior to the law’s passage (98).
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Fig. 4.4.2 Real excise tax per pack of cigarettes (multitier, two-tier, unitary) and total tobacco 
real excise tax revenue in the Philippines, 2012–2018
Note: Data were adjusted for inflation, using annual percentage change of average consumer prices from 
the IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2020, and using 2012 as the base year. 
Sources: (107, 108 and data shared by the Philippines Department of Finance, September 2020).
Ukraine is another example of a country that has regularly increased taxes over 
the past 10 years and has experienced increased revenues along with decreases in 
consumption and the number of smokers. Figure 4.4.3 the shows the trends in excise 
tax, revenues, cigarette sales and number of smokers in 2008–2017. Increases in 
excise rates were consistently accompanied by increases in revenues. In 2014–2015, 
excise tax was not increased above inflation (and inflation, especially in 2015, was 
very high, at 48.7%), so real values of excise and revenues went down. But it is 
evident from the data that revenues closely follow the path of excise levels even 
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Fig. 4.4.3 Average real cigarette excise tax rates, real cigarettes excise tax revenues (base year 
2008) and cigarette sales and number of cigarette smokers in Ukraine, 2008–2017
 
 
Note: Data were adjusted for inflation, using annual percentage change of average consumer prices from 
the IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2020, and using 2008 as the base year. 
Source: Data provided by Konstantin Krasovsky, July 2020.
Countries with high tax and falling prevalence of tobacco use can still increase 
revenue with tax increases
Countries with already high tobacco taxes and rapidly diminishing tobacco use 
can still increase revenue by increasing taxes (98, 109). Australia has implemented 
comprehensive tobacco control policies and enacted consistent tobacco tax increases 
on top of what were already some of the highest tax rates in the world (see Fig. 4.4.4). 
Between 2001 and 2010, revenue increased with increasing tax rates, but in real 
terms (inflation-adjusted) it remained static (109). Then, in 2010, a 25% excise tax 
increase was introduced, with large annual increases scheduled from 2013 onward 
(98, 109). The result of this tax policy has been consistent and large increases in 
revenue year after year for nearly a decade, even when the increases were being 
made on already high tax rates.23
23  The apparent reduction in revenues in 2012 and 2013 was due to a change in the source of the data for 
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Fig. 4.4.4 Real excise tax and customs duty per stick and real total revenue (all tobacco 
products) in Australia, 2001–2019  
Notes: Rates published by Australian Taxation Office and Australia Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection, adjusted using Australian Bureau of Statistics Consumer Price Index rates. The 2011–2012 and 
2012–2013 figures do not include customs duty, which explains the apparent decline in revenue. Using official 
disclosures, Scollo and Bayly estimate that duties in these years were $7397.2 and $7687.2 respectively (110). 
Sources: (109, 110). 
Countries that reduced taxes and saw revenues decline
Prior to 1982, Canada lowered taxes on cigarettes and experienced declining revenues 
as well as increased smoking – particularly among youth. Subsequent fivefold in-
creases in cigarette taxes between 1982 and 1992 resulted in more revenue, increases 
in retail price and substantial reductions in consumption, with teenage smoking 
declining by nearly two thirds (5). In the early 1990s, a growing illicit trade in ciga-
rettes emerged in which Canadian cigarettes exported to the United States were then 
smuggled back into Canada (5). The tobacco industry – which was later found to be 
complicit in and profiting from this illicit trade – sought to frame Canada’s high tax 
rates as the cause of smuggling (111–112) and succeeded in convincing the federal 
government, as well as six provincial governments, to make massive reductions in 
the tobacco tax (111–112). As a result, federal tax revenues fell significantly – more 
than twice as much as the government had predicted – and smoking rates among 
both adults and youth began to increase (5, 112). The Canadian government later 
changed its strategy, and the federal excise tax was restored, resulting in increased 
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revenues and decreased smoking (5). Canada’s focus then shifted to using customs 
enforcement, rather than tax rates, as the best means of countering illicit trade (5).
Countries that increased taxes in the face of illicit trade and still  
increased revenue
As discussed in section 4.1, the tobacco industry exploits illicit trade as a strategy 
to undermine tobacco tax policy, with the goal of deterring governments from 
increasing tobacco taxes. The narrative that has been created is that higher tobacco 
tax rates result in increased illicit trade and undermine the policy goals by resulting 
in lower (or no) declines in tobacco use or lower (or no) increases or even decreases 
in revenue. However, as shown in section 4.1, the empirical evidence does not sup-
port the industry arguments. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the industry 
and its allies have consistently overstated and exaggerated the scale and extent of 
illicit trade (see section 4.1).
As was the case in Canada, Brazil’s tobacco tax policy suffered from a fear that 
the illicit market would expand unless it was undercut by price competition in the 
legal market, which it was thought could be best encouraged through tax cuts (20). 
Real excise tax rates declined from 1999 until the mid 2000s, as nominal increases 
were below the rate of inflation. This resulted in declines in real tax revenues (20). In 
these years, the tobacco industry used the tax cuts to increase profit margins rather 
than decrease prices and outcompete the illicit market, while also exaggerating the 
size and scope of the illicit trade problem (20). This caused the industry’s argument 
on illicit trade and revenue to lose credibility and resulted in increases in tax rates 
from 2007 onwards, with a major reform passed in 2011 (20). Tobacco excise rates 
and minimum prices were scheduled by the law to increase at levels above expected 
inflation from 2011 until 2015 (20). This resulted in substantial increases in the 
tobacco excise per pack, as well as overall revenue, which by 2015 had more than 
doubled from its low point in 2013 – equating to more than 50% in real terms (see 
Fig. 4.4.5). The success of this reform shows that revenues can be increased by higher 
rates despite the presence of a sizeable illicit market (113). More recent data show 
that revenues in Brazil declined in 2015 and 2016, coinciding with an increase in 
illicit trade, but also with an exceptionally bad economic recession that saw GDP 
decline by more than 3% in those years.
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Fig. 4.4.5 Average real excise tax per pack, real excise tax revenues and domestic cigarette sales 
in Brazil, 1999–2014
Notes: Data based on domestic sales and tobacco excise revenues, Federal Revenue Secretariat, indexed to 2013 
Brazilian reals, using Consumer Price Index. Revenue collection indexed to 2013 reals, using Consumer Price Index. 
Source: (20).
Improvements in tax administration and enforcement can also generate increases 
in revenues. In Kenya, several measures, including fiscal markings and, later, an 
advanced tracking and tracing system, improved collection, resulting in increases 
in both legal sales and tax revenues and a reduction in illicit sales (114). Moreover, 
these examples of poor governance indicate that attention should be focused on 
countries where a significant loss in administrative and enforcement capacity un-
dermined revenue collection. 
4.4.3 CONCLUSIONS
The tobacco industry uses revenue concerns as a SCARE tactic to avoid, dilute 
and/or delay tobacco tax increases. The argument that higher taxes will decrease 
revenue is theoretically plausible, but real-world examples have demonstrated that 
this has not occurred. Furthermore, simulations show that even large tax increases 
in current average tax shares yield substantial revenue gains. 
The use of the Laffer curve by the tobacco industry should be challenged and 
refuted. The relatively price inelastic nature of cigarette demand combined with the 
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low tax share and no overshifting of the tax means that most – if not all – countries 
are still far from the revenue-maximizing point, indicating that increases in taxes 
will lead to increases in revenues.
The case studies in this section refute each of the tobacco industry’s arguments 
regarding alleged potential revenue loss due to tax increases. The experiences of South 
Africa, the Philippines and Ukraine demonstrate that large and regular tax increases 
result in large and consistent revenue increases. Well-designed tax structures have also 
proven to play an important role in generating revenues. The experience of Australia 
shows that even countries with already high tax rates and declining prevalence of 
tobacco use can increase revenues with regular, large tax increases. The experience 
of Canada warns against following the advice of the tobacco industry to decrease 
taxes as a way to fight illicit trade. It demonstrates clearly that decreasing tobacco 
taxes will decrease revenue and encourage consumption, rather than counteract 
illicit trade. The experience of Brazil shows that countries with substantial illicit 
trade issues can still increase revenue by increasing taxes.
Finally, in the few cases where revenue decreases were seen, the reasons for the 
decreases were not strictly linked to tax increases. This was the case in Tonga, where 
the increase in tax was applied only to cigarettes and not to their close substitute, 
loose tobacco – leading smokers to switch products. In South Africa, a decrease 
in revenue was the result of the weakening of government institutions. And in 
Ukraine, real revenues decreased only during the two years when taxes were not 
increased above inflation. 
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4.5 SCARE TACTIC E: EMPLOYMENT
4.5.1 INTRODUCTION
In opposing tax increases, the tobacco industry often seeks to frame tobacco taxes as 
an economic rather than a public health issue (5, 48, 53, 115). Particular emphasis is 
placed on the alleged threat that tax increases pose to employment in tobacco farm-
ing and manufacturing, as well as other related industries (5). This so-called choice 
between health and jobs is, however, based on several false premises, including (5):
1. tobacco is a significant source of jobs within the context of broader labour 
markets, and domestic tobacco tax increases will have a drastic effect on 
domestic employment  (48, 53, 116–117);
2. tobacco consumption is an indispensable engine for job creation (5, 48, 54); and
3. tobacco provides highly prosperous, sustainable and irreplaceable livelihoods 
(5, 53, 118).
In reality, the relationship between tobacco taxation and employment is consider-
ably more complex than the industry makes it out to be. In fact, there is ample 
evidence to show that tobacco taxes are a win-win for public health and the fiscal 
space, without measurable risks to employment. 
4.5.2 THE LINK BETWEEN TOBACCO EMPLOYMENT AND  
TOBACCO TAX RATES 
Tobacco farming, production and manufacturing (including hand-rolling in some 
countries, most of them in South-East Asia) constitute a small proportion of the 
labour force, even in countries where the industry is most heavily concentrated (5, 48, 
103, 116). Employment in tobacco farming and manufacturing has been declining 
globally due to advances in technology, trade liberalization, market consolidation 
and the privatization of formerly state-owned tobacco companies (5, 103, 119). 
These same trends have led to the heavy concentration of tobacco growing and 
manufacturing in only a handful of countries – and within these countries, often in 
only a small number of regions (103, 119–121). Even in those countries that lead in 
tobacco growing and manufacturing, tobacco’s overall share of total agricultural and 
manufacturing employment is relatively small and is often decreasing as efficiencies 
in production reduce labour intensity (5, 117–118, 122).
Similarly, the industry’s claim that tobacco taxes reduce employment is exag-
gerated and typically overlooks wider trends driving tobacco industry employment. 
Indeed, tobacco industry developments and innovations have played a greater role 
in the reduction of employment in the tobacco industry than have tobacco control 
policies (103). Despite industry claims that tobacco taxes can affect employment, 
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 229 
characteristics of the location of production – such as market size, labour costs, 
growing conditions and leaf preferences –  have much more to do with tobacco 
industry interests than with the tobacco tax rate (103, 123). Moreover, jobs in countries 
that produce tobacco primarily for export are not greatly affected by reductions 
in local consumption resulting from tax increases (5, 103, 116, 123). Finally, it has 
been demonstrated that tobacco tax increases do not have a significant effect on 
employment in the retail sector, as most retail businesses sell other goods (103).
Estimates of the gross employment impact of tobacco tax hikes demonstrate 
that job losses that do occur can be more than compensated for by increases in 
revenue. A 2018 World Bank study estimated that in Indonesia, for example, an 
ambitious tax reform that would simplify tiers and increase prices by close to 50% 
would reduce gross employment in the tobacco manufacturing sector by less than 
0.5% (a loss of 2 914 jobs). The government could provide income support to the 
displaced workers (for example, through training, temporary transport/mobility 
or income support) with less than 2% of the revenue gained from the tax increase 
(117). Similarly, a 2019 study by Bangladesh’s National Board of Revenue estimated 
that a substantial increase in tobacco taxation would cause 7 012 lost jobs, but that 
the total income associated with these job losses in the bidi industry would amount 
to only 3.5% of the revenue gained (120). Accordingly, increased revenue can more 
than compensate for the expenditure of supporting those who lose jobs and need 
to acquire new skills before transitioning to new employment (120).
Box 4.5.1 Employment fears deployed to frustrate tobacco 
tax reform in Indonesia
In 2017, the Indonesian Ministry of Finance decided to implement tobacco tax in-
creases by 2019 and tier simplification by 2021 (124). This resolution was, however, 
abandoned within a year, after a concerted campaign by tobacco industry actors 
and their allies to reframe the increase as an economic issue with a focus on, among 
other things, the effect the tobacco tax increase would have on employment (124). 
This defeat for the tobacco tax initiative came despite estimations of how the loss of 
income associated with lost jobs would be dwarfed by the additional revenue gained 
by the tax (117). Earlier analysis had estimated an overall large net positive impact 
on employment from tobacco tax increases (125), which illustrates how evidence 
that challenges assumptions around the negative socioeconomic impacts of tobacco 
control tends to be discounted (126). In this case, tobacco industry arguments seem 
to have resonated strongly with politicians from the electoral districts of West Java, 
East Java, Central Java and West Nusa Tenggara, where employment in tobacco
farming and manufacturing is concentrated (124). Although tobacco manufacturing 
230  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
represented only 5.13% of total manufacturing employment, the concentration of 
the job and economic activity meant that arguments regarding employment were 
particularly salient (117,119). Accordingly, tobacco industry arguments that tobacco 
taxation would negatively impact employment and farmer livelihoods prevailed, 
despite strong opposing evidence (119). Concentration of tobacco industry activity 
within countries poses particular obstacles to overcoming industry arguments on 
employment and needs to be given careful attention.
4.5.3 THE EVIDENCE ON THE NET EFFECT OF TOBACCO TAX INCREASES 
ON EMPLOYMENT
 A proper analysis of the effect of tobacco tax increases on employment must examine 
their impact on net or economywide employment. Decreases in expenditures on 
tobacco associated with tobacco control do not mean that expenditures simply 
disappear; rather, they are redistributed towards consumption of other goods and 
services, thereby generating employment elsewhere in the economy (5, 103, 123). 
Similarly, though the effect of higher tobacco taxes on net consumption is arguably 
more ambiguous, revenues from this intervention do generate spending, invest-
ment and employment in public services such as health and education (5). Tobacco 
control polices usually have a marginal neutral or positive effect on net employment, 
particularly in countries that are net importers of raw or manufactured tobacco 
products, as expenditures on these imported items tend to flow out of the country 
(5). Export-oriented tobacco producers are less sensitive to local demand and are 
not significantly affected by domestic tobacco tax measures, which likely have a 
near-neutral net impact (5). In some cases, the net employment impact is a very 
small negative number, typically less than 1% (127–128). 
A recent study estimated that in the United Republic of Tanzania – a large 
tobacco-producing and exporting country – a 30% reduction in smoking prevalence 
would result in a net employment decline of just 0.5% across the economy as a 
whole (129). A similar study of Pakistan found that, with some variance depending 
on where spending was redistributed from tobacco consumption, the overall net 
effect on employment from a significant reduction in expenditure on cigarette 
employment – 1 billion rupees – would be a gain of between 6 651 and 5 803 jobs 
(122). This increase would occur because expenditure on cigarettes produces much 
less employment in the broader economy than expenditure on food and education 
(122). In the United Republic of Tanzania, as elsewhere, increased revenue could 
be used to assist those who lose employment with transitioning to new livelihoods.
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4.5.4 THE VIABILITY OF BETTER LIVELIHOODS  
In arguing against tobacco tax increases, the tobacco industry advances the myth 
that people employed in tobacco production – particularly tobacco farming, but 
also manufacturing – lack any other prospect for a comparably attractive livelihood. 
However, studies based on extensive survey data in Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, the 
Philippines and Zambia have shown that despite needing to commit significant 
amounts of labour to their crop, tobacco farmers often suffer losses rather than gain 
profits (119, 121, 123, 130–132). Furthermore, the Indonesian studies demonstrate 
that tobacco farming has a negative impact on household income and opportunity 
compared with the experience of other farming households that have given it up (119). 
Declines in consumption as a result of tobacco tax increases are gradual and 
susceptible to the same progressive adaptation that has occurred for decades (5, 103). 
While there will be a need in some countries for the government to help farmers 
transition to other crops or industries in the longer term, this process will not be a 
major short-term shock to employment or the wider economy (123).  
Because tobacco growing and manufacturing can be concentrated in just a few 
locations within a country, job losses within the tobacco industry might have a 
disproportionate effect in one location, while employment gains from reduced 
consumption may be spread across the whole country (120, 123). A study of the 
employment effects of tobacco tax increases in Bangladesh estimated that up to 
60% of all job losses would occur in only two districts – among the poorest in the 
country – due to the high level of industry concentration (120). Studying the need 
for support, as well as the means of delivery and funding of support, is particularly 
necessary in these circumstances. Beyond the need to ensure equity and support 
employment, a failure to provide for targeted relief can exacerbate fear of job losses 
and may prove fatal to a tobacco tax proposal (120).
Box 4.5.2: Supporting alternative livelihoods  
in the Philippines
The Philippines earmarked 15% of the revenue from a 2012 increase in tobacco taxes 
to supporting economically viable alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers and 
workers (5). Tobacco farming in the Philippines is regionally concentrated, and the 
tobacco industry had previously been successful in deploying concern for smallholder 
tobacco farmers to undermine tobacco control measures (136). The provision of 
economic support was a politically effective countermeasure to tobacco industry 
SCARE tactics and eased the tax increase’s passage. 
Given the Philippines’ integration with global tobacco markets and demand, 
tobacco farmers have not been seriously affected by the tobacco tax increase and 
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reduced domestic demand (108, 132). Nevertheless, transfers to tobacco-growing 
regions from the earmarked tax have been substantial (108). These funds are support-
ing gradual transitions to alternative livelihoods, with farmers being encouraged to 
take up alternative crops, as well as establishing infrastructure, such as market-to-farm 
roads, that will make these alternative crops more economically viable (108, 133–134).
Supporting alternative livelihoods for farmers and other tobacco workers is important 
because it can offset the political effect of industry arguments, even though domestic 
tax increases usually have only a modest and gradual effect on employment. There 
are various models for supporting alternative livelihoods when employment in the 
tobacco sector gradually diminishes due to decreases in either global or national 
demand. 
The Philippines is exemplary, but many other countries have either implemented 
or experimented with supporting crop transitions. Turkey’s alternative crop pro-
gramme, implemented in anticipation of the privatization of the country’s cigarette 
monopoly, has proven effective in supporting many tobacco farmers’ move to other 
crops (135). Smaller-scale crop substitution projects in Kenya and Yunnan Province 
in China have shown how financial, regulatory and infrastructure support from 
government can contribute to crop transitions (5, 53). Argentina, Bangladesh, Mexico 
and the state of Maryland in the United States provide additional case studies of 
how governments can support these transitions (5, 136).
4.5.5 CONCLUSIONS
The tobacco industry exaggerates the importance of tobacco employment and over-
states the impact that domestic demand reduction due to local taxes will have on 
tobacco farmers serving a global market. The industry also simplifies employment’s 
relationship with taxation by focusing only on gross employment in tobacco, which 
ignores the reality that expenditures on tobacco do not disappear but rather are 
redistributed for other consumption that can produce a similar or higher number 
of jobs.
Many detailed studies have found that tobacco growing is much less profitable 
and sustainable than the tobacco industry claims. Tobacco farmers throughout the 
world have successfully transitioned to other crops, although the transition often 
requires temporary or additional support from the government or other stakeholders. 
The extent of such support is moderated by the reality that transition from tobacco 
to other crops is a long-term consideration.
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4.6 EARMARKING TOBACCO TAX REVENUES TO FUND HEALTH
4.6.1  INTRODUCTION
Earmarking tax revenues involves the separation of all or a portion of revenue 
from a tax or group of taxes to be put aside for a specific purpose (137). Globally, 
more than 80 countries earmark for health (138), and 37 earmark tobacco tax 
revenues for health (27). There are two main types of earmarks: hard – also called 
substantive – and soft, or symbolic (139). Hard earmarks link the expenditure with 
a revenue source in legislation. This can limit funding if the earmarked revenues 
are the main source of funding, or it can cause surpluses to accrue wastefully when 
more revenues are raised than may be expended for the earmarked purpose. Soft 
earmarks include dedicated funds or commitments to use funds for a particular 
purpose. They are not necessarily legally binding. For example, in France, the ma-
jority of tobacco tax revenue is used to fund social security (which includes health 
insurance and health care), but there is no hard, formal earmark (140). Earmarks 
can also be some combination of hard and soft. In the Philippines, tobacco tax 
earmarks are legally binding, but earmarked revenues go to the general fund, and 
the Department of Health must submit an annual budget for covered programs as 
part of its budget request.
Earmarking is a broad and contentious topic that goes beyond the specifics of 
tobacco tax earmarking. Discussions on the topic fall within the ambit of public 
financial management, and earmarking generally is not encouraged. From a tobacco 
control perspective, however, tobacco tax earmarking is best understood as a way 
of selling significant tobacco tax increases to the public, politicians and officials. 
It is a tool to improve the political economy of tobacco taxation; it is a secondary 
issue only, after the primary goal of reducing demand for tobacco. One way to use 
earmarking to improve the political economy of tobacco taxation is to link the 
payment of tax by tobacco users to benefits they will receive through the funding of 
complementary tobacco control programmes, such as cessation support, or through 
increased funding for health programmes on which they will rely disproportionately. 
This is known as the benefit principle.
Earmarking for tobacco control makes sense, as its financial cost is relatively small 
and tobacco tax reduces demand more effectively when implemented within a package 
of complementary tobacco control measures. Another way earmarking improves 
the political economy of tobacco taxation is by safeguarding against any perceived 
or potential negative ramifications of the tax itself. This is important for neutralizing 
erroneous but often convincing tobacco industry arguments against effective tobacco 
tax policies. For example, the Philippines earmarks the bulk of the additional revenues 
from sin taxes for the health insurance premiums of the poor. In addition, a portion 
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of the country’s tobacco tax revenues is earmarked to provide for the economic 
well-being of tobacco growers and tobacco growing regions, with the general aim of 
promoting economically viable alternatives to tobacco farming and manufacturing 
as a safeguard against the potential for reduced domestic tobacco demand (141).
Tobacco tax earmarks are complex, however, and care is required when determin-
ing whether a particular earmark is needed on the grounds of political economy and 
justified on the grounds of equity and economic efficiency. In assessing tobacco tax 
earmarks, many of the same criteria that have been used to assess the appropriateness 
of generic earmarks also apply. In the rest of this section, these criteria are set out 
and matched with reasons for the ability of well-designed tobacco tax earmarks 
to fulfil them. The types and structures of tobacco tax earmarking are explored 
alongside descriptions of country experiences to provide guidance on how tobacco 
tax earmarks are used, when they are justified and the best ways to design them.
4.6.2 CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH EARMARKS MAY BE SUITABLE
Scepticism about earmarking is both long-standing and justified, but much of the 
debate concerns earmarking generally and is not specifically concerned with the 
merits of tobacco tax earmarking (138). The main concerns raised about earmark-
ing are listed in Table 4.8, accompanied by suggestions for how earmarks may be 
structured to address these concerns.
Table 4.8 Concerns about earmarking and suggested safeguards to avoid the concerns
MAJOR CONCERNS RAISED ABOUT 
EARMARKING
HOW DESIGNING EARMARKING 
SAFEGUARDS CAN ADDRESS THE CONCERN
Democratic accountability and oversight: 
earmarks undermine democratic processes by 
impeding legislative and executive oversight 
over expenditure.
Establishing proper oversight and accountability 
procedures is important to ensure funds are not 
mismanaged (138). Additionally, if a soft earmark 
structure, which transfers revenue to the general 
fund from which it is then allocated, is adopted, 
this will not be a concern. 
Budget rigidity:
earmarking may create budget rigidity that can 
lead to inefficient allocation of resources (138).
An earmark’s particular design determines how 
much rigidity is introduced (138). Flexible soft 
earmarks are less prone to introducing rigidity 
than hard earmarks. Concerns about rigidity can 
be reduced by the inclusion of a sunset clause 
that ensures that the earmark is automatically 
discontinued or reviewed after a set period of 
time has elapsed (138). A further safeguard is 
to establish the earmark as a waterfall account, 
with any excess revenue over a set amount being 
allocated to the general fund.
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MAJOR CONCERNS RAISED ABOUT 
EARMARKING
HOW DESIGNING EARMARKING 
SAFEGUARDS CAN ADDRESS THE CONCERN
Fragmentation: 
earmarking can result in fragmented and 
uncoordinated expenditures. This means policies 
complementary to the earmarked purpose but 
outside of its purview may be unfunded  
(138, 142).
This is a legitimate concern. The negatives of 
fragmentation cannot be entirely eliminated, but 
they may be outweighed by the other merits 
of tobacco tax earmarking. That said, proposals 
for tobacco tax earmarks should be scrutinized 
to ensure that the funded purpose is at least 
cost-effective.  
Decreased equity:
equity will decrease if individual access to 
benefits is narrowly defined according to 
payments made.
This issue is not likely to arise with tobacco tax 
earmarks but is conceivable and something 
that should be guarded against in an earmark’s 
design.
Capture by special interests: 
because earmarks are often the result of political 
expediency, an earmarked purpose may be 
determined by powerful special interests 
promoting a tax’s passage rather than careful 
prioritization of resources (138).
Well-designed earmarks will guarantee funding 
for underresourced programmes and high-
priority programmes. 
While the above concerns may be valid and design does matter, tobacco tax and 
other health-promoting taxes are not subject to the same concerns when it comes 
to the justifiability of earmarking their revenue (138, 143). Some of the factors that 
distinguish tobacco tax earmarks from more general critiques of earmarking are 
listed in Table 4.9 (138).
Table 4.9 Concerns about earmarking and distinguishing factor for tobacco tax earmarks
GENERAL CONCERNS RAISED BY EARMARKS DISTINGUISHING FACTOR FOR TOBACCO 
TAX EARMARKS
Procyclicality:  
earmarked revenues are often procyclical and 
susceptible to booms and busts (138–139, 142).
Tobacco tax revenues are generally not cyclical 
(they are recession-proof ), and revenue is 
predictable relative to most other indirect and 
direct taxes (103).
Budget rigidity Tobacco tax earmarks necessarily involve only 
a relatively small proportion of the budget; 
therefore, the effect of any rigidity will be 
relatively insignificant. Partly because of the 
relatively small amounts involved, there is only 
limited real-world evidence of tobacco tax 
earmarks having introduced harmful rigidity 
(143).24 
24  See also the subsection on the amount of money associated with tobacco tax earmarks in section 4.6.3.
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GENERAL CONCERNS RAISED BY EARMARKS DISTINGUISHING FACTOR FOR TOBACCO 
TAX EARMARKS
Capture by special interests All earmarks should be scrutinized to ensure 
that their funded purpose is cost-effective. In 
the case of tobacco tax earmarks, however, 
political economy considerations may mean 
that it is sufficient for a low-priority purpose 
to be funded if the funding will unlock the 
political will needed for effective tobacco tax 
increases. In these cases, special interests are 
being purposefully catered to in order to ensure 
that tobacco tax increases occur. Of course, 
arguments against tobacco taxes and tobacco 
tax earmarking are led by special interests such 
as the tobacco industry (144–147).
Insufficient revenue:
the earmarked revenue source may become 
insufficient for funding its purpose (139, 142).
Even though revenue may decrease in the 
long term when more tobacco users quit, such 
decrease is expected to be gradual. See Section 
4.4 for details on how, with effective design, 
revenue will generally increase even with 
declining consumption.
In addition to these reasons why general concerns about earmarking do not fully 
apply to well-designed tobacco tax earmarks, there are a number of compelling 
reasons for tobacco tax earmarking to finance tobacco control or public health that 
argue in favour of its implementation: 
• Significant increases in excise taxes are the most effective, as well as the 
most cost-effective mechanism for reducing consumption, but they are 
best implemented as a part of a package of complementary tobacco control 
measures, such as the WHO MPOWER package. Earmarking tobacco tax 
revenue for interventions that may not be funded otherwise can strengthen 
overall tobacco demand reduction (148).
• The political economy of tobacco tax increases also makes earmarks attractive: 
 – People have been shown to be more supportive of tobacco tax increases 
when they know the revenues will be used for targeted social programmes 
(143, 149–150). Earmarking tax revenue for health or tobacco control 
frames tobacco tax as a public health intervention in the minds of the 
public, which may otherwise view it as merely a revenue source (138). 
Research has shown that using earmarking to link a tobacco tax to health 
can also help raise awareness about the dangers of tobacco use (143).
 – When tobacco tax revenue is earmarked for programmes that benefit 
vulnerable groups, the tax becomes more equity-enhancing. Although 
lower socioeconomic groups and young adults receive disproportionate 
health and economic benefits from tobacco tax increases over the medium 
term, these groups will expend a greater share of their income in the 
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 237 
short term because of tobacco taxes. Earmarking tobacco tax revenue for 
programmes such as UHC or cessation services that provide immediate 
benefits to these groups neutralizes some critiques of tobacco taxation (e.g. 
the 2009 United States federal excise tax increase and the 2012 Philippines 
Sin Tax Reform illustrate how equity-enhancing earmarking facilitated 
passage of substantial tax rises) (93, 138, 143, 150).
4.6.3 EARMARKING PRACTICES AND COUNTRY EXAMPLES
Earmarking tax revenues for health is a common practice in 80 countries. In 2018, 
37 countries from all regions of the world earmarked tobacco tax revenues for 
health purposes.25
Case studies in the political economy of tobacco tax earmarking
In 2012, the Philippines comprehensively reformed tobacco and alcohol excise taxes. 
Tobacco taxes were increased significantly, and numerous tax tiers were reduced 
to only one tier by 2017. Although increasing revenue was a foremost motive for 
some officials, the reform was explicitly framed around boosting UHC funding and 
advancing public health by reducing alcohol and tobacco consumption. Earmark-
ing of tax revenue for UHC was essential to the political compromise that made 
this trailblazing tax increase a reality. It ensured that the increase, which may have 
otherwise been perceived as regressive, was framed as a progressive public health 
measure in the public imagination, while also appeasing tobacco growers and their 
political representatives. Earmarking was also important because the earmark en-
sured high-level support for the tax by achieving a key political priority (151). Its 
soft-earmark structure meant it was not a blank cheque to the Ministry of Health, 
and this addressed concerns within the Ministry of Finance.
Similarly, in Australia, earmarking of revenue helped overcome community 
objections to tobacco taxes and tobacco control more generally that resulted from 
the tobacco industry’s sponsorship of sports and the arts in the 1980s. Attempts to 
completely ban tobacco advertising and sponsorship had been unsuccessful due to 
strong pressure from sports, arts and racing lobbies that claimed that a ban would 
harm these activities. States, starting with Victoria, responded by earmarking funding 
for Health Promotion Foundations that took over the tobacco industry’s sponsorship 
activities and also paid for antismoking campaigns. In 1997, these earmarks ended 
after a High Court ruling that the Constitution did not allow states to collect excise 
taxes. However, in recognition of the successful work of the Foundations, the federal 
25  Details about earmarked taxes by country are provided at https://www.who.int/tobacco/global_report/
Table-9-4-Use-of-earmarked-tobacco-taxes.xls?ua=1.
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government began funding them directly from the federal budget (152). Although this 
example may be difficult to replicate precisely, it shows how earmarks with built-in 
sunset clauses for piloting cost-effective interventions can potentially graduate to 
funding from the general budget once they have proven their effectiveness. It also 
more generally shows how earmarks can disarm community objections, reframe 
tobacco tax increases and unlock the political will needed to advance effective 
tobacco control measures.
Structures for managing earmarked tobacco taxes
A 2016 review of nine countries’ tobacco tax revenue earmarking experiences 
identified three arrangements for governance and allocating revenue (151). Table 
4.10 presents some examples of these allocation arrangements. In some countries, 
earmarked tobacco tax revenues are combined with alcohol tax revenues.
Table 4.10 Illustrative arrangements for allocating earmarked tobacco tax revenues
POSSIBILITIES FOR ALLOCATING TOBACCO TAX EARMARK REVENUE
Forms of budget 
allocation
Revenue goes to the 
general fund and 
is later assigned to 
the official actor(s) 
specified in the 
earmark. 
Revenues do not go 
through the general 
budget but are instead 
paid into a separate 
account belonging 
to the official actor(s) 
specified in the 
earmark.  
Earmarked tax revenue 
is paid directly to 
the account of the 
entity managing an 
autonomous or semi-
autonomous fund. 
Examples In the Philippines, 
revenue goes to the 
general fund before 
being allocated to 
the Ministry of Health 
following  submission 
of a budget for its use 
(140).
In Romania, revenue 
goes directly into a 
Ministry of Health 
account that is distinct 
from the general fund. 
In Panama, revenue is 
paid into subaccounts 
of the three recipient 
agencies (the Ministry 
of Health, the National 
Cancer Institute and 
the Customs Authority).
In Thailand, ThaiHealth 
directly receives the 
earmarked revenues in 
its own account.
In Viet Nam, the Viet 
Nam Tobacco Control 
Fund receives the 
revenues directly into a 
subaccount it manages 
but that belongs to the 
Ministry of Health.
Source: (151).
Where is the money being spent?
Earmarked tobacco tax revenues are used for a variety of health purposes, including 
tobacco control, health promotion and UHC. A wide variety of other programmes 
have also been funded with earmarks from tobacco taxes, including disaster relief (e.g. 
hospital medical supplies and equipment to treat COVID-19 in India), youth pro-
grams, sports and craft jobs in Yemen, social cohesion in Morocco, health and social 
programs in areas dependent on tobacco growing in Argentina, health promotion 
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and tobacco control in Thailand and alternative livelihood programs for tobacco 
farmers as well as economic projects in tobacco-growing provinces in the Philippines.
Table 4.11 shows the three main categories of health programmes to which ear-
marked tobacco tax revenue is allocated, as well as a fourth miscellaneous category, 
with country-specific examples for each.26
Table 4.11 Programmes to which earmarked tobacco tax revenue is allocated














Costa Rica, Côte 
d’Ivoire, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 
Madagascar, Panama 
(tobacco cessation and 




Costa Rica, Mauritania 
(anti-cancer research), 
Palau (NCD prevention 
only),
Panama (National 














Côte d’Ivoire (AIDS 
programme), El Salvador, 
Estonia (sports), 
Guatemala, Indonesia, 
the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (sports), Ireland, 
Jamaica, Lithuania 
(sports), Madagascar 
(sports), Morocco, Nepal, 
Paraguay (sports), 




United States, Yemen 
(sports)
Note: Countries appear in more than one column when their earmarked tax revenues are used in more 
than one specific health programme.
Source: (27). 
The amount of money associated with tobacco tax earmarks
Case studies of the experiences of nine countries in tobacco tax earmarking show 
that earmarked funds are relatively small in comparison with government spend-
ing on health (see Table 4.12) and, consequently, even smaller in terms of GDP. 
Therefore, the argument that tobacco tax earmarks would introduce rigidity into 
public financial management may not apply.
26  Details about how the tobacco tax revenues are earmarked are given in Annex 4.2.
240  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
Table 4.12 Proportion of earmarked tobacco tax funds in government expenditures 
COUNTRY ESTIMATED ANNUAL TOTAL FUNDS FROM 
EARMARKED TAX 
ANNUAL FUNDS FROM 
TOBACCO TAX EARMARKS 
as a % of general government 
expenditure on health in 2013
Botswana 2014–2015: 4 million pula (US$ 0.48 million) NA
Egypt 2013–2014: 392 million Egyptian pounds 
(US$ 52.06 million); 
earmarked taxes only 1.8% of total taxes on 
cigarettes
1.086%
Iceland 2014: 108.3 million kronor (US$ 0.89 million) 0.083%
Panama 2014: US$ 27.8 million 1.322%
Philippines 2014: 50.18 billion Philippine pesos 
(US$ 1.18 billion) 
NA
Poland 2013: 1 million złoty (US$ 0.316 million) from 
general budget 
0.001%
Romania 2014: 1.1 million lei (US$ 0.33 million); 
14.4% of total health budget 
0.004%
Thailand 2014: 4064.74 million baht (US$ 125.15 million); 
1.78% of Ministry of Health budget and 1.84% of 
National Health Security Fund
0.932%
Viet Nam 2014: 299.171 billion dong (US$ 13.91 million); 




Despite the initial principled resistance to earmarking by some ministries of finance, 
experience has shown that the use of revenue from tobacco taxes and other taxes on 
the consumption of products that have negative externalities can ensure political 
as well as public support. Successful earmarking needs a well-developed structure 
for the use of funds for health purposes. Even intergovernmental organizations 
that are opposed to earmarking (e.g. the IMF) have acknowledged the justifiability 
of well-designed tobacco tax earmarks when revenue is directed to specific cost-
effective programmes (153–154).
The amounts of tobacco tax revenue effectively earmarked for health have been 
relatively small and could hardly introduce the feared rigidity in government budgets. 
Moreover, in some countries, those funds have helped to implement much-needed 
health programmes (e.g. Australia, the Philippines, Thailand). More governments 
are considering this option as a stable medium-term source of secure funding for 
programmes such as tobacco control. The payoffs will be seen in the future as fewer 
people fall ill and less medical care for tobacco-related illnesses is needed. In Australia, 
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an earmarked tax was used to fund a needed and underresourced programme that 
proved to be successful, effective and impactful; the programme is now sustainably 
funded, embedded in the federal budget. 
Earmarking is desirable in a particular political economy when it enables the 
implementation of effective tobacco taxation that will increase price and reduce 
consumption. It will, however, also be rational as a matter of public financial man-
agement, economic efficiency and democratic governance when concerns such as 
the following are considered. Although not every question needs an affirmative 
answer, policy-makers who can answer yes to many of the following questions will 
likely be considering an effective and rational tobacco tax earmark:27
• Does the tobacco tax earmark’s purpose rationally connect with the recipient 
programme’s purpose? Earmarks that fund tobacco control or other health 
programmes are more economically rational under the benefit principle than 
those that fund unrelated programmes such as childhood education, even 
when the popularity of the unrelated programmes may make a tax increase 
politically palatable. 
• Does the tobacco tax earmark’s amount rationally connect with the needs 
of the recipient programme? Earmarked funds that cannot be absorbed by 
the recipient programme are, in effect, money taken away from other needs.
• When a tobacco tax earmark funds health programmes, is this clearly com-
municated to the public to ensure that the framing of the tobacco tax increase 
as a health measure reinforces the demand-reduction effect?
• Is the programme being funded by the tobacco tax earmark a politically neglected 
but highly cost-effective or crucially needed programme that, once established 
as a proof of concept, has a chance of being funded out of the general budget? 
• Does the tobacco tax earmark’s purpose rationally connect with the effects 
of the tax itself? Earmarks that fund programmes that disproportionately 
benefit lower socioeconomic groups or that fund alternative livelihoods for 
former tobacco workers and farmers will have equity-enhancing effects that 
will reinforce the already progressive nature of tobacco taxes.
• Is the scope of the earmark’s purpose narrow enough that it can be funded 
mostly from the tobacco tax earmark, to ensure that the revenue is additive 
and does not merely substitute for spending that would otherwise come 
from the general fund?
• Does the design of the tobacco tax earmark provide for flexibilities that ensure 
that windfall revenue collection is not squandered on a purpose already 
saturated with overfunding? 
27 Adapted from and informed by References 138–139, 143, 150.
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• Does the design of the tobacco tax earmark include a sunset clause that 
triggers its automatic end or review? The presence of such a clause will guard 
against inefficiency in allocation arising and being left uncorrected due to 
political inertia.
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 243 
REFERENCES
1. Smith KE, Savell E, Gilmore AB. What is known about tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco 
tax? A systematic review of empirical studies. Tob Control. 2013; 22(2): 144–153 (https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3701860/pdf/nihms481283.pdf, accessed 31 January 2021).
2. LaFaive MD, Drenkard S, Nesbit T. Strong link between cigarette tax and illegal smuggling rates 
[website]. Midland: Mackinak Center for Public Policy; 2018 (https://www.mackinac.org/strong-
link-between-cigarette-tax-and-illegal-smuggling-rates#:~:text=An%20increase%20of%2011%20
percentage,packs%20to%2030.6%20million%20packs.&text=Tax%20evasion%20and%20avoidance%20
is,high%20excise%20taxes%20on%20cigarettes., accessed 31 January 2021).
3. Ross H, Blecher E. Illicit trade in tobacco products need not hinder tobacco tax policy reforms and 





that,consumption%2C%20and%20improves%20overall%20health, accessed 31 January 2021).
4. Confronting illicit tobacco trade: a global review of country experiences. Washington (DC): World 
Bank Group; 2019 (http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/677451548260528135/pdf/133959-
REPL-PUBLIC-6-2-2019-19-59-24-WBGTobaccoIllicitTradeFINALvweb.pdf, accessed 12 October 2020). 
5. The economics of tobacco and tobacco control. Bethesda: US Department of Health and Human Services, 
National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute; and Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 
(National Cancer Institute Tobacco Control Monograph 21; https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/
default/files/2020-06/m21_complete.pdf, accessed 28 September 2020).
6. Joossens L, Chaloupka FJ., Merriman D, Yürekli A. Issues in smuggling of tobacco products. In: Jha P, 
Chaloupka F, editors. Tobacco control in developing countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2000 
(http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/602821468330954036/pdf/709670WP0tobac00Box
370064B00PUBLIC0.pdf, accessed 18 February 2021).
7. Merriman D, Yürekli A., Chaloupka, FJ. How big is the worldwide cigarette smuggling problem. In: 
Jha P, Chaloupka F, editors. Tobacco control in developing countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
2000 (http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/602821468330954036/pdf/709670WP0tobac
00Box370064B00PUBLIC0.pdf, accessed 18 February 2021).
8. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2003 (https://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/42811/9241591013.pdf;jsessionid=B6558076A38E8DEB
6D3A9E6CDA96151B?sequence=1, accessed 5 October 2020).
9. Merriman D. Understand, measure, and combat tobacco smuggling. Washington (DC): World Bank 
Group; 2003 (Economics of tobacco toolkit 7; https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/10986/16267/805800NWP070Sm0Box0379807B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, 
accessed 31 January 2021). 
10. Progress report on the implementation of the Commission Communication. Stepping up the fight 
against cigarette smuggling and other forms of illicit trade in tobacco products – a comprehensive 
EU strategy. Brussels: European Commission; 2017 (COM(2017) 235 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0235&from=en, accessed 31 January 2021).
11. Ross H. Understanding and measuring cigarette tax avoidance and evasion: a methodological guide. 
Tobacconomics; 2015 (https://tobacconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ross_Methods_to_
Measure_Illicit-Trade_03-17-15.pdf, accessed 12 October 2020).
12. Understanding the US illicit tobacco market: characteristics, policy context, and lessons from 
international experiences. Reuter P, Majmundar M. (editors). Washington (DC): National Academies 
Press; 2015.
13. von Lampe K. The illegal cigarette trade. In: Natarajan M, editor. International crime and justice. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 2010:148–54.
14. Joossens L, Raw M, From cigarette smuggling to illicit tobacco trade. Tob Control. 2012;21:230–34 
(https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/21/2/230.full.pdf, accessed 31 January 2021).
15. Gomis B, Lee K, Carrillo Botero N, Shepherd P, Iglesias RM. “We think globally”: the rise of Paraguay’s 
24 4  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
Tabacalera del Este as a threat to global tobacco control. Global Health. 2018;14(1):110 (https://
globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12992-018-0412-3, accessed 31 January 
2021).
16. Communication from the commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Stepping up the 
fight against cigarette smuggling and other forms of illicit trade in tobacco products - A comprehensive 
EU Strategy. Brussels: European Commission; 2013 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0324&from=EN, accessed 31 January 2021).  
17. Ross H, Vellios N, Smith KC, Ferguson J, Cohen JE. A closer look at ‘cheap white’ cigarettes. Tob Control. 
2016;25(5):527–31 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/25/5/527.full.pdf, accessed 
31 January 2021).
18. Nagelhout GE, van den Putte B, Allwright S, Mons U, McNeill A, Guignard R, et al. Socioeconomic and 
country variations in cross-border cigarette purchasing as tobacco tax avoidance strategy. Findings 
from the ITC Europe Surveys. Tob Control. 2014;23:i30–i38 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/
tobaccocontrol/23/suppl_1/i30.full.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
19. Gilmore AB, Rowell A, Gallus S, Lugo A, Joossens L, Sims M. Towards a greater understanding of the illicit 
tobacco trade in Europe: a review of the PMI funded ‘Project Star’ report. Tob Control. 2014;23:e51–e61 
(https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/23/e1/e51.full.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
20. Iglesias RM. Increasing excise taxes in the presence of an illegal cigarette market: the 2011 Brazil 
tobacco tax reform. Revista Panam Salud Publica. 2016;40(4):243–9 (https://www.scielosp.org/pdf/
rpsp/2016.v40n4/243-249, accessed 1 February 2021).
21. Operação Huno combate mercado clandestino de cigarros em sete Estados [Operação Huno fights 
clandestine cigar market in seven states]. Brasilia: Federal Police of Brazil; 2015 (in Portuguese) (http://
www.pf.gov.br/agencia/noticias/2015/11/operacao-huno-combate-mercado-clandestino-de-cigarros-
em-seis-estados, accessed 12 October 2020).
22. Gilmore AB, Gallagher AWA, Rowell A. Tobacco industry’s elaborate attempts to control a global track 
and trace system and fundamentally undermine the Illicit Trade Protocol. Tob Control. 2019;28:127–40 
(https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/28/2/127.full.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
23. Technical assessment of the experience made with the Anti-Contraband and Anti-Counterfeit Agreement 
and general release of 9 July 2014 among Philip Morris International and affiliates, the Union and its 
Member States. Brussels: European Commission; 2016 (SWD (2016) 44 final; https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/sites/antifraud/files/technical_assessment_pmi_24022016_en.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
24. Gallagher AWA, Evans-Reeves KA, Hatchard JL, Gilmore AB. Tobacco industry data on illicit tobacco trade: 
a systematic review of existing assessments. Tob Control. 2019;28(3):334–45 (https://tobaccocontrol.
bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/28/3/334.full.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
25. Joossens L, Merriman D, Ross H, Raw M. How eliminating the global illicit cigarette trade would increase 
tax revenue and save lives. Paris: International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease; 2009 
(https://theunion.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/How%20Eliminating%20the%20Global%20Illicit%20
Cigarette%20Trade%20Would%20Increase%20Tax%20Revenue%20and%20Save%20Lives%20-%20
EN.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
26. Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2013 
(https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/80873/9789241505246_eng.pdf?sequence=1, 
accessed 5 October 2020). 
27. WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2019: offer help to quit tobacco use. Geneva: World 
Health Organization; 2019 (https://www.who.int/teams/health-promotion/tobacco-control/who-
report-on-the-global-tobacco-epidemic-2019, accessed 24 January 2021).
28. Prieger JE, Kulic J. Cigarette taxes and illicit trade in Europe. Econ Inquiry. 2018;56(3):1706–23 (https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2718519, accessed 18 February 2021).
29. Stoklosa M. Prices and cross-border cigarette purchases in the EU: evidence from demand modelling. 
Tob Control. 2020;29:55–60. 
30. Passport: illicit trade in tobacco products. In: Euromonitor International [website]. London: Euromonitor 
International; 2018 (restricted access).
31. The Global Illicit Trade Environment Index. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit; 2018 (http://
illicittradeindex.eiu.com/documents/EIU%20Global%20Illicit%20Trade%20Environment%20Index%20
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 245 
2018%20-%20Overall%20Results%20White%20Paper%20June%206%20FINAL.pdf, accessed 1 February 
2021).
32. Chaloupka FJ, Yürekli A, Fong GT. Tobacco taxes as a tobacco control strategy. Tob Control. 2012;21:172–
80 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/21/2/172.full.pdf, accessed 1 February 
2021).
33. Chernick H, Merriman D. Using littered pack data to estimate cigarette tax avoidance in NYC. Natl 
Tax J. 2013;66(2):635–68 (https://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/66/3/ntj-v66n03p635-668-littered-pack-data-
cigarette-tax.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
34. Liber AC, Ross H, Omar M, Chaloupka FJ. The impact of the Malaysian minimum cigarette price law: 
findings from the ITC Malaysia Survey. Tob Control. 2015;24:iii83–iii87 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.
com/content/tobaccocontrol/24/Suppl_3/iii83.full.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
35. Blecher E, Liber A, Ross H, Birckmayer J. Euromonitor data on the illicit trade in cigarettes. Tob Control. 
2015;24:100–1 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/24/1/100.full.pdf, accessed 
1 February 2021).
36. Stoklosa M, Ross H. Contrasting academic and tobacco industry estimates of illicit cigarette trade: 
evidence from Warsaw, Poland. Tob Control. 2014; 23(e1), e30–e34 (https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/255954649_Contrasting_academic_and_tobacco_industry_estimates_of_illicit_cigarette_
trade_Evidence_from_Warsaw_Poland, accessed 1 February 2021).
37. Maldonado N, Llorente BA, Iglesias RM, Escobar D. Measuring illicit cigarette trade in Colombia. Tob 
Control. 2020;29:s260-s266 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/29/Suppl_4/
s260.full.pdf, accessed 29 January 2021).
38. Paraje G, Araya D, Drope J. Illicit cigarette trade in metropolitan Santiago de Chile. Tob Control 
2020;29:68–73.
39. Iglesias RM, Szklo AS, de Souza MC, de Almeida LM. Estimating the size of illicit tobacco consumption 
in Brazil: findings from the global adult tobacco survey. Tob Control. 2017;26(1):53–9.
40. Saenz de Miera Juarez BS, Reynales-Shigematsu LM, Stoklosa M, Welding K, Drope J. Measuring the illicit 
cigarette market in Mexico: a cross validation of two methodologies. Tob Control;2020(0):1-7 (https://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/early/2020/03/31/tobaccocontrol-2019-055449.
full.pdf, accessed 1 February 2021).
41. Lee K, Collin J. ‘Key to the future’: British American Tobacco and cigarette smuggling in China. PLoS 
Medicine. 2006;3(7):e228 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1502159/pdf/pmed.0030228.
pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
42. Barker DC, Wang S, Merriman D, Crosby A., Resnick EA, Chaloupka FJ. Estimating cigarette tax avoidance 
and evasion: evidence from a national sample of littered packs. Tob Control. 2016;25(Suppl 1):i38–
i43 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/25/Suppl_1/i38.full.pdf, accessed 2 
February 2021).
43. Aziani A, Kulick J, Norman N, Prieger JE. Empty discarded pack data and the prevalence of illicit trade 
in cigarettes; 2017. (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906015, accessed 12 October 2020).
44. Philip Morris International. The Perspective of PM International on Smoking and Health Issues. In: 
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library [website]. San Francisco: University of California; 1985. Bates no. 
2023268328-2023268349 (https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=pxpb0040, 
accessed 5 February 2021).
45. Mandal S, Gilmore A, Collin J, Weishaar H, Smith K, McKee M. Block, amend, delay: tobacco industry 
efforts to influence the European Union’s Tobacco Products Directive (2001/37/EC). Smokefree 
Partnership/Cancer Research UK; 2009 (http://www.smokefreepartnership.eu/images/Reports-and-
Position-Papers/EU_TI_TPD_report_May_2012.pdf, accessed 15 October 2020).
46. Bishop DJ. Key area paper: indirect taxation – British American Tobacco. In: Legacy Tobacco Documents 
Library [website]. San Francisco: University of California; 1994. Bates no. 503911771-503911780 (http://
bat.library.ucsf.edu/data/h/f/k/hfk11a99/hfk11a99.pdf, accessed 15 October 2020).
47. Zhou S, Liberman JD, Ricafort E. The impact of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
in defending legal challenges to tobacco control measures. Tob Control. 2009:28:s113-s118 (https://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/28/Suppl_2/s113.full.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
48. Gilmore AB, Fooks G, Drope J, Bialous SA, Jackson RR. Exposing and addressing tobacco industry 
246  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
conduct in low-income and middle-income countries. Lancet. 2015;385:1029–43.
49. Ulucanlar S, Fooks G, Gilmore A. The policy dystopia model: an interpretive analysis of tobacco 
industry political activity. PLoS Med. 2016:13(9):e1002125 (https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002125, accessed 2 February 2021).
50. Apollonio D, Glantz S. Tobacco manufacturer lobbying to undercut minimum price laws: an analysis 
of internal industry documents. Tob Control. 2020;29:e10-e17 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC7374022/pdf/nihms-1590806.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021). 
51. Crosbie E, Glantz S. Tobacco industry argues domestic trademark laws and international treaties 
preclude cigarette health warning labels, despite consistent legal advice that the argument is invalid. 
Tob Control. 2012;23:e7 (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233769722_Tobacco_industry_
argues_domestic_trademark_laws_and_international_treaties_preclude_cigarette_health_warning_
labels_despite_consistent_legal_advice_that_the_argument_is_invalid, accessed 2 February 2021). 
52. Puig S. Tobacco litigation in international courts. Harv Int Law J. 2016;57(2):1–68.
53. Crooked nine: nine ways the tobacco industry undermines health policy. New York: Vital Strategies; 
2019 (https://exposetobacco.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Crooked-9-STOP.pdf, accessed 2 
February 2021).
54. Balwicki L, Stokłosa M, Balwicka-Szczyrba M, Tomczak W. Tobacco industry interference with tobacco 
control policies in Poland: legal aspects and industry practices. Tob Control. 2016;25(5):521–26 (https://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/25/5/521.full.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
55. Sud SR, Brenner JE, Shaffer ER. Trading away health: the influence of trade policy on youth 
tobacco control. J Pediatrics. 2015;166(5):1303–07 (https://www.jpeds.com/action/showPdf?pii
=S0022-3476%2815%2900017-7, accessed 2 February 2021).
56. Lee S, Ling PM, Glantz SA. The vector of the tobacco epidemic: tobacco industry practices in low and 
middle-income countries. Cancer Cause Control. 2012;23:117–29 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3332051/pdf/nihms-367996.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
57. Zhou S, Liberman J. The global tobacco epidemic and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control—the contributions of the WHO’s first convention to global health law and governance. In: Burci 
GL, Toebes B, editors. Research handbook on global health law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing; 
2018 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339718, accessed 18 February 2021). 
58. Legislative Consultation with Constitutional Division of the Supreme Court, No. 2012-003918. 
Constitutional Division of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica; 20 March 2012 (https://www.
tobaccocontrollaws.org/files/live/litigation/830/CR_Legislative%20Consultation%20with%20.pdf, 
accessed 2 February 2021). 
59. British American Tobacco Kenya Ltd v Ministry of Health, Petition No. 143 of 2015. High Court of Kenya; 
2016 (https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/files/live/litigation/2643/KE_British%20American%20
Tobacco%20Kenya.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
60. British American Tobacco v Ministry of Health, et al,  Civil Appeal No. 112 of 2016. Kenyan Court 
of Appeal; 2017 (https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/files/live/litigation/2521/KE_British%20
American%20Tobacco%20Ltd%20v.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
61. Thailand – customs and fiscal measures on cigarettes from the Philippines: Report of the Panel. 
Geneva: World Trade Organization; 2010 (WT/DS371/R; https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.
aspx?filename=Q:/WT/DS/371R.pdf&Open=True, accessed 2 February 2021).
62. Tribunal Constitucional de Chile [Constitutional Court of Chile] (1995  Rol No. 219-95; https://www.
tribunalconstitucional.cl/descargar_sentencia2.php?id=3074, accessed 4 April 2020.)
63. McGrady B. International investment law. In: Voon T, Mitchell AD, Liberman J, editors. Regulating 
tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy foods: the legal issues. New York: Routledge; 2014.
64. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes; 2002 (https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0319.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
65. Feldman Karpa v Mexico (2002 ICSID Arbitral Tribunal) (https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0319.pdf, accessed 18 February 2021).
66. Undang-Undang Nomor 11 Tahun 1995 tentangCukai (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun1995 
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 247 
Nomor 76) (Excise Law,in Indonesian). Article 5. 
67. Excise Regulation (2011) Reference No. PMK Number 167/PMK.011/2011 (in Indonesian) (https://
peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/145897/pmk-no-167pmk0112011, accessed 3 February 2021).
68. Mahkamah Agung. Indonesia Supreme Court, Case No. 73/PDT/2018/PT SBY (https://putusan3.
mahkamahagung.go.id/direktori/putusan/74efff9cfe18d60990fcde19583ecd5f.html, accessed 6 
February 2021).  
69. Maya D. Analisis kebijakan kenaikam tarif cukai dan penyesuaian batasan  harga jual eceran hasil 
tembakau [Policy analysis on excise tax increases and price limit adjustments retail tobacco products]; 
2013 (in Indonesian) (http://lib.ui.ac.id/naskahringkas/2015-09/S45937-Deacy%20Maya accessed 3 
March 2020).
70. Indriawati EN, Susanti L, Qurnia MA. Kebijakan tarif cukai hasil tembakau terhadap perekonomian 
[Tobacco excise tariff policy on the economy]; 2014 (in Indonesian). (https://www.academia.
edu/6611977/MAKALAH_CHT_kel_6, accessed 15 October 2020).
71. Arroyani DW. Evaluasi Kebijakan Penetapan Tarif Cukai Hasil Tembakau Berdasarkan PMK [Evaluation 
of Tobacco Excise Tariff Determination Policy Based on PMK].167/PMK.011/2011. 2013 (in Indonesian) 
(http://lib.ui.ac.id/naskahringkas/2015-08/S44664-Dwira%20Wanti%20Arroyan, accessed 15 October 
2020).
72. Ngo Ngo Ha and Another v. State of New South Wales and Others (Matter No S 45 of 1996); Walter 
Hammond & Associates Pty Ltd v. State of New South Wales and Others (Matter No S 165 of 1996). 
Constitutional law; (1997) 146 ALR 355: 5 August 1997 (https://staging.hcourt.gov.au/assets/
publications/judgments/1997/029--NGO_NGO_HA_AND_ANOR_v_STATE_OF_NEW_SOUTH_WALES_&_
ORS_(Matter_No_S_45_of_1996);_WALTER_HAMMOND--(1997)_146_ALR_355.html, accessed 2 
February 2021).
73. McGrady B. Trade and public health: the WTO, tobacco, alcohol, and diet. New York: Cambridge 
University Press; 2011.
74. Giorgetti C. Health and international investment law. In: Burci GL, Toebes B, editors. Research handbook 
on global health law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing; 2018.
75. British American Tobacco v Attorney General and Center for Human Rights and Development. 
Constitutional Court of Uganda Petition No.46 of 2016; 2017 (https://media.ulii.org/files/judgments/
ugcc/2019/4/2019-ugcc-4_0.pdf, accessed 18 February 2021).
76. Lim CL, Ho J, Paparinskis M. International investment law and arbitration: commentary, awards and 
other materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2018.
77. Dominican Republic – measures affecting the importation and internal sale of cigarettes : Report 
of the Panel. Geneva: World Trade Organization; 2004 (WT/DS302/R; https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/
Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/DS/302R.pdf&Open=True, accessed 21 February 2021)
78. Dominican Republic — measures affecting the importation and internal sale of cigarettes: Report 
of the Appellate Body. Geneva: World Trade Organization; 2005 (WT/DS302/AB/R; https://docs.wto.
org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/DS/302ABR.pdf&Open=True, accessed 21 
February 2021).
79. Gilmore A. Tobacco and transition: understanding the impact of transition on tobacco use and control 
in the former Soviet Union [Thesis]. London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, June 
2005 (https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rw2c04c, accessed 2 February 2021).
80. MacKenzie R, Collin J, Sopharo C, Sopheap Y. ‘Almost a role model of what we would like to do 
everywhere’: British American Tobacco in Cambodia. Tob Control. 2004;13(suppl II): ii112–ii117 (https://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/13/suppl_2/ii112.full.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021). 
81. Smith KE, Savell E, Gilmore AB. What is known about tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco 
tax? A systematic review of empirical studies. Tobacco Control 2013;22(2):144-53 (https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3701860/pdf/nihms481283.pdf, accessed 21 February 2021). 
82. Price and tax. In: TobaccoTactics [website]. Bath: University of Bath; 2020 (https://tobaccotactics.org/
topics/price-and-tax/, accessed 15 December 2020).
83. Vulovic V, Chaloupka FJ. Questioning the regressivity of tobacco taxes: a distributional accounting 
impact model of increased tobacco taxation—commentary. Tob Control. 24 June 2020.
248  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
84. Verguet S, Kearns PKA, Rees VW. Questioning the regressivity of tobacco taxes: a distributional 
accounting impact model of increased tobacco taxation. Tob Control. 23 June 2020 (https://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/early/2020/08/11/tobaccocontrol-2019-055315.
full.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021)..
85. Palipudi KM, Gupta PC, Sinha DN, Andes LJ, Asma S, McAfee T. Social determinants of health and 
tobacco use in thirteen low and middle income countries: evidence from Global Adult Tobacco 
Survey. PLoS ONE. 2012;7(3):e33466 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3306395/pdf/
pone.0033466.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
86. Systematic review of the link between tobacco and poverty. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014 
(http://www.who.int/tobacco/publications/economics/9789241507820/en, accessed 21 October 2020).
87. Goodchild M, Sinha P, Gill Munish V, Tullu FT. Changes in the affordability of tobacco products in India 
during 2007/2008 to 2017/2018: a price-relative-to-income analysis. WHO South-East Asia J Public Health. 
2020;9(1):73–81 (https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331836/whoseajph2020v9i1p73.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 2 February 2021).
88. Faruque GM, Ahmed M, Huq I, Parven R, Wadood SN, Chowdhury SR, et al. The economic cost of tobacco 
use in Bangladesh: a health cost approach. Dhaka: Bangladesh Cancer Society; 2020 (https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/342445467_The_Economic_Cost_of_Tobacco_Use_in_Bangladesh_A_
Health_Cost_Approach, accessed 2 February 2021).
89. John RM, Sung H, Max WB, Ross H. Counting 15 million more poor in India, thanks to tobacco. Tob 
Control. 2011;20:349–52 (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49809290_Counting_15_million_
more_poor_in_India_thanks_to_tobacco, accessed 2 February 2021).
90. Liu Y, Rao K, Hu TW, Sun Q, Mao Z. Cigarette smoking and poverty in China. Soc Sci Med. 
2006;Dec;63(11):2784–90.
91. Fuchs A, González Icaza F, Paz D. Distributional effects of tobacco taxation – a comparative analysis. 
Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2019 (Policy research working paper 8805; https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31534/WPS8805.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y, accessed 
2 February 2021).
92. Smith CE, Hill SE, Amos A. Impact of population tobacco control interventions on socioeconomic 
inequalities in smoking: a systematic review and appraisal of future research directions. Tob Control. 
29 September 2020 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/early/2020/09/28/
tobaccocontrol-2020-055874.full.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
93. Furman J. Six lessons from the U.S. experience with tobacco taxes – World Bank conference “Winning 
the tax wars: global solutions for developing countries”. Washington (DC): Obama White House Archives; 
24 May 2016 (https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160524_cea_
tobacco_tax_speech.pdf, accessed 21 October 2020).
94. Önder Z, Yürekli A. Who pays the most cigarette tax in Turkey. Tob Control. 2016;25(1):39–45.
95. Verguet S, Gauvreau CL, Mishra S, MacLennan M, Murphy SM, Brouwer ED, et al. The consequences 
of tobacco tax on household health and finances in rich and poor smokers in China: an extended 
cost-effectiveness analysis. Lancet Glob Health. 2015;3:e206–16 (https://www.thelancet.com/action/
showPdf?pii=S2214-109X%2815%2970095-1, accessed 2 February 2021).
96. Fuchs Tarlovsky A, González Icaza F. The welfare and distributional effects of increasing taxes on 
tobacco in Vietnam. Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2019 (http://documents1.worldbank.org/
curated/en/758391561477648302/pdf/The-Welfare-and-Distributional-Effects-of-Increasing-Taxes-
on-Tobacco-in-Vietnam.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
97. Expanding the global tax base: taxing to promote public goods: tobacco taxes. Washington (DC): 
World Bank Group; 2016 (http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/799981480947591462/Taxing-to-Promote-
Public-Goods-tobacco-taxation-chapter-conference-25-nov-2016-final-version-pmarquez-002.pdf, 
accessed 2 February 2021).
98. Blecher E. Increasing tobacco taxes significantly will increase revenues. Chicago: University of Illinois 
at Chicago; 2018. (Tobacconomics policy brief; https://tobacconomics.org/files/research/470/Laffer-
Curve-Policy-Brief_v2.2.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
99. Savedoff W, Lopert R. Sugar, rum, and tobacco: domestic resource mobilization for low-income countries 
through excise taxes. Washington (DC): Centre for Global Development; 2020 (CGD Policy Paper 
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 249 
164, https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/PP164-Savedoff-Health-Taxes-DRM.pdf, accessed 2 
February 2021). 
100. Lavado R, Postolovska I, Sotomayor RE. Beyond the perceived regressivity of higher tobacco taxes, 
turning short-term losers into long-term winners? In: Tobacco reform: at the crossroads of health 
and development: a multisectoral perspective. Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2017 (https://
untobaccocontrol.org/taxation/e-library/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/WB-Report-CrossRoads.pdf, 
accessed 2 February 2021).
101. Petit P, Nagy J. How to design and enforce tobacco excises? Washington (DC): International Monetary 
Fund; 2016 (International Monetary Fund How To Notes, No.3/2016; https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/howtonotes/2016/howtonote1603.pdf, accessed 7 October 2020). 
102. Tonga NCD related taxation policy assessment preliminary findings. Presentation made at the 
innovations and actions against NCDs conference ADB headquarters, Manila, 17 July 2018.
103. Moreno-Dodson B. Raising tobacco taxes: why, what, and how: where public health and economics 
converge. In: Tobacco tax reform: at the crossroads of health and development: a multisectoral 
perspective. Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2017 (https://untobaccocontrol.org/taxation/e-
library/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/WB-Report-CrossRoads.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
104. Fuchs A, Del Carmen G, Mukong AK. Long-run impacts of increasing tobacco taxes: evidence from South 
Africa. Policy Research Working Paper 8369. Washington [DC]: World Bank; 2018 (https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29497/WPS8369.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y, accessed 
18 February 2021) .
105. van Walbeek C. Case studies in illicit tobacco trade: South Africa. Tobacconomics fact sheet. Chicago: 
University of Chicago, Tobacconomics, Health Policy Center; 2020 (https://tobacconomics.org/files/
research/607/UIC_South-Africa-Illicit-Trade-Case-Study-v1.3.pdf, accessed 18 February 2021).
106. van Loggerenberg, J. Tobacco Wars. Cape Town: NB Publishers; 2019.
107. Marquez P. Global tobacco control: a development priority. In: Tobacco tax reform at the crossroads 
of health and development: a multisectoral perspective. Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2017 
(https://untobaccocontrol.org/taxation/e-library/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/WB-Report-CrossRoads.
pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
108. Kaiser K, Bredenkamp C, Iglesias R. Sin tax reform in the Philippines: transforming public finance, 
health, and governance for more inclusive development. Washington [DC]: World Bank; 2017 (https://
tobacconomics.org/files/research/607/UIC_South-Africa-Illicit-Trade-Case-Study-v1.3.pdf, accessed 
18 February 2021).
109. Scollo M, Bayly M. Revenue from tobacco taxes in Australia. In: Scollo M, Winstanley M, editors. Tobacco 
in Australia: facts and issues. Melbourne: Cancer Council Victoria; 2016 (https://www.tobaccoinaustralia.
org.au/chapter-13-taxation/13-6-revenue-from-tobacco-taxes-in-australia, accessed 21 October 2020).
110. Scollo M, Bayly M. Tobacco taxes in Australia. In: Scollo M, Winstanley M, editors. Tobacco in Australia: 
facts and issues. Melbourne: Cancer Council Victoria; 2016 (https://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/
chapter-13-taxation/13-2-tobacco-taxes-in-australia, accessed 21 October 2020).
111. Breton E, Richard L, Gagnon F, Jacques M, Bergeron P. Fighting a tobacco-tax rollback: a political 
analysis of the 1994 cigarette contraband crisis in Canada. Journal of Pub Health Policy. 2006;27:77–99.
112. Fanta E, Garcia M. Preventing and controlling illicit tobacco flows. In: Tobacco tax reform: at the 
crossroads of health and development: a multisectoral perspective. Washington (DC): World Bank 
Group; 2017 (https://untobaccocontrol.org/taxation/e-library/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/WB-
Report-CrossRoads.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021). 
113. Goodchild M, Perucic AM, Zheng R, Blecher E, Paul J. The health impact of raising tobacco taxes 
in developing countries. In: Tobacco tax reform: at the crossroads of health and development: a 
multisectoral perspective. Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2017 (https://untobaccocontrol.org/
taxation/e-library/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/WB-Report-CrossRoads.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
114. Ross H. Tracking and tracing tobacco products in Kenya. Prev Med. 2017;105:S15–S18 (https://reader.
elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0091743517301457?token=424D9EC1D42A9C69BDB55B90090C3F7853AA
20A4970D0E379C91EE64C73A273A0FA949557F4F120A0B636701581EC055, accessed 2 February 2021).
115. Mamudu H, Hammond R, Glantz S. Tobacco industry attempts to counter the world bank report 
curbing the epidemic and obstruct the WHO framework convention on tobacco control. Soc Sci & 
250  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
Med. 2008;67(11):1690–9 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2662513/pdf/nihms81164.
pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
116. Gilmore A. Understanding the vector in order to plan effective tobacco control policies: an analysis 
of contemporary tobacco industry materials. Tob Control. 2012;21:119–26 (https://tobaccocontrol.
bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/21/2/119.full.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
117. The economics of tobacco taxation and employment in Indonesia: policy implications technical 
brief. Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2018 (https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/10986/29814/126158-WP-P154568-PUBLIC-add-series-WBGPNIndoEmploymentUPDATEFin
alWeb.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 2 February 2021).
118. Sahadewo GA, Drope J, Li Q, Nargis N, Witoelar F. Tobacco or not tobacco: predicting farming households’ 
income in Indonesia. Tob Control. 2020.
119. The economics of tobacco farming in Indonesia: health, population, and nutrition global 
practice. Washington (DC): World Bank Group, 2017 (http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/161981507529328872/pdf/120307-REVISED-PUBLIC-WBGIndoEconomicsTobaccoFarming.pdf, 
accessed 2 February 2021). 
120. The revenue and employment outcome of biri taxation in Bangladesh. Dhaka: National Board of 
Revenue, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh; 2019 (https://www.who.int/docs/
default-source/searo/bangladesh/pdf-reports/cat-2/biri-study-report-03-12-2019.pdf?sfvrsn=b8fea69_2, 
accessed 2 February 2021).
121. Magati P, Lencucha R, Li Q, Drope J, Labonte R, Appau A, et al. Costs, contracts and the narrative of 
prosperity: an economic analysis of smallholder tobacco farming livelihoods in Kenya. Tob Control. 
2019;28(3):268–73 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6512316/pdf/nihms-1012064.
pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
122. Ghaus K, Iqbal MA, Sabir M, Saleem W, Ali A, Aamir N. Macroeconomic impacts of tobacco use in 
Pakistan. Karachi: The Social Policy and Development Centre; 2018 (https://tobacconomics.org/files/
research/483/Macroeconomic-impact-of-Tobacco-in-Pakistan.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
123. Ross H. The effects of tobacco taxes on employment and labor productivity. In: Tobacco tax reform: 
at the crossroads of health and development. Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2017 (https://
untobaccocontrol.org/taxation/e-library/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/WB-Report-CrossRoads.pdf, 
accessed 2 February 2021)
124. Bigawanto M. Tobacco industry interference undermined tobacco tax policy in Indonesia. Bangkok: 
Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA); 2019 (https://seatca.org/dmdocuments/
Indonesia%20TII%20in%20Tax.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
125. Ahsan A, Wyono N. Analysis of the impact of higher cigarettes prices on employment in Indonesia. 
Bangkok: Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance; 2007 (https://seatca.org/dmdocuments/An%20
Analysis%20of%20the%20Impact%20of%20Higher%20Cigarette%20Prices%20on%20Employment%20
in%20Indonesia.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021). 
126. Higashi H, Khuong TA, Ngo AD, Hill PS. Evidence and decision making: tobacco control policy and 
legislation in Vietnam. Int J of Health Plann. 2013;2(1):e72–e94.
127. Buck D, Raw M, Godfrey CA, Sutton M. Tobacco and jobs: the impact of reducing consumption 
on employment in the UK. York: University of York; 1995 (https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/4814523_Tobacco_and_jobs_the_impact_of_reducing_consumption_on_employment_
in_the_UK, accessed 2 February 2021).
128. Petkova R, Ileva R and Rusenov A. Tobacco control policies and tobacco industry employment in 
Bulgaria. In: Economic, social and health issues in tobacco control. Report of a WHO international 
meeting, Kobe, Japan, 3-4 December 2001. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2003.
129. Jha V, Narayanan BG, Wadhwa D, Tesche J. Economic and environmental effects of reduction in 
smoking prevalence in Tanzania. Tob Control; 2020;29:24–8 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/
tobaccocontrol/29/1/24.full.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
130. Lencucha R, Makoka D, Drope J, Appau A, Labonté R, Li Q, et al. Costs, revenues and profits: an economic 
analysis of smallholder tobacco farmer livelihoods in Malawi. Tob Control. 2017;26(6)634–40 (https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5957074/pdf/nihms965842.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
131. Goma FM, Labonté R, Drope J, Li Q, Zulu R, Kangwa E. The economics of tobacco farming in Zambia: 
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 251 
tobacco farmers survey report. Lusaka: University of Zambia and American Cancer Society; 2019 
(https://www.cancer.org/content/dam/cancer-org/research/economic-and-healthy-policy/zambia-
report-7-16-19.pdf, accessed 28 October 2020).
132. Chavez JJ, Drope J, Li Q, Aloria MJ. The economics of tobacco farming in the Philippines. Quezon 
City: Action for Economic Reforms and Atlanta: American Cancer Society, 2016 (https://www.cancer.
org/content/dam/cancer-org/research/economic-and-healthy-policy/the-economics-of-tobacco-
farming-in-the-philippines.pdf, accessed 22 October 2020).
133. Augstin CP, Cardenas RP, Cortez JB, Gimongala GC, Ramos AR. The effects of the sin tax reform law of 
2012 to tobacco farmers of Amulung, Cagayan. IJARMSS. 2017;6(12):57–75.
134. Mercado A. Tobacco tax: good for the tobacco farmers, too. Business World; 2019 [website] (https://
www.bworldonline.com/tobacco-tax-good-for-the-tobacco-farmers-too/, accessed 25 October 2020).
135. Yürekli A, Önder Z, Elibol M, Erk N, Cabuk A, Fisunoglu M, et al. The economics of tobacco and tobacco 
taxation in Turkey. Paris: International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease; 2010 (https://
www.who.int/tobacco/en_tfi_turkey_report_feb2011.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021). 
136. Latif E, Warner V. Legislation and smoking prevention. In: Loddenkemper R, Kreuter M, editors. The 
Tobacco Epidemic: progress in Respiratory Research. 2015;42:136–148.
137. Tandon A, Cashin C. Assessing public expenditure on health from a fiscal space perspective. Washington 
(DC): World Bank Group; 2010 (http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/333671468330890417/
pdf/560530WP0Box341penditureFiscalSpace.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
138. Cashin C, Sparkes S, Bloom D. Earmarking for health: from theory to practice. Geneva: World Health 
Organization; 2018 (https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/255004/9789241512206-eng.
pdf?sequence=1, accessed 2 February 2021).
139. Wilkinson M. Paying for public spending: is there a role for earmarked taxes? Fiscal Studies. 
1994;15(4):119–35 (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-5890.1994.tb00213.x, 
accessed 2 February 2021).
140. ITAF: impôts et taxes affectées à la protection sociale. Les impôts et taxes affectés (ITAF) [taxes and 
duties allocated to social protection]. Vie publique: au coeur du débat public [website]. Paris: Directorate 
of Legal and Administrative Information; 2018 (in French) (https://www.vie-publique.fr/fiches/22010-
impots-et-taxes-affectees-itaf-protection-sociale, accessed 31 October 2020).
141. Seventeenth congress of the Philippines, Metro Manila, RA 11346, 23 July 2018 (https://www.
officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2019/07jul/20190725-RA-11346-RRD.pdf, accessed 31 October 2020).
142. McCleary W. The earmarking of government revenue: a review of some World Bank experience. World 
Bank Res Obs. 1991;6(1):81–104 (http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/109871468764672767/
pdf/multi-page.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
143. Strategic investment of tobacco tax revenue. Washington (DC): Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids; 2020 
(https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/global/pdfs/en/strategic_investment_tobacco_tax_revenue.
pdf, accessed 31 October 2020). 
144. Bialous SA, Glantz SA. Arizona’s tobacco control initiative illustrates the need for continuing oversight 
by tobacco control advocates. Tob Control. 1999;8:141–51 (https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/
tobaccocontrol/8/2/141.full.pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
145. Goldman LK, Glantz SA. The passage and initial implementation of Oregon’s measure 44. Tob Control. 
1999;8:311–22 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1763939/pdf/v008p00311.pdf, 
accessed 2 February 2021).
146. Heiser PF, Begay ME. The campaign to raise the tobacco tax in Massachusetts. Am J Public Health. 
1997;87(6):968–73 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1380932/pdf/amjph00505-0082.
pdf, accessed 2 February 2021).
147. Landman A, Bialick P. Tobacco industry involvement in Colorado. Chicago: American Lung Cancer 
Association; 2004 (https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9d880448#main, accessed 18 February 2021).
148. Technical manual on tobacco tax administration. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2010. (https://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/44316/9789241563994_eng.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 
26 January 2021).
149. Vardavas CI, Filippidis FT, Agaku IT, Mytaras V, Bertic M, Connolly GN, et al. Tobacco taxation: the 
252  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
importance of earmarking the revenue to health care and tobacco control. Tob Induc Dis. 2012;10:21 
(http://www.tobaccoinduceddiseases.org/Tobacco-taxation-the-importance-of-earmarking-the-
revenue-to-health-care-and-tobacco,66110,0,2.html, accessed 31 October 2020).
150. Bird RM. Tobacco and alcohol excise taxes for improving public health and revenue outcomes: 
marrying sin and virtue?. Washington (DC): World Bank Group; 2015 (Policy Research Working 
Paper 7500; https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23464/
Tobacco0and0al0ing0sin0and0virtue00.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 2 February 2021).
151. Earmarked tobacco taxes: lessons learnt from nine countries. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2016 
(https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/206007/9789241510424_eng.pdf?sequence=1, 
accessed 2 February 2021).
152. The establishment and use of dedicated taxes for health. Manila: World Health Organization Western 
Pacific Regional Office; 2004 (https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/dedicated_taxes.
pdf?ua=1, accessed 2 February 2021).
153. Teja RS. The case for earmarked taxes: theory and example. Washington (DC): International 
Monetary Fund; 1988 (IMF Working Paper; https://www.elibrary.imf.org/doc/IMF001/14514-
9781451922677/14514-9781451922677/Other_formats/Source_PDF/14514-9781455212002.pdf, 
accessed 2 February 2021).
154. Keen M. Taxation and development – again. Washington (DC): International Monetary Fund; 2012(IMF 
Working Paper WP/12/220O; (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12220.pdf, accessed 
2 February 2021).
CHAP T ER 4. PO LI T I C AL ECO N OMY 253 
ANNEX 4.1 METHODS TO ASSESS THE NATURE AND SIZE  
OF THE ILLICIT TOBACCO TRADE
A4.1 DIRECT MEASUREMENT
A4.1.1 SMOKER INTERCEPT AND PACK OBSERVATION SURVEYS
Illicit trade can be measured directly by examining the cigarette packs of smokers. 
The smokers themselves can provide information on purchasing patterns, brand 
preferences and prices paid. Researchers can select individuals or retailers to survey 
based on a convenience sample (i.e. a sample that may not be representative) or a 
probability-based sample (i.e. a sample selected to be statistically representative of 
an underlying population).
Data collected from a pack could reveal whether the pack is compliant or non-
compliant with the local tax laws. Information can be obtained from objective 
markings such as brands, public health warning labels, tax stamps, foreign language 
labels or duty-free labels. During these stops, researchers can record demographic 
information (e.g. age and gender of the smoker), smoking-related history (e.g. number 
of cigarettes smoked per day) and price information. This is helpful in understand-
ing the profile of smokers who are able and willing to avoid cigarette taxes. Pack 
observations can be used in conjunction with population-based household surveys 
to obtain population-based estimates of the illicit tobacco trade (1,2). For example, 
as part of a regular national health survey, Kaplan et al. conducted a cross-sectional 
study of smokers in Turkey, using a face-to-face interviewer-administered survey 
and pack observation (3). They were able to collect sociodemographic, lifestyle and 
medical details along with pack observations as part of the study protocol. 
Advantages and disadvantages of smoker intercept  
and pack observation surveys
A primary advantage of conducting pack observation is that it is direct and objective, 
and smokers are not subject to any value judgements (2). Paired with survey data, 
pack observation can appropriately account for respondents who are not residents 
of the area in which they are surveyed (4). Disadvantages include the difficulty 
of identifying areas that are representative of the tobacco use population and the 
difficulty of sampling important subpopulations such as elderly and immobile smok-
ers. Also, surveys conducted in the daytime may discount the number of youthful 
smokers who are in school. Another disadvantage is that a sizeable number of 
smokers may refuse to show their last-purchased pack (2). Kaplan et al. found that 
24% of smokers sampled in Turkey did not show their cigarette pack to the study 
interviewer (3). This issue may be mitigated by asking users to provide information 
on the brand purchased, whether any public health warnings were posted and the 
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price paid (5). Although  the responses are based on recall, they may still yield useful 
information. For example, Joossens et al. allowed smokers who did not show their 
packs to provide self-reported information and found no statistical differences 
in illicit packs between these respondents and those who did show their packs 
(2). Another obstacle to accurate measurement based on smoker intercepts is the 
inability to determine the tax payment of smokers who purchase single cigarettes, 
since these smokers are generally not given packs. However, information can still 
be captured in self-report surveys by asking smokers to report the brand purchased 
and price paid. 
Key study for readers to refer to for additional guidance: 
Kaplan B, Navas-Acien A, Cohen JE. The prevalence of illicit cigarette consumption and 
related factors in Turkey. Tob Control. 2018;27(4):442–447. 
A4.1.2 PACK RETURN AND SWAP SURVEYS 
Pack return and pack swap surveys fall within the broader category of pack ob-
servation studies that use survey sampling techniques to examine smokers’ pack 
characteristics and to determine whether they are tax compliant. For these surveys, 
the unit of analysis is the individual. The main differences between pack swap 
and pack return surveys is that swap surveys offer the smoker a replacement pack, 
whereas pack returns are built into mail surveys and allow respondents to mail 
in their unopened packs. Pack swap and pack return surveys use probability and 
nonprobability sampling procedures. Probability sampling allows researchers to 
generalize to the broader population. 
Governments can use this method to rapidly assess the availability of illicit 
products in a given geographic area or to measure the share of the illicit market-
place. Rapid assessment may be performed in instances where there is an emerging 
tobacco product (e.g. a new cheap white brand) or suspected counterfeiting of tax 
stamp features. Rapid assessment using a convenience sampling strategy could place 
researchers near busy intersections where they could ask smokers for permission 
to look at their cigarette packs or to take photographs that could be analysed later. 
A population-based study requires a sample that closely mirrors the tobacco use 
population. 
Advantages and disadvantages of pack return and pack swap surveys
Pack swap and pack return surveys may help to overcome the stigma associated 
with traditional smoking surveys. For example, when researchers ask smokers to 
see their cigarette packs (or when they take photographs), no value judgements are 
made. These surveys are good rapid-assessment tools that can be used to examine 
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the effectiveness of physical features of a pack designed to deter illicit trade (e.g. 
packs that have tracking and tracing technology or high-tech stamps). In addi-
tion, they can be supplemented with population-based tobacco use surveys. When 
coupled with such survey data, these methods allow researchers to obtain relevant 
information about the context of illicit purchases, including, for example, sources 
(e.g. street, peer networks, retail stores) and prices. Mail-in surveys are filled out 
in the comfort of the respondent’s home without the presence of family members 
or passers-by, which may assure them that responses will be kept confidential. A 
potential disadvantage is that smokers who purchase both illicit cigarettes and 
tax-paid cigarettes may disproportionately mail back compliant packs. In addition, 
in LMICs, this mode of survey distribution may be unreliable because of issues 
associated with mail delivery systems. 
Key study for readers to refer to for additional guidance: 
Fix BV, Hyland A, O’Connor RJ, Cummings KM, Fong GT, Chaloupka FJ. A novel approach 
to estimating the prevalence of untaxed cigarettes in the US: findings from the 2009 and 
2010 International Tobacco Control Surveys. Tob Control. 2014;23:i61-66.
A4.1.3 LITTERED-PACK SURVEYS
Littered-pack surveys, also known as empty discarded pack surveys, are used pre-
dominantly in high- and middle-income countries (e.g. the United States, France, 
Canada, New Zealand, Mexico and Poland). This unobtrusive method relies on 
the premise that smokers publicly discard packs (e.g. on streets, sidewalks and in 
public trash cans). The packs bear characteristics that illustrate whether they are 
tax compliant (e.g. tax stamps, health warnings). For example, an Albanian health 
warning label on a cigarette pack discarded in Greece provides evidence that the 
pack was destined for the Albanian market. The pack may have been smuggled 
into Greece by criminal entrepreneurs or it may have been brought by a visitor. 
Collecting discarded packs from a representative geographic sample and examining 
these characteristics can provide estimates of tax compliance. Operationally, this 
data collection method uses an ecological approach whereby geographies are the 
units of analysis. Geographical units are meant to represent the smokers in the city/
country and can be administratively defined (e.g. by the country’s census bureau 
or transit zones) or may reflect researcher-defined neighbourhoods (e.g. half-mile 
buffer zones near bus stops or activity spaces).
Researchers in Canada have expanded the littered-pack method to include col-
lection and analysis of cigarette butts on 25 postsecondary campuses. The cigarette 
butts provide information on the brands sold (or lack thereof) and allow researchers 
to distinguish between legal and illegal products (6). A recent innovative expansion 
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of the littered-pack methodology is the collection of packs from cigarette retailers. 
John and Ross collected empty packs of tobacco products from a sample of registered 
and unregistered retailers in India (7). Collecting packs from retailers was relevant 
given that single cigarettes dominate the illicit market in India. Smokers who buy 
single cigarettes would be unable to provide a pack in a pack swap or street intercept 
survey, so collecting littered packs from the ground would undercount sales of 
single cigarettes. The feasibility of this method is dependent on the relationship 
between researchers and retailers (enhanced trust) and the efforts taken to ensure 
confidentiality. In some countries, retailer compliance with this research method 
might be strained because of concerns regarding confidentiality, since retailers may 
face criminal and civil penalties, depending on the research findings. 
Advantages and disadvantages of littered-pack surveys 
Littered-pack surveys are generally advantageous for governments because they 
facilitate comparison with industry estimates. This is one of the most-preferred 
methods because it yields estimates that are less likely to be biased due to issues of 
social desirability, recall error and confidentiality that plague survey research, and 
they are much less expensive than face-to-face interviews used in smoker intercept 
or household surveys. However, there are some issues regarding these surveys, espe-
cially in high-income countries, including the inability to differentiate between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion (8). For example, a pack in Berlin that bears a Vietnamese 
tax stamp may have been smuggled in mass quantity or brought in by a temporary 
visitor. Researchers have circumvented this issue and broadened the umbrella to 
measure cigarette tax noncompliance considering the potential biases introduced 
by tourism. Another disadvantage of littered-pack surveys is that larger budgets 
are needed to employ field researchers to collect, code and analyse the data. Not all 
countries employ tax stamps on their cigarette packaging, which may make it difficult 
to measure tax compliance. These surveys also can underestimate the markets in 
low-income countries such as India, where the main item of illegal trade is single 
cigarettes (7). The surveys may also overestimate illicit trade if littering behaviour 
is correlated with willingness to engage in illicit trade. Finally, littered-pack surveys 
and butt collections provide information on the proportion of butts and packs that 
are illegal, not the proportion of smokers that purchase illegal cigarettes (6).
Key studies for readers to refer to for additional guidance: 
Barker DC, Wang S, Merriman D, Crosby A., Resnick EA, Chaloupka FJ. Estimating cigarette 
tax avoidance and evasion: evidence from a national sample of littered packs. Tob Control. 
2016;25(Suppl 1):i38–i43.
Merriman D. The micro-geography of tax avoidance: evidence from littered cigarette 
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packs in Chicago. Am Econ J Econ Policy. 2010;2(2):61–84.
Stoklosa M., Paraje G., Blecher E., A Toolkit on Measuring Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. 
A Tobacconomics and American Cancer Society Toolkit. Chicago, IL:Tobacconomics, Health 
Policy Center, Institute for Health Research and Policy, University of Illinois at Chicago, 
2020 (https://tobacconomics.org/files/research/621/uic-illicit-trade-tool-kit-eng-v2.0-2.
pdf, accessed 18 February 2021). 
A4.1.4 SELF-REPORT POPULATION SURVEYS
Self-report surveys, when distributed to a representative sample of the population, can 
provide meaningful data on the prevalence of tax noncompliance. The surveys can 
be distributed to individuals or households in various ways, including face-to-face, 
telephone, mail and internet. Questions that specifically address illicit purchases 
can be added as supplementary questions to existing health or tobacco surveys. 
Some countries include such questions in their adult and youth tobacco surveys 
to estimate tax evasion/avoidance. For example, Canada’s annual Youth Smoking 
Survey asks smokers about the frequency of their purchases of First Nations/Native 
brand cigarettes (9-10). Davis et al. used data from the New York Adult Tobacco 
Survey to measure the source of purchase of the last cigarette pack purchased (i.e. 
Native American Reservations, lower-tax neighbouring states or countries, toll-free 
telephone numbers, the internet, duty-free shops) and the price paid (11). Twenty-
eight nations currently use surveys to measure tax noncompliance as part of the ITC 
Project (12). Similar analyses can be conducted using questions from the Global 
Adult Tobacco Use Surveys. For example, Iglesias et al. used the Brazil Global Adult 
Tobacco Use Surveys to compare self-reported prices with a defined threshold retail 
price to estimate the proportion of illicit cigarette use among smokers in Brazil (13). 
Countries are encouraged to use existing global health surveys or to incorporate 
similar types of questions pertaining to illicit trade in their annual health surveys. 
Asking respondents about price paid per pack (including taxes), brand name and 
location where cigarettes were purchased (e.g. duty free shop, unlicensed vendor, 
internet) can contribute to a better understanding of the illicit tobacco trade. 
Advantages and disadvantages of self-report surveys
Self-report surveys can be repeated over time to measure purchasing trends and 
progress associated with increases in cigarette taxation. Well-designed surveys can 
also provide generalizable estimates at the national level. Depending on the size of 
the sample, a self-report survey can provide comparable data across geographies that 
can help governments target resources. For example, findings that illicit cigarettes 
are more common in urban areas could lead to additional education campaigns 
and targeted enforcement. 
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Limitations of self-report surveys include the possibility of bias due to the social 
stigma associated with participating in the illicit trade, which could lead survey 
respondents to underreport participation. Additionally, surveys may be unable to 
gauge whether individuals are associated with tax avoidance versus tax evasion. Finally, 
there is evidence that self-report household surveys may underrepresent smokers. 
Key studies for readers to refer to for additional guidance: 
Callaghan RC, Veldhuizen S, Ip D. Contraband cigarette consumption among adolescent 
daily smokers in Ontario, Canada. Tob Control. 2011;20(2):173–174.
Davis K, Farrelly M, Li Q, Hyland A. Cigarette purchasing patterns among New York smokers: 
implications for health, price, and revenue. Albany (NY): New York State Department of 
Health, Tobacco Control Program; 2006.
A4.1.5 COVERT-PURCHASES SURVEYS
A number of studies in high-, middle- and low-income countries use covert purchases 
of packs and single cigarettes to gauge the availability of illicit cigarettes in public 
and semi-private spaces (14-17). This method is also used by the tobacco industry 
in the United States to identify retailers who sell counterfeit cigarettes (18).
Covert-purchases surveys do not provide estimates of the size of the illicit trade 
(i.e. market volume). Instead, they serve as a surveillance tool to identify where illicit 
cigarettes are sold and the extent to which they have infiltrated legal businesses. For 
example, a covert-purchases survey can examine whether illicit cigarettes are sold 
through legal retailers. It can also be used to measure compliance with emerging 
tobacco control policies that focus on, for example, product standardization or new 
regulations on flavours (e.g. plain packaging or bans on flavoured tobacco products). 
Covert-purchases surveys use trained researchers to visit a selected sample of 
retailers and directly purchase or inquire about the availability of illicit tobacco 
products. Retailers are not informed about the goals of the studies. Methods for 
determining the availability of illicit product vary. For example, in some studies, 
covert buyers do not directly inquire about illicit products. Instead, they purchase 
packs of tobacco products, paying full price, to determine whether retailers are 
selling illicit products under the guise that they are licit (14). The research team 
then examines the packs to determine whether they are legal. In the United States, 
researchers have observed that some consumers are paying full price for illicit 
untaxed packs smuggled from lower-tax states (14). Other research protocols directly 
ask retailers for illicit products (14,16-17). In Guatemala, Arevalo et al. specifically 
asked retailers for “imported cigarettes” (17). The ways covert buyers ask for illicit 
products may also vary geographically. For example, in some countries covert buyers 
may ask for “cheaper” packs or for illicit whites such as Jin Ling. 
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Advantages and disadvantages of covert-purchases surveys
Covert purchasing allows researchers to directly identify sources of illicit cigarettes. 
It also allows them to measure and test the dynamics between buyer and seller. For 
example, researchers can experiment to see if repeated attempts to purchase products 
increase the likelihood of purchase (known as the familiarity protocol) (16). One 
methodological challenge associated with covert purchases is that it is difficult to 
create a sampling frame for illicit sources because some may be unknown (e.g. pubs 
or homes). The traditional approach is to make purchases in legal outlets, which 
may bias estimates. Another issue with this method is that it is difficult for buyers 
(also called raters) to purchase products if they are unfamiliar with the seller or do 
not fit the typical demographics of purchasers. Therefore, researchers using covert-
purchases surveys must have detailed knowledge of the marketplace, including the 
ways individuals specifically ask for illicit tobacco products, and they must know 
whether they mirror the demographics of the neighbourhood. For example, in a study 
of South Bronx smokers, von Lampe et al. found that smokers looked for certain clues 
to assess whether they were being sold illicit cigarettes (19). Overall, this method 
can be quite costly because it requires training researchers, travelling to retailers and 
purchasing product. Covert-purchases surveys do not enable researchers to estimate 
the level of illicit trade, but they can provide information on availability of supply. 
Key studies for readers to refer to for additional guidance: 
Silver D, Giorgio MM, Bae JY, Jimenez G., Macinko J. Over-the-counter sales of out-of-state 
and counterfeit tax stamp cigarettes in New York City. Tob Control. 2016;25(5):584–586.
Arevalo R, Corral JE, Monzon D, Yoon M, Barnoya J. Characteristics of illegal and legal 
cigarette packs sold in Guatemala. Global Health. 2016;12(1):78.
A4.1.6 SEIZURES OF GOODS
Seizures are the result of enforcement activity carried out by local, national and 
international organizations that confiscate tobacco products that are illegally manu-
factured, transported and sold. Seizures are meant to reduce the profits associated 
with illicit trade by confiscating proceeds (e.g. cash, cars or houses) and the tools of 
the trade (e.g. print and tobacco machinery). Seizures can occur at various points 
in the supply chain. 
Seizure data are often tallied by the responsible agencies and used to measure 
program effectiveness or as justification for requesting additional resources (e.g. 
personnel). Some of the data may be supplied to international customs organiza-
tions, including the WCO (20). The quality of recordkeeping varies. For example, 
some agencies may maintain criminal files in databases that detail dates of seizure, 
brand names and laboratory testing. 
260  W H O T ECHNI C AL M ANUAL O N TO BACCO TA X PO LI C Y AND ADM INIS T R AT I O N
Seizures provide preliminary data on the scope of criminal activity and can help 
identify key trends to guide law enforcement agencies’ efforts. For example, seizures 
can identify trends on the modus operandi of smugglers, including transporta-
tion methods (e.g. sea cargo versus trucks), point of entry and brand preference. 
Seizure statistics can also be used as a preliminary test to measure the efficacy of 
interventions. For example, Stoklosa and Ross used seizure data from the Canadian 
province of Nova Scotia to test the impact of a 2015 menthol ban. He found no 
statistically significant change in the number of menthol cigarettes seized before 
and after the ban (1). 
Advantages and disadvantages of seizures of goods
Generally, seizure statistics can be readily obtained from law enforcement agencies 
through formal requests to agency gatekeepers (e.g. public information officers). 
Seizure data, however, generally do not provide a representative picture of illicit 
activity. For example, certain geographies may yield higher seizures because that 
is where the bulk of operations are being conducted. Police agencies may focus on 
certain geographies (e.g. locations near borders) rather than randomly inspecting, 
and their findings may be limited to those specific regions. Seizure data may also 
be skewed by the type of investigation procedures utilized. Large seizures may be 
the result of long-term investigations (i.e. wiretaps or culling confidential infor-
mants), while smaller seizures may come from anti-smuggling cases that involve 
cross-border purchases of low quantities of cigarettes (less than 1 000) (2). Seizures 
can also be skewed by industry cooperation with law enforcement agencies. For 
example, the tobacco industry may be more likely to support law enforcement on 
counterfeit seizures rather than smuggling cases because counterfeiting impacts 
their brand integrity. 
A4.2 RESIDUAL METHODS
Because the illicit tobacco trade is often decentralized, it can be difficult to observe 
directly. However, researchers are sometimes able to make inferences about its size 
without direct observation by comparing observed tobacco tax revenues with the 
amount of tax revenue that hypothetically would have been collected had all tobacco 
consumption been taxed. The difference between observed and hypothetical revenues 
is called the residual and can be used as an indicator of the magnitude of illicit 
trade. Even when the residual is only an approximate measure, changes in its size 
may be a reliable indicator of changes in the size of the trade. When actual tobacco 
tax revenues are reliably observed, the main challenge for residual methods is that 
of producing accurate estimates of the amount of tax revenue that hypothetically 
would have been collected had all tobacco consumption been taxed.
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A4.2.1 GAP ANALYSIS
Gap analysis is the preferred residual methodology because it is intuitive, straight-
forward and relatively easy to explain to policy-makers and the general public, 
and it has been widely employed in government studies (4). Researchers using gap 
analysis compare survey-based self-reported consumption data with observed (usually 
administrative) data on tax-paid sales. The basic premise is that if both self-reports 
and observed data are accurate, any difference between reported consumption and 
tax-paid sales can be explained by legal imports of non-taxed cigarettes (such as 
duty-free sales), exports of taxed cigarettes, tax evasion or tax avoidance.
The greatest research challenge in implementing gap analysis – as with most 
residual methods – is obtaining reliable and accurate estimates of tobacco consump-
tion. In its simplest implementation, gap analysis calculates the residual as the 
difference (which should be a minimum of zero) between the amount of tobacco 
consumption reported in surveys and tax-paid sales, which are generally available 
from administrative sources, minus exports. This simple calculation, however, is 
generally flawed, since surveys of reported tobacco consumption underestimate 
true consumption. Underreporting of tobacco consumption may result from survey 
respondents’ reticence about disclosing behaviour that is viewed as unhealthy and 
potentially socially undesirable. Depending on the legal and cultural context, cer-
tain groups (e.g. women or youth) may be more likely than others to underreport 
consumption. Other groups (e.g. rebellious young men and women) may accurately 
report or even overestimate consumption. Reuter and Majmundar measured actual 
consumption by total national taxed sales in the United States, where both legal 
untaxed imports and exports of taxed tobacco are widely believed to be very small, 
and found that the ratio of self-reported consumption to actual consumption was 
only 65% (4). After incorporating this survey underreporting into their analyses 
and considering the evidence from their gap analysis and the literature, Reuter 
and Majmundar found that the illicit market in the United States, which largely 
consists of avoidance or evasion of subnational state taxes, is between 8.5% and 
21% of consumption (4). The higher range of the estimate is consistent with prior 
estimates using population-based pack observation studies (21).
Researchers using gap analysis for countries or regions where legal imports of 
untaxed tobacco (such as duty-free products) or (legal or illegal) exports of taxed 
cigarettes are more significant should attempt to incorporate data about, or estimates 
of, these factors into their calculations. Legal untaxed imports of tobacco should be 
subtracted from reported consumption (after adjustment for underreporting), and 
exports of taxed tobacco should be subtracted from taxed sales. Obtaining data about 
legal untaxed imports and exports of taxed tobacco may be challenging, because 
these imports and exports may be the result of decentralized decisions of individual 
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travellers as they cross tax borders. Data on these activities will not necessarily be 
collected through normal administrative activities. Despite these challenges, gap 
analyses may still prove useful.
For example, if researchers have reason to believe that misreporting of tobacco 
consumption and the amounts of legal untaxed imports and taxed exports are 
relatively stable or follow known trends (e.g. are falling) over time, gap analyses 
can be used to provide estimates or lower (or upper) bounds on illicit trade when 
several years of data on taxed sales and reported consumption are available. Data 
sources may be country tax administrators who have access to sales data and health 
departments that have access to population-level studies of reported tobacco con-
sumption. In this context, multiple years of data on reported consumption and 
tax-paid sales can allow researchers to estimate changes in the size of the illicit trade 
even when it is difficult to measure the absolute level. Paraje used the 2008 Global 
Adult Tobacco Survey and the 2013 National Health Survey to measure reported 
tobacco consumption in Brazil (22-23).
Advantages and disadvantages of gap analysis
A major advantage of gap analysis is that when quality data are available, it is simple, 
easily reproduced and explainable to policy-makers and the general public. How-
ever, high-quality data on reported consumption may not be available, especially 
in low-income countries. In many cases, gap analysis does not provide reliable 
information on the size of the illicit market but only on changes in the size over 
time (22). Additionally, some low-income countries may not have reliable estimates 
of tax-paid cigarette sales, and secondary data repositories of cigarette sales may 
not be transparent about their methodology (24). 
Another disadvantage of gap analysis is that it generally cannot be used to obtain 
separate estimates of tax avoidance and tax evasion. Biased estimates may also result 
if surveys of tobacco consumption are not representative of the population (25). 
Moreover, it is generally not possible to quantify the precision of the estimates or 
uncertainty associated with the estimates, because of both statistical uncertainty 
resulting from the use of samples to imperfectly represent populations (e.g. the share 
of the population that smokes) and uncertainty about key facts such as the degree 
to which survey respondents understate their tobacco consumption.
Key studies for readers to refer to for additional guidance:
Szklo A, Iglesias RM, Carvalho de Souza M, Szklo M, Maria de Almeida L. Trends in illicit cigarette 
use in Brazil estimated from legal sales, 2012–2016. Am J Public Health. 2018;108(2):265–269.
Paraje G. Illicit cigarette trade in five South American countries: a gap analysis for Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Nicotine and Tob Res. 2019;21(8):1079–86
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A4.2.2 ECONOMETRIC MODELLING
There is a long tradition of using data to estimate parameters of demand functions 
that relate the quantity of goods consumed to the prices faced by consumers, their 
incomes and other variables. Because of the addictive nature of tobacco – and 
because of important public health and public policy concerns relating to tobacco 
use – economists have paid particular attention to the estimation of cigarette demand 
functions (26). As the literature on this topic developed, it became apparent that taxed 
tobacco sales would be a biased indicator of tobacco consumption if some consumers 
obtained their tobacco in illicit markets. Similarly, the price of cigarettes in the legal 
market might overestimate the price paid by consumers if some sales were not tax-paid. 
While economists generally cannot observe sales in the illicit market, they have 
been able to develop models that predict conditions under which consumers avoid 
tobacco taxes. They reason that the relative size of illicit tobacco markets depends 
primarily on two variables: the relative price of taxed and untaxed consumption 
and the ease of obtaining lower-cost (untaxed) tobacco. Other variables, includ-
ing the social stigma from evading tax laws and the perceived relative quality of 
illicit tobacco, could also influence the demand for it. While illicit trade cannot be 
directly observed, it can be estimated from the difference between tax-paid sales 
and predicted consumption. Tax-paid sales can be less than predicted consump-
tion when retailers or consumers evade taxes. They can be greater if some tax-paid 
cigarettes are bought within the jurisdiction and then consumed in areas where 
after-tax prices are higher. 
Econometric modelling estimates of illicit trade must be tailored to the situation 
in the country that is being studied, and therefore the data requirements may differ 
substantially from case to case. Researchers using this method should be familiar 
with the literature and should also understand the conditions in the areas they are 
researching. They must always include some measure of tobacco consumption or 
sales and some measure of the price of tobacco in the home country, as well as other 
variables (e.g. income) that are known to affect the demand for tobacco. It is also 
generally necessary to include variables that measure the availability and relative 
price of illicit tobacco, which can often be measured by comparing tobacco taxes 
in the home country with those in areas that are the source of illicit tobacco.
Advantages and disadvantages of econometric modelling
The major advantage of econometric modelling is that it is consistent with a long 
tradition of economic theory and practice, and the quality of the modelling techniques 
and empirical estimates can therefore be evaluated against widely accepted criteria. 
Empirical analyses provide estimates of price elasticities, income elasticities and 
price elasticities of tax avoidance. A substantial literature base makes it possible to 
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rigorously quantify uncertainty about the estimates and to test their robustness to 
various assumptions made in the modelling process. Estimates can be compared to 
other estimates available in the literature, and the results of these analyses can be 
used to simulate the impacts of policy changes (including tax and/or enforcement 
increases) on both consumption and tax avoidance. Because this methodology 
provides direct estimates of the uncertainty of the results, researchers can specify 
their level of confidence in the findings.
A shortcoming of econometric modelling is that it requires high-quality data on 
a variety of important variables over a period of time, as well as advanced econo-
metric modelling expertise. Also, because results from the econometric models are 
based on statistical inference and economic theory rather than direct observation 
(e.g. the proportion of packs without tax stamps), it can be difficult to explain to 
policy-makers and the general public.
Key studies for readers to refer to for additional guidance:
Becker GS, Grossman M, Murphy KM, (1994). An empirical analysis of cigarette addiction. 
Amer Econ Review. 1994;84(3):396–418.
Schafferer C, Yeh CY, Chen SH, Lee JM, Hsieh CJ. A simulation impact evaluation of a 
cigarette excise tax increase on licit and illicit cigarette consumption and tax revenue 
in 36 European countries. Public Health. 2018;162:48–57.
A4.2.3 EXPERT OPINION (KEY-INFORMANT SURVEYS AND INTERVIEWS)
Insight on illicit trade dynamics can come from experts in the field, including 
researchers (e.g. in economics, criminal justice and public health), taxation depart-
ments, enforcement agencies, product manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. 
Other key informants include journalists and academics who have secured confi-
dential informants. Experts can provide novel information about emerging trends 
(e.g. new smuggling routes). In some cases, researchers can obtain interviews with 
incarcerated or active offenders (27-29). For example, researchers studying cigarette 
smuggling in eastern Africa conducted interviews with more than 150 Ugandan 
tobacco smugglers (29). 
Experts can be queried through surveys or semi-structured interviews. When 
sampling frames are available (e.g. directories of tax department employees), surveys 
are more expedient than interviews. However, when experts are hard to find, non-
random sampling strategies coupled with interviews are recommended. Identifying 
experts may require recruiting a gatekeeper who is tasked with helping researchers 
find additional experts; or purposive sampling, where individuals are identified based 
on set criteria (e.g. they are taxation experts employed by local governments) (30). 
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Advantages and disadvantages of key-informant surveys and interviews
Informant interviews can be a useful starting point for identifying trends in the 
marketplace (e.g. venues where illicit cigarettes are sold or modes of entry). One of 
the disadvantages of relying on informants is that the information solicited from 
them may not be generalizable. Expert knowledge may be outdated or limited by 
the informants’ experience. Furthermore, the opinions of experts are subjective 
and may be biased by the experts’ employment status and the sampling methods 
used. For example, persons working in law enforcement may overestimate the 
extent of bootlegging in order to secure additional funding for future operations. 
Similarly, manufacturers looking to defeat taxes may overestimate the illicit trade 
to illustrate the links between taxation and illicit behaviour. Alternatively, tobacco 
control advocates may underestimate illegal market measures in order to support 
the argument that taxes do not increase illicit trade. 
Key studies for readers to refer to for additional guidance: 
Joossens L, Raw M. Cigarette smuggling in Europe: who really benefits? Tob Control. 
1998;7:66–71. doi:10.1136/tc.7.1.66 PMID: 9706757.
Titeca K, Joossens L, Raw M. Blood cigarettes: cigarette smuggling and war economies 
in central and eastern Africa. Tob Control. 2011;20(3):226–232.
A4.3 MIXED AND MULTIMETHOD STUDIES
Given the shortcomings of the aforementioned methods for assessing the nature and 
size of the illicit tobacco trade, governments may want to validate their findings by 
using mixed or multiple methodologies. Mixed methods use two methodological 
paradigms, qualitative and quantitative, as tools for exploration and explanation. For 
example, mixed method studies can use littered-pack surveys to measure the size 
of the market along with self-report surveys of smokers to understand patterns of 
purchasing, including sources, frequency and social norms. For example, Stoklosa 
and Ross estimated the share of the illicit market in Poland using a population-
based self-report survey and a littered-pack survey (1). Using both types of survey 
simultaneously enables governments to assess their validity in estimating the size 
of the illicit market. Alternatively, governments can employ multimethod research, 
i.e. the use of multiple methods that are similar in tradition (e.g. focus groups and 
semi-structured interviews) (31). Saenz de Miera et al. used face-to-face interviews 
(households), litter collection and observation of single-stick sellers, which enabled 
them not only to cross-validate the two major methodologies, but also to see if the 
brand of the single stick was a good measure of licit versus illicit trade (33).
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Advantages and disadvantages of mixed and multimethod studies
Mixed and multimethods studies enable researchers to check the validity of their 
findings. Multiple methods are preferred in contexts where illicit trade estimates 
are politicized. For example, low estimates may be challenged by the tobacco indus-
try, while high estimates may be challenged by tobacco control researchers and/or 
proponents. Mixed and multiple methods (e.g. littered-pack surveys and informant 
interviews) can enable governments to understand the situational context in which 
the illicit trade operates, including the actors involved and venues of sale. One 
disadvantages of using mixed and multiple methods is cost. Governments that are 
constrained by tight budgets may choose to use a single method that provides the 
most accurate information. However, given the issues faced by each method, this 
may not be feasible – each method has limitations. Instead, governments can pair 
a high-cost method with a lower-cost method (e.g. pairing interviews with empty 
pack surveys, or law enforcement seizure data with face-to-face consumer surveys). 
Key study for readers to refer to for additional guidance: 
Zaloshnja E, Ross H, Levy DT. The impact of tobacco control policies in Albania. Tob 
Control. 2010;19:463–468.
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ANNEX 4.2 HOW ARE THE TOBACCO TAX REVENUES EARMARKED?
The introduction of earmarking of tobacco tax revenue is almost always combined 
with an increase in excise taxes (or a new surcharge) rather than reallocation of 
existing revenues (1). Table A4.1 provides examples of the different approaches 
used by several countries to earmark tobacco tax revenues.
Table A4.1 Approaches used to earmark tobacco tax revenues
FUNDING SOURCES/ 
TYPE OF TAX
EXAMPLES OF TAX BASE AND RATES




Specific Republic of Korea: 841 
won (US$ 0.75) per 
pack or 29% of the 
specific excise rate
Costa Rica: 467.8 
cólones (US$ 0.83) per 
pack or 100% of the 
specific excise rate
Congo: 20 CFA francs 
(US$ 0.036) per pack 
or 50% of the specific 
excise rate







Specific Egypt: additional 0.75 Egyptian pounds (US$ 0.042) per pack
Ad valorem Thailand: surcharge of 2% over 
the excise tax base
Botswana: new tobacco levy of 





Cook Islands: 50% of revenues 
from the excise tax on tobacco
Guatemala: 100% of revenues 
from the excise tax on tobacco
Note: Conversions of amounts from the local currency were made using the official exchange rates from 
the IMF as of 31 July 2018 (date of the data collection).
Source: (2).
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CHAPTER 5. 
Best practices in tobacco tax policy  
and administration
TAX POLICY
Use excise tax increases to achieve the public health goal of reducing  
the death and diseases caused by tobacco use
Extensive research has clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of higher tobacco 
product taxes and prices in reducing tobacco use and its harmful consequences, 
particularly among the poor and the young. In fact, tobacco excise tax increases are 
the single most effective and cost-effective policy for reducing tobacco use. Excise 
taxes are the most significant taxes applied on tobacco products because of their 
ability to raise both absolute and relative prices. Tobacco excise tax increases also 
generate sizeable new revenues that will be sustained in the short to medium term. 
In the long term, continued increases in tobacco taxes – coupled with implementa-
tion of other evidence-based tobacco control policies and programmes – will lead 
to even larger reductions in tobacco use and its consequences.
Include significant tobacco excise tax increases as part of a comprehensive 
strategy to reduce tobacco use
Governments should adopt a comprehensive tobacco control strategy that includes 
objectives for reducing adult tobacco use and preventing youth tobacco use. Rais-
ing excise taxes significantly is the most effective, as well as the most cost-effective, 
measure for reducing consumption. When combined with other demand reduction 
interventions, the impact of tax increases on tobacco use is even stronger. Such 
interventions include comprehensive smoke-free policies in all public spaces, total 
bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship by tobacco companies, large 
graphic health warnings about the consequences of tobacco use, plain packaging, 
broad efforts to help current users quit and mass media public education campaigns. 
Implementation of a comprehensive strategy to reduce tobacco use leads to greater 
reductions in the harmful consequences of tobacco use, builds public and political 
support for higher taxes and maximizes the effectiveness of tax increases in achieving 
public health objectives.
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Involve the competent authority from the start when considering  
the revision of a tax policy
Competent authorities such as tax administrations and customs authorities are 
key partners in the effective implementation of a tax policy. Policy-makers need 
to ensure that those competent authorities are consulted and involved in the tax 
policy revision process so that their concerns about the impacts of policy change on 
enforcement can be taken into account from the beginning. This can also help identify 
and address possible loopholes early on in the enforcement process. Coordination 
among relevant bodies, including close cooperation and sharing of information, will 
optimize enforcement of tax policy and tax collection. To streamline the process of 
cooperation and exchanges of information, a basis in law needs to be established. 
Additionally, the involvement of tax administration authorities in the entirety of the tax 
revision policy process is important to ensure effective implementation of the policy.
Promote greater policy coherence across sectors such as agriculture, industry, 
trade, finance and labour
Greater multisectoral integration and policy coherence is needed at the country level 
to achieve effective health improvements. In particular, it is important to ensure that 
public policies and interventions in non-health sectors (e.g. agriculture, industry, 
trade, finance and labour) do not act against the intended public health impact of 
tobacco control and taxation (such interventions include providing subsidies to 
tobacco growing or manufacturing).
TAX DESIGN
Tax structure matters and simpler is better
Complex tax structures are difficult to administer, create opportunities for tax avoid-
ance and evasion and are less effective than simpler structures in achieving public 
health and revenue goals. Simplifying the structure of tobacco excise taxes will 
facilitate tax administration, reduce tax avoidance and evasion, enhance revenues 
and have a greater impact on tobacco use by reducing incentives to substitute among 
tobacco products or brands in response to tax increases. Countries with multiple 
tiers of tobacco tax rates based on product characteristics (e.g. price level, length, 
weight, type of tobacco) should reduce and eventually eliminate these differential 
tax rates. An appropriate transition strategy is to reduce the variations in tax rates 
over time with the aim of implementing a uniform tax (i.e. a single rate applies 
whether excise is ad valorem or specific) on a given tobacco product. Applying a 
uniform tax to all brands of a given tobacco product also sends a clear message 
that they are equally harmful.
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Rely more on specific tobacco excises to drive price increases
Greater reliance on specific excise taxes maximizes the impact of tobacco taxes 
on public health by reducing the gap in prices between premium and low-priced 
alternatives and limiting opportunities for users to switch down in response to tax 
increases. For countries that currently rely on an ad valorem tax, an appropriate first 
step would be to shift to a mixed system by adding a sizeable specific component or 
introducing a high minimum specific excise tax (an excise tax floor). For countries 
that rely on a mix of ad valorem and specific taxes, the specific tax component should 
be increased regularly so that it accounts for a greater share of the total excise tax.
Increase tobacco taxes significantly to reduce the affordability  
of tobacco products
To maximize the public health impact of higher tobacco taxes while at the same 
time generating higher revenues, governments should significantly raise taxes to 
increase prices and reduce the affordability of tobacco products. In many LMICs, 
tobacco use increases with incomes, and since incomes rise faster than tobacco 
product prices, these products are becoming more affordable. To reduce afford-
ability, tax increases need to result in real price increases that are higher than the 
increases in real incomes. 
Where revenue increases are a goal, rely on regular excise tax increases 
If governments want to increase tobacco revenues, they must increase excise taxes 
regularly. From the tax revenue perspective, the important determinant is the tax 
base elasticity, which has three key components: the price elasticity of demand of 
tobacco, the share of the tax in the retail price and the degree of pass-through of 
the excise tax rate increase on to retail price. Tax increases will increase revenues at 
least in the short to medium term, because demand is price inelastic, tax levels are 
generally low as a proportion of retail prices and the pass-through of tax increases 
on to retail prices is unlikely to be higher than the tax increase itself (i.e. there is no 
overshifting). In addition, increasing tax rates is the only policy measure that can 
reverse reduced revenues in a declining market that has strong tobacco control policies.
Automatically adjust specific tobacco taxes for inflation and income growth
Unless specific tobacco taxes are regularly adjusted, their real value will fall over time 
as general price levels increase. When this happens, their effectiveness in reducing 
tobacco use will be diminished. Governments should establish a mechanism for 
automatically adjusting specific taxes to keep pace with inflation. Recently, some 
governments have begun to extend this indexation to include income growth as 
well, further ensuring that tobacco does not become more affordable over time. 
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Pricing regulations cannot be considered an alternative to excise tax. However, 
in some specific contexts, pricing regulations could be used in conjunction 
with excise taxes to help ensure the effective implementation of tax increases
In certain contexts where increasing taxes is challenging or the tax structure is weak, 
non-tax policies such as pricing regulation (specifically, minimum mark-ups and 
price floors/minimum prices) may be seen as a second-best alternative to ensure 
a high price level and dissuade consumption of tobacco products. These policies, 
however, do not necessarily lead to the desired price level, nor do they protect 
consumers and government from industry manipulation. However, in the context 
of powerful multinationals that sell brands across all market segments and could 
easily undershift a tax increase to cheaper brands – or where price promotions 
cannot be banned – minimum price policies may help increase the effectiveness of 
tax increases, especially if the minimum prices are increased regularly. 
Implement nontax policies affecting price levels, such as banning promotional 
discounts for tobacco products and the sale of single sticks of cigarettes 
The banning of promotional discounts is usually dealt with in tobacco control laws 
under the Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship provision. 
Do not allow concerns about the inflationary impact of higher tobacco taxes to 
deter tax increases
Given that wages or some government spending may be tied to a price index, govern-
ments can reduce concerns about the inflationary impact of a tobacco tax increase 
by using a price index that excludes tobacco products. 
TAX PARITY
Tax all tobacco products in a comparable way
Increasing excise taxes on some tobacco products but not on others results in changes 
in the relative prices of these other products. This induces substitution towards 
relatively less-expensive products – for example, from expensive manufactured 
cigarettes to other, cheaper tobacco products such as RYO tobacco, bidis, cheroots 
or chewing tobacco. As a result, the overall reduction in tobacco use is smaller than 
it would have been had all taxes increased by comparable amounts. Comparable 
increases in the taxes on all tobacco products maximize the public health impact 
of tobacco tax increases by minimizing opportunities for substitution. Moreover, 
increases in taxes on all tobacco products will generate larger increases in revenues.
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Strictly regulate new and emerging tobacco and nicotine products where they 
are not banned and impose an excise tax
In recent years, the world has been experiencing the rise of new and emerging 
tobacco and nicotine products including ENDS, ENNDS and HTPs. The tobacco 
industry claims these new products are safer than traditional tobacco products, but 
the evidence so far suggests that they could pose a threat to public health, especially 
if they attract new or young users or prevent current smokers from quitting. 
The market and demand dynamics of newer products – as well as initiation, 
smoking cessation and switching behaviour among different socioeconomic groups 
– are not yet clear. Best practices for taxing new and emerging tobacco and nicotine 
products, based on current knowledge, are that: 
1. HTPs should be taxed at the same level as cigarettes and, in terms of structure, 
through a specific excise per unit regardless of tobacco content. HTPs contain 
tobacco and should be treated as a tobacco product.
2. ENDS/ENNDS products should be taxed in a manner that discourages up-
take by youth and non-users. Nicotine- and non-nicotine-delivery systems 
containing e-liquids should be taxed equally.
3. Countries can also consider taxing the devices used for ENDS/ENNDs and 
HTP consumption, but they need to adequately assess their administrative 
capacity to do so.
While these newer products create additional challenges for tobacco control, it 
is important to remember that cigarettes remain by far the predominant tobacco 
product and that raising taxes and prices on cigarettes – and thereby reducing their 
use – should remain the top priority. 
MONITORING AND EVALUATION
Know your market 
Know your market well. The type of tax structure you choose and the impacts it will 
have on consumption and tax revenue are shaped by the particular dynamics of your 
market. Understanding the nature and degree of competition in your market is vital to 
selecting the appropriate type of tax structure and policies to achieve your public health 
and revenue objectives. This knowledge will also facilitate more accurate estimates 
of the impacts of a tax increase, as well as better anticipation of industry responses. 
Assess the impact of your policies to design and implement the most effective 
tobacco excise tax policies
Monitoring and evaluation are essential for effective tobacco taxation, and they 
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should be built into the initial design – or redesign – of tobacco tax policies. 
A number of tools exist to help policy-makers pre-emptively assess the effects of a 
proposed tobacco control policy on consumption, smoking prevalence and lives 
saved. The WHO TaXSiM uses target simulations to assist governments in predict-
ing how specific tax changes will impact consumer prices, consumption and tax 
revenue in their market.
Adopt indicators that help you measure improvements in tax policy  
and its impact
Building and monitoring indicators of tax and tobacco control policies helps policy-
makers assess the improvement of their policies and determine if those policies have 
an impact on tobacco use over time. The tax share of the retail price for a particular 
tobacco product is a key indicator that should be used in conjunction with an af-
fordability indicator. A recommended target for countries to aspire to is to have an 
excise tax that represents at least 70% of the retail price of tobacco products. Another 
useful indicator to assess the performance of the tax policy overall is the use of a 
tax scorecard, which synthesizes best practices in tobacco taxation by combining 
the four key components of tax policy (price level, change in affordability over time, 
total and excise tax share in the retail price and tobacco tax structure).
TAX ADMINISTRATION
Implement best practice approaches in general tax administration to make 
tobacco tax administration more effective and efficient
Best practice approaches include (1) defining clearly the roles and responsibilities of 
competent authorities, (2) ensuring effective coordination among relevant bodies at 
the national and international levels and (3) undertaking evaluation of performance 
and accountability against pre-agreed indicators to identify points for improvement. 
Ensure compliance and accuracy of information on the tax compliance cycle 
To achieve this, implement the following actions:
• Require licences for manufacturing, importing, exporting, retailing, growing, 
transporting, wholesaling, brokering, warehousing and distributing tobacco 
products. This will help secure the supply chain while obtaining valuable infor-
mation, e.g. through access to companies’ accounting and inventory systems.
• Make sure all persons and entities engaged in the supply chain of tobacco, 
tobacco products and manufacturing equipment keep complete and accu-
rate records of all relevant transactions and details of materials used in the 
production of tobacco products. 
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• Ensure that tax declarations collect as much information as possible on the 
taxpayer.
• Collect taxes close to the point of production and import to limit the number 
of taxpayers a competent authority needs to manage.
• Maintain a system of authorization for warehousing to carry out controls in 
production and storage facilities to ensure that taxes are paid.
• Use electronic methods, through the best available IT, for declarations and 
collection of taxes. This allows for cross-check of information provided in dec-
larations with information from other government agencies and third parties.
Ensure control and enforcement on the supply chain
To achieve this, implement the following actions:
• Include control and enforcement as a fundamental pillar in the strategic plan 
of the tax administration overall. 
• Use a risk-based approach by choosing defined targets for enforcement and 
control, such as those who have a higher probability of noncompliance.
• In the licensing process, ensure that purchases from unlicensed suppliers or 
sales to unlicensed purchasers are not allowed. Ensure also that the validity of 
licences is limited in time and require renewals or reapplication to maintain 
a high level of control.
• Use tax stamps with strong security features to reduce the risk of stamp 
counterfeiting. These markings facilitate the collection of excise taxes, audits 
and enforcement actions.
• Implement a tracking and tracing system for tobacco products. A tracking 
and tracing system assists authorities in determining the origin of tobacco 
products and the point of diversion, if applicable, and monitoring and control-
ling the movement of tobacco products and their legal status.
• Implement anti-forestalling measures so that forestalling does not delay a 
tax increase and its intended effect on revenues and consumer behaviour. 
• Control import and export of tobacco products and manufacturing equipment 
by allowing only duly licensed natural persons or legal entities to conduct 
such activities. 
• Strengthen border control, e.g. by utilizing non-invasive tools such as X-ray 
scanners and dogs to detect tobacco products.
• Limit or tightly control and, ideally, ban activities related to production and 
trade of tobacco products in tax-free zones to avoid opportunities for tax evasion.
• Prohibit intermingling of tobacco products with non-tobacco products in 
a single container or any other similar transportation unit when removed 
from tax-free zones.
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• Prohibit the sale to or import by international travellers of tax-free or duty-
free tobacco products. These sales erode the effects of tax and price measures 
aimed at reducing the demand for tobacco products and adversely affect 
government revenues by creating a loophole in the tax structure.
Clearly define procedures to follow after detecting illicit trade of tobacco 
• Take immediate action to seize and destroy smuggled and/or illicit tobacco 
and collect due taxes.
• Ensure certain, swift and severe sanctions for those caught engaging in illicit 
trade in tobacco products, such as penalties, fines and withdrawal of licences. 
It can also be effective to consider illicit trade in tobacco products by law as 
a source of money-laundering.
Become a Party to and/or implement the WHO FCTC Protocol to Eliminate 
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 
The WHO FCTC Protocol provides a blueprint of best practices and policies for 
dealing with illicit trade and should be part of any strategy to fight it.
Implement, to the extent possible, the same rules and regulations for tax 
administration and enforcement for all tobacco products, as well as new and 
emerging nicotine and tobacco products 
Implement broad policies for ensuring a good tax system that will trickle 
down to good tax administration of tobacco products by:
• ensuring proper resourcing of competent authorities;
• having strict rules and regulations to detect corruption and to punish both 
personnel and taxpayers who are engaged in corrupt practices; and 
• ensuring a strong judicial system that is independent in fact and in perception, 
where disputes are solved quickly. The appeal process should have limits so 
that appeals cannot continue for years. The use of criminal rather than civil 
charges should also be considered, especially for illicit trade.
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Beyond the technical soundness of best practices in tax policy and administration, 
a critical factor in advancing tobacco taxes is the ability to get the political buy-in 
of the highest instances in the government. One key strategy is to address concerns 
around the political economy of tobacco taxation,  which are often exploited by the 
tobacco industry to block major reforms.  
CHAP T ER 5. B E S T PR AC T I CE S 279 
SCARE tactics
The tobacco industry uses SCARE tactics to dissuade governments from implement-
ing tobacco tax increases. These include smuggling and illicit trade (S), court and 
legal challenges (C), anti-poor rhetoric (A), revenue reduction (R) and employment 
impact (E). Best practices for countering these tactics are described below.
S: Smuggling and illicit trade
Do not allow concerns over the impact of increasing excise taxes on illicit trade in 
tobacco affect your decision to increase them. Rely on your own estimates of the 
level and nature of illicit trade and not on the industry’s estimates. 
Illicit trade in tobacco products continues to be a major concern for tax administrators 
because of the difficulties associated with accurate and independent measurement of 
it, as well as with its elimination. Industry figures provide a distorted understanding 
of the extent of the problem, along with a monocausal explanation of the link between 
illicit trade and tobacco taxation. It is therefore recommended that governments 
(1) assess independently and with the best statistical practices the size of the illicit 
trade to assess the scope of the problem; (2) address directly the country-specific 
institutional and/or governance challenges, including multilateral coordination, 
and improve tax and customs administrations practices; and (3) implement best 
practices to fight illicit trade, contained in the WHO FCTC Protocol to Eliminate 
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. Ideally, accede to the Protocol if not yet a Party.
C: Court and legal challenges
Do not let tobacco industry threats of court and legal challenges to tax increases 
or reforms prevent you from improving your tax policy. Closely follow legal 
requirements for design, procedure and consultation to strengthen your legal 
position and minimize the possibility that any challenge will be raised. 
Health-protective and non-discriminatory tobacco excise taxes are legally defensible, 
and industry threats will usually be baseless. Your legal position can be strengthened, 
however, by exercising care with a tax measure’s procedure, design and consultation: 
(1) determine the standard of consultation required under domestic law and any 
applicable international obligations; (2) distance the tobacco industry from the 
policy-making process to the extent that this is permissible; (3) avoid unnecessary 
and unjustified discrimination towards foreign tobacco products or investors in 
the design, implementation or enforcement of a tax measure; and (4) do not offer 
investment incentives in the form of inducements or contractual undertakings, as 
these may be binding in and of themselves or grounds for a challenge under an 
international investment agreement.
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A: Anti-poor rhetoric
Do not allow concerns about the regressivity of higher tobacco taxes prevent 
tobacco tax increases. 
In recent years, there has been an overwhelming increase in the evidence concern-
ing the positive distributional impact of tobacco taxes and tax increases. Indeed, 
tobacco taxation and tax increases are actually a progressive or pro-poor policy 
once these wider considerations are properly accounted for. In its effort to lobby 
against tax increases, the tobacco industry often claims that tobacco taxation will 
hurt the poor. This argument is based on the concept of regressivity in relation to 
taxation. Conceptually, a tax is regressive if it means lower-income people must pay 
a relatively greater proportion of their household income to meet the tax liability 
than wealthy people. However, there are two limitations to the industry’s argument. 
First, the concept of regressivity based solely on tax burden does not consider the 
wider health and economic harms caused by tobacco use that are disproportionately 
experienced by lower socioeconomic groups. Second, higher tobacco taxes and prices 
can induce behavioural change in the population, as reflected in the price elasticity 
of demand, which means that lower-income smokers will curtail their smoking the 
most and thus will benefit disproportionately in terms of health gains from reduced 
tobacco consumption and use. In fact, these broader considerations make tobacco 
taxation a progressive, rather than regressive, public health intervention. 
R: Revenue reduction
Do not let fears of potential revenue reductions prevent you from increasing excise 
taxes on tobacco products. 
Tax increases, even in countries with already high taxes, bring in additional revenue. 
Arguments by tobacco control opponents that tax increases will not result in increases 
in revenue are unfounded. The relatively price inelastic nature of cigarette demand, 
combined with the low tax share and no overshifting of the tax, means that for most, 
if not all, countries, increases in revenues will accompany increases in taxes. If tax 
increases are carefully designed and tax administration is functional, it is extremely 
unlikely that tax increases will lead to revenue decreases. 
E: Employment impact
Do not allow concerns about employment impact to prevent tobacco tax increases. 
The tobacco industry often seeks to frame tobacco taxes as an economic issue rather 
than a public health issue. Particular emphasis is placed on the alleged threat tax 
increases pose to employment in tobacco farming and manufacturing, as well as 
related industries. This so-called choice between health and jobs, however, is largely 
based on exaggeration. The tobacco industry exaggerates the importance of tobacco 
CHAP T ER 5. B E S T PR AC T I CE S 281 
employment relative to total national employment and overstates the impact that 
domestic demand reduction from local taxes will have on tobacco farmers serving a 
global market. The argument used by the industry also ignores the fact that expendi-
tures on tobacco do not disappear but rather are redistributed to other consumption 
that can produce a similar or higher number of jobs. Case studies demonstrate the 
possibility and methods for governments to support farmers in transitioning to 
other crops that provide similar and often better returns with greater sustainability. 
Earmarking 
Consider earmarking tobacco tax revenues for health-focused programmes, 
especially if it helps advance tobacco control efforts and, more specifically,  
efforts to implement large tobacco tax increases and tax reforms. This could have 
the additional benefit of funding health programmes where they are poorly funded 
or not prioritized.
From a tobacco control perspective, tobacco tax earmarking is best understood as a 
way of selling significant tobacco tax increases to the public, politicians and officials. 
Earmarking is a tool to improve the political economy of tobacco taxation; it is only 
a secondary issue, after the primary goal of reducing demand for tobacco. Evidence 
shows that public support for higher tobacco taxes is greater when at least some of 
the increased revenues are explicitly used to support health-focused programmes. 
Current evidence shows that the amounts effectively earmarked for health have 
been relatively small and therefore unlikely to introduce rigidity in government 
budgets. At the same time, in some countries, those funds have helped to imple-
ment much needed underresourced health programmes. The payoffs will be seen 
in the future as fewer people fall ill and need less medical care for tobacco-related 
illnesses. Earmarking tobacco tax revenues to fund high-burden/low-priority health 
programmes could pave the way for raising awareness about the importance of such 
programmes and their effectiveness, thereby convincing governments to redefine 
their priorities and commit to including the programmes in their regular budget. 
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TOBACCO TAX REFORM CHECKLIST 
(FOR TAX POLICY-MAKERS)
Focus on tobacco taxation’s purposes
Tobacco tax policy should aim not only to increase revenues but 
also to decrease consumption and improve health. To both raise 
revenue and reduce consumption, you need to (1) simplify tobacco 
tax structures, (2) significantly increase rates to impact price levels, 
and (3) regularly adjust rates to at least account for inflation and 
income growth.
 
Analyse your tax structure and identify  
its weaknesses
You need to analyse and identify the problems of your current tax 
structure to know which steps to consider next. Which tax structure 
do you have: specific, ad valorem, mixed, or no excise?
 
Identify the improvements to be made  
to the existing tax policy/structure
Your present tax structure and tax situation will provide you with 
the steps you would ideally take next to achieve the aims in Step 1. 
 
Specific:
1. Ensure that the tax automatically adjusts for inflation and income 
 growth effects.
2. Ensure that all price promotions are banned.
Ad Valorem:
1. Ensure that the tax base of the ad valorem is retail price.
2. Introduce a high specific excise component (and a minimum 
 specific excise).
3. Ensure that the specific excise and/or the minimum specific excise 
 automatically adjusts for inflation and income growth effects.
4. Ensure that all price promotions are banned.
Mixed:
1. Ensure that the tax base of the ad valorem component is retail price.
2. Ensure that you are using a high specific excise component and 
 a minimum specific excise.
3. Ensure that the specific excise and/or the minimum specific excise 
 automatically adjusts for inflation and income growth effects.
4. Ensure that all price promotions are banned.
No Excise:
1. Introduce a high specific excise.
2. Ensure that the rate automatically adjusts for inflation and income 
 growth effects.
3. Ensure that all price promotions are banned.
 
Assess tobacco taxation’s political economy
Reform must begin with an assessment of tobacco taxation’s political 
economy: (1) learn from past successes and failures – what went 
wrong, what went right, what you can do differently this time; (2) 
assess the reform’s strengths and weaknesses, likely opportunities 
and risks; (3) determine who the main supporters and opponents 
of reform inside and outside of government have been and may be, 
based on past reforms and current situation; and (4) anticipate argu-





Prepare a plan for realizing the reform
Focusing on the overall aims identified in Step 1, the steps for achiev-
ing them identified in Steps 2 and 3 and the political economy around 
this reform as identified in Step 4, prepare your plan: 
1. Be clear on the non-negotiable objectives for the reform and the 
 trade-offs you are prepared to make to realize them.
2. Develop a plan to approach potential allies and win them over 
 to the reform efforts.
3. Develop the counterarguments that will be needed in response 
 to the SCARE arguments identified earlier.
4. Prepare the evidence you will need ahead of time. To do this, get 
 support from academics and relevant intergovernmental agencies. 
 
Mobilize a coalition for reform
1. Formulate a strategic communications plan: aim for political 
 support both at the highest levels and among the public (framing 
 tobacco taxation as a health issue has helped win political support 
 in many countries). 
2. Identify champions in government: ensure that finance and health 
 officials are on the same page; involve implementing departments, 
 such as enforcement agencies, from the start.
3. Mobilize allies from academia, civil society and the private sector 
 to counter the anticipated pushback from the tobacco industry, 
 its proxies and its allies.
 
Monitor and evaluate
To make the most well-informed policy decisions, a reform effort 
should be monitored to assess its overall impact and its effect on 
key indicators; this will help identify issues to be fixed while also 
creating a strong evidence base for further reform efforts.
 
Get and analyse the relevant data to better understand the 
market situation and its dynamics: 
1. Monitor the market and its evolution (e.g. retail prices, duty-paid 
 sales, market shares).
2. Get regular estimates of price elasticity (including cross-price 
 elasticity), income elasticity and tax base elasticity to evaluate 
 any changes in tobacco demand.
Use relevant tools to assess the impact of the tax policy on 
consumption and revenue: 
1. Use specific tools on the impact of excise on price, consumption 
 and revenue (e.g. the WHO TaXSiM).
2. Use global tools to assess the tax increase’s impact on prevalence 
 (e.g. the WHO ISPT).
Monitor key indicators closely to assess improvements over time:
1. Tax as a percentage of retail price.
2. Change in affordability of tobacco products over time. 
3. Change in the tobacco tax scorecard, which combines a mix of 
 best practices in tax policy.
4. Change in sales, prevalence and illicit trade in tobacco products.
5. Improvements in MPOWER package achievement.
STEP 5
STEP 6
STEP 7


